


SURINAME *in the* LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY

Domination, Contestation, Globalization



Rosemarijn Hoefte



Suriname in the Long Twentieth Century

This page intentionally left blank

Suriname in the Long Twentieth Century

Domination, Contestation, Globalization

Rosemarijn Hoefte

palgrave
macmillan



SURINAME IN THE LONG TWENTIETH CENTURY

Copyright © Rosemarijn Hoefte, 2014.

Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1st edition 2014 978-1-137-36012-0

All rights reserved.

First published in 2014 by

PALGRAVE MACMILLAN®

in the United States—a division of St. Martin's Press LLC,

175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010.

Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.

Palgrave Macmillan is the global academic imprint of the above companies and has companies and representatives throughout the world.

Palgrave® and Macmillan® are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe and other countries.

ISBN 978-1-349-47183-6

ISBN 978-1-137-36013-7 (eBook)

DOI 10.1057/9781137360137

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available from the Library of Congress.

A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.

Design by Newgen Knowledge Works (P) Ltd., Chennai, India.

First edition: January 2014

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

In memory of Marcel Höfte (1922–2008)

This page intentionally left blank

C O N T E N T S

<i>List of Map, Figures, and Tables</i>	ix
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xi
Introduction	1
One Setting the Scene: The Culture of Late Colonial Capitalism 1900–1940	27
Two The Growing Role of the State in Late Colonial Society	51
Three Discontent, Protest, and Repression in the 1930s	69
Four Resetting the Scene: Developments 1940–1975	91
Five Bauxite Mining in Moengo: Remnants of the Past and Signs of Modernity	113
Six Economic Collapse, Social Dislocation, and the Military Regime	133
Seven The Development of Paramaribo in the Second Half of the Century	159
Eight Leaving the Scene: A New Century	187
<i>Notes</i>	219
<i>Bibliography</i>	261
<i>Index</i>	279

This page intentionally left blank

MAP, FIGURES, AND TABLES

Map

1	Current Map of Suriname	xiii
---	-------------------------	------

Figures

3.1	Demonstration of Unemployed in Front of Governor's Palace, June 17, 1931	73
3.2	Queen's Day Paramaribo, Circa 1910	90
4.1	Public at May Day Parade, Paramaribo 1961	101
5.1	Aerial View of Moengo, 1950–1960	125
7.1	Share of Javanese and Hindustanis of Total Population Paramaribo 1921–2004	172
7.2	Population of Paramaribo According to Ethnicity in 2004	173

Tables

1.1	Population of Suriname According to Gender 1865–1929	29
1.2	Population of Suriname and Paramaribo by Ethnicity 1921	33
1.3	Rice Production in 100,000 Kg in Suriname 1911–1939	39
1.4	Gold Export in Kg and Guilders 1896–1930	42
1.5	Balata Export in Kg and Guilders 1891–1935	43
1.6	Main Export Products 1881–1940	46
4.1	Population of Suriname According to Gender 1950–2003	108
4.2	Population of Suriname According to Ethnicity 1950–1972	108
4.3	Migration to the Netherlands 1972–1975	110
7.1	Weight of Individual Categories in Total Consumption of Households in Paramaribo 1953–2008	178
7.2	Homeownership in Paramaribo According to Ethnicity 1980–2001	179

This page intentionally left blank

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book is the outcome of a study on the social history of Suriname in the twentieth century, financed by The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research / NWO. Three postdocs with different backgrounds and perspectives made this an interdisciplinary and fruitful research project. Anouk de Koning and Rivke Jaffe started their research with great enthusiasm. After one year, however, Rivke got an “offer she couldn’t refuse.” Fortunately, Hebe Verrest could join our group a few months later. The insights of Anouk, Hebe, and Rivke are visible throughout this book. Moreover, the chapter on Moengo is co-authored with Anouk, while the chapter on Paramaribo is written with Hebe. Tim van Gilst assisted us with the analysis of census data.

In September 2008, Anouk and Hebe organized the NWO-financed workshop “Cultural Dynamics in Twentieth-Century Suriname in a Caribbean Context.” We are grateful to the international and Dutch participants for sharing their expertise and insights: Marieke Bloembergen, Ad de Bruijne, Jerry Egger, Steve Garner, Ruben Gowricharn, Francio Guadeloupe, Harold Jap-A-Joe, Guno Jones, Michiel van Kempen, Aisha Khan, Ellen Klinkers, Patricia Mohammed, Alex van Stipriaan, Deborah Thomas, Paul Tjon Sie Fat, Wieke Vink, and Gloria Wekker.

Along the way we have incurred many debts and our heartfelt thanks go to Astrid Aarssen, Ine Apapoe, Freek Bakker, Hans Buddingh’, Eithne Carlin, Lisa Djasmadi, Regie Dors, Lila Gobardhan-Rambocus, Harold Jap-a-Joe, Rudi van Kantén, Joke Kardux, Ellen Klinkers, Sobha Lalkoe, Harriëtte Mingoën, Lilian Mungroop, Mariana Parijo, Sally Price, Peter Sanches, Usha Schalkwijk, Roekmienie Sewradj-Debipersad, Siegmien Staphorst, Alex van Stipriaan, Julia Terborg, Bonno Thoden van Velzen, Ronald Tjoe-Ny, Joop Vernooij, Amin Wartim, and all our informants without whom this book could not have been written.

I am privileged to work at KITLV / Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies, with its marvelous library and great colleagues. My special thanks go to my colleagues to Michelle van den Berk, Rini Hogewoning, Gerry van Klinken, Liesbeth Ouwehand, Jessica Vance Roitman, Irene Rolfes, Nico van Rooijen, Jan van Rosmalen, Alfred Schipper, Josephine Schrama, Ellen Sitingjak, Fridus Steijlen, and

Dan Vennix whose combination of professional expertise and friendship have helped make this book better.

Jonathan van de Bilt gave me a hand in the final stages of preparing the manuscript. At Palgrave Macmillan, Chris Chappell ably guided this book through the stages of publication. I want to express my gratitude to Ad de Bruijne, Gert Oostindie, and Gloria Wekker for their much appreciated assistance and willingness to comment on one or more chapters. Gert also intensively participated in drafting the research proposal for this project. Nigel Bolland and Kevin Yelvington traveled across the Atlantic to discuss the project and the first drafts. Their presence was inspiring and their expertise on the contemporary Caribbean truly helped to improve this study. I am forever in debt to Peter Meel, Hans Ramsoedh, and Henk Schulte Nordholt who extensively commented on the entire manuscript. Peter and Hans shared their great knowledge about Suriname and saved me from many a pitfall; it is always a pleasure to discuss Suriname's history and politics with them. Henk's cheerful but critical comments invariably showed me the larger perspective. *Gran tangi* to all of you; needless to say all remaining mistakes are mine.

This book is in memory of my father who passed away in 2008 and who instilled his love of history in me.



Map 1 Current Map of Suriname

Introduction

At the turn of the twentieth century, Suriname, like many other Caribbean colonies, was in a gradual and steady state of decline. Established by English planters out of Barbados in 1651, it became Dutch in 1667 when Suriname was traded for Manhattan in the Peace of Breda treaty. Dutch political sovereignty would last for more than 300 years, except for a brief interlude during the Napoleonic Wars, when the British ruled the colony (1802–1816); Suriname became an independent republic in 1975. After flourishing as a typical Caribbean plantation colony, decline set in in the late eighteenth century.

After protracted discussions in Dutch parliament, slavery was abolished in 1863. Owners received compensation for every person they released, regardless of age and health. More than 33,000 enslaved people were freed on July 1. A ten-year period of state supervision bought time for the colonial government to determine the course of the colony. Given that large-scale agriculture was seen as the only viable economic option, tens of thousands of Asian indentured workers were imported to keep the plantations running, as many former enslaved left the estates to find work elsewhere, preferably in the colony's capital and only city, Paramaribo, or in the recent gold and balata industries.

The social history of twentieth-century Suriname is rooted in a culture of domination and contestation. These roots go back to slavery and colonialism, but after emancipation and independence, authoritarian traditions continued to permeate many institutions. This domination not only included control and the introduction of values and norms by the state, but also by employers, churches, schools, political parties, and families. All these entities required discipline and obedience. The state demanded order and quiet, while the work place instilled social control by making clear divisions between managers and employees and within rank and file. Religious leaders paternalistically prescribed preferred “civilized” life styles to the faithful, while corporal punishment was widespread in schools and families, where male heads of households demanded female submissiveness and filial obedience. Needless to say, these very different entities did not form a hegemonic bloc in the efforts to instill their own values, nor did they necessarily see eye to eye.

Formal and informal associations and individuals contested these powers at all levels of society; by protesting government policies, striking for better working conditions, forming trade unions to negotiate labor contracts, and ignoring preferred religious and cultural norms. Paradoxically, some of the organizations that protested or tried to improve conditions, such as political parties and trade unions, could be quite hierarchical themselves, causing contestation within the ranks.

The culture of domination then permeated and still permeates all aspects of society. It is rooted in Suriname's colonial history of subordination and the profound social cleavages based on ethnicity, class, and gender. In the words of sociologist Nigel Bolland (2001: 11), in the Caribbean "authoritarianism was perceived to be essential by, and became the habit of, those who were in control, and so, whether in legal, or racist or paternalistic guise, it became the central and traditional feature of the dominant political culture." This authoritarianism could manifest itself in many forms, from the bureaucratic to the charismatic. In Suriname, authoritarian excesses as in the suppression of the riots in the 1930s (chapter 3) were not limited to the colonial period, as the December murders of 1982, executing 15 oppositional leaders to the military regime show (chapter 6). Moreover, ethnic stereotyping and occasionally outright racism, gender stereotyping, and class pretensions were ubiquitous and existed in different forms in the postcolonial period.

Contestation also took many guises and ranged from cultural resistance by smallholder communities, which not only established an economic alternative to the plantations but also a more autonomous way of life by, for example, resisting religious efforts to impose European family forms, to the longest strike in colonial history by Maroon transporters in 1921, to open political resistance in the form of mass protests against administrations as occurred in the 1930s, 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The history of Suriname, however, also shows that often leaders of such protests develop a new style of authoritarianism, that maybe "distinct from but rooted still" in the extant Caribbean culture of domination (Bolland 2001: 19).

This study explores how the culture of domination and contestation manifested itself in twentieth-century Suriname and also whether socioeconomic and political changes affected the nature of this culture. Perhaps, the most visible changes in the last century were the large-scale population movements with profound demographic, socioeconomic, and cultural repercussions but also leading to questions about inclusion or exclusion of recent immigrants regarding educational and other rights. In the first three decades of the century, Suriname was an immigration country, receiving tens of thousands of Asian migrants trying to construct their own communities in a new environment. In 1900, the main ethnic groups were the Creoles, British Indians or Hindustanis, Javanese, Chinese, Europeans, Maroons, and Amerindians.¹ Emigration, to the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, the Netherlands East

Indies, and the United States also took place, be it on a much lesser scale, but the move abroad surged in the 1970s when approximately one-third of the population left for the Netherlands in anticipation of independence. In the century's last decades (illegal) immigration reversed the demographic trend once more. Thousands of Haitians, Chinese, and Brazilians constituted the largest population groups entering the country, thereby adding to the demographic mix. In contrast to the "old" migrants, who found it hard to maintain relations with their homeland, these "new" immigrants can and do maintain relations with their place of origin. As a Haitian laborer states in an interview, he and his family return to Haiti every few years to visit relatives.² Internet and other telecommunication facilities make it easier to keep in touch. Many migrants invest more in ties back home than in personal relations in Suriname. According to anthropologists Marjo de Theije and Ellen Bal (2010: 67), the new immigrants, in this case Brazilians, do not form a community anymore but a "category" or network, with weak (social) ties to the host community. Meanwhile, the ethnic balance shifted and by the 1970s the Hindustanis formed the largest population group. The creation of Surinamese society is thus marked by various processes of dislocation, settlement, and community formation.

The twentieth century also witnessed major changes in the political and constitutional realm. First, universal suffrage was introduced in 1948; the first general elections took place one year later. In 1954, Suriname became autonomous and in 1975 an independent republic. Five years later, a military coup and subsequent human rights abuses shook the country to its foundations. Since this takeover, Suriname has faced a succession of authoritarian and democratic regimes, which fundamentally affected domestic and economic conditions as well as relations with other countries, notably the Netherlands. One cannot but conclude that the at times turbulent relationship with the former metropolis has underscored that the decolonization process was unfinished by the year 2000. The political awakening in the postwar period coincided with cultural emancipation movements since the early 1950s, which stressed the cultural achievements and uniqueness of the various population groups.

A third and final noticeable change concerned the economic structure. In the early years of the century it was obvious that large-scale agriculture was on the wane, although the governments in both The Hague and Paramaribo needed considerable time to face this fact. In the course of the century, new booming products came and went, including gold, balata, timber, bauxite, and oil. Of these, bauxite was the country's major export product for years, and the economic anchor of Suriname. In the last decades of the century, oil and the renewed exploitation of gold and timber, in particular, were at the basis of economic growth.

Yet, as the nineteenth-century French novelist Alphonse Karr had noted "*plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose.*" Underneath these changes a number of demographic, political, and economic configurations remained the

same. Suriname has always been a multiethnic society, where a small but varied group of Europeans, including Germans, Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews, Dutch, French, Scots, English, and Scandinavians, ruled. Enslaved from different African regions, their offspring formed the labor force in the plantation colony where the native population was not even included in population statistics in the first decades of the twentieth century. Indentured immigration from Asia transformed Suriname from an Afro-Caribbean into an even more multiethnic country.

A second factor that continued to influence the entire century were the Dutch, including their culture and language. In colonial times, the adoption of the Dutch language and culture as well as the Protestant or Catholic faith were a *sine qua non* for upward mobility. The lingua franca Sranan Tongo, an English-based Creole, was long denigrated by the cultural elites and educators, as were creole languages elsewhere in the region (see also Moore & Johnson 2011: 82–96). Yet, even after independence, the Dutch language continued to dominate the administrative and educational system. Remarkably, in 2004 Suriname even became an associated member of the Dutch Language Union (Nederlandse Taalunie), a government organization originally promoting cultural cooperation between the Netherlands and Flanders. Economic, financial, political, and cultural ties between the two countries remained strong as well, if only because of Dutch financial assistance and The Hague's interest in political developments in Suriname. As former Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van Mierlo (1994–1998) expressed, “Suriname is the only country where Dutch foreign policy really matters.”³ For Suriname, the Netherlands has remained the benchmark and source of support in times of crisis throughout the century. An important factor in this continuing relationship is the presence of approximately 350,000 people of Surinamese descent in the Netherlands.

Economically, dependency as well as globalization has characterized the twentieth-century economy. Most major enterprises in Suriname were owned by Dutch or US companies, and in recent decades Canadian, Malaysian, Indonesian, and Chinese interests in the exploitation of the riches of the interior have grown significantly. Moreover, the Surinamese economy always has been dependent on the supply and demand of European and North American, and to a much lesser extent Asian, markets.

Summing up, Suriname was a dynamic society in the last century, not necessarily moving in a unilateral direction but rather multifarious and characterized by great, intended and unintended, transformations. However, some basic demographic, political, and economic structures remained unaltered. It should be emphasized that locality or geographic space is an important factor in these processes of transformation and continuity.⁴ Specific social spaces, including the plantation, company town, and city, produce specific social relations. Economic factors are the main determinants of the use of geographic space: colonial plantations recruited labor that was divided along ethnic lines. Changes in the agricultural and industrial structure largely continued to reproduce such divisions in other

settings. Diseases in agricultural crops pushed smallholders to the city, while bauxite mining led to the building of company towns. To underline this spatial approach, separate chapters are devoted to discuss the state's social engineering in the first decades of the century: promoting large-scale immigration in the service of agriculture (chapter 2); the mining town of Moengo (chapter 5); and the sociospatial setting of Suriname's capital, Paramaribo (chapter 7). Throughout this study attention is paid to the changing socioeconomic, and cultural, structure of the interior. This spatial approach highlights how social and ethnic relations evolve in different (geographical) settings.

A Historiographical Overview of Ethnicity, Class, and Gender in Suriname

This study discusses the culture of domination and contestation in relation to the complex interaction between ethnicity, class, and gender. Many historical studies on Suriname have used an ethnic focus, while a few others are based on a class analysis. Gender has, up till now, played a rather minor supportive role in historical publications. This historical analysis will be based on the multiple relations between ethnicity, class, and gender. These sociocultural phenomena together informed power relations as well as the resistance to dominance and authority. Thus, ethnicity, class, and gender are not perceived as separate and independent from each other but as interconnected. Gender relations cannot be discussed without taking ethnicity and class into account, while class has ethnic and gender dimensions. Conversely, class and gender are integral aspects of ethnic relations.⁵

In the historiography of Suriname ethnic, and to a lesser extent, class dimensions were privileged. In his erudite social history *Samenleving in een grensgebied* from 1949 (translated as *Frontier Society: A Social Analysis of the History of Surinam* in 1971) R. A. J. van Lier's analysis is based on the concept of pluralism.⁶ The British colonial official and scholar J. S. Furnivall had introduced the idea of the "plural society" in the late 1930s. Analyzing the situation in British Malaysia, he argued that in this society two or more social orders existed side by side, without mingling. Later, he phrased pluralism as, "Each group holds by its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market place, in buying and selling" (Furnivall 1948: 304). Thus, spatial proximity is accompanied by social segregation and a caste-like division of labor. On the political level, this translates into a "lack of social common will." By implication, the colonial state functions as the mediating actor between these deeply divided groups, keeping together by whatever means what otherwise would disintegrate. Furnivall believed that local nationalism by definition would be ethnically determined and thus divisive.

This concept traveled the world and was introduced in the *British Caribbean* by M. G. Smith in 1965; he posits that only the vertical power of the state can hold together the different antagonistic groups with different cultures and value systems.⁷ He thus predicted the failure of independent nation states in the Anglophone Caribbean. Yet, the first person to use pluralism in a Caribbean context was Van Lier, who made it the backbone of *Frontier Society*. He argued that “Surinam is probably one of the finest examples of a plural society” (Van Lier 1971: 11). The colonial state functioned as the arbiter between population groups of African, British Indian, and Javanese descent.⁸ Without this “neutral arbiter” chaos would ensue.

Scholarly criticism on Van Lier’s pluralism thesis focuses on its essentialism: the idea that ethnic walls are insurmountable and that ethnic identity is a timeless and irreversible marker of cultural difference. Additionally, the virtual absence of class, not to mention gender, in his analysis is called into question. It is not that Van Lier ignores class, but he certainly underestimates the impact of class differences. Similarly, he cursorily addresses the position of women and men of different ethnic groups, yet he does not treat gender as an organizing principle in society.

Sociologists Ruben Gowricharn (2006) and Jack Menke (2011) consider the plural society model an Eurocentric ideological construct that aims at homogeneity and uniform culture, using the power of the state. Instead, they depart from the notion that the power of society will bring harmonious ethnic diversity. Menke (2011: 201) adds that the “plural society concept is inappropriate to analyse dimensions of unity between ethnic groups and common values across these groups.” Gowricharn and Menke focus on the supposed link between multiethnicity and conflict.⁹ They argue that the harmonious relations between the population groups disprove Van Lier’s (and M. G. Smith’s) predictions, and thus give a positive twist to the theory. Gowricharn (2006: 224) states that “notwithstanding the sizeable fluctuations in political and economic conditions, ethnic relations in Surinam remained conspicuously stable.”

The most open attack on pluralism and Van Lier’s publications comes from Sandew Hira (pseudonym of Dew Baboeram) who uses a Marxist approach in his analysis of Suriname’s history. Inspired by Anton de Kom’s *Wij slaven van Suriname* (“We slaves of Suriname”), first published in 1934,¹⁰ Hira presents a history of resistance to colonialism and capitalism in the period 1630–1940 in *Van Priary tot en met De Kom* (1983 [orig. 1982]). His work highlights various aspects of Suriname’s history that until then had received scant attention. However, his analysis, which positions white colonial oppressors versus a non-white colonized, enslaved, or indentured “proletariat,” lacks nuance. In this book, he uses class in the Marxist economic sense; the relation of people to the means of production, thus ignoring social-cultural factors that I think are crucial in the analysis of class relations in Suriname. In Hira’s analysis, gender relations, when discussed at all, are subordinated to class

struggle. Other recent, general histories of Suriname take a decidedly less theoretical approach.¹¹

Given the centrality of the interrelation of the concepts of ethnicity, class, and gender in this study, I will briefly discuss the main, intertwined changes in ethnic, class, and gender relations in twentieth-century Suriname. All three are social or cultural constructs that are relatively open to change and reinterpretation; in addition, power is involved in all these relationships. These constructions may be used in different ways in relation to the other, for example, to distinguish oneself from others or to obtain political goals or specific rights.

Ethnic Relations, Colonial Creation, and Nation Building

Ethnicity revolves around a believed common ancestry and heritage and subsequent cultural expressions as found in language, celebrations, dress, and cuisine. In his publications on Trinidad, anthropologist Kevin Yelvington defines ethnicity “as a particular ‘involuntary’ social identity seen in relation to a socially constructed ultimate ancestral link between an individual and a named group, which is presumed to have shared ancestors and a common culture.”¹² Boundaries are an important aspect of ethnic relations. Cultural processes establish outer borders through distinctions in comparison to other groups as well as internal boundaries by communal activities within the group. These boundaries are the product of cultural or social processes, and thus not fixed. Yelvington (1995: 24) uses the term “social construction of primordality” to point out that the “subjective identification ethnicity entails is not arbitrary nor purely imaginary.” In Suriname, ethnic identities of, for example, Hindustanis and Javanese had to be actively constructed on the inside and outside. Ethnicity then is a dynamic construct.

Suriname is a prime example of a Caribbean colonial creation, built under European hegemony by enslaved Africans and Asian indentured laborers and their descendants. The social and cultural characteristics of twentieth-century Suriname cannot be accounted for without reference to colonialism. In the words of anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot (1992: 33), “the groupings one tends to take for natural are human creations, changing results of past and ongoing processes.” History plays an important socioeconomic and political role, and in the words of historian Bridget Brereton (2007: 170) the past in Trinidad and Tobago is “a key arena for contestation” in a dynamic and complex society. In Suriname or other Caribbean societies, original presence or the time of arrival, economic contributions, suffering and hardship, and loyalty are arguments to support claims on the nation by different groups.¹³

The idea of a plural society is largely a colonial creation as well. Its persistence continues to shape and organize Surinamese society. Ethnicity was institutionalized through colonial policy and maintained after World

War II with the creation of political parties based on ethnicity. Various policies by the colonial government and economic enterprises served to establish and maintain ethnic boundaries, whether to “divide-and-rule” or to “safeguard the culture” of different population groups. The replacement of Creoles by British Indian and Javanese contract laborers after the abolition of slavery led to the emergence of a division of labor along ethnic lines. Sociologist Steve Garner (2008b: 3) states that in British Guiana the highly state structured “labour market has been pivotal in constituting ethnicised and gendered trajectories.” As a consequence, there was a growing geographical segregation as well between urban and rural areas and within rural areas. In this respect, sociologist Simboonath Singh (2003: 229) speaks of a “social-distancing strategy” leading toward the “initial systematic separation of Afro- and Indo-Caribbean peoples into urban and rural spaces respectively, invariably lead to the development of the negative construction of the Other.” Sociologist D. Alissa Trotz (2003: 22) sums up: “Differences and the conditions that historically produced them became signifiers of an unchanging ethnic identity.” These observations on British Guiana apply to Suriname as well.

The state functioned as a recruiter of labor, a distributor of the spatial location of work and land, and also “as regulator of elements” of diasporic cultures (Garner 2008a: 67–69; 2008b: 6). Moreover, the state played a crucial role in legitimating ethnic differences; it used ethnicity as a means of domination. Or, in the words of Garner (2008b: 1), “the State acts as a racialising machine, *without all of its products necessarily being those intended*” (emphasis Garner). In colonial times, the state never acted as a neutral arbiter of interethnic relations, as the pluralists would have it, and in the postcolonial era the state remained an actor in ethnic conflict because of its varied institutions, including schools and the police force.

In the colonial discourse, produced by state officials, and also by politicians, planters, clergy, and press, the free Creoles after the abolition of slavery were depicted as “lazy” and “unreliable” (Hoefte 1998: 26). British Indian migrants were hailed as the hard-working saviors of large-scale agriculture. Yet, when the possibility to import contract laborers from Java came into play, new adjectives for British Indians entered the colonial discourse: now they were also stereotyped as “cantankerous and rebellious.” The other side of the coin was the label for Javanese as more “manageable” than the British Indians and “slow.”¹⁴ In short, the state characterized and differentiated between groups in the interest of the planters. Ethnicity was largely shaped in relation to others.

In the nearly 70 years of Asian immigration, these stereotypes underwent moderate change. In the 1930s, when free Javanese families migrated to become smallholders, future governor J. C. Kielstra (1927: 185–186) stated that not the “economically developed” British Indians but the “underdeveloped” Javanese were suitable peasants, although he expressed concern whether they could work on a regular basis without supervision. He did not even consider the “spoiled” Creoles in any economic

plan. Likewise, the cultivation of rice was described as an ancestral Asian skill, and thus entirely natural for British Indians, and to a lesser degree Javanese, who supposedly did not possess the commercial acumen to make the growing of rice an economic success. The state thus granted legitimacy to difference and reified this by creating special legal provisions for different groups, for example, a separate marriage law for the Asian population (see chapter 2).

All working-class women, who did not stay at home, were readily labeled as “indecent” and “immoral.” Yet, next to these class and gender elements, women were ethnically stereotyped as well: dark-skinned Creole females were supposedly “matriarchal,” British Indian women “submissive,” and Javanese “sexually promiscuous” (see also Kopijn 1998: 113).

Planters and officials made contradictory statements of praise and disapproval to describe and mark their laborers. Both groups showed an economic preference for Asians when compared to dark-skinned Creoles. Culturally, this preference may have existed as well: as Brereton (1974: 24) suggests for Trinidad, the Europeans may have preferred Asians to blacks because of a “Euro-centered aesthetic sense: the Indian conformed more closely to European features than the African and was therefore judged by outsiders to be the more ‘civilised’ of the two.”

The official discourse on ethnicity had its effect on the way Creoles, Hindustanis, and Javanese saw themselves and each other. Economically, Creole male workers had no reason to be enthusiastic about indentured immigrants as they increased labor competition and lowered wages. They viewed the immigrants as interlopers and the British Indians in particular they called “coolies.” The migrants, however, often considered Creole men as pretentious and lazy, who had driven the colony to the verge of bankruptcy, thus repeating the official discourse. Moreover, each population group had its own notions of hierarchy, boundaries, and appropriate behavior. In general, Creoles and British Indians did not appreciate each other’s lifestyles and religions; part of these negative attitudes, however, was based on premigration ideas about other people with a different physical appearance (Hoefte 1998: 102–104). Both groups looked down on the most recent arrivals, classifying the Javanese as either “*lau-lau*” or “*malahi*,” both meaning “idiot.” The Javanese considered themselves, however to be a *bongso luhur* (elevated people) because of their own language and *adat* (customs).

Immigrants had to build a new community in this environment, a task hampered by the fact that in both the Hindustani and the Javanese cases appreciably fewer women than men had come to Suriname. Women were important agents in establishing new networks, of which a common Javanese and Hindustani culture could develop to cope with a hostile environment and poor socioeconomic conditions.¹⁵

Important aspects of ethnic belonging are language and religion. In Suriname, 19 languages are spoken.¹⁶ The main, besides the official Dutch, are Sranan Tongo, the lingua franca, Sarnami (an amalgamation of languages

and dialects of Central Northern India), and Surinamese-Javanese.¹⁷ Contract immigrants were at first not requested to learn Dutch (chapter 2), rather officials were supposed to learn Hindi or Javanese. More recent immigrants often learn Sranan, although at the end of the century Brazilians formed Portuguese-speaking enclaves, forcing Surinamese working there to learn Portuguese. However, the children of these immigrants will learn Dutch when they enter the school system.¹⁸

Language is used not just to communicate within the group but also to divide and exclude. In order to communicate with people outside the own language group, most people will speak two or more languages. Place, occasion, and discussion partners often determine which language is used. As is discussed in the next section, social class is an important element in the choice of language. In other words, it is important to know which language(s) a person should speak to whom and when. As linguist Eithne Carlin (2001: 231) puts it, “in spite of the apparent linguistic chaos in Suriname, uniformity as well as social norms are to be found and constantly being adhered to.”

Religious divisions seem straightforward: Creoles are Christians; Hindustanis either Hindus or Muslims; Javanese Muslims; and the Maroons and Amerindians adhere to their own religions or are Christians. In practice, things were and are not as clear cut. Many, especially dark-skinned Creoles also practiced Winti (a traditional Afro-Surinamese religion that was officially forbidden until the early 1970s). In addition, the churches frowned upon Afro-Surinamese expressions of Christian spirituality, which had to stay largely underground. In contrast to the British Caribbean, Afro-Caribbean denominations, such as the African Methodist Episcopal Church, did not gain much popular support in Suriname (Jap-A-Joe, Sjak Shie, & Vernooij 2001: 202–203). Christian missions, divided into Javanese and British Indian sections, tried to convert the “heathen” Asians. Theologian Freek Bakker (2009: 4) notes that, as in other Caribbean colonies, Hindus and Muslims “had to accommodate their religion to the standards and values of Christianity in this new environment.” In time, both Hinduism and Islam partly modeled their institutions after the Christian churches with their own schools and social organizations (chapter 4). In the case of Hinduism, this went further when temples, with pews, became increasingly similar to Caribbean Christian churches and Hindus visiting a *mandir*, said that they were going to church. Moreover, services were often held on Sundays and included sermons by the priest.¹⁹ Bakker (2009: 10) concludes that the influence of Christianity was “undeniable.”

Informants speak of a sometimes surprising religious flexibility. Three women, all born in the 1930s, tell of their religiously mixed families, often as a result of education. Urban Roman Catholic schools stood in high regard, and to paraphrase French King Henry IV, for parents “Paramaribo was well worth a Mass.”²⁰ “I was at a Catholic school, and then the father [priest] asked my mother whether she would have me baptized. My mother

said yes, but I still go with my mother, because she is Muslim and I am also Catholic . . . Sometimes I go to the church, but more often to the mosque.”²¹ Another woman tells that she went to a Catholic school, but her father was Hindu. “He read his own Bible, Ramayana it is called . . . I went to the Roman Catholic church, but not my father . . . if you are at a Catholic school you have to go to that church.” In the end she frequented the Catholic and Moravian church as well as the Hindu temple. She went everywhere, “except Muslim, because my father was Hindu.”²² A woman of mixed descent tells that her mother and brother are active Moravians and she and all her sisters are Catholic.²³

Ethnic relations changed during and after the World War II when geographical and social separations became lenient as new economic opportunities presented themselves to all population groups. However, ethnicity continued to preoccupy the country, particularly when the formation of political parties emphasized ethnic belonging and loyalty. Ethnicity, rather than ideology, was the basis of institutional politics. Parties were formed around authoritarian personalities with great popular appeal to their own ethnic group. Yet, an ethnic group was not necessarily represented by only one party. The Javanese, for example, split into a traditionalist, rural-based and a reformist, more urban party. It caused profound intergenerational conflicts and family discords (Derveld 1982; Suparlan 1995; Hoefte forthcoming). In addition, personal feuds and ambitions led to breaks and the founding of new (ethnic) parties, leading to a proliferation of parties throughout the century (Ramsoedh 2001: 91; see also Jaffe 2011). Given the ethnic composition, one party could never gain an absolute majority, therefore a multiethnic consociational democracy was considered the most ideal outcome. Politicians used the specter of Guyana’s deadly ethnic riots to strengthen their own power base and their party’s position by power-sharing on an ethnic basis (chapter 4). According to anthropologist Rivke Jaffe (2011: 189), the “preoccupation with ethnicity as a problem constituted a specific hegemony that allowed the ethno-political elites who succeeded the Dutch colonial rulers to maintain power. It allowed them to profile themselves as leaders who [by working together] could save Suriname from a fate of ethnic warfare . . . In this manner, the plural society theory put forth by M. G. Smith and Rudolf van Lier, became a political ideology that became entrenched as the dominant social paradigm, a hegemonic structure that allowed elites to consolidate and share political and economic power.”

During the military regime in the 1980s, the old political parties went underground and the military attempted to gain support from shifting civilian coalitions. At Paramaribo’s main square, Cuban-style propaganda signs depicting Suriname’s history of struggle and resistance, stressed national rather than ethnic unity. Apparently, this had little effect, as ethnic politics returned to the scene as soon as the military were forced back to the barracks. Former dictator Desi Bouterse, of Creole and Amerindian descent, did not leave politics, however, and formed his own, successful

political party in 1987. It is the first major panethnic political party, but despite its anti-establishment tone, it lacks a clear ideological base as well.²⁴ Similar to other parties, it is organized around a charismatic, authoritarian leader and based on clientelism. In the end, in Suriname ethnic allegiance remains the cardinal factor in political mobilization.

Ethnic categories have become homogenized and sanctified in the five population censuses held in the twentieth century (1921, 1950, 1964, 1972, 1980).²⁵ Apparently, in 1972 the census takers felt compelled to defend the counting in ethnic categories: "Time and again the question is asked why in every census we divide the population according to national character (meaning ethnic groups). We feel that we differ so much ethnically [and culturally] that simply ignoring this aspect of our society would mean that we are disregarding the presence of an area of tension in our community."²⁶ The first census of the next century, in 2004, for the first time included the category "mixed," accounting for 12.5 percent of the population (see also Segal 1993: 93–94).

Class Relations and Social Mobility

Traditionally, Suriname has been a status-conscious society, in which skin color, ethnic origin, descent and legitimacy, occupation, and thus financial assets, gender, educational and cultural background, and individual comportment ordained one's place in society.²⁷ Class then was regarded as more than the involvement in the production process and included individual attributes. This extension of class beyond the purely economic is similar to Pierre Bourdieu's notion of different forms of capital: economic, social, cultural, and symbolic.²⁸ The total amount of all these four forms of capital possessed by the different groups informs the overall class structure. The more the better, but ethnicity largely determined the possessions of the four forms of capital in the prewar period. In other words, ethnicity and class overlapped to a great extent. The exception was in the Creole population in which "color" in a physiognomic and cultural sense decided one's place in the class pyramid. In short, just as in other Caribbean societies, class was and is an intricate socioeconomic and cultural complex, but the system was neither completely closed nor static. In his ethnography on Trinidad, Yelvington (1995: 29–30) notes the importance of exclusion and usurpation to maintain or improve class positions. Exclusionary closure in a downward direction tried to restrict access to resources and privileges to secure the dominant position of a superordinate group. The other side of the coin was usurpationary closure by a subordinate group to gain some of the advantages of a higher-ranked group.

In prewar Suriname, this process of closure in upward and downward directions could be seen among the upper class and the upper middle class, in which Jews expressed frustration at not being able to gain access to the upper class, largely for ethnic reasons, but also tried to prevent the

upward mobility of the “common” middle class. The same phenomenon may be discerned in the lower classes, in which education was a vehicle for upward mobility, yet downward closure also occurred in the case of recent immigrants. Throughout the century, the supposed “cultural backwardness” and “foreignness” of Chinese, British Indians, Javanese, Guyanese, Haitians, Brazilians, and lately Maroons was reason to attempt to exclude them from benefits and opportunities.

In colonial times, the white male population stood at the top of the social pyramid. They occupied the highest public functions or managed large economic enterprises such as plantations or mines. “The Dutch considered themselves to be the bearers of authority.”²⁹ Thus, the highest social rank was based on the combination of whiteness and maleness. That is not to say, however, that all whites belonged to the upper class; lower-ranked military personnel or *Buru* (farmers of Dutch descent) were examples of white groups not belonging to the upper echelon of society. The Dutch elite tried to keep as much distance as possible from the rest of the population, including the “native” upper classes. However, Van Lier (1971: 267) notes that in contrast to British colonies, the Dutch and Surinamese elites frequented the same social club, *Sociëteit Het Park*. There they mixed more than outside. The tennis clubs in Paramaribo, however, were indeed segregated.

In Suriname’s small middle class further distinctions in an upper or lower middle class were made. In the prewar years, this distinction was commonly based on color. Light-skinned Creoles, Jews, and a few Chinese³⁰ considered themselves as part of the upper middle class, and were recognized as such by the upper class of Dutch colonials. Individual achievement and a strong sense of moral propriety and cultural superiority characterized this social group. A crucial aspect of this moral propriety was that the sexual activities of Jewish and light-skinned women were as guarded as those of white women. As anthropologist Gloria Wekker (2001: 182) notes, “it was essential that the sexual activities [of white spouses and daughters, and in their train upper middle-class Jewish and light-skinned Creole women], were policed” as their children should be white or as light-skinned as possible in the case of non-white mothers.³¹ In contrast to working-class women, women in the upper and lower middle class were the keepers and the managers of the home and family, with the help of lower-class personnel.

According to Van Lier (1971: 264), members of the upper middle class presented themselves to the Dutch as a united front, yet the latter regarded them as different population groups and treated them accordingly. The Dutch held the Jewish group in higher regard than the light-skinned Creoles; the Jews did not regard the light-skinned Creole as equals either. After an exodus of white colonists in the second half of the nineteenth century, the, mostly Sephardic, Jewish men came to dominate public and professional life. Having studied in the Netherlands, they became physicians or lawyers, or occupied a variety of posts within the colonial

government. “[A]s their group included a large number of persons with a legal training it came to take the lead in the political field as well. Jewish men, a numerically small but socially significant group in Paramaribo, continued to exercise a strong influence on public affairs until about 1910.”³² In 1916, a politician of Dutch descent criticized this Jewish influence by writing “a net had been spread over the population.”³³

Light-skinned Creole men or mulattoes gradually gained influence, on their own merits, by excluding others, and more so because many Jews chose to stay in the Netherlands after their studies, where there would be better opportunities than in Suriname. These Creoles adopted Dutch, Christian standards and values as not only color, but education, occupation, culture, and religious affiliation determined one’s place in the social hierarchy. In the nineteenth century, men of this class had been appointed to important colonial offices. However, discrimination and disdain despite achievements and Jewish competition made many light-skinned Creole males decide to seek a career in the Netherlands or in the Netherlands East Indies after completing their studies in Europe. Migration thus depleted the top echelon of the Creole population, but in the early twentieth century they were on the ascendancy again. They almost strived to out-Dutch the Dutch.

The lower middle class was initially largely Creole and included skilled laborers, teachers, and lower-ranked civil servants. Located between the upper and lower class, the middle class did not function as a bridge as social mobility from below was not encouraged (Segal 1993: 86). Education was the main vehicle for upward mobility. Chinese and Lebanese merchants and shopkeepers as well as Jewish artisans also belonged to the middle class. Until World War II only a few, mostly urban, Hindustani men, and no Javanese, could be counted among the middle classes. Unlike, for example, Trinidad or British Guiana, Suriname had no emerging Hindustani middle class in the 1920s or 1930s.³⁴ Given that migration from British India to Suriname took place 30 years after the labor movement to the British colonies, the move from the plantations to the city and into nonagricultural occupations also took place later. The upper and middle classes were mainly urban based.

In general, the Creole lower class was darker complexioned, less educated, and more traditionally Creole than Dutch in its cultural expressions. The preferred language was Sranan Tongo rather than Dutch. Religious practices were more based on African-derived faiths than on Christian beliefs, and the Christian and Western preference for a monogamous, nuclear family relationship was not prevalent. The group included smallholders, (domestic) servants, laborers, and itinerant and market traders. Hindustanis and Javanese were almost “automatically” included in the lower class, although these groups also included skilled individuals. The lower class was the largest and also the most diverse. Although Maroons and Amerindians participated in the cash economy they were not included in the coastal class scheme.

That the class divisions were not carved in stone became more evident in the second half of the century. During the first decades after World War II increasing urbanization, employment in the nonagricultural sector, growth of the civil service, and educational opportunities led to upward social mobility for many. Notably, the middle class expanded. Now all ethnic groups, with the exception of Amerindians, moved into the middle and upper class. Suriname, however, remained a highly stratified society, which probably was most clearly expressed in locations outside Paramaribo such as the mining enclave Moengo or Wageningen, a project for the mechanical cultivation of rice. At these locations there existed a clear social and residential hierarchy based on occupation and salary (chapter 5).

Changing investment patterns as well as the growth of the state apparatus created new employment opportunities and altered occupational patterns. After independence many Dutch people, officials but also entrepreneurs, left the colony, thus changing class relations once again. The economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s, leading to runaway inflation, was probably even more significant and again led to emigration of mainly middle-class Surinamese to the Netherlands, the United States, and the Netherlands Antilles. As will be discussed in chapter 6, now economic assets and overseas relatives became all important: "Access to foreign currency, U.S. dollars or Dutch guilders, has become vital to one's position in the class structure of Suriname" (Wekker 1997: 341). By the turn of the century, wholesale international traders, dealing in legal and illegal merchandise, politicians, professionals, and high military personnel formed the new elite. The middle class included retirees from foreign companies, especially bauxite, who received their pensions either in Dutch guilders or US dollars, and high-level employees in foreign and domestic enterprises. Teachers and nurses were part of the lower middle class, but given their fixed salaries, often in danger of downward mobility. A number of informants with regular middle-level incomes indicated that informal jobs, as taxi drivers for example, were necessary to keep their households afloat. The lower class had grown due to economic and demographic reasons. Inflation and structural adjustment programs affected the (lower) middle class, in particular those people who drew their income or pension in Surinamese currency. The trek to the city of Maroons, and to a lesser degree Amerindians, increased the competition for low-paying jobs as well as services, leading to increasing socioeconomic tensions.

These tensions, however, did not have spatial repercussions. Social geographer Hebe Verrest points out that in contrast to other Caribbean cities neither ethnic nor class divisions have led to sharp divisions in Paramaribo, as ethnically and socially mixed neighborhoods characterize the city. As will be discussed in chapter 7, in the last decades of the twentieth century, differences between quarters have not grown. Verrest argues that the economic crisis as well as the structure of the land and housing markets has "slowed down processes of moving and resettlement, encouraged the

development of socio-economically mixed neighbourhoods and sustained the absence of no-go areas in the city” (Verrest 2009: 1).

Gender Relations, Household Composition, and Employment

Gender relations have been informed by class and ethnicity as they determined the varying degrees of socioeconomic independence allowed to women.³⁵ Together with gender, sociocultural background, migration history, and location determined the societal role of women and men, employment opportunities, the composition of households, and the place of women and men in the public domain.

Metropolitan notions of family, marriage, male responsibility, and feminine behavior were very much class specific in Suriname and in the, until the 1960s, socially and culturally conservative Netherlands.³⁶ The decision whether women were to remain home to run the household and take care of the children was often made by their male partners. As one elderly Creole male informant expressed: “many women who do not work, have a man who doesn’t want them to work.”³⁷ Middle-class women who “did not work” often had their hands full with child rearing, household tasks, and in a number of cases tending provision grounds. The same informant said that his wife spent many hours on their provision ground (*kostgrondje*) planting and harvesting vegetables and fruit for the family and for him to sell to colleagues. This idea of a man not wanting his spouse to work for money was part of the hegemonic gender ideology during most of the century. The ideal was the middle-class Western family with the husband / father as the only breadwinner. He was in charge of his children and his wife, who should be a homemaker and who outside the family home could be active in charities, to enhance her husband’s status. In this view, lifelong monogamy validated by a recognized religious official was the marker of success and mobility.

Missionaries in particular tried to instill this ideal on the former enslaved, but they soon concluded that their efforts were often in vain. As historian Ellen Klinkers (1997: 180) underlines, the nuclear family was not vital to the lower class, as relationships outside the household retained their importance for this group. In the Caribbean, “Western norms and ideals regarding marriage and family could not be enforced with new rules and sanctions.” Men and women “rejected the notion that confinement to domesticity and economic dependence on a husband were necessary to female respectability. Such ideas were too much of a denial of African-Caribbean family forms and gender roles” (Brereton 1999: 106).

After abolition and state supervision, many Creoles, especially from the sugar plantation regions surrounding Paramaribo left for the city. In other regions, with different socioeconomic and ecological conditions, families and communities formed the basis for small-scale agricultural enterprises. By and large Creole women withdrew from plantation labor

as only skilled Creole men still could find employment on the estates. On the plantations, whether during enslavement or indenture, exceedingly few women were employed as skilled laborers or supervisors. In town, the women were in the majority and often earned their own income, thus “keeping their autonomous position within the family and the community” (Klinkers 1997: 178).

Urban lower-class women did not have a choice on whether to work or not and mostly found employment in the service sector as domestics, laundresses, cleaners, or more informally as seamstresses and peddlers of cooked and baked goods. Many informants recall washerwomen carrying baskets of clean and ironed linen on their heads and seamstresses making anything from layettes to wedding dresses. These women often combined several jobs to make ends meet. The artisanal trades were reserved for males, as were fishing or work in the interior such as gold mining and balata bleeding. In the prewar period, most emigrants were men as well. If women migrated, it was to accompany their spouse. The long absences of men working in the gold or balata industries changed gender relations as it gave women freedom and authority in the household, but also the burden to keep the household going (Brereton 1999: 101). The occupational choices of lower-class urban women were limited to low-paid jobs, often in service of others. Certainly in the first six decades of the century class determined the occupational choices women had. Where (lower) middle-class women often opted for skilled employment as teachers or nurses, lower-class women did not have a decent education to fall back on.

In the non-urban areas called the districts, women’s labor was largely confined to agriculture or domestic service. The migration history and cultural backgrounds of Hindustanis and Javanese largely determined women’s place in society. Planters openly stated that women were contracted not for their labor power but to tie the men to the plantations. Women were to “stabilize” the labor force; that did not mean, however, that women were exempted from work in the fields. Contractually women earned considerably less than men, thus making females dependent on males for economic survival and institutionalizing gender stratification on the plantations. Better-paid jobs, for example as overseers, were an exclusively male preserve.

Many contemporaries commented on the jealousy between men because of the shortage of women migrants in British Guiana, Trinidad, and Suriname. Male prestige depended heavily on “having a woman” and sexually subduing her. It led to polyandry, violence, and prostitution, thus reaffirming the colonial assumptions about the violent behavior of British Indians.³⁸ These problems diminished in later stages of the migration process, when complete (Javanese) families were moved to Suriname to become smallholders.

After indenture, many time-expired laborers remained in the colony and could obtain agricultural land to cultivate rice and other products. The colonial government silently assumed that the work would be a family

enterprise, and that women next to their reproductive roles would take an active part in the exploitation of the family grounds, cultivating crops, growing provisions, and rearing livestock. Caribbean, and thus Surinamese, lower-class women have always worked for money in formal and informal settings (Massiah 1986; Reddock 1994).

The composition of the household also determined gender relations. Traditionally, researchers have defined household types by ethnicity, without taking class and location into account. Female-headed households were viewed as “typically Creole,” while Hindustanis preferred a joint family type household. The Javanese nuclear and extended family settings figured somewhere in between. For demographic reasons, the Indian ideal of a joint family could not be reproduced in Suriname during the first two generations of Hindustani migrants. Later, joint families, often consisting of three generations, would be formed, especially in the districts. Marriages would often be pre-arranged and the young bride moved in with her in-laws, where she was to perform household tasks and work in the field. The men would demand that their women be chaste, domestic, and adhere to tradition.³⁹

According to educationalist Bea Lalmahomed (1992: 38–41), this system did not survive long in Suriname as the authoritarian and patriarchal character of the institution, denying individual rights and liberty to sons and daughters-in-laws and their children, undermined the family. Lalmahomed states that in the fourth generation, the joint family system lost its attractiveness, especially for women, because of urbanization and increasing contacts with other population groups. There existed, however, a difference between the city and the districts, as some of the female informants narrate how in the early 1980s they still suffered in joint families in the western part of the country. Lalmahomed (1992: 41) suggests that the joint family has been replaced by jointness of family. This system is based on strong, often patriarchal, family ties, without the earlier financial and household obligations.

In the last decades of the century, however, the number of female-headed households increased in all ethnic groups, but among Hindustanis in particular. Research on poverty revealed that in the 1990s 58 percent of Hindustani women had no partner (Kromhout 2000: 12). Sociologist Mayke Kromhout (2000: 13) cautiously concludes that ethnicity is no longer the main defining characteristic of organizations at the household level. “The different household types no longer seem to be purely ethnic.” Socioeconomic status thus trumps ethnic characteristics.

When during and after World War II rural–urban migration made Paramaribo an increasingly mixed city, it influenced not only the way households were set up but also employment patterns. Like their Creole counterparts, urban Hindustani and Javanese women would also find employment in the service sector.⁴⁰ Now Hindustani women would walk the streets with baskets full of vegetables to sell from door to door, while domestic service was no longer a Creole preserve. In the last decades of

the century, women were officially estimated to form approximately 40 percent of the labor force, yet this figure is almost certainly too low as it did not take underemployment and informal employment into account. This informal sector is gendered as well: for women it includes extensions of “female work” such as sewing, baking, cooking, and huckstering. Men find informal, and often better paid, employment as car mechanics, taxi drivers, traders in foreign currencies, construction workers etcetera (Verrest 2007b: 158–159). More than two-thirds of the female labor force is employed by the state, often in low salary scales without additional social benefits, as cleaners, street sweepers, and lower office personnel. In the late 1980s, the earnings of 80 percent of all working women put them below the poverty line, thus making them dependent on others or forcing them to find extra income, often in the informal sector (Wekker 1997: 342). Women became increasingly marginalized from wage work as the formal labor market was incapable of absorbing the vast numbers of women entering the labor force.

New in the informal sector are Maroon women. In the last decades of the century, profound changes took place in the interior, particularly after the Interior War (1986–1992),⁴¹ which caused thousands to leave their villages for Paramaribo or refugee camps in French Guiana (chapter 6). Women’s roles have changed significantly. In the strongly matrilineal kinship system Maroon women traditionally maintained a household separate from their husbands’, raised their children, cultivated their individually owned forest plot on land cleared by their partner, and harvested the crop and produced food stuffs.⁴² Men would go hunting and fishing and provided their wives and children with meat and fish.⁴³ As anthropologist Sally Price (1998: 237) points out, “the pivotal position of women in defining the basic structure of social relations has often been misread as a central role for women in directing social life itself; matriliney has been read as matriarchy.”

Currently, many Maroon women became more market oriented and sold agricultural and crafts products on town markets in both Suriname and French Guiana. Because women were spending more time away for the interior, they expected greater independence than in the 1960s. Then it was the men who owned sewing machines, although it was the women who did most of the sewing, producing clothes or their renowned textile arts. “Now, many women have earned enough money on their own to buy their own state-of-the-art sewing machines and have developed embroidery in new artistic directions using fancy machine-made stitching.”⁴⁴ Moreover, lots of younger people have moved permanently to the city, where some women are pursuing advanced studies, have salaried jobs, or earn money through their own initiative. Maroon women started to organize themselves in networks to further (economic) cooperation and consultation (Aviankoi 2003: 10–11; Amoksi 2011).

Maroon women also have new opportunities to participate in public functions, partly because the government has established new positions of

female captains and *basias* in the villages of the interior: in 1994, the first female *kabiten* (captain) was named.⁴⁵ However, as Sally Price points out, “the basic gender ideology and the basic patterns of male–female relations, including those having to do with polygyny, still hold true, especially in the interior.”⁴⁶

Not only Maroon women were and still are largely absent in the public domain in twentieth-century Suriname, this also applies to women from other ethnic groups. As Wekker (2001: 175) has argued “with few exceptions, women have had access to the upper class only through the mediation of a man to whom they are attached, either as a wife . . . or as his mistress.”⁴⁷ Women have made great educational progress, as is attested in many of the interviews. The importance of schooling is expressed in the saying “your diploma is your first man.” Yet, compared to men, women still occupied lower positions in the occupational hierarchy and in society at large. Younger women were less restricted in the choices between working or homemaking, yet in the public domain, women often still deferred to male authority and faced gender discrimination, despite their achievements. In politics, for example, some parties like the Creole Nationale Partij Suriname (NPS, National Party Suriname) have a large group of active female members who traditionally have raised funds, attended rallies, campaigned and mobilized voters, but this is not translated into political power.⁴⁸ Plans to organize a women’s party have never materialized because of the male-dominated political structure and also out of fear of splitting the ethnic vote. In other words, here ethnic allegiance trumps gender interests.

Efforts to change the socioeconomic and political conditions of women have not been very successful. Informal networks at the street, plantation, or yard level, for example to watch each other’s children, are mentioned in several interviews, yet in the prewar era there were few formal organizations to promote women’s interests. In Paramaribo, voluntary associations thrived among women in Creole working-class neighborhoods. Until the 1950s, next to nothing is known about these social and religious associations which often developed into mutual support networks (Brana-Shute 1993: 134). These networks could lead to (new) jobs and access to markets and services. Reciprocity could deepen and widen the network. Demographic changes, such as the large-scale migration to the Netherlands in the 1970s, when slightly more women than men left the country, and the fact that the population became younger affected the female networks, but as informants indicate the (food) scarcity in the next decade revitalized informal networks. Women, and to a lesser degree men, traded products and services in economically trying times.

Gender inequality was still predominant in late twentieth-century Suriname. Wekker (1997: 343) somberly concludes that “women, in general, have not kept pace with men in their ethnic groups in climbing the class structure.” She also points at another problem in gender relations: “generally

men of every group—from the beginning of the century to the end—have (had) more sexual freedom than women . . . It is part of the construction of the dominant variety of Surinamese masculinity that men should have access to women, regardless of ethnic group.”⁴⁹ Consequently, as journalist Usha Marhé (2000: 17) puts it, “Surinamese women have always known that sexual violence is a problem in Surinamese society. But because of the dominance of the male perspective, women have trivialized their problems with sayings such as ‘that’s life’ or ‘if I haven’t died from it, you’ll survive too.’” In other words, both men and women underplay the problem of sexual violence; the Sranan term “*tapu sjén*” (cover your shame) illustrates how society chooses to ignore the problem. Domestic violence cuts across location, class, and ethnicity. Suriname is no exception in the region: “Overt or subverted violence pervades many male–female relations in the Caribbean, so much so that it is almost taken for granted” (Yelvington 1995: 162).⁵⁰

About this Book

This study on dominance, contention, and globalization in twentieth-century Suriname is not a chronology.⁵¹ Rather it highlights important aspects in the country’s development, including the role of the state in the late colonial period, the social unrest in the 1930s, the emergence of bauxite mining and the development of the company town of Moengo, livelihood strategies during the military regime of the 1980s, and the sociospatial development of Paramaribo. These chapters are “anchored” by three more general sections, giving comprehensive overviews of important demographic, economic, and political changes. The first chapter, “Setting the Scene,” introduces developments in the colony during the period 1900–1940, as World War II inaugurated gradual decolonization and socioeconomic and political changes. The fourth, “Resetting the Scene,” discusses transformations between 1940 and 1975, the year of independence. The final section, “Leaving the Scene,” looks at the state of affairs around the turn of the century and the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Chapter 1 discusses the basic demographic and social changes after the abolition of slavery. It highlights socioeconomic conditions in the colony’s only city, Paramaribo. This is followed by a discussion of the characteristics of the plantation economy and the attempts to diversify the economic base through the development of small-scale agriculture, the introduction of new agricultural products, and the exploitation of natural resources. In 1900, cacao, balata, and particularly gold seemed to be the new anchors of the economy and these products promised an auspicious future for the colony. The boom in the gold and balata industries was crucial to developing a non-agricultural labor market. Yet, the subsequent busts in gold, balata, and cacao underscored the uncertainty of socioeconomic conditions. This first chapter closes with a review

of the political and administrative situation. In line with the changing socioeconomic situation, the planters lost political power to members of the middle class, professionals, and urban traders.

Chapter 2 focuses on the crucial and expanding socioeconomic and cultural role of the state in the postemancipation era until World War II. The abolition of slavery and the subsequent import of tens of thousands of indentured laborers from British India and the Netherlands East Indies unchained intended and unintended material and sociocultural forces that transformed Suriname's sociocultural structure and fundamentally changed its ethnic composition. The state organized the recruitment and regulated the working conditions of the Asian immigrants, who during indenture and later as smallholders were largely geographically separated from other groups. Outside the plantations, the state was involved in the contracting of laborers for the gold and balata industries. It is argued that in the aftermath of abolition colonial power became even more deep-rooted. Interconnected policies implemented in this era aimed to include the Asian migrants in society and to strengthen Dutch influence.

This strategy culminated in the 1930s, when the government tried to construct a colony based on Asian colonists and smallholders and grounded in ethnic diversification. Governor Kielstra's socioeconomic engineering as well as his authoritarian style of government evoked ethnic and class reactions as the newly implemented policies and laws were seen as a threat to the social and economic positions and the culture of both the Creole lower and middle class.

Chapter 3 deals with social upheaval caused by economic decline and austerity measures. Mass meetings and riots in 1931 and 1933 led to open and more hidden forms of state repression. New laws limiting various freedoms intensified the control of the authoritarian state. In the attempts to organize the widespread discontent, ethnicity, class, and gender played a major role. Working-class men and women of all ethnic groups participated in the unrest. But Anton de Kom was the only social activist who included all ethnic groups as in his view class unity prevailed over ethnic diversity. The divide between the working class and the more progressive parts of the middle class became more pronounced as the (fear of) violence and the threat of radical ideas turned the progressives away from working-class organizations and actions.

Economic misery was the main trigger of protest, but the government's inertia fed the existing frustration even further. In its reactions to the unrest, the administration blamed foreign influences rather than the colony's social and economic problems. As a result, it did not address these problems. It raises the question of why anticolonialism did not gain substantial support in Suriname, when frustration with Dutch policies and the administration in Paramaribo was widespread.

Chapter 4 reviews socioeconomic, political, cultural, and demographic developments in the postwar era up to 1975. World War II, including the

US occupation, induced economic growth and caused rapid social changes when the war effort lured many people from the districts to Paramaribo. The decreased involvement of the Dutch administration coupled to economic expansion stimulated nationalist feelings among light-skinned, educated Creoles. After the war, the primary responsibility for setting and executing economic policy was now in the hands of local officials, while politically Suriname became autonomous in 1954. Bauxite revenues and Dutch transfers financed a growing civil sector and nationalist projects to further expand the economy. Most of these plans involved the systematic exploitation of natural resources in the interior. Economic interests outweighed social or cultural considerations and the many development plans decidedly changed the interior and the lives of many Maroons and Amerindians.

A variety of political parties based on ethnicity and religion dotted the political landscape. A coalition of ethnic parties governed the country in the late 1950s and 1960s. These political alliances advanced the interests of the Hindustanis and Javanese as well as of the Creole working class, thus linking class and ethnic emancipation. This chapter also pays attention to the role of education and culture in the emancipation of these three groups. Cultural and later political nationalist stirrings undermined the political system based on ethnic cooperation, and in 1974 Creole Prime Minister Henck Arron, to the surprise of many, called for Suriname's independence a year later.

The prospect of independence and possible ethnic tensions caused tens of thousands to leave for the Netherlands. This migration had started in the late 1960s, when the ethnic and class background and gender of the emigrants changed. In the year of independence alone, almost 40,000 people left the country, making Suriname demographically a sending rather than a receiving society.

Chapter 5 (with Anouk de Koning) highlights the development of the bauxite company town of Moengo. The bauxite sector was the mainstay of the Surinamese economy from the 1940s to the 1990s. The number of employees in this capital-intensive sector was not large, but these well-paid workers were considered the labor aristocracy. The degree of union organization in the sector was high, and the mining unions were in the vanguard of labor organization. The sector gave birth to modern social legislation.

The bauxite companies were associated with modernity, but a closer view learns that the occupational and ethnic hierarchy and the accompanying segregation that characterized the plantations were reproduced in the company towns. Moengo was a residentially segregated place, where the dividing lines were first based on race and ethnicity and later on income and occupation. Throughout the decades, the rigidity of extant hierarchies relaxed while forms of labor discipline and authority underwent changes. The focus on Moengo shows the various and complicated interconnections between location, class, ethnicity, and gender.

Chapter 6 focuses on the military regime and its violations of human rights which caused political, social, and economic upheaval. At first, the military coup of 1980 was greeted with relief. However, when the promises of democracy waned and repression increased, the army leaders started to lose popular support. Open protest against the regime ended when 15 prominent men were executed in December 1982. The regime's isolation in domestic and foreign arenas forced the military to start negotiations with the "old" ethnic political parties in 1984. This process partly coincided with an armed revolt by a group of Maroons in the interior, starting in 1986. The Interior War claimed hundreds of lives, while thousands fled the interior. In 1987 elections were held, but it took another five years before peace was signed with the Maroon guerrillas and Desi Bouterse was forced to resign as chief commander. Suriname has not been able to fully digest this past as yet, and a systematic investigation of what really happened is still lacking.

The political turbulence also led to an economic downturn, caused by several interruptions of Dutch financial support, falling bauxite revenues, and policy failures. This chapter pays attention to economic plight at the household level showing how class, labor position, age, gender, and the strength of social networks intertwined to determine the socioeconomic position of households in the last two decades of the century.

Chapter 7 (with Hebe Verrest) is on Paramaribo as an extremely primate city in a country without important secondary towns. It questions how the changes analyzed in the previous chapters, including the demise of small- and large-scale agriculture, large-scale urban migration of various ethnic groups, and the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, transformed the capital. In other Caribbean cities, urban migration and socioeconomic transformations have led to internal fragmentation, segregation, and spatial inequality. This chapter focuses on spatial settlement patterns and social inequality to track the roles of ethnicity and class in the capital. It shows that time of arrival in the city rather than ethnicity and class appears to be a decisive factor in Paramaribo's spatial patterns. Thus, Paramaribo is an "atypical" Caribbean town without social and ethnic boundaries.

A related question is how migration and economic downturns influenced the capital's land and housing market. It begins with an examination of the population growth and social development and the role of the government in urban expansion in the postwar era. The chapter explores the question of why socioeconomically and ethnically mixed neighborhoods remain the norm.

The final chapter looks at Suriname in the last years of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century as recent demographic, social, political, and economic developments posed new challenges as well as opportunities. The discontinuities (demography, political and constitutional changes, and economic structure) and continuities (the multiethnic society, Dutch influences, and economic dependency) discussed in

this introduction are revisited. Looking at the economy and labor market it seems that Suriname has come full circle when compared to the start of the twentieth century. Immigrants, now mainly from Haiti, China, and Brazil, flood the labor market. Despite the fact that the present-day migration experiences differ greatly from those some hundred years earlier, the influx of foreigners again raises social tensions.

After the crises of the 1980s and 1990s, the economy seems on the rebound, thanks mainly to the exploitation of natural resources. Socially, the idea of a “lost generation” characterized the state of the country, but with economic growth, some social indicators improved as well. A major issue, however, is the growing unequal distribution of income. This class issue has an ethnic component as well, as intra-ethnic inequalities grow.

It is argued that constitutional changes have not affected the political culture of ethnic clientelism, personalism, chicanery, and top-down politics. What has changed are external relations, the official relation with the Netherlands has cooled, although the influence of Dutch culture, including the language, seems to have increased in recent decades. Yet almost paradoxically, Suriname is slowly but surely integrating into the Caribbean region and South America, while looking to China for economic support.

In this conclusion, the importance of geographic space in the processes of transformation and continuity is underlined by the developments in the interior, where resource exploitation, migration, legal disputes regarding territorial rights, and possible large infrastructural projects make the rainforest into a hotbed of change and contestation.

These interrelated changes in the economy, social structure, and politics affected gender, race, and ethnicity. The economic crises upset the existing social hierarchy when new economic elites, including all ethnic groups save Amerindians, emerged and the middle and lower classes became unhinged. Particularly women, from all ethnic groups, were hit hard by the various economic downturns. Despite the fact that women participate more than men in higher education, there is no corresponding increase in female labor force participation. Women’s juridical position may have formally been equated with that of men, but when comparing women and men with similar educational backgrounds, women still rank lower in the class hierarchy.

The political as well as the social structure can be described as hybrid: both systems combine democratic and autocratic practices. Dominance was contested through open protests and strikes, but also through the socioeconomic and cultural emancipation of the different ethnic and social groups who after gaining the franchise demanded equal recognition of their cultures and religions. Ironically, this goal was achieved mainly through the authoritarian politics of their ethnic leaders. At the turn of the twenty-first century, the culture of dominance and contestation still characterize Suriname.

This study is based on analyses of census and other statistical material, archival data, and close to 100 in-depth interviews conducted by Anouk

de Koning, Hebe Verrest, and the interviewers of the Stichting Comité Herdenking Javaanse Immigratie (STICHJI), Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI), and Vereniging Herdenking Javaanse Immigratie (VHJI) who collaborated in a Surinamese-Javanese heritage project in 2009–2010.⁵² These interviews are sometimes on a specific topic, but often life histories and capture the diversity of perspectives and the ways “grand” history influenced daily lives. These are important historical sources as they inform us about matters that are not covered in archival documents. Gender, ethnicity, class, location, and age of the informants influence the informants’ experiences and their stories.

The volume puts the history of Suriname in a Caribbean context by comparing developments in Suriname to other countries in the region, particularly Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago. These two countries have experienced a similar evolution regarding ethnicity, class, and gender in the twentieth century. The fact that Suriname since 1995 is a member of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) makes such a regional perspective even more relevant.

CHAPTER ONE

Setting the Scene: The Culture of Late Colonial Capitalism 1900–1940

Guarded optimism. Such is the tone of the front-page article of the Surinamese newspaper *Onze West* on January 3, 1900 reviewing the past year and looking forward to the new.¹ Looking back to 1899, the paper saw no reason for “exuberant joy or great sorrow,” despite economic problems caused by unexpected rain and drought, “everything’s running normally.” The writer thought that progress was slow, as little was done to stimulate economic growth. He held high hopes, however, for the gold industry: “unquestionably there is a bright future” for gold and the exploitation of the hinterland. The year 1900 promised to be better. Unfortunately, for this journalist and Suriname, the gold industry had reached its peak already early in the twentieth century, and the immediate future of the colony was not going to be based on gold.

As will be discussed in this chapter, Suriname’s economy did diversify around the turn of the century but many of the fundamentals remained intact. Large-scale agriculture lost its overwhelming importance; new economic sectors, including gold, balata bleeding, and bauxite changed the colony by offering nonagricultural and often better paying jobs and by opening up the vast interior. What remained the same, however, was that the major companies involved in these extraction industries were in foreign hands. Given that the plantations have received ample coverage in the scholarly literature, the emphasis here is on the nonagricultural sector.

Onze West did not mention the great demographic changes in Suriname. The writer might have been so used to the influx of tens of thousands of immigrants, that he did not think it worth mentioning. The great majority of these immigrants were recruited to work on the plantations, but the capital of Paramaribo and its outskirts grew as well because of rural–urban migration of the former enslaved. These demographic developments were the most obvious changes in Suriname in the latter part of the nineteenth and the early decades of the twentieth century. Moreover, this population growth and the influx of immigrants had an impact on many other areas,

including social structure, gender relations, the economy, spatial planning and development, culture, religion, politics, and governance.²

Contemporaries focusing on the plantation economy often portrayed Suriname as a colonial backwater. They ignored the socioeconomic changes that took place in the first decades of the twentieth century. In a reaction to these transformations and the resulting tensions between population groups and classes, domination by the state and social institutions continued and even intensified, in turn leading to resistance at the work place but also in the political arena in attempts to challenge the existing hierarchy.

Demographic and Social Changes after the Abolition of Slavery

In 1900, Suriname counted 72,144 inhabitants. The majority comprised Creoles, often (descendants of) the enslaved who gained their legal freedom on July 1, 1863. For another ten years, during the period of state supervision (*staatstoezicht*) the freedpeople were required by law to work at a plantation of their choice. Abolition and state supervision had far-reaching consequences for the former slave communities and families. Historian Ellen Klinkers (1997: 107, 121–129) notes that despite regional differences, old plantation communities remained important and ties to the plantations were not severed. Sociologist Nigel Bolland has pointed out that in the Caribbean, freedom for the former enslaved did not necessarily mean personal autonomy in the Western sense; the survival of family and community often took precedence over individual goals or perhaps the distinction was immaterial (see also Brereton 1999: 92). Nevertheless, in Suriname the freedom of movement led to large-scale migration and many traditional plantation communities disintegrated as a result of abolition. In particular, young people left faraway estates for those closer to Paramaribo, while there were psychological motives as well to leave the old plantation and especially the old owner.³ Moving to another plantation was an expression of freedom. Reasons to stay were often related to ties people had to their place of birth or the difficulty to leave the region. Especially in the districts of Coronie and Upper-Para, freedpeople for both economic and cultural reasons could not and would not leave their families and communities. In Coronie, all plantations were in the hands of only two owners who had agreed not to hire each others' workers, and the district was too isolated to easily establish contacts with other estates. In both districts tight family networks and deep-rooted religious and cultural bonds made people also reluctant to leave the ancestral burial grounds. Regional authorities by and large denied requests to work in the city, so Paramaribo's growth during state supervision was limited. Most urban migrants were craftsmen and domestics.

Once state supervision had ended the move from the plantations was gradual but irreversible. People looked for a better life in the city, the gold fields or cacao plantations. Particularly women left for Paramaribo to work

as washer women, domestics, and market women (Klinkers 1997: 159). To the freedpeople who stayed behind, the Creole culture that was part and parcel of the plantation was crucial in the development of a free Creole society. It was based on the Afro-Surinamese traditional religion Winti, even though these religious practices were legally banned, the Creole language Sranan Tongo, although considered as a detriment to progress, Creole medical practices, and local marriage and family practices. The population contested missionary efforts to change this life style. Most plantation communities, especially in the sugar-growing areas, changed decidedly with the immigration of thousands of Asian immigrant laborers.

Since the abolition of slavery in 1863, the population had grown by more than 20,000 people. This growth can largely be attributed to immigration of contract laborers from British India and Java (for a discussion on indentured labor see chapter 2). The majority of these immigrants were men, which explains that since indentured immigration began in 1873, the relative number of females declined. As Table 1.1 shows, 1880 is the first year that the number of males surpassed that of females which remained the case until 1930. In the first four decades of the twentieth century, the population more than doubled, again largely due to immigration.

Table 1.1 Population of Suriname According to Gender 1865–1929* (excl. Amerindians and Maroons)**

<i>Year</i>	<i>Male</i>	<i>Female</i>	<i>Total</i>
1865	24,712	25,866	50,578
1870	24,945	25,265	50,210
1875	26,074	25,255	51,329
1880	26,406	26,070	52,476
1885	29,431	27,701	57,132
1890	30,768	29,198	59,966
1895	34,254	31,285	65,539
1900	38,199	33,945	72,144
1905	n/a	n/a	80,124
1910	49,989	42,153	92,142
1915	54,762	45,483	100,245
1920	n/a	n/a	113,181
1925	62,581	57,345	119,926
1929	68,111	63,576	131,687
1935	n/a	n/a	146,843
1940	n/a	n/a	159,396

*The following figures are estimates by the colonial government. The first census of the twentieth century was held in 1921. Demographer H. Lamur (1973: 136) makes a downward correction for data published between the censuses of 1921 and 1950, based on the outcome of the 1950 census.

**In 1900 an estimated 12,000 to 15,000 Maroons and Amerindians lived in Suriname (Van Traa 1946: 50). The 1921 census estimates that number at 18,400 Maroons and 2,600 Amerindians, but Lamur (1973: 4) considers this estimate “unreliable.” “Maroons” is the present-day term for the descendants of runaway enslaved. At the time this group was called *bosnegers* (bush Negroes).

Source: Lommerse 2008: 362, based on *Koloniale Verslagen* and Lamur 1973: 136.

On June 5, 1873, just weeks before the period of state supervision came to a close, 399 indentured British Indians arrived in Suriname.⁴ They were not the first foreign laborers introduced to work on the plantations preparing for and in the aftermath of abolition. The ethnic origins of these first immigrants were diverse: Portuguese / Madeirans, Chinese, West-Africans, Barbadians, and other West Indians. Their numbers, however, were not sufficient to boost large-scale agriculture. In the period 1873–1917, 34,304 British Indians came to Suriname; fewer than 13,000 returned to their homeland between 1878 and 1929. The influx of Hindustanis was heaviest in the late nineteenth century. By 1900, already more than two-thirds of the total number of British Indian migrants had arrived in Suriname.

A second large group of indentured laborers came from Java: from 1890 to 1939, 32,962 people from the Netherlands East Indies arrived in Suriname.⁵ Approximately 80 percent of them came in the twentieth century. Migration from Java was particularly intense after World War I and the termination of indentured emigration from British India in 1917. During the period 1917–1928, more than half of the total number of Javanese migrants arrived in Suriname. In total 7,684 Javanese would repatriate during the period 1896–1939 (Hoefte 1998: 61–65). More than 67,266 British Indians and Javanese came to Suriname. The heaviest influx was in the first decade of the twentieth century when in some years thousands of immigrants would arrive.

This flow of permanent immigrants changed the ethnic composition. In 1900, a little less than three-quarters of the population (72 percent) was considered Creole,⁶ 23 percent was British Indian, and 5 percent Javanese. By 1930, the Creoles numbered slightly less than half (49 percent), the Hindustanis constituted 27 percent of the population, and the Javanese 24 percent. In other words, according to these data, the combined Asian groups formed the largest demographic segment. The swing year was 1927, when the numbers of Creoles and Asians were equally large (Hoefte 1998: 79). In addition, (temporary) labor migration from not only British India and Java, but also from places such as British Guiana, Barbados, St Lucia, Montserrat, and the Netherlands Antilles, made Suriname a truly multiethnic society, with obvious physical and cultural differences between the various population groups, which would often translate into socioeconomic differences as well. Serious ethnic conflicts were sparse, but tensions between the different groups were evident from the first arrival of the immigrant laborers.

These demographic changes also had an impact on religious affiliations. In 1900, the Moravian Brethren (*Evangelische Broedergemeente*, EBG) and the Roman Catholics were by far the largest denominations. In 1900, the Moravians counted more than 28,000 members and the Catholics almost 13,000. In 1937, both churches had more than 29,000 adherents: the total number of more than 71,000 Christians was outnumbered by 41,300 Muslims and 32,000 Hindus, who at the turn of the century had numbered respectively almost 4,000 and more than 11,000 souls.⁷ Migration and great demographic change would remain an important

aspect in Suriname in the twentieth century. The overwhelming majority of the immigrants would go to the plantations outside Paramaribo, but time-expired contract laborers already lived in town in the very first years of the twentieth century.

Paramaribo in the Early Twentieth Century

Paramaribo was the only city in a very centralized colony.⁸ It was the cultural, commercial, political, and educational center; only Nieuw Nickerie in the west had developed into a small regional hub, growing from 1,400 inhabitants in 1900 to nearly 4,000 by 1940 (Van Traa 1946: 10, 50). As any primate city in the world, Paramaribo was multifaceted. It showed an attractive façade to the casual visitor, but often literally behind this front was the stark reality of the town slums as demonstrated by Paul Flu's description.

In 1911, the physician Paul Christiaan Flu left Paramaribo only to return for a research trip in late 1927.⁹ Flu, of course, was curious as to what his native town would look like after 17 years. In the Netherlands he had heard that he would be disappointed in "everything he would see": ramshackle houses were badly in need of a couple of layers of paint. He was happy to see upon his return that things were not as desperate as predicted (Flu 1928: 3). "The white painted wooden houses contrast beautifully against the dark green and seen from the river [the Suriname] the town looks picturesque." Before Flu left Suriname, the roads were in such a bad state that the term "street" was a euphemism. They were nothing more than dirt tracks: in the dry season one was up to his ankles in sand, while in the rainy season these "streets" were quagmires.¹⁰ Yet, Flu noticed improvements here as well: the streets were "enormously improved." It used to be that two ditches of about 2 meters wide along the street would drain the water; these ditches were bordered by grass and bushes which would grow so high as to give the streets a jungle-like appearance. In 1927, the town center looked much better: shells replaced the sand, new sidewalks had been built, and recently constructed sewers replaced the ditches.

Despite these improvements the living conditions of the majority of the population were poor. The poorer parts on the outskirts looked the same as in the first decade of the century. Although visitors praised the exotic, Dutch-looking white wooden houses, the great majority of the population lived in less comfortable abodes dating from the era of slavery. Most "grand houses" had a so-called *erf* (yard) containing negro-houses (*negerhuizen*): rows of small rooms in a shed close to the main building. Thus rich and poor, which largely translated into ethnic and color terms, lived in close proximity, yet the social differences were hard to escape in these hierarchically organized spaces. Yards in which 50 or more individuals lived were no exception. According to Flu (1922–1923), the rooms were about four by five meters, housing eight to ten people. The wooden floor was often 30 to

50 cm above the ground and the boards were not joined, producing cracks where sand would collect, thus creating breeding spaces for sand fleas.¹¹ In 1913, a new social research group, *de Sociale Studiekring*, identified housing as the colony's most pressing social problem (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2008: 64–65).

A rather bleak government report by Rabbi J. S. Roos (1912: 36) comments that in the yards “everything looks bare, filthy, and disgusting.” In the rainy season matters deteriorated even further as the sewage capacity was insufficient to drain off all the rain water. After a heavy rain shower the water in the streets could be up to 50 cm high, flooding houses and creating breeding spaces for mosquitoes. The flooding problem was very much out in the open, but the authorities could not or would not spend the rather large amounts of money needed to fix it. The mosquito problem was probably less obviously dangerous, but these insects could transfer malaria, yellow fever, filariasis, and dengue. In the first decades of the twentieth century, several engineers designed as many plans for a sewage system, but all these efforts were in vain for lack of money. The same was the case for the construction of a water supply system. People collected rain water in all sorts of open vessels, which invariably created an ideal breeding ground for mosquitoes.¹² A water supply system was finally built in 1933; the authorities ordered the closing of all wells and the removal of rain water collecting vessels. Yet, Dr Simons reported 17 years later that people were standing in long lines to get water from one of the few standpipes.¹³ Drinking water was thus available, but hard to obtain. Clean water for bathing and house cleaning was not available, and therefore people continued collecting rain water in open vessels. In short, the city underwent improvements in the early decades of the twentieth century, but for the majority of the population things at the personal level remained the same.

The government report of 1912 also commented on the coarse, boisterous, and selfish behavior of the inhabitants of the yards. It thus stressed the, in the eyes of the author, disharmonious and inferior life style of the lower classes. The inhabitants themselves often gave a different picture by pointing at the solidarity among people in the yard: “you dump your children there in the yard and they would be watched over until you came back. It was really a kind of community they have there.”¹⁴

Demography and Labor in Paramaribo

In 1900, the city counted 32,000 inhabitants and in 1940 this number had grown to 50,000. The relative number of town dwellers declined from 44 to 31 percent, due to Asian migration to the plantations. The population count of 1921 reveals that Paramaribo at that time was a Creole town: more than 80 percent of the inhabitants belonged to this population group (see Table 1.2). There was a steady rural–urban migration; particularly, young

Table 1.2 Population of Suriname and Paramaribo by Ethnicity 1921

<i>Ethnicity</i>	<i>Suriname</i>	<i>Paramaribo</i>	<i>Living in Paramaribo</i>
Creole	55,138 (49.7%)	35,486 (81.1%)	64.4%
Hindust.	30,530 (27.5%)	3,380 (7.7%)	11.1%
Javanese	18,529 (16.7%)	527 (1.2%)	2.8%
Chinese	1,313 (1.2%)	966 (2.2%)	73.6%
European	1,396 (1.3%)	1,066 (2.4%)	76.4%
Others*	4,027 (3.6%)	2,332 (5.3%)	57.9%

*Others include individuals from elsewhere in the Caribbean, mostly men between 20 and 40 years of age. In 1921, more than 8 percent of the heads of households and singles in Paramaribo were born elsewhere in the region (De Bruijne 1976b: 49).

Source: De Bruijne 1976b: 43.

Creoles moved to town, while the elderly stayed behind in the districts (De Bruijne 1976b: 48–49; Van Lier 1971: 250, 253–254). The majority of Creoles, Chinese, Europeans, and “others” resided in Paramaribo, while the overwhelming majority of Javanese still lived in the districts. Many of the Hindustani town dwellers were born in Calcutta, and had urban roots. After 1920, the number of Hindustani children increased as their parents sent them to town for education, often at a Roman–Catholic institution (De Bruijne 1976b: 50–51).

Visitors and residents alike commented on the liveliness of Paramaribo and its multiethnic and multilingual population, despite the fact that Creoles dominated the city. In an autobiography, a resident of Paramaribo describes his street in the center of town during the 1930s: “one would find Chinese, mulattoes, blacks, European and Surinamese whites, Hindustanis, Javanese, Amerindians, bush negroes and it was full of colorful types.”¹⁵ Most shopkeepers were Chinese, Portuguese, or Lebanese.¹⁶ Chain migration made that the Chinese population steadily grew to more than 2,000 people in the 1930s (Tjon Sie Fat 2009: 73). Almost all streets had one or more shops, making competition between them stiff, forcing the shopkeepers to reduce prices or to extend credit to nonsolvent customers (Roos 1912: 85–88).

An extensive government report on labor, published in 1912, gives an indication of the most common occupations among 12,071 registered individuals (8,789 men and 3,228 women) in Paramaribo on January 1, 1910. The by far largest groups were gold miners (1,956, all men), domestic servants (1,067, of whom 1,014 women), washer women (1,299, all women), smallholders (790, of whom 643 men and 147 women), and carpenters (719, all men).¹⁷ Of the 3,228 listed women, 40 percent were washer women (making approximately 20 guilders per month, when it was estimated that one female adult in Paramaribo would spend more than 3 guilders per week on food alone), more than 31 percent were domestics (making between 10 and 16 guilders per month), and 9 percent market women. Job opportunities for women were thus limited, especially considering that nursing and education was the domain of the unmarried white and light-colored

Creole population (Surinaamsche Sub-Comitee 1912: 18). Looking at both men and women, most people were employed in domestic service (20 percent), trades (14 percent), and retailing (9.5 percent). The industrial sector was underdeveloped and included a few printers and plants producing gas, ice, and matches.

The same report listed 2,200 men and 10,029 women as unemployed; also 10,097 children under 14 years of age held no regular job (Roos 1912: 31). The account notes that because of the shortage of jobs, many (semi-)skilled people moved abroad (Roos 1912: 54). It lists no numbers or destinations, but it seems likely that the Netherlands, the Netherlands East Indies, and since the 1920s especially Curaçao and Aruba were among the main destinations.¹⁸ Van Lier (1971: 248–251) also notes that the skilled lower classes experienced serious difficulties on the job market. He does not think that unemployment among the working class was a problem before 1924. After the collapse of the gold and balata industries many unemployed drifted to town, however.

There was a clear ethnic division of labor in many occupations. Data from the 1930s show that all professionals and almost all civil servants were Creole or Dutch. In the (lower) middle class the group of teachers was 84 percent Creole and the police was 85 percent Creole. For this group, education opened up the road to social mobility. As a matter of fact, education itself became an important venue to make a career. Among lower-class occupations, almost all carters were Hindustanis and Creoles dominated such trades as shoemaking and carpenting. Most Hindustanis earned their living in the trade, transport, and agricultural sectors and were often self-employed (De Bruijne 1976b: 42; 51).

The Economy: Characteristics and Impediments

Suriname was a small, open colony. It was vulnerable to a number of developments that it had little or no control over, including world demand and prices, insect and plant diseases, and its geographical location. Moreover, Suriname produced no agricultural products or raw materials that other Caribbean colonies, or the Netherlands East Indies for that matter, did not export as well. Domestically, production of anything but export products—such as sugar and cacao, and later gold, balata, and bauxite—was low. The import of foodstuffs hampered the development of local production by smallholders. As a result, in almost all years between 1900 and the beginning of World War II, the value of imports exceeded exports. The major exception was during World War I, when ties were largely cut with the metropolis and other European and American countries.

Suriname used to be a typical Caribbean plantation economy, producing mainly sugar, cacao, and coffee. After the abolition of slavery, the Netherlands, the local administration, and the planters wanted to continue on this path, despite the fact that market conditions for Suriname's

crops were poor, if only because of international competition and trade policies coupled with transportation difficulties. The Netherlands were focused on reducing Suriname's deficit and most politicians and officials were convinced that only large-scale agriculture could bring economic relief. Yet in the first decades of the century, the plantation sector withered away. Some new (mineral) products seemed to provide an alternative, but the optimism turned out to be short lived. In 1910, the two main products, gold and balata comprised half of the export value, but 15 years later, that picture had completely changed. Despite the changes in products, one basic pattern remained the same: whether the export products were tropical crops or raw materials, the large plantations, gold mines, and balata companies were mainly in foreign hands, thus making the colony even more dependent on decisions made outside Suriname.

Communication and transportation within the colony and with the outside world was complicated. Water was the most important means of transportation. Regular shipping lines existed with the Netherlands,¹⁹ New York, Curaçao, and the neighboring Guianas. The French *Compagnie Générale Transatlantique* sailed to Paramaribo once a month, giving the Dutch colony a second connection to Le Havre. From Suriname, the United States and not the Netherlands was the most frequent destination, mainly because of the export of bananas in the 1910s and bauxite in the 1930s.²⁰ In 1939, KLM (*Koninklijke Luchtvaartmaatschappij* / Royal Dutch Airlines) performed its first regular flight connecting Amsterdam with Paramaribo by way of Curaçao and Trinidad.²¹ Communication by wire was difficult and "exorbitantly" expensive and a source of complaint for decades. Therefore, businesses sent their messages by mail carrier to the capital of British Guiana, Georgetown, to save more than 200 guilders per telegram (Schoch 1924: 500–501).

In Suriname itself, with its huge underdeveloped hinterland transportation was hazardous and thus expensive. Government sea ships served the coastal districts on a regular if infrequent basis: once a week to the districts of *Coronie* and *Nickerie* (continuing to *Demerara*) and once every fortnight to *Albina* in the district of *Marowijne*.²² A continuing service from there to *Cayenne* was discontinued. In addition, a fleet of smaller government ships were used for travel within the colony. As a result, Paramaribo was a distant place for people living in, for example, *Nickerie*. As *Lila Gobardhan-Rambocus* expressed, "we used to say 'we're going to Suriname' when we left for Paramaribo" and that was after World War II.²³ In contrast to British Guiana, Suriname had few paved roads, which made communication and transport difficult and expensive. Bauxite and gold mining prompted the building of roads to *Brownsberg* and, much later, from *Albina* to *Moengo*, respectively. The first was taken over by nature after the gold industry went into decline. The construction of a railroad turned out to be a disappointment, as will be described below.

Agriculture

Developments outside and within the colony led to profound changes in the economic structure and the pattern of agricultural specialization in the first decades of the century. Fluctuations in world market prices of, for example, sugar and coffee, plant diseases such as witch's broom, that destroyed the cultivation of cocoa, and changing government policies first supporting large-scale agriculture and later focusing on smallholders had their effect on production, export volumes, and revenues. The significance of the main product, sugar, started its decline already in the nineteenth century. Soon after the abolition of slavery, sugar production was confined to large estates where technical improvements could be introduced. As a result, the number of estates declined, while the total area under cultivation grew slightly. In 1890, 14 estates were producing sugar and in 1930 only four were remaining. Scale increases and modernization kept production at the pre-abolition level of 8–9 million kilograms. Employment on the sugar plantations remained high: in 1900, the sector employed 5,000 workers (58 percent immigrants), in 1920 this number increased to 7,000 (94 percent immigrants) and to 7,500 in 1930 (Hoefte 1998: 210–211). Yet marketing, transportation, and especially the rapidly declining price of the product posed severe problems and made the cultivation of sugar unprofitable in Suriname. In 1939, only 6 percent of the total value of exports was derived from sugar products (Hoefte 1998: 15–18; Van Dijck 2001: 53–54). Despite these developments, Van Lier (1971: 239) concludes that “‘in drawing up plans for the development of Suriname the planters’ interests always received first consideration.”

The decline of sugar and the search for alternatives changed the structure of production and the choice of products. The number of large plantations more than halved in the first three decades of the century.²⁴ Plantations were reclaimed by nature or the government subdivided the estate into small rental plots. Planters and the colonial government searched for alternatives to sugar and tried to cultivate cacao, coffee, bananas (*bacoven*), citrus, rubber, cotton, and sisal to keep large-scale agriculture alive.²⁵ Fluctuating demand and prices on the world market, plant diseases, problems with transportation and marketing made none of these products a lasting success, however. In the end, until World War II, no product provided large-scale agriculture with a lasting alternative to sugar.

Small-scale agriculture included subsistence farming, production for the domestic market, and small-scale export farming. Around the turn of the century, approximately half of the working population was involved in independent agricultural activities (Heilbron 1982: 201). They had to compete with imports from overseas. In 1900, the average size of a plot was 0.09 ha, and the acreage under cultivation by smallholders was 3.378 ha.²⁶ Before 1895, mostly Creole farmers cultivated cacao. Insects and diseases, however, ruined the cultivation of this product in the last decade of the nineteenth century.²⁷ In the 1920s, the sector was almost completely liquidated.

Following this deception, the small-scale and urban agricultural sector produced mainly for the domestic market. Small-scale agriculture expanded despite government support for the larger plantations and the antagonism between large- and small-scale farming. Traditional products included (root) vegetables, corn, coconuts, and fruits. Small-scale cattle breeders and poultry farmers sold dairy products and meat. This type of agriculture was concentrated near the only town; given the poor infrastructure, for smallholders living further away from Paramaribo it took too long and too much effort to get their products to the city.²⁸ In the early twentieth century, most of these smallholders supplying the urban market were Hindustanis. The sellers were often not the smallholders or their relatives themselves, but Creole market women. Hindustani vendors, often the wives or relatives of peasants, however, gradually pushed out these Creole women; by 1938 only some 30 market women were remaining.²⁹ The Hindustani women walked the streets with a basket on their heads filled with fruits and vegetables.

The development of small-scale agriculture showed considerable regional differences. In *Coronie* and *Upper-Para* the sector remained strong, while in the traditional plantation areas in the northeast it came and went in a flash. Early signs in *Saramacca* and *Nickerie* were hopeful, but the disappearance of cacao was the death knell for Creole smallholding there. In the twentieth century, rice production by Hindustanis and *balata* bleeding would revive *Nickerie* in particular. In the former plantation areas, young people were pushed by the past in the form of the rejection of large-scale agriculture and economic insecurity, and pulled by the prospects of another life in nearby *Paramaribo* or the gold and *balata* fields. They left the old, infirm, and children behind. Here, smallholders barely managed to cultivate enough to supply their own needs and needed additional work. The quality of the plots and the water infrastructure were often substandard (Klinkers 1997: 161–162; De Kom 1934: 166–169).

Historians Gert Oostindie and Alex van Stipriaan (1995) blame ecological and technological difficulties for the problems of smallholders. They point out that only in *Coronie* and *Para*, areas without polders, the Creoles managed to earn a living as smallholders. Klinkers (1997: 163–171) puts forward another argument. Unlike other regions like the northeast, traditional communities and family networks stayed intact in *Coronie* and *Para*, where smaller cotton and timber plantations were located. Here, villages and communities sprung up after state supervision had ended. In *Coronie*, the Creoles bought land and built houses with money made from selling fish and agricultural products. *Para*'s inhabitants bought old estates and also founded landowning cooperatives. The subsistence farmers sold surplus products in *Paramaribo*, despite the difficulties of getting fresh products there in due time. *Coronie* farmers, in particular, supplied the market with coconut oil, used for cooking. Klinkers emphasizes the importance of the family, household, and

community structure in smallholding.³⁰ Few people moved away from Coronie and Upper-Para. Klinkers argues that the Creole communities here resembled the idea of a moral economy, based on extensive and strong family and community networks. She contrasts this moral economy to the image of the Hindustani “rational peasants.” They entered the sector in the 1890s as more market-oriented and rational than the Creole peasants, who, in addition, had enjoyed more favorable conditions than the Creole smallholders in the 1870s, when the state provided more land and better infrastructure. Finally, the Asian immigrants had fewer options as they were excluded from gold mining or balata bleeding.

The market for food crops steadily grew in the twentieth century and was booming during World War I, when the import of food was problematic and production as well as prices soared. For example, the production of rice increased with 200 percent and root vegetables with more than 160 percent.³¹ Prices of products such as imported and domestic rice and brown sugar nearly doubled (Hoefte 1998: 123). As a result, the number of small-scale production units, the acreage in use by smallholders, and the number of producers and family members dependent on this sector all increased. By then, Asian smallholders outnumbered Creoles (Van Lier 1971: 234). Within five years the share of the population active in this sector increased from approximately 30 percent to almost 36 percent.³² This development, however, was less positive for the nonagricultural urban population and the plantation workers as prices soared. The average weekly spending by a Hindustani plantation worker increased from 4.50 before World War I to 6.24 guilders in 1917, while wages remained the same (Hoefte 1998: 124).

As chapter 2 will show, in the twentieth century the administration in Paramaribo gradually increased its support of small-scale agriculture in order to increase the domestic production of food, populate the districts, generate taxes, and create a labor reserve for the plantations. The most obvious government effort in this respect was the distribution of new land, which the colonists had to prepare themselves, in the fertile district of Nickerie, stimulating former indentured laborers to farm rice. Nickerie counted approximately 4,500 inhabitants around the turn of the century. Most were former enslaved who produced coffee, cacao, and bananas. Some 400 Asian immigrants worked at the four plantations. Almost two decades later, in 1918, there were 400 rice farmers owning their own land, varying in size between 4 and 12 ha.³³ Yet, it took the government until the 1930s to see smallholding as an important *economic* sector.

Rice had been known in Suriname for centuries, yet the Asian immigrants fully developed its cultivation, particularly during World War I (see Table 1.3). The rice polders in Nickerie belonged to the largest concentrations of smallholders in the colony. The government financed the water infrastructure such as sluices. Agricultural prices reached a peak during the war years, but started declining again within a few years. World market prices dropped to such low levels that export of rice, corn, and other

Table 1.3 Rice Production in 100,000 Kg in Suriname 1911–1939

1911	2,195
1916	7,471
1921	11,797
1926	21,530
1931	24,395
1936	33,726
1939	39,424

Source: Van Traa 1946: 110.

products stopped, while prices in the domestic market fell when after World War I unrestricted imports from the Netherlands and other countries resumed. Yet, domestic consumption made the cultivation of rice still profitable and the production kept rising, especially in Nickerie and the Saramacca polder. Rice was not only a staple food for the Hindustanis and Javanese, but also became the main item in the Creole diet, replacing bananas. In 1939, the six polders in Nickerie covered 4,866 ha, and were predominantly populated by migrants from British India and their descendants (Van Traa 1946: 108–111; also Heilbron 1982: 253–256). Some rice farmers, as earlier cacao farmers, were able to expand their arable holdings and production to form a class of agricultural entrepreneurs.

In 1937, the colony counted 73,993 smallholders cultivating 22,377 ha; more than 50,000 of them were of Asian descent (Van Traa 1946: 107; Van Lier 1971: 234). Of these Asian smallholders, many Hindustanis produced for the domestic market or cultivated rice, while the majority of the Javanese were subsistence farmers.

Gold, Balata, Timber, and Bauxite

It appeared as though the myth of Eldorado would turn into reality in the late nineteenth century when gold was discovered in all three Guianas.³⁴ The bleeding of balata was less mythical, but it pushed the colonies into the fast, modern world of suppliers of the raw material for telegraph cables. Developments in the gold industry in Suriname were, however, dwarfed by French Guiana where production levels were four times as high.³⁵ The Surinamese gold and balata industries were also smaller than in British Guiana, yet the two products had a greater relative importance to the economy of the Dutch colony.³⁶

Inspired by findings in French Guiana, the first serious exploration of gold took place in Suriname in 1874. A year later, the Surinaamsche Bank bought the first bar of gold. Gold fever really caught on when large deposits were discovered near Sarakreek, a tributary to the Suriname River approximately 100 kilometers south of Paramaribo. The colonial administration distributed concessions to explore and mine for the coveted metal.³⁷ Yet by 1877, only two concessions still produced gold. A concentration

of production took place in the 1880s as the majority of these permits were granted to large, foreign companies. After 1903, only Dutch nationals, inhabitants of Suriname, or companies registered in the Netherlands or Suriname could receive concessions (Polak 1908: 7–32, 132–137). The administration wanted to prevent intervention by foreign governments, but did not aim to exclude foreign capital. Thus, foreign companies could invest in the gold industry on the condition of registration in the Netherlands or Suriname. The law did not lead to foreign disinvestment: the French *Compagnie des Mines d'Or* was the largest company and survived the longest; it stopped its operation in 1928. German, French, British, American, and South African nationals were among the many foreigners who came to Suriname as entrepreneurs, engineers, and fortune hunters.

The license policy of the administration was geared toward companies and not individual pork knockers. In 1883, the contracting of workers in the gold fields became a government concern. Police officers in Paramaribo supervised the signing of labor contracts, and policemen in the districts controlled the gold placers (and balata concessions) to prevent illegal exploitation and smuggling. Given the size of the concessions and the limited size of the police force, this was an almost impossible task (Klinkers 2011: 48–50, 74–79). Work in the gold and balata industry was generally considered as strenuous and full of hardship, but earnings were attractive, as skilled workers could make 2 to 2.50 guilders a day plus keep, compared to approximately 1.20 guilders as a skilled plantation laborer, a bricklayer at 2.25 guilders, and a carpenter at 1.50 guilders per day (Roos 1912: 64–66; Van Lier 1971: 245).

In 1900, 5,513 men had a government contract allowing them to work in gold placers.³⁸ Almost 99 percent of them were employed in the Upper Suriname, Saramacca, and Marowijne regions. When more placers were opened up near Paramaribo around the turn of the century, the industry in the interior had difficulty attracting sufficient workers and sick leaves could reach to more than 20 percent (Polak 1908: 178). In 1900, serious deliberations took place to attract foreign workers. One transport of an unknown number of workers from Montserrat arrived in Suriname. This was the only transport, as no new foreign laborers were needed anymore because the industry went into a decline.³⁹ An additional problem was that laborers simultaneously received advances from different companies, but then did not show up for work. Efforts to control the quality of labor largely failed.⁴⁰ The highest authorities tried to maintain labor discipline in the industry, but results were mixed.⁴¹

Just before the turn of the century mechanization of production started to increase productivity, now that in the Netherlands shares in gold companies went up in price. The six biggest companies all had more than 1,000,000 guilders in capital assets (Heilbron & Willemsen 1980a: 80). The results of mechanization, however, were not as positive as had been hoped. Some of the equipments did not suit the geological conditions in Suriname or were not built for gold extraction, while the lack of skilled personnel was another obstacle. In addition, transportation of the heavy

equipment to the interior proved difficult. Often mules were used, but repeatedly these animals succumbed to the heavy loads. The mechanized phase of gold extraction ended already in the first years of the new century. According to Polak (1908: 159, 266), mismanagement in general, the failed introduction of machinery in particular, and the excessive prices for concessions were the death knell of the industry.

The colonial administration, and later the government in The Hague, nevertheless showed its optimism by planning the colony's first railway, from Paramaribo to the Lawa fields bordering French Guiana. The idea was that this line would also serve agriculture and the balata and timber industries. This infrastructural project was considered a boost to the flagging economy. The 173-km long railroad was completed in 1912 reaching only to Dam in the rainforest. The extension to the Lawa was never built. The project turned out to be a heavy drain on the treasury, as the construction costs were approximately 8 million guilders.⁴² In the end, predominantly smallholders used the train to transport their products to Paramaribo; therefore, it soon got the name "market train" or "milk train" (Van Putten 1990: 70).

The number of construction laborers on the railway varied between 600 and 1700 men in the early years, and included Javanese, British Indians, Afro-Surinamese, and West-Indians. In 1903, 170 men were recruited on the Dutch Caribbean islands, many of whom quickly succumbed to malaria. This disease turned out to be major problem once construction reached the interior. In addition, British Indians and Javanese returned to the plantations, when large-scale agriculture picked up again in 1906. Javanese, who in that year were contracted specifically to work on the railroad, were sent back to Java because of malaria infection. Trials with Barbadians were unsuccessful as well. Only Afro-Surinamese and British-Guianese were immune to malaria. In 1906, the number of construction workers was reduced to 500 (Polak 1908: 227–267).

In 1908, Suriname's production was at its peak with 1,210 kilograms of gold (see Table 1.4). At that point, almost all of this was mined again by hand. Some of the *gowntuman* (literally gold men) managed to become rich and were the toast of the town. But even for the individual workers gold prospecting lost its luster. Exhaustion of the most accessible placers, the rising production costs, the steady price of gold, and the rising cost of living made gold mining increasingly less attractive. However, gold mining would make a comeback in Suriname at the turn of the millennium (chapter 8).

Compared to British Guiana, Suriname was rather late when it began to exploit balata (or bulletree).⁴³ The English colony started to export this product in 1865, while Suriname recorded its first serious harvest in 1890. In that year, the administration defined the conditions for the distribution of concessions; the ruling was based on the model of British Guiana.⁴⁴ Again the exploitation of a raw material was in the hands of companies, of which the largest, Balata Compagnie Suriname, was owned by the Surinamese business firm of C. Kersten. The government, apprehensive of fraud and smuggling, did not grant concessions to individuals, yet reversed this policy

Table 1.4 Gold Export in Kg and Guilders 1896–1930

<i>Years</i>	<i>Amount (Kg)</i>	<i>Value</i>
1896–1900	4.386	6.008.820
1901–1905	3.996	5.474.520
1906–1910	5.717	7.832.290
1911–1915	4.386	6.008.820
1916–1920	3.261	4.467.570
1921–1925	1.753	2.401.610
1926–1930	929	1.272.730

Source: Adapted from Heilbron & Willemsen 1980a: 83; Van Traa 1946: 209.

under pressure to relieve unemployment in 1932. The administration in Paramaribo allocated the concessions. All balata had to be delivered to Paramaribo or branch offices in Albina or Nieuw Nickerie. Government officials then inspected, weighed, and shipped the balata. Contracts with laborers were signed at the police station in Paramaribo, in an attempt to control the business as well as laborers. Surinamese politicians differed on the role of the police: did the force take the workers' complaints seriously or did they take sides with the concession holders? The majority believed the latter to be the case (Klinkers 2011: 79).

Balata trees were spread over the colony, but most were found in Nickerie, where bleeding was most intensive and had to be stopped in the early 1890s because of overexploitation. Only a decade later could bleeding be resumed there, when some 1,300 bleeders worked in this district (Heilbron 1982: 175, 249–250). In 1900, the export of balata was 208,805 kilograms. The balata industry reached its highpoint in the years 1911–1914, exporting approximately 1.5 million kilograms and employing some 7,000 laborers, including workers from the British Caribbean, Amerindians, and Maroons.⁴⁵ The balata law of 1890 strictly prohibited the employment of British Indians.⁴⁶ Usually a team of bleeders consisted of 15 to 40 individuals. High advances lured foreign workers, particularly from St Lucia, thus transferring money abroad. It could take weeks before the laborers reached their concession in the forest.⁴⁷ Once there, it was almost impossible for both the employers and the government to control the activities of the men, who enjoyed great freedom, one of the attractions of the work. Earnings could be high, depending on the production. It certainly was not easy money, as the work was exhaustive and carried a certain risk: if little balata could be tapped, income would be low, as there was no fixed wage in this industry. As a consequence, workers would be in debt to their employers who had given them an advance. Balata-bleeding was not a year-round business, most laborers could work six months per year. Yearly earnings varied between 250 and 1,000 guilders (Van Lier 1971: 245). Sudden wealth was more common in the gold than in the balata industry. Nevertheless, more money came into circulation, stimulating the domestic economy, although a large part was spent outside of Suriname. In the case of Nickerie, it was much easier and cheaper to buy food, tools,

Table 1.5 Balata Export in Kg and Guilders 1891–1935

<i>Years</i>	<i>Amount (Kg)</i>	<i>Value</i>
1891–1895	490.779	873.427
1896–1900	809.601	1.522.491
1901–1905	1.434.000	2.768.013
1906–1910	2.375.993	7.401.267
1911–1915	3.917.476	12.852.528
1916–1920	3.511.288	11.199.221
1921–1925	2.840.000*	10.019.743
1926–1930	n/a	7.497.510
1931–1935	n/a	1.341.240

*Estimate

Sources: Adapted from Oudschans Dentz, Plasschaert, & Sack 1909: 91; Olivieira 1977: 51–52.

and other necessities in British Guiana than in Suriname. Laborers from Demerara or elsewhere were likely to spend most of their earnings in their homelands, as they returned immediately after their job was completed.⁴⁸

Some experts believed that balata bleeding would become the new monoculture of Suriname. However, the boom ended soon because of the unsustainable way the material was harvested, forcing bleeders to go deeper into the hinterland, making exploitation less profitable. Meanwhile, on the world market prices fell after 1921 because supply was much higher than the decreasing demand (see Table 1.5). In the 1930s, all balata companies ceased their activities in Suriname, firing hundreds of laborers.

Apart from companies and workers in the gold and balata industries, another group profited from the economic expansion in the hinterland: the transporters and guides. In both Suriname and French Guiana, transport was a monopoly of the Maroons with their boating skills and knowledge of the waterways in the interior. Amerindians possessed this experience and expertise as well, but their numbers were too small to be serious competitors. In the interior, rapids and water falls block all rivers every few kilometers. To make matters even more complicated, a boat crew had to find a new path on each trip as the form and extent of the natural barriers would change in the course of a short time (Thoden van Velzen & Van Wetering 1988: 22). As of the late eighteenth century Maroons had been involved in the lumber trade. The gold industry and its need for transportation facilities took, however, Maroon males away from their villages and families to uninhabited parts of Suriname, French Guiana, and northern Brazil. French Guiana, however, was the destination of preference. According to a song

A-yai-yo, A-yai-yea
 Money is finished in Suriname
 Lower Cayenna took it!
 A-yai-yo, A-yai-yea (Quoted in Herskovits & Herskovits
 1934: 52).

The colonial authorities recorded the first substantial number of Maroons working as guides and transporters for the gold industry in 1882. The transporters (or *bagasiman* in Ndyuka) in their canoes moved workers back and forth to the placers and hauled food and equipment. After the decline of the gold industry, the booming of balata bleeding kept the Maroons in the transportation business, but the halcyon years were over by 1920, and many Maroons went back to logging now that there was less demand for transport and fright prices fell precipitously.

The Maroons could and did extract high wages and fright prices in an inelastic market. Each major discovery of gold led to rise in prices. In 1901, a bonanza in French Guiana caused major problems for the main company in Suriname as it was short of supplies, food, equipment, and spare parts. Even a 100 percent price increase could not lure transporters to Suriname. After the gold rush along the Inini River was over, prices fell back to the normal level (Thoden van Velzen & Van Wetering 1988: 25; see also Scholtens 1994: 60–63). By 1915, the most profitable years for the *bagasiman* were over. Prices dropped so low, even more because of the devaluation of the French franc, and consumer prices were so high that in 1921 the transporters staged the longest strike in Suriname's colonial history. For three months the *bagasiman* effectively brought the gold and balata industry to a standstill in both Suriname and French Guiana. Next to the economic effect, this also put a strain on French–Dutch diplomatic relations. The strike was ended when a Dutch colonial official drove a political and religious wedge between the striking Maroons.⁴⁹

Anthropologists H. U. E. Thoden van Velzen and W. van Wetering (1988: 25–29) estimated the annual income of a boat crew to assess the economic position of freight carriers: in the period 1885–1920, the income of boat crew members was rarely below 2,500 guilders per year, and for many years considerably higher. In other words, the transporters' earnings were higher than the wages of the best-paid laborers in town or in the placers. As one missionary explained the new affluence: “Suddenly the Bush Negroes had become rich gentlemen” able to buy any desired European luxury product.⁵⁰ This affluence, however, disrupted social relations as income differences between boatmen and their relatives caused tensions. Yet, the old communities continued to survive.

The involvement of Maroons in the gold and balata industries was not the first time they participated in the colonial monetary economy. Maroons held a virtual monopoly in the logging and transportation of trees to the coastal zone, where wood was an all important material in the construction of buildings.⁵¹ Although the administration imposed rules, the Maroons had the freedom to log and sell wood as they pleased. Yet in this case as well, the colonial administration tried to get a grip on commercial activities in the hinterland.⁵² In 1919, Maroons and Amerindians had to apply for three-year concessions to sell wood; commercial companies were allowed to exploit traditional Maroon areas. Immediately, Dutch, American, and Belgian companies invested in the timber industry

but results were poor. The limited availability of specific timber species, plummeting prices on the world market, and transportation costs stalled exploitation within a few years and the Maroons retained half of the colonial timber production (Scholtens 1994: 56–59; Van Traa 1946: 121–126). Paramaribo was determined to limit Maroon influence and power and to assimilate the group within “the normal colonial population” (Scholtens 1994: 58). One colonial official expected that with the exploitation of the rainforest and the construction of the Lawa railroad the Maroons as a separate entity would disappear. The growth of the companies and the resulting encroachment on traditional Maroon territory caused tensions and only strengthened the administration in its plans to curb Maroon rights and to control their activities (Scholtens 1994: 57–58, 181–182; Van Traa 1946: 118). In the last years of the twentieth century, the timber industry would expand again. Once more foreign, this time Asian, companies and the government encroached upon the territories and the rights of Maroons and Amerindians, as is discussed in chapter 8.

A final new economic sector was bauxite. The exploitation and processing of this material would transform Suriname’s export economy. Its main pillar would no longer be agriculture but bauxite. Because of bauxite’s importance to twentieth-century Suriname, chapter 5 will focus on the social and economic consequences of the mining and processing of bauxite since World War II. Bauxite was discovered during gold prospecting expeditions in the two last years of the nineteenth century. Maybe because of the lure of gold, the Suriname administration or Dutch investors showed no interest in this discovery. World War I led to a sharp increase in demand and US companies searched for alternatives for European suppliers in the Americas. In 1916, Alcoa (Aluminum Company of America) established a subsidiary, *Surinaamsche Bauxiet Maatschappij* (Surinamese Bauxite Company), to exploit rich reserves in the Cottica River basin.⁵³ The company obtained exclusive control of almost 34,000 ha and the administration’s approval of the transfer of preferential mining rights for another 100,000 ha. The Americans required a monopoly: all bauxite “found and still to be found” in Suriname was to be reserved for an eastern Suriname aluminum plant (Lamur 1985: 4). In this “American takeover,” a term introduced by Carlo Lamur, nearly all bauxite land known at the time was denationalized.

At first, activities were concentrated in Moengo, a deserted Maroon village. The first shipment of bauxite took place in 1920. In 1926, a start was made with the construction of a refinery at Moengo. Soon the village housed more than 2,400 people. Paranam was the next site where since 1939 mining and processing facilities were built. The number of laborers in the bauxite industry increased from 273 in 1932 to 924 in 1939. During the 1930s, the volume of production doubled, but during the next decades the export production would multiply. In 1943, Suriname supplied a three-quarters of all bauxite used in the North American war industry (Van Dijk 2001: 55–57).

The Economy: Conclusion

The guarded optimism at the start of the century had given way to gloom three decades later. In 1900, cacao, balata, and especially gold seemed to be the new pillars of the colonial economy. The following table (Table 1.6) gives an indication of the volatility of Suriname's exports.

The boom in balata and gold was crucial to developing a nonagricultural labor market. The workers in these industries spent part of their earnings in the local economy, thus creating a small domestic market. On the downside, loans financed the underused railroad; the costs increased the financial dependency on the metropolis. Moreover, the interest in investing in Suriname received a blow.

The busts in gold, balata, and cacao made socioeconomic developments uncertain. Cacao had provided a measure of stability to many smallholders and small plantation owners. The gold, balata, and timber industry provided work to fewer people, but gave a taste of economic possibilities in new economic sectors. Now that all these sectors had dwindled or even collapsed, anxiety and misery took over. In addition, the world economic crisis in the 1930s hit Suriname too and as a result, conditions in the colony led to social unrest as will be seen in chapter 3.

Gold, balata, and rice benefited the development of the hinterland, in general, and of the district of Nickerie in particular. The large-scale influx of immigrants from British India and Java had a great demographic impact on the districts. Hired as contract laborers for the plantations, many of the immigrants and their descendants later settled as smallholders thus exemplifying the shift from plantation agriculture to smallholder production.

Suriname remained an agricultural economy in the first decades of the twentieth century. The question is whether it remained a plantation colony. According to Van Lier (1971: 217), "Surinam gradually lost the character of a plantation colony." That is true as far as the production of crops is concerned. Yet, Suriname's economic structure did not transform in any fundamental way. Mining products replaced tropical cash crops, but just as the large plantations, most of the mines and concessions were in the hands of foreigners, transferring profits out of the colony. In this sense, Suriname still was a plantation economy and the dependence on

Table 1.6 Main Export Products 1881–1940

<i>Period</i>	<i>Two Main Products in % of Total Export Value</i>	
1881–1890	Gold (34%)	Cacao (32%)
1891–1900	Cacao (41%)	Gold (26%)
1901–1910	Sugar (29%)	Gold (26%)
1911–1920	Balata (30%)	Sugar (29%)
1921–1930	Sugar (31%)	Coffee (22%)
1931–1940	Bauxite (54%)	Coffee (12%)

Source: C. Lamur 1985: 2.

bauxite during and after World War II would not change its economic structure. Suriname's economy was and would remain dependent on the supply and demand of European and North American markets. Moreover, the import of food and consumer goods frustrated the development of local production. The exception was the years of World War I, when the value of exports exceeded that of imports, also because of the growth in domestic food production.

The former director of the Surinaamsche Bank, A. van Traa, compared the economic situation of Suriname to British Guiana in the year 1937. He points out that the balance between import and export figures in British Guiana was much better. Also, Suriname's budget deficit was nearly ten times as high as the neighboring colony's. He concludes that colonial policy and British Guiana's place in the British Empire were of overriding importance. Britain's protective trade policy helped to save the sugar industry, which still counted for 60 percent of the export value of British Guiana. According to Van Traa, this trade protection and the larger market within the empire made all the difference between the colonies.⁵⁴

Politics and Administration

The economic fluctuations sketched above were also partly reflected in changes in the political balance as planters not only lost economic power but also political influence. The latter was also true for the colony as a whole. In the early twentieth century, Suriname experienced a setback in its degree of self-government. In 1901, the Dutch government amended the Constitution for Suriname (*Regeringsreglement*) of 1865, giving more power to The Hague, except for the assessment of taxes, the allocation of Crown Lands, and the right of budget. The latter colonial right did not carry much weight, as the final budget was made up in The Hague anyway. This new situation limited the power of the *Koloniale Staten* (the Colonial Estates), elected by an extremely narrow franchise of never more than 2 percent of the population.⁵⁵ The governor was to exercise his function with strict observance of the royal government's orders.⁵⁶ As Van Lier (1971: 300) states, "There is not the slightest doubt that up to 1937 the Governor possessed no independent executive power; he was the representative of the Crown and ruled the overseas territory of the Kingdom in the name of the King." In short, the government was highly centralized and hierarchical and policy was often made by individuals who had never visited the colony.

Suriname regained some of its autonomy in the 1930s. The 1936 Colonial Constitution retained the clause on the authority of the royal government, but the position of the governor changed nevertheless. He acquired independent authority and only had to defer to broad government policies. Simultaneously, the power of the *Staten*, renamed the *Staten van Suriname*, increased as this body now had the right of legislation, initiative, amendment, petition, and interpellation. Thus, the Colonial

Constitution granted shared legislative power to the governor and the *Staten*. It was impossible to enact an ordinance against the will of either the governor or the *Staten*. Yet, the governor still had the possibility to propose to The Hague to enact a regulation by Royal Decree even if the *Staten* overwhelmingly opposed such a decision (Van Lier 1971: 300–301; Meel 1999: 27; Gobardhan–Rambocus 2008: 73). In other words, the *Staten* held a number of important rights of a parliamentary body, but its resolutions could always be revoked by The Hague and ordinances could be imposed against the will of the colonial representatives. In addition, Van Lier (1971: 301) argues that the *Staten* could control the governor only by its right of interpellation, but it did not have the power to replace him if its members lost confidence in him. In short, the *Staten* “were a body with incomplete constitutional rights.”

The way the *Staten* was composed also changed in the early decades of the century. The 1866 constitution introduced nine elected and four appointed members,⁵⁷ yet in 1901 all members were to be elected. Historian C. Ch. Goslinga (1990: 657) identifies the year 1910 as “a watershed between the influences of the plantocracy and the rich at the one side and the middle class on the other side.” Goslinga (1990: 658) argues that “the creole middle class after 1910 replaced the plantocracy and the rich merchants as the mouthpiece of the population.” *Staten* members included merchants, landowners, lawyers, members of the Court of Justice, school directors, and journalists. Members defended group interests, not only in the *Staten*, but also in the press. Small issues could acquire more weight because of personal animosity and merciless criticism, sometimes leading to convictions and jail sentences for defamation (Gobardhan–Rambocus 2008: 66).

According to the government, the appointed members frequently fiercely opposed the governor, even though he had named them (Van Lier 1971: 302). To protect the rights and interests of the Hindustanis and Javanese, the 1936 constitution, however, reintroduced appointed members, now five out of a total of 15. The *Staten* suggested that the reintroduction of appointed members served to increase the governor’s power (Meel 1999: 27). Put differently, the institution of appointed *Staten* members was always under fire: they were either accused of opposing the governor or of enlarging his power base by kowtowing to him. The 1936 constitution also widened the franchise, now there were 1,706 electors, but still recent Asian immigrants would not fairly be represented if only elected members would form the *Staten*. The group that did become better represented because of the widening of the franchise was the middle class, including minor officials and teachers. Not only financial standing, but a certain degree of education now determined the franchise. Prior to 1940, of the then nearly 2,000 electors, 142 were Hindustani and 41 Javanese.⁵⁸ Their influence as well as that of the urban mercantile class and professionals grew to the detriment of the planters (Van Lier 1971: 334–339). The official parliamentary deliberations in the *Staten* as well as

in parliament and senate in The Hague quickly reached the public domain as literal transcriptions or extensive summaries were published in most Surinamese newspapers (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2008: 71).

The government's immigration policy and the Dutch obsession with Suriname's financial deficits were largely responsible for tensions between the metropolis and the colony. The annual debates on Suriname's budget in Dutch parliament constantly caused irritation in the colony, especially because the *Staten* believed that its opinions were ignored, its warnings not heeded, and its own policy measures not appreciated or understood. This type of government thus reinforced the authoritarian tradition as final power was in the hands of the governor and through him to the government in The Hague. Historian Hans Ramsoedh (2003: 208–210) argues that there existed different types of misgivings about this political situation. In the lower middle class the feelings were not so much anti-Dutch or anticolonial, but rather leveled at the local administration and political establishment. The middle class, however, resented its lack of true political influence. Van Lier (1971: 273–277) points at the “existing racial antagonism” between the Dutch elite and the light-colored Creole and Jewish upper classes. As a result, the social mobility of many light-colored Creoles was limited as the higher ranks of the civil service were hard to reach. Many attempted their luck in the Netherlands or the Netherlands East Indies, for example.

Not surprisingly, political frustrations combined with socioeconomic uncertainty evoked action. An attempted coup in 1910, however, failed. This so-called Killinger affair, named after a rather shadowy Hungarian-born police inspector,⁵⁹ tried to overthrow the administration and establish a “free state” under Dutch sovereignty.⁶⁰ Killinger and his six companions had hoped to gain the support of dissatisfied Hindustani contract laborers, but betrayal exposed the quite amateurish plan.⁶¹ Killinger was arrested and the trial lasted ten months. During the first day, thousands cheered “Long live Killinger!” in front of the court house (Ramsoedh 2003: 200). The court found Killinger and his men guilty and condemned them to death, this soon was amended into jail sentences. Ramsoedh (2003: 203–204) points out that the Killinger affair was not discussed in either the *Staten* or the Dutch parliament. The governor called the plan rather “fantastic” and emphasized that the popular spirit was “exceptionally good,” while the Colonial Minister regarded the coup as a “Surinamese exaggeration.” The Surinamese newspapers condemned Killinger. Moreover, the crowds in the streets of Paramaribo did not spring into action to protest the arrest or the conviction of Killinger. To be sure, the population sympathized with a man who had scared the colonial administration, but he was not viewed as the man who could change things for the better (Ramsoedh 2003: 208–211). Within a few years, the authorities lost their fear for rebellion or revolution, probably counting on the fact that the heterogeneous population

would be too segregated to unite in protest (see also Klinkers 2011: 94). What happened when activists did channel discontent and a messiah-like individual actually appeared on the Surinamese scene, at a time when socioeconomic conditions had even further deteriorated, will be discussed in chapter 3.

CHAPTER TWO

The Growing Role of the State in Late Colonial Society

This chapter discusses the activities of the state in shaping the social, economic, and cultural conditions in the first decades of the twentieth century. This is a period of temporary retreat from liberalism as the government saw a need for more regulation and a more active role for the state. The many changes in Suriname after the abolition of slavery led to a certain ambivalence and disagreement within the elites in the colony and politicians in the metropolis regarding the pace and the extent to which they had to react to these transformations that were initiated by the government itself. To make matters even more complicated, the reach and scope of the changes were often not clear at the outset. The new situation led to debate and discussion in both Suriname and the Netherlands.

The outcome was that the colonial state, albeit reluctantly, became increasingly involved in socioeconomic affairs. With the introduction of indentured immigrants, first from British India and later from Java, Suriname and the role of the colonial state changed considerably. The influx of tens of thousands of immigrants turned out to have a lasting impact. An evident result of the demographic growth was that state institutions, including security forces, expanded to deal with the swelling population in town (alternative) and in the districts. In addition, the police had to cover more territory and had more tasks now that new economic sectors were coming up. In a colonial state such as Suriname with its profound social and economic inequalities and existing racial and social hierarchies authoritarianism was ubiquitous. Not only the state, but employers, churches, schools, and the family demanded strict discipline and obedience. The entrance of new ethnic groups who were placed in a separate socioeconomic niche and were largely geographically separated from other groups only strengthened this tendency. Maybe less visible was the changing social and economic role of the colonial state after the decision to hire indentured Asian laborers. First, the state became involved in the recruitment of the immigrants and the financing of immigration.

Next, the state entered the plantations to control and uphold the rights of both the indentureds and the planters. Outside the plantations, the state was involved in the contracting of laborers for the gold and balata industries. As chapter 1 has shown, the state also held a monopoly in granting agricultural plots and concessions in the balata, gold, timber, and bauxite industries.

In the course of time, the purpose of immigration changed and the new goal was to populate the colony with smallholders on land provided by the government. Finally, the colonial state had to deal with the fact that the majority of Asian immigrants did not return to their homeland and stayed in Suriname. Was the state going to include these newcomers by assimilation or by recognition of cultural differences? Ultimately, in the years immediately before the watershed of World War II the then governor, against much opposition, tried to construct a colony leaning on Asian colonists and smallholders and based on ethnic diversification rather than assimilation.

The State and Indentured Immigration

After the abolition of slavery in 1863, the planters asked for a contingent of new laborers to continue their economic activities. These new laborers were to start working after the ten-year transition period of state supervision (*staatstoezicht*) had ended.¹ The governments in both The Hague and Paramaribo never questioned that agriculture was the *raison d'être* for Suriname. That was not to say, however, that the plantations and large-scale, temporary immigration were supported unanimously. In fact, the bill “to promote the importation of free laborers to the colony of Suriname” divided Dutch parliamentarians into two camps. One group supported government-subsidized immigration as the only means to save the colony. Their opponents stressed that the available labor force in Suriname was sufficient and that immigration schemes were thus unnecessary. This more or less ideological debate caught fire when the possible introduction of a fund to finance immigration put a financial edge on the discussion (see Hoefte 1998: 25–60).

The faction favoring government-sponsored immigration argued that sugar plantations were the exclusive base of the Surinamese economy. The survival of the sector depended on the importation of cheap and reliable labor from elsewhere. These parliamentarians labeled the former enslaved as too “inconsistent,” “unreliable,” “demoralized,” and “lazy” to work. “Free” laborers would teach the Creoles the virtues of regular work and discipline.²

The opposing group envisioned a colony based on the production of agricultural products by Creole peasants and pointed out that plantation agriculture was in permanent decline. The number of sugar plantations had declined throughout the nineteenth century and the (correct)

expectation was that after abolition this process would accelerate. Moreover, temporary migration without permanent settlement would not contribute to the development of the colony. Finally, the opponents were not at all sure about the quality of possible immigrants, whereas they believed in the economic potential of the Creole group.

Both groups tried to sway the colonial minister to their views. Minister J. J. van Bosse was initially against state-sponsored immigration but changed his mind. The main reason for this change, of course, was that he expected the revival of large-scale agriculture to make Suriname a profitable colony again. Thus, questions of efficiency and economic growth prevailed, and moral considerations regarding the Creole population and the Asian immigrants were avoided. Once it was decided to resort to immigration of temporary laborers, two issues remained: the area of recruitment and the sharing of the costs involved. The government was aware of the fact that Suriname competed with the British and French Caribbean colonies in the search for immigrant labor, but The Hague nevertheless prohibited the recruitment of labor from Java, where the Dutch held a monopoly. The colonial minister was a strong proponent of importing workers from West Africa, because Africans would easily adopt the language, morals, and customs of Suriname, where "members of their race formed the native population" or so it was believed (Hoefte 1998: 27). Postemancipation experiences in the French and British Caribbean had already learned, however, that not Africa but Asia, and British India in particular, were the most convenient sources of labor.

In 1870, the Dutch and British governments signed the agreement on the emigration of British Indians to Suriname. This was an imperial deal which gave Great Britain suzerainty over the Dutch possession in the Gold Coast (present-day Ghana), while the British gave up claims to the East Indian island of Sumatra. In 1872 the parliament in The Hague finally ratified this Anglo-Dutch treaty.

Meanwhile, the planters and colonial officials asked for government assistance to meet the expenses involved in the recruitment and transportation of the Indian laborers, although the law of 1872, making immigration a government concern, stated that these costs had to be paid by the planters at the moment of their request for immigrants. It was not until the late 1870s when the interests of the *Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij* (NHM), the most important economic player in Suriname, became involved, that an immigration fund, to be financed by the (expected) profits from the gold industry, was set up.³ As a matter of fact, the NHM decision to establish a central sugar factory hinged upon the introduction of the immigration fund. In 1879, this fund was indeed voted into law; its most important contribution was to cover part of the transportation cost of the migrants to Suriname and their repatriation to the port of departure. The total costs covered by the fund were to be two-fifths of the total expenses involved in recruiting, transporting, and contracting indentured

laborers. This financial agreement was no exception in the region as the state covered part of the expenses incurred in importing labor in other Caribbean colonies as well (Hoeft 1998: 30–44).

Thus by 1880, after discussions that spanned decades, the Dutch government was fully involved in the recruitment, transport, deployment, and financing of indentured migration from British India to Suriname. In other Caribbean colonies that would have been the end of the debate, but not so in Suriname where in a few years deliberations would start about recruitment of workers in Java.

Plans to recruit Javanese for Suriname existed as early as the mid-nineteenth century, yet the Dutch government was not willing to permit the migration of workers from its profitable Asian possession to its declining Caribbean colony, when Suriname had the possibility to obtain labor elsewhere. However, the movement to import Javanese gained strength in the 1880s due to changing political winds in India, where nationalism, and the accompanying rejection of indentured emigration, was on the rise. In addition, once in Suriname the British Indians remained foreign nationals and the planters depended for laborers on another country that could suspend recruitment. Another advantage of Javanese immigration was that the Dutch would have no competition from other recruiting nations. After the abolition of slavery many planters and politicians casted Creoles in a negative light, now it was the turn of the British Indians to be characterized as undesirable. They were stereotyped as “cantankerous” and “barbarous” (Hoeft 1998: 43, 103).

Again the NHM played a commanding role in forcing a decision; especially the Netherlands East Indian administration expressed doubts about Javanese migration to Suriname. In 1890, the NHM trading station in Batavia (present-day Jakarta) recruited on an experimental basis 100 Javanese for the NHM sugar plantation Mariënborg. The length of the labor contract was five years, the same as for British Indians. The experiment had its flaws, yet a number of plantations requested Javanese laborers. Soon a steady stream of Javanese would enter Suriname, adding a new element to the Caribbean population mix. Interestingly, the Javanese were not characterized as physically robust as the Creoles or the British Indians, but their strong point was their supposed “docility” (Hoeft 1998: 44–51). In other words, suitability for agricultural work and submissiveness were the main requirements for plantation workers.

The State on the Plantations

During the period of indenture management attitudes in the region did not change enormously when compared to slavery (Haraksingh 1981: 7). However, now not only the planters but the state as well exercised control over the indentured laborers. The labor contract specified the rights and duties of the workers and placed them under strict social and disciplinary

control. Crucial was the penal sanction, which made neglect of duty or refusal to work punishable by jail sentences. It gave the planter the right to press criminal charges against workers who broke their contract, a civil offense of course. At that point the government intervened to inquire complaints, put the suspects on trial, and execute sentences.

In Suriname, the official who was in charge of protecting the rights of the immigrants was the agent general, who served as head of the Immigration Department. His task was to supervise and control the indentureds and inquire about complaints regarding labor and living conditions on the plantations. By and large, this took so much of his time that he rarely had the opportunity to make his yearly inspection tour of all plantations. The Hindustanis enjoyed the additional protection of the British consul in Paramaribo. The Anglo-Dutch agreement on contract migration granted the British Indians the right to claim consular assistance and free communication with this official. The administration in Paramaribo was not pleased with the consul's presence and his power. Particularly in the first decade of immigration, both planters and officials were in fear of the British consul, who once actually stopped immigration because of the lack of adequate medical facilities.

Ultimately, the district commissioner as executive officer of the state had the most influence on the estates. He was the official to investigate accusations of breach of contract and sanction the charge before it was taken to court. During the sessions held in Dutch, the commissioner was seated next to the (itinerant) judge and he had to enforce sentences.⁴ Not surprisingly, many contractants viewed the district commissioner as a foe and rather tried to obtain justice in Paramaribo where the immigrant agent general and the British consul resided (Hoefte 1998: 80–93).

When the bonded laborers believed that justice could not be obtained by legal means they could resort to open or more hidden forms of resistance. Hidden and nonviolent resistance could include sabotage, the feigning of an illness, sulking, and refusal to answer questions. More eye-catching was open violent resistance by individuals or a mass of laborers. These acts regularly provoked a violent reaction by the planters and the state; Paramaribo would dispatch the military police and even the army to put down rebellious immigrants. In 1902, 30 policemen and 126 troops arrived at plantation Mariënborg after an angry mob of mainly Hindustani laborers had killed the director in a wage dispute. In an attempt to restore order the army fired at the crowd, killing 24 workers. This was not the first time during indenture the army and police used violence to subdue a rebellious crowd. The Mariënborg massacre served as a *lieu de memoire* for laborers, planters, and the state, as all parties involved were afraid of a repetition of this bloodshed but also threatened each other with reminders to this calamity. In the wake of the tragedy, the colonial minister stated in parliament in The Hague that the abuses by the plantation management had led to the revolt. According to the official colonial report, wage questions had started the troubles. Attempts by state officials to raise daily

payments had proven futile. The government responded by appointing a commission to investigate whether the payment system needed to be changed. Thus, the state had responded with heavy hand to unrest, but also tried to preserve a climate of stability by attempting to influence the treatment and payment of the laborers (Hoeft 1998: 194–197).

Summing up, the state was much more present at the plantations during contract labor than during slavery. Now the state was in charge of the implementation of new labor laws. The system of indenture added a new layer of bureaucracy both in Paramaribo where the Immigration Department was established and in the districts where the commissioners gained added tasks and authority. However, the state was not in full control of the new regime it had initiated as it depended on the cooperation between (major) plantation owners and state officials.

From Indentured Labor to Colonization

The colonial government's support of indentured labor was based on the idea that the large plantations in Suriname were the mainstay of the colony and, therefore, had to be saved. Gradually, however, the focus moved to permanent settlement. In the late nineteenth century it was fashionable to equate progress with population growth. The idea to populate Suriname with smallholders gained prominence around the turn of the century. That is not to say that the interests of the plantations were neglected. Certainly, in the early phases of this new form of colonization, the idea was that the smallholders would serve as auxiliary laborers for the estates.

Since the late nineteenth century, the government encouraged small agriculture by legally establishing favorable conditions for obtaining land. This regulation also applied to Asian immigrants who possessed a certificate of good behavior. Colonists received uncultivated plots free of charge for a period of six years. The colonists were not only responsible for cultivating the land but also for maintaining the (water) infrastructure, such as dikes and sluices, always a labor intensive task in the low-lying Guianas. Combined with the fact that the migrants lost their rights of a free return passage to their homeland, this land offer turned out to be not very appealing to potential settlers.

The visiting Indian government official D. W. D. Comins suggested that the situation for British Indians in Trinidad and British Guiana was more favorable because time-expired immigrants there had a better chance to hold land. According to Comins (1892: 5), the difference in land-holding patterns explained the variation in the repatriation rate between British Guiana (2 percent) and Suriname (30 percent). In 1895, the administration in Suriname heeded some of his suggestions and encouraged Asian immigrants to colonize by offering them land while guaranteeing their right to a free return passage. Those who declined to return received 100 guilders in addition to the land. This program was rather successful in

keeping the British Indians, and later the Javanese, in Suriname. In effect, this ordinance of 1895 resulted in indentured immigration becoming a system of colonization as well.

The growing number of smallholders caused some friction in the colonial administration. Not surprisingly, the planters feared that smallholder agriculture would take precedence over plantation agriculture. In 1919, a commission appointed by the governor concluded that large-scale agriculture still was the economic basis of the colony. The group presented ten suggestions on how to attract capital and to revive the plantations. In tune with the planters, one of the commission's most important recommendations was to create government settlements closer to the plantations (Suriname Syndicaat 1920). This plantation colonization would enable the smallholders to also work on the estates. The agent general, however, emphasized colonization rather than plantation labor by proposing the immigration of free families. These immigrants would work for less than five years on a plantation to gain agricultural experience and would not have the right to a return ticket (Van Drimmelen 1916). This free immigration scheme was a step too far for Governor G. J. Staal (1916–1920). He believed that indenture and coercion were fundamental to plantation labor; smallholder agriculture was only possible following a period of contract labor. The governor thus rejected direct colonization and opted for plantation colonization as a compromise between indentured and free agricultural labor. This phase coincided roughly with the zenith of Javanese immigration, as the migration of British Indians was stopped in 1917.

The administration in Paramaribo thus decided to side with the planters once more and its support even increased when in 1920 the government changed the existing immigration regulations. After heavy lobbying, the administration eliminated the planters' payment of three-fifths of the transportation costs. Instead, the planters now had to pay 15 cents for each actual day worked by immigrants older than 13 years.⁵ This new regulation lowered the planters' costs appreciably, but their final goal was to abolish all their financial obligations to the immigration fund. According to the planters, the estates served as training institutes that would prepare new immigrants for becoming independent colonists. This would be of use to the colony as a whole and therefore not the planters but the colonial administration should pay the costs for recruitment and transportation. In 1927, the government indeed exempted the plantations from the 15-cent regulation and four years later the immigration fund was abolished as it had lost its significance. All expenses were paid directly out of the Dutch treasury (Snellen 1933).

Free Immigration and Colonization

Finally, in the 1930s both The Hague and Paramaribo steered the course away from immigration on behalf of the plantations and toward the

immigration of free laborers and colonization. The economic importance of the plantations continued to decline and the notion that it would be cheaper to exploit free laborers rather than indentureds gained ground rapidly. Suriname would remain an agricultural colony, but now the emphasis was going to be on small-scale agriculture. The penal sanction was first modified and completely abolished in 1931, while re-indentures were phased out as well. As of 1935, contract labor no longer existed in Suriname.

The end of contract labor did not spell a diminishing role of the state. To the contrary, the final phase of immigration, the so-called Welter-Kielstra plan, was an imperial project designed by the administrations in The Hague, Paramaribo, and Batavia intended to originally transport 100,000 Javanese in a ten-year period to Suriname. The auctor intellectualis was the Surinamese Governor Kielstra who had the support of the Dutch colonial minister C. J. I. M. Welter, who, however, expressed doubts about the number of immigrants. The correspondence between Kielstra and A. W. L. Tjarda van Starkenborgh Stachouwer, the governor-general of the Netherlands East Indies, shows that the Javanese colonists would settle in *desa* (villages), complete with their religious and civil leadership, on new lands provided by the government. Since the inception of Javanese immigration in 1890, this was the first time that the Netherlands East Indies administration fully cooperated. It was a first also, that small-scale agriculture received full backing by the state. Kielstra stopped reanimating the terminal patient named plantation agriculture.

Governor Kielstra (1933–1944) was probably the most provocative governor in the twentieth-century history of Suriname.⁶ His critics called him a reactionary and a dictator, while his steadily declining group of supporters considered Kielstra a pragmatic social reformer. After a career in the Netherlands East Indies, where the future Dutch Prime Minister H. Colijn served as his mentor, Dr J. C. Kielstra moved into Dutch academia. His excellent network and experience helped him to secure professorships at the agricultural university of Wageningen and later at Utrecht University. In 1933, Colijn appointed him as governor in Suriname. Kielstra's experiences in the multiethnic East Indies turned out to have a great influence on his ideas and policy once he arrived in Paramaribo. He was the first governor to articulate ideas about colonial relationships and the multiethnic state. His ideology was based on the belief that existing differences between different populations in the East Indies should be acknowledged according to their own merits. Culture and customs, including the administration of justice, should have their own place in colonial society.

The difference between East and West justified colonial exploitation by the latter (see Hoefte 2011). According to Kielstra, Western nations helped the colonized peoples by providing stability, authority, and economic training. In line with the writings of J. S. Furnivall, he envisioned a multiethnic society with the colonizer as a “neutral” patron and

watchdog.⁷ In his eyes, the interests of the metropolis and the colonies were closely intertwined: the first could not survive without the colony and its products, while in the colonies (limited) education, an adequate administrative structure, and economic growth would enhance the autonomy of the different population groups. In other words, synthesis characterized the economics, politics, and morals of the colonial relationship (Kielstra 1908).

As governor, Kielstra based his policy not only on his experiences in the Netherlands East Indies and his theories on colonial political economy, but also on ideas he had developed during an earlier visit to Suriname. At the request of the then governor he had investigated the economic potential of the colony in 1925. Kielstra concluded after his visit that drastic action was necessary to save the, as he labeled it, "Dutch problem child."⁸ Kielstra stated that Suriname's economy was moribund due to international competition, its unfavorable geographical position, and its small population. Suriname produced no agricultural product or raw material that other Caribbean colonies did not produce also. In Kielstra's eyes, only lower production costs would bring relief. This lowering of costs could only be achieved by depressing wages through large-scale immigration or the increase in the level of consumption. He linked the latter issue to mistakes made during the abolition of slavery. He thought the government at the time should have paid attention to the lack of "native social cohesion" within the Creole community. This lack of a "native culture" was caused by the fact that the bought enslaved were not allowed to own property or develop a family life. Kielstra considered the particular cultural values of a population as the basis for the building of a civilization and economic (capitalist) progress.

People who had read Kielstra's publications could not have been surprised by his approach once he had disembarked in Suriname. The new governor, in turn, knew that his policy would stir up resistance among the "spoiled" Surinamese.⁹ The Surinamese press received Kielstra with a certain enthusiasm, if only because his predecessor A. A. L. Rutgers had become extremely unpopular.¹⁰ As governor, he opted for a two-pronged approach: balancing the budget and reversing population movements. Financially, he implemented budget cuts and tax increases. Demographically, he tried to stop the rural-urban migration and increase the population in the districts to stimulate small-scale agricultural development there. In effect, Kielstra not only restrained geographical mobility but social mobility as well. His views on limited education for children in districts were also in support of this policy.

On the one hand, Kielstra continued old practices to encourage small-scale agriculture by providing lots to peasants who would simultaneously serve as auxiliary hands for the few remaining plantations. The Welster-Kielstra plan, however, added a new element to this socioeconomic policy: the so-called "indianization" (*verindisching*). Not the individual interests of the smallholder but the collective interest of a supervised community, the

desa, prevailed. The inhabitants of the *desa* had fewer rights than individual smallholders and were dependent on their village leader who distributed or recalled rental, governmental plots.¹¹ The first new *desa* were established in the midwestern district of Saramacca.

In other words, the Welter-Kielstra plan combined ethnicity, labor, and conservatism. Kielstra focused his plan on one ethnic group: the Javanese, who were to become smallholders in a controlled and traditional setting. A change in comparison with Kielstra's ideas in the 1920s was that he no longer included Creole villages in the plan.¹² Earlier, Kielstra had expressed doubts regarding the suitability of Javanese migrants to work without supervision, but he expected that "social training" and their getting used to a "regular, industrious life" would make the Javanese valuable inhabitants of Suriname (Kielstra 1927: 185–186). This casting of the suitability of migrants for agricultural labor in racial terms was nothing new. Given the conservative ideology of Kielstra and his political companions, it was logical that the Welter-Kielstra plan focused on smallholding and *desa*. The conservatives believed in maintaining cultural traditions and customs and the self-activation and organic connections of the different population groups. Not only economic interests should tie the population to the *desa*. As in Java, the head of the village would ensure proper financial, legal, and material procedures and decide on the distribution of land. World War II, however, prevented full-scale execution of the plan. In 1939, the first 990 immigrants reached the colony, but they were the last Javanese to enter Suriname as part of a government program.

The *desa* never prospered; it proved difficult, if not impossible, to transfer a traditional institution from one area to a completely different society. In Suriname, geographical conditions were different from Java as ribbon development along roads or waterways made the Surinamese *desa* an open rather than a closed community. In Indonesia, the villages were constructed around a central point, which was not the case in Suriname.¹³ Moreover, the lack of capable leaders left actual power to the colonial authorities (Ramsoedh 1990: 118–119). Nevertheless, this village policy was the only serious attempt to systematically develop the districts through smallholder agriculture in Suriname's history. These *desa* may not have been an economic success, but it did lead to the creation of relatively homogeneous settlements and increased geographical segregation.

The Inclusion of the Immigrants in Surinamese Society

The main purpose of indentured immigration was to provide the plantations with replaceable, obedient, and cheaper labor. Contract workers, however, turned out not to be temporary residents. At first, this caught the government by surprise, but around the turn of the century it became government policy to tie expired laborers to the colony. In the twentieth century, this colonization aspect gradually took precedence over

plantation labor. All in all, approximately 65 percent of the more than 34,000 British Indians and slightly less than 80 percent of the almost 33,000 Javanese did not return to their homeland and stayed, for multiple reasons, in Suriname. The changing government policies on immigration and settlement also affected social and cultural policies: should newcomers be integrated fully or should the cultural differences between the various populations be recognized by establishing different rules and laws for the Asian population? In the East Indies, Dutch colonial policy was focused on using and adapting local customs, traditions, languages, and juridical systems, but in the early decades of Asian immigration colonial officials steered toward social-cultural assimilation in Suriname. Therefore, the administration promoted the unification of the different population groups in one cultural community, grounded on the Dutch language, Dutch law, and Christianity. However, a clearly defined concept on how to achieve this ideal society did not exist. In the end, approaches were often ad hoc and pragmatic as is shown in the colony's educational policies. Plans were adopted, reversed, and then abandoned when circumstances changed or unintended consequences became apparent.

One such game-changing development was that immigrants began to organize themselves, often along ethnic lines, when it became clear that many were going to stay longer than anticipated, or even settle permanently in Suriname. The dozens of officially recognized associations promoted the interests of their members without challenging the colonial state. Not only did the administration recognize these associations, it actually played a role in setting them up.

Self-organizations were the result of a longer process of Hindustani and Surinamese-Javanese identity formation as well as vehicles for continued emancipation. Despite the fact that migration and life on the plantations disrupted the newcomers' social and cultural life, Asian cultural traditions have proven to be resilient. There are several reasons for this. The first is that new arrivals informed already established immigrants about the conditions and developments in their homelands. Second, some plantations, and later the colonial administration as well, promoted the preservation of selected elements of Javanese and British Indian cultural practices, by, for example, organizing cricket matches or importing *gamelans* (Indonesian traditional musical ensembles).

A final element was the fact that ethnic solidarity and reliance on cultural traditions was key to settling in a not very hospitable society. The marginal place of the migrants in colonial society and their poorly paid plantation work strained relations between British Indians or Javanese and other population groups (Hoefte 1998: 158–170). To be sure, the Indian and Javanese cultures did not survive the transfer to Suriname untouched. The immigrants originated from different districts and areas with diverse economic, social, cultural, and religious traditions, yet forced communal living in the depots, on board, and in Suriname led to the amalgamation of several cultures and languages into one “Hindustani” or “Javanese”

culture or language, fashioning an increasingly strong ethnic identity. The geographical and social isolation of most immigrants gave them even more space and opportunity to create their own Hindustani or Surinamese-Javanese culture, rooted in the respective homelands. This geographical segregation continued in the postplantation period, when the government distributed land in predominantly “British Indian” and “Javanese” districts. The largest and most important association was the *Surinaamsche Immigranten Vereeniging* (Suriname Immigrants’ Association, SIV) founded in 1910 on the initiative of the then Agent General C. van Drimmelen, who urged two prominent Hindustanis to organize the immigrants.¹⁴ These men dominated the organization in its early years: the wealthy businessman Lutchman or Luchman Singh, who had arrived as a free immigrant in 1889, and the interpreter Sital Persad. Given that Sital Persad had very close ties to high-ranking officials it seems likely that Van Drimmelen motivated this interpreter to set up a union.¹⁵ The SIV focused on the moral, intellectual, and material interests of the immigrants in Suriname in general, and on education and economic issues in particular.¹⁶ The SIV advocated assimilation with other ethnic groups in the colony without losing their own cultural identity. Although intended as a multiethnic union, Hindustanis formed the majority from the start. This Hindustani domination was expressed in the SIV’s promotion of immigration from India after the abolition of indenture there, and the enticement of Indians planning to repatriate to remain in Suriname in order to expand the Indian population group.

In 1922, the SIV renamed and rebranded itself: *Bharat Uday* (The Rise of Hindustan) expressed the growing ethnic consciousness of the membership. The term “immigrants” was jettisoned, as they now considered themselves inhabitants of Suriname. The most important goals of *Bharat Uday* were the promotion of communal interests and the forging of a Hindustani ethnic identity. The preferred strategy called for cooperation and not confrontation with the colonial authorities. Ideological and religious inspiration came from South Africa, with its large Indian community, and other Indo-Caribbean communities, especially Trinidad and British Guiana. Yet, the Indian nationalist, anti-European, and anti-Christian tone of foreign publications did not harm relations with the administration. The administration, in turn, opted for an inclusive strategy by allowing a high-ranked colonial official to initiate the organization of immigrants. The same pacifist approach was used in the Javanese case, when (sub)Agent Westra of the Immigration Department heavily influenced the creation and early years of *Tjintoko Muljo* (Elevated in Calamity). This league was founded in 1918 and five years later counted about 900 members. Like the SIV, the action program of the Javanese concentrated on immediate social and economic issues.¹⁷ The authorities preferred this placid and low-profile union over the rather unorganized and less predictable migrant groups who increasingly expressed their growing Indonesian nationalistic sentiments by, for example, supporting

the Islamic movement Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association, founded in Java in 1911) and the nationalist leader Sukarno who emerged in Java in the 1930s.

One of the important issues to all immigrant unions was the education of Asian children. This matter was closely linked to the evolution of the concept and functions of (indentured) immigration.¹⁸ In Suriname, education of immigrant children became a government concern, when Governor M. A. de Savornin Lohman (1889–1891) argued that the state had the moral obligation to provide some form of primary education for immigrant children. An additional economic motive was that the immigration agent general hoped to impress the British government by this gesture and thus induce it to grant more favorable immigration conditions.

The next question was whether immigrant children should be taught in their native languages or in Dutch. In 1890, plantation Mariënborg, that employed the largest number of Hindustani immigrants, opened the first so-called “coolie school” for children between seven and twelve years. A British Indian teacher instructed them in at least Hindi and Urdu. At that time, the idea still was that the children would only remain temporarily in Suriname and knowledge of the Dutch language would be useless in case of repatriation to India. Thus, the administration in Paramaribo initially did not impose Dutch and Christian values upon migrant children. It was the influential Inspector of Education, H. D. Benjamins (1878–1910), who recognized the developments in immigration and colonization: he did not support education in the native languages as it would not enhance settlement of the migrants. The colonial government, however, thought that an uninterrupted flow of immigrants was more important, thus still putting the interests of the plantations first (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 137–140; 251; Hoefte 1998: 174–175). It should be noted that the inspector introduced a more Dutch-oriented curriculum and insisted that the medium of instruction would be Dutch rather than Sranan Tongo in the so-called “Negro schools” (Van Stipriaan 1998: 71).

Financial considerations as well as the institution of the coolie school provoked opposition. In 1899, the Roman Catholic newspaper *De Surinamer* protested against the government allocation of 10,000 guilders for the education of Asian children. According to the paper, a separate educational system, including the teaching of two Asian languages, would not encourage their assimilation into society and would prevent their Christianization. Moreover, the state had no official commitment to provide education for immigrants. The agent general’s argument that the Hindustanis were only temporary residents did not convince the *De Surinamer*, because in that case the state should not spend any money on their education (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 144–148; Hoefte 1998: 174–175). The newspaper seems to have been a voice for the Christian community as both Protestant and Roman Catholic missionaries wished to slowly integrate the Asians into the Christian community while still respecting their customs and practices. To them conversion and education

in missionary schools were the first steps on this road to westernization. These missionaries defined pluralism as the existence in one country of both Christians and “heathens,” who still had to be converted, not as the coexistence of various cultures and languages.

The government abolished the “coolie schools” in 1906. It fell victim to the new policy to promote smallholding by time-expired indentureds. As of now, unqualified Hindustani teachers would teach Hindi as a preparation for, or in addition to, education in Dutch. The administration hoped that this compromise would promote the integration of Asian children into Surinamese society and simultaneously instill the values of the colonizers.

The press again raised an argument similar to the opposition to coolie schools and their costs when an unregistered Javanese teacher was appointed in 1919. A reader pointed out that Dutch was the only language of social mobility in Suriname. A year later, the Suriname Teachers’ Association (Surinaamsch Onderwijzers-Genootschap) officially protested against the existing educational system by advocating Dutch-style education in integrated schools. The association expected that this change would westernize the Asian children and secure employment for Suriname-educated teachers. In contrast, the Suriname Immigrants’ Association / Bharat Uday continued to promote education as a means for Hindustani to become part of society, while holding on to their ethnic and religious identities. It pressed for public schools exclusively for Hindustani children and continued education in Hindi language and culture, but lost the argument when the administration abolished the institution of the Hindi teacher in 1929. The government argued that it was too costly and that second-generation Hindustani was expected to be fluent in Dutch.¹⁹

In the twentieth century, not only the language of instruction but also the level of education was a matter of dispute. Certainly the planters, but many government officials as well doubted the value of an extensive education. After all, these children were to be prepared for an agricultural existence, so reading, writing, and some simple arithmetic would suffice. Common wisdom held that more knowledge made a person less economically valuable (Van Gilst 2009: 1). Especially for Asian children, the so-called BLO school was introduced; BLO stood for Limited Elementary Education (*Beperkt Lager Onderwijs*). In 1932, the great majority of approximately 80 district schools were converted to the BLO type, thus limiting the educational progress of the children living there. In addition, the schools were allowed to hire uncertified teachers. In Paramaribo and in dominantly Creole districts the children could enjoy Normal Elementary Education (*Gewoon Lager Onderwijs*, GLO), thus giving them a head start.²⁰ Both financial and ideological motives guided the introduction of the BLO schools.

Thus, location and ethnicity played a large role in the type and quality of education the children received. Although there existed considerable differences on the language of instruction and didactics and certainly

not all Asian charges received an adequate education, the schools did play a role in the assimilation of children after the abolition of the coolie schools. The schools served as means to socialize and discipline children, not only those of immigrants. Schools could be important vehicles for emancipation for a few, while on the other hand they maintained and may be even enhanced existing societal and ethnic inequalities.²¹

Another step in the process of assimilation was the law of 1927 that made all Indians born in Suriname Dutch subjects. It was the final stage of assimilation, as during the administration of Governor Kielstra the emphasis was no longer on assimilation but on ethnic diversity. Kielstra was very critical of the extant situation in schools and given his ideology it is not surprising that he called for an educational system recognizing the existing cultural differences. Kielstra pointed out that neglecting these differences could “unbalance” pupils, which could lead to their rejection of manual work or traditional values.²² Ultimately, this uprooting would lead to an exodus from the districts to the town and could even lead to political radicalism. Kielstra, however, did not have the opportunity to implement an ethnically segregated education system as first other priorities and then World War II took precedence.

Be that as it may, Kielstra did manage to enforce another measure that would cause the definitive break in the assimilation policy. Against heavy opposition, he implemented the so-called marriage laws legalizing marriages concluded according to Muslim or Hindu religion. Prior to this law, most immigrants did not contract a civil marriage and their religious unions did not have any legal validity. One of the obvious consequences was that children of such an “illegal union” could not inherit their parents’ property if the latter had not made a will. Official records indicated that more than 90 percent of the Asian children were “illegitimate.” In 1913, the SIV requested the legal recognition of marriages solemnized by acknowledged Muslim or Hindu religious officials. It took until 1937 to introduce a draft bill to this effect. The inheritance of property was crucial for the Asian population groups in order to prosper economically. Kielstra’s bill ran into strong opposition in the *Staten*, whose Creole members feared the dissolution of society into different cultural and ethnic communities.²³ The *Staten* twice rejected the bill arguing that statutory uniformity would be broken. Only in 1940 under emergency law, on account of the war, could the Asiatic marriage decrees be passed and the laws came into effect on January 1, 1941 (Ramsoedh 1990: 122–131).

The minimum age for an Asian bridegroom was 15 years, while the bride could be no younger than 13 years. The minimum ages for non-Asians were 18 and 15 years, respectively.²⁴ The marriage laws were written customary law. The government, however, did not fully acknowledge the customary laws of both population groups, because certain aspects, including polygamy and child marriages, were “alien” to Surinamese marriage law (Adhin 1969: 106).

The marriage decrees were not only important for the Asian population in Suriname but also for an indication of a new colonial policy. The Creoles, in particular, interpreted these decrees as one, albeit important, element in a process that would change Suriname from a Christian, Creole society into a multiethnic society based on various ethnic and religious pillars.²⁵

Verindisching and the marriage decrees had their greatest effect on the Asian, mostly agrarian, population groups, but Kielstra wanted to change things in official Paramaribo as well. Hand in glove with *verindisching* was a process of Dutchification. The governor preferred Dutch officials with a training in colonial East Indian affairs (*Indologen*) to Creoles.²⁶ Particularly the district commissioners, one of the few important functions for which Surinamese could qualify, should be Dutch men. (The DCs had been Surinamese before, but now the function was to go to Dutch men only). This Dutchification was not limited to the colonial civil service. In 1938, a controversy at the colonial hospital reveals not only that the relations between the Dutch director and his medical staff left much to be desired, but also that the director was replacing experienced Surinamese personnel with less qualified people from the Netherlands.²⁷

Moreover, Kielstra wanted to change the existing electoral laws at the expense of the Creoles. The governor intended to change the franchise that was based on tax payment and education to include social position in order to diminish the influence in his eyes socially irrelevant, urban, intellectuals and their useless book learning. Instead, he preferred electoral influence by *desa* leaders or economically successful agrarian entrepreneurs. The Hague, however, torpedoed these plans to ethnically mix the electorate and undermine Creole dominance (Ramsoedh 1990: 102–110). Kielstra's unpopularity with the Creole population only increased when he introduced stern fiscal policies and censorship to reign in leftist social-political sentiments.²⁸

Needless to say, the Creole elite and to a lesser degree the small middle class were dead set against the neutralization of assimilation policies, because this group was the very product of that policy. It used to be that the "educated Surinamers identified themselves with Holland" (Van Lier 1971: 313). However, this loyalty was already severely tested when in 1918 Dutch politicians and newspapers discussed the possible sale of the colony (see chapter 3). According to Van Lier (1971: 313), this allegiance to the Dutch gave way to increased self-confidence of the light-colored Creole middle class, while sensitivity to racial discrimination also grew. Kielstra's policies undermined the new self-confidence and heightened awareness of discriminatory practices. Knowledge of the Dutch language and culture no longer seemed pivotal to make it in the colony. The Creole elite and middle class feared that Christianity and its churches would be undermined, statutory unity would be broken, and that the Asian population groups would increase their power.

In addition, Dutchmen would take over official functions, thus restricting Creole social mobility and increasing Dutch influence.²⁹

In short, the role of the colonial government became much more pronounced during the governorship of Kielstra, yet at the same time he tried to reduce the size of the actual government with the goal to have the colony itself pay for its administrative system.³⁰ His plans failed, and in the second half of the twentieth century the state would become the largest employer in Suriname.

Conclusion

The colonial state attempted to save the large-scale agricultural economy after the abolition of slavery, but in the following decades its role became more complicated and more influential. Over and above its economic role in importing foreign laborers to save the plantations, contracting laborers for the gold and balata industries, distributing land and mining and logging concessions, the state became more involved in social and cultural affairs. Its role was much greater than during slavery, now that the government had the obligation to protect the interests of the workers it had helped to transport to Suriname. The government quietly supported the formation of interest groups based on ethnicity to channel possible dissent. And when pacification and acquiescence did not work, the state could become heavy-handed and authoritarian as chapter 3 will prove.

When indentured labor was coming to an end, the state became actively involved in social engineering in its attempt to copy the social structure of its East Indian possession in the Caribbean colony. Governor Kielstra, in particular, tried to promote the interests of Asian smallholders as well as successful entrepreneurs, to the detriment of the Creole population. As a result, the casting of different population groups in racial terms became even more pronounced than before. That is not to say, however, that Suriname became ethnically completely polarized. As chapter 7 will detail, the history of twentieth-century Paramaribo shows the growth of a surprisingly mixed city.

CHAPTER THREE

Discontent, Protest, and Repression in the 1930s

The economic developments and the growing role of the state as sketched in the previous chapters came together in the 1930s when economic decline and austerity measures caused social upheaval, in the form of mass meetings and riots in 1931 and 1933. These challenges to colonial authority led to open and more hidden forms of state repression. New laws limiting various freedoms intensified the control of the authoritarian state. Intelligence services informed the powers that be on potentially seditious acts.¹ Despite the existing fears, the size of the police force actually declined from 265 men in the 1920s to 201 men in the mid-1930s. To compensate for these cutbacks in (expensive) personnel, improved efficiency was to be achieved through organizational changes, better weapons, and the purchase of motor cycles.²

In the attempts to organize the widespread discontent, ethnicity and class played a major role. The leadership of all organizations, unions, and parties which sprung up during this period was Creole. Immigrants were not explicitly excluded but were expected to behave according to “Creole norms.” The exception was the movement around Anton de Kom in 1933 who categorically included all ethnic groups. In his thinking, class unity prevailed over ethnic differences. Moreover, the divide between the working class and the more progressive parts of the middle class became more pronounced. This progressive group was sympathetic to the plight of the working poor, but the (fear of) violence and the threat of radical ideas turned this group away from the working-class organizations and actions, although this group was frustrated as well about its declining standard of living and the inertia of the administration. For the middle class stability was paramount in the end.

Throughout this chapter, Grace Schneiders-Howard will be a voice for the politically aware, concerned middle class.³ She was a Dutch woman born in Suriname who as a social activist had a large following among Hindustanis in particular. As a self-proclaimed social-democrat she organized May Day gatherings in her house; yet, she also was a staunch anti-communist, who expressed great fear about political radicalism. Although

she firmly believed in Dutch superiority, she was explicit in her rejection of the governor before and after the riots of 1931 and 1933.

The decline of the colonial economy caused major unrest, but underneath loomed a larger, more hidden question: what or who was going to bring improvement? Economic misery was the main trigger of protest, but policies made by The Hague and the colonial government, or better the lack thereof, fed the existing frustration even further. Successive Dutch governments had viewed Suriname since the abolition of slavery as an economic problem. The social unrest of the 1930s forced a look at the political situation, which was framed in the repression of communism and other unwelcome ideas. Here, experiences in the Netherlands East Indies again informed policy in Suriname. In its reactions to deadly riots in 1931 and 1933 the administration blamed foreign influences rather than social-economic problems and opted for repression instead of reform.

This raises three questions. First, what were the nature and dimension of the protest and support for actions? Second, given the massiveness of discontent and the fact that social and economic conditions did not improve, why did the open protest against the administration stop after 1933? And, finally, a question barely addressed in studies on Suriname: why did anticolonialism not gain substantial support in Suriname, when frustration with the policies made in The Hague and the lethargy of the administration in Paramaribo was widespread?

The Economic Crisis

The Wall Street crash of 1929 created a major crisis in the capitalist world. The Great Depression also hit Suriname as world trade contracted. The fact that the colony had to follow metropolitan economic policies only made matters worse. In 1930, the effects of the world crisis were neither readily apparent in the Netherlands nor was there a widely supported sentiment to follow the devaluation of the pound sterling; unlike other European countries and the United States, the Netherlands kept adhering to the gold standard. The general consensus was that a strict policy of deflation would keep production costs low. This policy of deflation failed; in 1936, the Netherlands was among the last countries to abandon the gold standard (Kossman 1978: 659–665).

The problem for the colonies was that their exports were agricultural commodities, and the prices of these fell far more than the price of industrial products. Some agricultural, and mining, products became simply unmarketable. As a result, Suriname, and the Netherlands East Indies for that matter, was more seriously hit during the depression than the Netherlands itself.⁴ Historian Ernst Kossman (1978: 670) concludes that “the depression and the excessive exchange value of the guilder, maintained for too long, [damaged] the Indian economy even more than it did the Dutch.” The same goes for Suriname. To complicate things even more,

some countries adopted protectionist policies, damaging exports further. As the first chapter has shown, sugar, balata, and coffee were among the products hit by the depression. Despite record harvests, the export value of sugar and coffee plummeted. In the balata and bauxite industries thousands of people became unemployed. To lower exploitation costs, the plantations fired approximately one-fifths of the laborers, while they officially lowered wages. Smallholders who could no longer pay their rent or taxes were evicted. Salaries and pensions of teachers and officials were curtailed.⁵ Moreover, some 500 migrants who had gone to Curaçao and Aruba returned to Suriname, as the crisis also hit the oil industry. The influx of Javanese continued, thereby the number of workers rose, while the number of jobs declined.

There are no reliable unemployment statistics for this period. The so-called labor exchange (*Arbeidsbeurs*) provides no reliable data and was intended for male Creole urban dwellers only.⁶ In addition, underemployment was never registered. The cut-backs and high tax increases implemented in the 1930s made it impossible, not only for the working poor but also for the middle class, to maintain their standard of living.⁷ The fact that many were breadwinners for extended families and the absence of social relief made things more difficult. Contemporaries stated that hunger, malnutrition, health problems, pollution, and dilapidation of houses and buildings were soon noticeable in Paramaribo.⁸ In 1933, 20 percent of the boys and 15 percent of the girls in the city were underfed (Van Lier 1971: 295). In the districts things were only slightly better. Under the heading "In the wake of misery," the Moravian Church noted that "Everywhere one experiences the downward pull of material want. Lack of the most necessary goods, undernourishment, continuing worries and endless disappointments have a numbing effect on many."⁹

Unrest and Organization

Return migrants from Curaçao were the first to put the spark to the tinder. The oil industry had quickly moved the Dutch Antillean island into the twentieth century, including ideas regarding unionization, socialism, and unemployment benefits. Commercial and personal ties with nearby Venezuela, supplier of the oil refined on the island, were strong. Several political opponents of Venezuelan strongman Juan Vicente Gómez (1908–1931) conspired in the Curaçaoan capital of Willemstad to overthrow the dictator. To obtain the necessary weapons the refugees under the leadership of Rafael Urbina stormed the seat of government in Fort Amsterdam in 1929; the governor was taken hostage. The group went to Venezuela, where the authorities ended the rebellion and Urbina was killed. It is likely that these Venezuelan refugees and their actions acquainted a number of Surinamese with nationalist and socialist ideas. As Grace Schneiders-Howard wrote, Urbina was also popular in Suriname. Citing the general

restlessness and dissatisfaction among Creoles, Hindustanis, and Javanese alike, she writes “Urbina is the hero. Can it be any sillier? They are longing here for Urbina.”¹⁰

An awkward speech by Governor A. A. L. Rutgers (1928–1933) in 1931, diminishing the impact of the crisis on life in Suriname, irritated many. A few weeks later a group calling itself “the thinking unemployed” (*beredenerende werklozen*) called for a reaction in a newspaper article: “Unemployed, peasants, arise! The time has come to stand firm against the bureaucratic inertia of the hunger regime! Fight for work and bread!” (quoted in Wijntuin 1998: 12). A week later hundreds of people gathered to discuss possible courses of action to improve socioeconomic conditions.¹¹ Various speakers, including members of the *Staten*, addressed the crowd; the undisputed leader was activist Louis Doedel.¹² He was one of the return migrants from Curaçao, but differed from most of his fellow returnees. He and some forty friends had moved to the Antilles in 1928, where he found employment at the tax office. He was known as a caviler, venting his grievances against the Surinamese administration, in general, and the governor, in particular, in the local press. In 1931, the authorities on the island seized the first chance, a minor traffic offense, to fire him by claiming that he was “very lazy and conceited.” Probably even worse, he “had a very negative influence on other Surinamese living in Willemstad by fomenting dissatisfaction and inciting rebellion against the authorities” (quoted in Scholtens 1986: 55). It did not stop Doedel’s political activism, and within months he was deported to Suriname, where his reputation made it nearly impossible to find a job. Doedel’s political affiliation is unclear, according to contemporary police reports he was a member of the Dutch Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiders Partij (SDAP, Social-Democratic Labor Party) and supposedly he had been in contact with the Communistische Partij Holland (CPH, Communist Party Holland).¹³

Under Doedel’s leadership, a pressure group called Surinaams Werkloozen Comité (SWC, Surinamese Committee of the Unemployed) demanded social reforms. It organized a procession to the governor’s palace to present Rutgers with a petition, asking for a political voice and economic reforms including public works projects and unemployment relief. The SWC explicitly included women in its actions and publications. An estimated 3,000 people carrying red flags and placards with texts calling for action walked through the center of Paramaribo on June 17, 1931 to present this petition (see Figure 3.1). Citing religious texts, Doedel handed the address to the governor. The march was the first organized form of protest against the deteriorating situation. In addition, a few days earlier the *Staten* unanimously had adopted a motion to provide work and support for the unemployed. Apparently, this popular and political pressure forced the governor’s hand, who promised to adopt most of the requests in the petition. For example, within weeks a labor exchange was opened; not to provide jobs, but to serve as an intermediary between employers and employees.



Figure 3.1 Demonstration of Unemployed in Front of Governor's Palace, June 17, 1931.

Source: Courtesy of KITLV, Leiden, the Netherlands 54446.

Meanwhile, the SWC continued to attract hundreds and sometimes more than one thousand people to its meetings. Nevertheless, the committee decided to discontinue its activities, arguing that its goals were met now that relief work was on the political program. At this point, the committee called for unionization. This was not a new phenomenon. Already in the 1890s, white-collar workers such as teachers were organizing themselves. In the early twentieth century, more unions followed, usually put together by and for one specific group of laborers or employees, including painters, porters, and civil servants. Following the Dutch pattern, there were also unions according to religious affiliation, that is to say Roman Catholic or Protestant. Remarkably, Creole market women founded the *Surinaamsche Sociaal-Democratische Vrouwenbond* (Surinamese Social-Democratic Women's Union) in 1937.¹⁴ Unlike Curaçao or Trinidad, for example, Suriname lacked industrial laborers; unionization would only really take off with the growth of the bauxite industry.

Historian Ben Scholtens (1986: 48) lists a number of characteristics of the unions prior to 1940. First, there was the problem of fragmentation, often as a consequence of personal feuds. Second, many unions existed because of one specific, often spontaneous action, such as a strike for a pay rise, but had no long-term goals or program. Third, most organizations were a combination of a trade union and a social club. Finally, the low number of contributors made it impossible to set up mutual funds. As a result, the impact of the miscellaneous unions was low. Scholtens (1986: 198) concludes that at least until the 1930s “the trade unions are still in their infancy” and are primarily characterized, just as the periodic popular outbursts, by a lack of organization, leadership, and ideas.

More general and politically and economically more effective unions were needed in these dire times. The leadership of the SWC breathed new life in an older organization, the Surinaamsche Volksbond (SVB, Surinamese People's Union). Yet many of the problems listed above soon became apparent in this "new" union. Louis Doedel was the chairperson once more. The SVB called for "Suriname for the Surinamese," a slogan presumably meaning Suriname for the Creoles. Doedel declared the crisis as a result of the failure of capitalism. He also accused the administration and the governor, in particular, of not delivering on its promises made in June. A meeting on October 28, known as the hunger riot (*hongeroproer*), again attended by hundreds of people, roused the emotions. The fact that some speakers decided to address the crowd in the vernacular Sranan Tongo and not Dutch added to the excitement. The leadership was unable to calm tempers. A police agent using his baton added fuel to the fire; a steadily growing crowd created havoc and looted shops and bakeries, but there were no personal assaults. A number of strikes in support broke out, but the unrest remained restricted to certain areas of town. The next day the unrest continued; Hindustanis cut telephone wires to Paramaribo. The police attempt to disperse the crowd resulted in one shooting death, two wounded, and 56 arrests.¹⁵ Subsequently, calm more or less returned. The authorities prohibited the SVB to organize any more meetings; this was a moot issue as most leaders had already quit their activities for the union. The union now concentrated on social action by opening soup kitchens. Some measures were taken to liberalize the gold industry to attract individual miners and to stimulate the production of agriculture, but the effects were limited (Scholtens 1986: 62–67; Hira 1983: 291–296).

Personal feuds, lack of organization and money, and ideological and political weakness continued to plague the unions after 1931. A number of new organizations appeared and soon again disappeared. The name of Doedel keeps popping up. New is the name of Theo de Sanders, who worked in British Guiana as a film operator. There he was politically active within the Surinamese community. Upon return to Suriname he found work as an electrician. In 1931, De Sanders became chairman of the new Surinaamsche Algemeene Werkers Organisatie (SAWO, Surinamese General Workers Organization). The new association had social and political goals. De Sanders did not focus on the jobless only, and tried to broaden the appeal by activities in the districts and adopting international social demands such as the eight-hour work day. Gatherings and courses attracted hundreds; special meetings for women attracted between 800 and 1500 attendants. There were special calls for better labor conditions for domestics and washer women (Scholtens 1986: 70). According to De Sanders, ethnicity and color should not play a role, yet the Hindustanis and Javanese would have to adjust to the norms and values of the Creoles. He argued that the Amerindians and the enslaved and their descendants had built up the country, and other population groups should understand

that they were in Suriname by “the grace of God and the children of this country” (quoted in Gobardhan–Rambocus 2008: 74). He asserted that it was time to respect the interests and rights of the Creoles. The authorities, however, did not grant SAWO much time: within a year they retracted its legal status on a technicality. It also used covert means of repression by, for example, putting pressure on owners not to rent out meeting halls to the organization (Scholtens 1986: 68–69).

Anton de Kom

The person who did focus on the importance of organization was Anton de Kom.¹⁶ He was also the first to espouse a nationalism that included all ethnic groups, without privileging one. De Kom too was a return migrant, who had left Suriname for the Netherlands in 1920. There he held white-collar administrative jobs. While in the metropolis, he maintained his contacts with Suriname, including with Doedel and De Sanders. Sailors acted as couriers, relaying news and carrying political publications and manifestos. In the Netherlands, De Kom became involved in at least two, partly intertwined political networks. The first was the Indonesian nationalist movement of students striving for the independence of their native country. The second were leftist organizations promoting (overtly and covertly) communist ideals. It is unclear whether De Kom himself was a communist. The authorities certainly labeled him as such, but in a newspaper interview in 1933 with Theo de Sanders, De Kom himself denied that he was a communist, even though he said to sympathize with the movement’s actions and did not preclude joining the party in the future.¹⁷

With the help of labor leaders as Doedel and De Sanders, De Kom and his family returned to Suriname, officially to visit his ailing mother and maybe to remigrate.¹⁸ De Kom arrived on January 4, 1933; tragically his mother has passed away while he was en route. In Paramaribo, his arrival was anticipated with great expectations or horror. The latter sentiment is articulated by Schneiders–Howard. She describes De Kom’s arrival in a letter written more than a month after his arrival. Although this letter is written in hindsight, it expresses the confusion and the fear for De Kom and his comrades among many in Paramaribo. Louis Doedel, who had welcomed De Kom in Suriname, supposedly told two of his acquaintances “De Kom wants it to be known that there should be unrest in town . . . and [we should] take a hard line against capital. We reject socialism . . . now is the time for communism, only communism will help us, and those who are not for us, are against us, and those that are against us, will be shot to death!!”¹⁹

Doedel might have said this, but it is unlikely that it was his master’s voice. A cloud of mystification surrounds De Kom’s activities in Suriname. He certainly was the talk of the town, but contrary to Doedel’s supposed proclamations, De Kom wanted to avoid unrest, and was more interested

in organization building than revolution (De Kom 1934: 214). De Kom's relationship with Doedel and De Sanders is unclear. Meel (2009: 265) thinks that De Kom and Doedel had a sort of division of labor: Doedel would organize the Creoles, while De Kom would concentrate on the Hindustanis and Javanese. De Kom's biographers think that the men quickly grew apart. Later De Kom described Doedel and De Sanders as moaners, reformists, and lacking militancy (Boots & Woortman 2009: 123–124).

Given the contemporary and later interest in De Kom, it is surprising that many details regarding his stay in Paramaribo remain unclear. What is known is that De Kom's reputation as a "communist agitator"²⁰ caused great anxiety among the authorities, who placed De Kom under permanent surveillance. They also forbade him to organize meetings, fearing that these would provoke unrest (De Kom 1934: 209). Curtailed in his freedom, he settled in the yard of his parental home, where he set up an "advisory and information office." He collected evidence of maltreatment and abuse, recording the information in "his books" of notes. "My notebooks of misery are becoming fuller and fuller."²¹ The name of De Kom quickly spread beyond Paramaribo. In "the parade of misery" hundreds of Javanese and Hindustanis voiced their complaints regarding taxation, the wanting infrastructure, low payments, and the lack of health care to De Kom when visiting him in the city or during his trips to several districts.²² They attributed mythical powers to De Kom: the Javanese saw him as the Ratu Adil (Righteous Prince), a messianic figure in Javanese folklore, while the Hindustanis believed that he was a representative of Gandhi.²³ Particularly the Javanese believed that this man could bring them back to their beloved homeland. Rumors about ships waiting ashore rapidly gained strength. De Kom's opponents called him a demagogue, deceiving uneducated people and tapping them for money for a return passage.²⁴ The authorities were especially apprehensive about the district dwellers coming to town and tried to warn them back.

Within a month, De Kom was in conflict with the authorities, who had banned a meeting near his home. On February 1, De Kom, accompanied by a large crowd, went in protest to Governor Rutgers, who would not receive him. Instead he was offered a meeting with the attorney general; that encounter never took place as De Kom was arrested. His supporters who had gathered in front of the police station were violently dispersed. That did not return peace and quiet in the streets. The attorney general rejected requests to free De Kom as he was considered a danger to the state. Nevertheless, talks about his release on February 7 created agitation in town and in the districts. At the plantations near Paramaribo, work was halted. On the seventh, a mass of people gathered on the square fronting the gubernatorial palace and the jail where De Kom was being held. After the police swept the square the mass moved to the office of the attorney general. Obstinate they refused to leave, confronting and vocally threatening police officers. In an attempt to regain

the upper hand, the police fired and killed two agitators and wounded 23. The authorities expelled De Kom without a trial in May. Later, they admitted that there was insufficient proof to convict him of sedition.²⁵

Again the comments of Grace Schneiders-Howard show the fear and mystification surrounding De Kom. She probably voiced the sentiments of many Dutch people in Suriname, and probably also of others in the elite and middle class, when she wrote "It would have been better if on February 7 Rutgers himself had come to the square in full regalia and had warned in the name of the Queen the Javanese [and British Indians] to leave [the square] and had told them that De Kom wanted a coup d'état, because those fools were deceived! In my mind A. de Kom is dotty! And I am dumbfounded that they let him play his dangerous game for so long. And Doedel is still doing it. A. de Kom must have brought a lot of money, and that is hidden!"²⁶ She blamed the police force, and its commissioner in particular, for not watching De Kom more closely.

Despite his deportation, De Kom's actions lived on in Suriname. As one Javanese woman now in her 50s told: "But I still remember the stories of Anton de Kom, who tried to organize the Javanese and they hoped for De Kom to improve their situation. And the people told that they thought he was a sort of leader, despite the fact that he was a Creole, he was accepted, and yes, in that period there really was the idea, I go back to Indonesia."²⁷

The Immediate Aftermath of 1933

One day before the violence on February 7, the governor submitted four antirevolutionary laws to the *Staten*, limiting freedom of the press, the freedom of assembly, and strengthening the power of the state to suppress subversive movements. These were literally based on laws made in the Netherlands East Indies.²⁸ There the perceived threat of communism had already resulted in tougher law enforcement. The *Staten* accepted three of the proposals, which the governor (by that time Rutgers' successor Kielstra) then proclaimed by Royal Decree in October. In addition, civilian patrols (counting some 150 men) were to assist the military and police. The latter added a pistol and a saber to their kit. In a meeting, the governor announced various social and economic measures, including some infrastructural projects, but refused to entertain far-reaching ideas regarding agriculture, gold mining, and youth employment.

The new governor, Kielstra (1933–1944), was very different in character from his predecessor and the law gave him more leeway. He was determined to suppress any protest and to strengthen the grip of the authoritarian state. Kielstra was much aware of his privileges, stating that his governing powers were countless (quoted in Ramssoedh 1990: 39). With the Royal Decrees in hand he made the publication of the leftist

and monarchist newspaper *De Banier van Waarheid en Recht* impossible and prosecuted a well-known journalist of this publication. Cabaret performances by the popular J. C. Kruisland, satirizing the police and military, were censored because “the tactics of communism, starting first with the undermining of authority with quasi-gentle jesting and gradually it gets worse.”²⁹ More covert were attempts to obstruct and infiltrate social and political organizations by, for example, paying leaders to serve as police informants.³⁰

On the boundary between covert and overt action was the way Louis Doedel was taken out of society. Doedel remained politically active by publishing articles and manifestos on specific socioeconomic and political topics. This brought him in regular conflict with the attorney general, and in 1937 he was transferred to the colony’s psychiatric facility. The authorities again used minor infractions, disturbing the neighborhood and attempting to speak to the governor, to institutionalize Doedel. The official reason being that he was a danger to society and himself. Doedel never left the institution, where he would pass away in 1980.³¹

The Role of the Javanese

De Kom’s message found most resonance among the Javanese. According to reports by the governor and in the press exceedingly many Javanese, as well as Hindustanis and Creoles were in the crowd on February 7 (Scholtens 1986: 83). The administration explained the fact that relatively few Hindustanis were present by pointing at their better organization and greater economic sophistication; therefore, they were more likely to heed the government’s warnings about De Kom. The president of Bharat Uday sided with the government by proclaiming that the authorities would take care of the Hindustanis as a mother would take care of her children.³² Grace Schneiders-Howard also claims that she persuaded Hindustanis not to follow De Kom. These arguments obviously did not convince some Hindustanis.

De Kom’s message appealed to the Javanese and to a lesser extent the Hindustanis because he lent them an ear and played on their feelings of homesickness (Hoeft 1998: 168–170). His experience with Indonesian nationalists in the Netherlands was an added advantage to De Kom. Yet exactly his attention to the Javanese alarmed the authorities. The fear of Javanese political radicalism, in general, and nationalism, in particular, had caused official worries in Suriname before De Kom’s arrival. The arrival of members of the Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association, founded in Java in 1911) after World War I stimulated Indonesian nationalism in Suriname. Indonesian nationalist leader Sukarno became popular in the West as well; his portrait adorned many a wall. Nationalist and radical

political developments in the Netherlands East Indies gave rise to great worries in the Dutch government, where people like Prime Minister Colijn and also Kielstra abhorred the thought of a possible independence or even self-government.

In Suriname, Dutch reactions to Indonesian nationalism varied. As Schneiders-Howard already noted, the chief of police reacted in a less agitated manner than other political and military authorities by assuming that attempts at organization were not very successful as people distrusted each other and lacked willpower to pursue an issue. Despite existing suspicions, he believed that the Perkoempoelan Islam Indonesia (PII, Indonesian Islamic Organization), counting 500 members in 1934, not to be dangerous and compared it to Bharat Uday.³³ The military commander, however, was certain about the guiding hand of the communists and referred to the unrest in the Netherlands East Indies in 1926–1927 (Scholtens 1986: 76). In November 1926 in Java and January 1927 in Sumatra the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian Communist Party) launched an uprising, which the Dutch authorities quickly and fairly effortlessly suppressed, but it caused great fear among the white population in the colony. The level of repression was raised: several “ringleaders” were hanged and many were transferred to a new penal colony in Boven-Digoel in New Guinea. Until 1942, nationalists and communists were detained in this camp.

In Suriname, immigrants, authorities, and planters alike looked at developments in the Netherlands East Indies with Argus’ eyes. The result was that the Javanese were watched closely. Every transport with immigrants was monitored for members of the PKI or the Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI, Nationalist Party of Indonesia). Mail to and from Java was censored and the management at plantation Mariënburg, with the largest concentration of Javanese in Suriname, received a list with all periodicals published in Javanese and Malay that were considered dangerous to law and order. The list also contained “the sound light reading material which would urge the Javanese in the right direction.” The plantation management subscribed to several of these “positive” periodicals in an attempt to counter radical thoughts (Hoefte 1998: 184).

The authorities and planters lauded the Javanese for their docility, but were also aware that they often did not understand them. The flip side of this docility was the idea that the Javanese were “childlike” and believers in supernatural powers and thus easily influenced by ideas and events. As the management at Mariënburg noted, following De Kom’s arrest, the Javanese displayed a remarkable silence during work, reluctance to answer questions, and general recalcitrance. After the departure of a great many Javanese to the city, the plantation staff gathered in fear of their lives (Hoefte 1998: 181–182). It was this activism plus the possible influences from their homeland that alerted the authorities and singled out the Javanese for special surveillance.

The Long-term Aftermath of 1933: We Slaves of Suriname

Anton de Kom was deported to the Netherlands, never to see his native country again. He was unable to find a job, but remained politically active.³⁴ He called for self-respect and urged Surinamese to shake off their “feelings of inferiority” and to start building a new future (De Kom 1934: 59, 148). On his return, De Kom emphasized the similarities rather than the divisions in Surinamese society. He focused on the misery experienced by all population groups and the need to create an economically and socially fair Suriname. He identified with the plight of the lower classes, of which he was part.³⁵ De Kom privileged this perspective over ethnic and cultural differences. He was aware of ethnic differences, but in his ideal world class unity prevailed.³⁶ De Kom was the first leader to successfully appeal to the three largest population groups. He promoted a national program of reconstruction to fight destitution and oppression, pauperization and unemployment.

Colored countrymen you were slaves, and you will live in poverty and misery as long as you have no confidence in your own proletarian unity. We cannot be helped with an incidental plot of land, a spade or a plough given on credit. A great plan of national reconstruction is needed, a plan directed at collective enterprises with modern equipment in the possession of the workers of Suriname. We will have to build our own welfare with our hands. This plan requires a great effort from us as Surinamese. But first the proletarians in our country have to develop a militant class-consciousness, first we have to shake off, together with the old slave chains, the old slave mentality. (De Kom 1934: 203–204)

What De Kom’s book did not mention, however, was the establishment of a classless society or a dictatorship of the proletariat.³⁷

De Kom gathered his thoughts and ideas in *Wij slaven van Suriname* (We slaves of Suriname), published one year after his return. It is a well-written *j’accuse* against capitalism and Dutch colonialism. The book is a political essay, a historical account, and a memoir all in one. It is the first publication on the history of Suriname written by a Surinamese author adopting a Surinamese perspective. The slaves in the book’s title refer to the “Negro slaves” as well as the (descendants of) Hindustani and Javanese indentured laborers.

Remarkably, this classic work in the historiography of Suriname obtained this status only decades after its original publication. The political authorities discredited the book as communist propaganda, while the tiny scholarly community judged it as unscholarly, emotional, and biased. As Meel (2009: 250) states it was Van Lier who generally determined the early reputation of *Wij slaven*.

De Kom attempted to write a study of the history of Surinam in which the accent fell on the slaves and the lot of the lower classes. The result was a work the chief value of which is a document which offers an insight into the mentality of the lower middle class Surinamer. The memory of sufferings endured by the ancestors as slaves, which is still alive among the common people, can be detected in his words. But his memory became part of a pathetic sense of grievance and a rancour which, however much justified by the circumstances in which the lower classes found themselves, prejudice a proper insight into the past. (Van Lier 1971: 370)

The “rediscoverers” of this work were Surinamese students in the Netherlands in the 1970s. They heralded the publication as the embodiment of anticolonialism and Surinamese nationalism with its emphasis on class solidarity and social justice.³⁸ In the wake of this popularity, Sandew Hira (1983) countered Van Lier’s judgment by praising De Kom’s “literary masterpiece” with its revolutionary spirit and its emphasis on class allegiance rather than ethnicity.³⁹ More than a quarter of a century later, Meel (2009: 251) argues that a focus on the anticolonialist and leftist notions in *Wij slaven* obscures “the versatility of De Kom’s investigation and the complex and intriguing design of the book.” He emphasizes the novel way of dealing with Suriname’s history and its historiographical significance, as the book represents “the formative phase of Surinamese decolonization.”

The Impact of the 1930s

The economic crisis and the administration’s austerity policies were the main cause for the social unrest in the first half of the 1930s. Coupled to the protest against unemployment and deteriorating economic conditions was the criticism of the administration by both the working and the middle class. Governor Rutgers’s speech in 1931 virtually ignoring the impact of the crisis in Suriname exemplifies the lack of comprehension and sensitivity of the administration to social grievances. But if the governor would have read the antiestablishment newspaper *De Banier van Waarheid en Recht*, he would have known that, for example, only half of the 1,800 undernourished pupils in 24 schools received free rations.⁴⁰ Another example of this rather obtuse attitude were the eight-day Queen’s Day celebrations in 1932 with illuminated government buildings and a fireworks display, costing thousands of guilders. According to an anonymous commentator, “this is not evidence of wisdom in this time of grinding poverty among the people. From countless homes the furniture and salable clothes have been brought to the pawn shop.”⁴¹

The administration underestimated the impact of the lowering of wages of the plantation workers or the dim job prospects for those who were

fired in the gold and balata industries or returned from abroad. Probably as a consequence, the administration saw no need to draw up an economic recovery plan. Its playing field was limited anyway because of The Hague's economic policies, based on austerity measures and adherence to the gold standard that was detrimental to the colonies. Instead of developing a coherent approach to the existing problems, Rutgers resorted to some minor stop-gap measures like setting up a labor exchange. In 1929–1930 already Schneiders-Howard judged that the “indecisive” and “absolutely unloved” Rutgers “is absolutely not the character to play governor. An indifferent man, who can't care less, I believe, whether the colony progresses or not.”⁴²

The hunger riot of 1931 was born of frustration over administration's inertia. It was a spontaneous outburst of violence, for which the leaders of the People's Union (SVB) apologized to the administration. The Anton de Kom riots in 1933 were also rooted in resentment as unemployment, poverty, and the lack of action by the administration continued to effect the masses. In addition, immigrants hoped that they could return to their homelands. This time the goal was clear: the release of De Kom. Both in 1931 and 1933 the demonstrations broke up after police violence dispersed the crowds. Between the two incidents, however, people kept coming to mass gatherings organized by the General Workers Organization (SAWO).

The administration's official reactions to the events in 1931 and 1933 were defensive in character and ignored the socioeconomic problems, unemployment, and the role of labor organizations. For example, in the report on the De Kom riots in 1933, the link between Javanese protests and the lowering of plantation wages was not made. Instead communism, as an outside force, was blamed, and this called for repressive measures limiting the freedoms of speech, of the press, and of assembly. The specter of communism and the Soviet Union haunted the Dutch and Netherlands East Indies governments and also many in the Surinamese establishment. Yet, not everyone shared this fear: the police chief, for example, questioned the communist credentials of the labor leaders, without denying that these men could cause trouble. He was convinced that communists played no role in the hunger riot of 1931.⁴³

The middle class resented its lack of influence on the policy-making process and the fact that few Surinamese were part of the administrative elite. They doubted the administrative and organizational competency of Dutch civil servants.⁴⁴ Several members of the *Staten* recognized the destitution of a large part of the population, and blamed the administration for the lack of a comprehensive relief policy. They also looked for a political solution by arguing for the enlargement of the franchise. Socially progressive members of the middle class, including *Staten* members, attended meetings of workers' organizations. The fear of unrest or even violence and communism repelled them, however. This small group was willing to come into action for the people, but did not believe

in actions through the people and therefore never was able to build a following. Grace Schneiders-Howard embodies this position with her fierce anticommunism and paternalistic attitude toward the lower classes. In the end, the class and ethnic differences between the progressive, light-skinned middle class and the multiethnic working class prevented the building of a coalition.

The Surinamese newspapers were not outspoken: politically sensitive articles were often published anonymously, even before the administration gagged the press. Only the leftist *De Banier van Waarheid en Recht* linked the unrest to administrative policy. Therefore, it is not surprising that this paper was the victim of the press muzzle.

The question is why the workers' unions failed to influence the tone deaf administration. One of the main problems was the lack of organization and leadership and as a consequence the goals were focused on immediate relief and not on long-term change. The leaders of these unions, or maybe better proto-unions, in the 1930s all had foreign experience and many, including Doedel and De Kom had come into contact with nationalists and other political activists. That did not mean, however, that all foreign political ideas and ideologies that were popular elsewhere in the Caribbean found resonance in Suriname. For example, Pan-Africanist nationalist movements emphasizing race, such as Garveyism and Ethiopianism, played a rather minor role in Suriname; these movements played an important role in the British Caribbean by heightening racial consciousness.⁴⁵ Moreover, in the Anglophone Caribbean, the return of demobilized troops after World War I, resentful about the discrimination they had encountered, influenced the nationalist and black radical movements.

The Surinamese leaders were focused on action and less on ideological underpinnings. As the Dutch social-democratic parliamentarian A. W. IJzerman expressed, "Doedel resembles a revolutionary leader as a female salvationist resembles Marlene Dietrich" (cited in Scholtens 1986: 123). The result was that there was lack of consistency. Doedel had attacked the administration in Paramaribo when he lived in Curaçao, but was at first exceedingly servile to the governor when in Suriname.⁴⁶ There may have been tactical reasons for this change, using honey rather than vinegar, but many of his speeches and publications, often using a stately language, also show a certain inconsistency plus a curious mix of leftist ideas and religion.⁴⁷ Personal antagonism and the lack of staying power also bedeviled the unions. The expulsion of De Kom and the institutionalization of Doedel were beyond their control, but the sudden disappearance of De Sanders, possibly to Trinidad, did not attest to long-term commitment.

Besides internal institutional problems, the organizations also had to deal with other difficulties including ethnic diversity, with the accompanying job and geographical divisions. As a result, the interests of the various groups differed, but all of them participated in the riots. To complicate matters even more, there was the issue of whether immigrants were

permanent residents. Both the Committee of the Unemployed (SWC) and the People's Union concentrated their efforts in Paramaribo on return migrants and the unemployed gold miners and balata bleeders. This, in effect, meant that the main focus was on Creoles, yet without excluding Javanese and Hindustanis. The SAWO also was active in the districts, but expected Javanese, Hindustanis, and Chinese to behave according to Creole standards. Anton de Kom was the person who explicitly included all population groups in his efforts. Despite differing interests and the competition for work, the economic downturn did not lead to open animosity between population groups as existing job and geographical divisions made that interethnic competition on the labor market was limited.

Particularly the SWC was still loyal to the administration, including the governor, but in the course of time this loyalty weakened and a more radical tone was noticeable, as the administration's response was considered inadequate. The SAWO had the potential to be the most encompassing and successful union with its long-term social and political goals. The authorities must have judged alike and ended its activities by legal means. However, all these organizations, and others, were short lived and lacked a solid structure and were a fairly easy prey for the administration. After the SAWO, all social or political organizations had to deal with increasing state repression. De Kom had only one month to deploy his activities geared toward all population groups. His supposedly communist credentials and the interests of particularly the Javanese alarmed the authorities sufficiently to end De Kom's activities in Suriname once and for all. The administration used several covert and overt tactics to cross the leaders and the organizations, including intimidation, restrictive laws, banishment and institutionalization, infiltration and bribery. It now also closely monitored Hindustani and Javanese organizations. New repressive tools became available in 1933 and governor Kielstra did not hesitate to use them. For example, police was present at all theatrical performances. This new governor left no doubt as to who was in charge. In other words, the degree of authoritarianism only increased, while policies to strengthen the economy or to ease the plight of the working poor and jobless were nonexistent.

This absence of reformist policies is in contrast to the British Caribbean, where labor unrest led to the installation of the Moyne Commission.⁴⁸ This royal commission, appointed by the Colonial Office, traveled the area in 1938–1939 to develop responses and policies to social-economic and political troubles. In the years 1934–1939 unrest had spread throughout the Anglophone Caribbean in reaction to economic distress and social discontent. Unemployment and prices were rising, while wages and migration opportunities were reduced. The state reaction included not only police action, concessions, and paternalistic policies but also an effort to reform existing social, economic, and political conditions. Following the suggestions made by the Moyne Commission, London financed schemes to improve agriculture, housing, education, social services, health

and sanitation, water supply, and communication and transport. Unlike Suriname, the agitation of the 1930s “had a profound and lasting influence on the political culture of all these former colonies.”⁴⁹ Also, in the British colonies, several of the labor leaders who had played an important role in the 1930s, would become political leaders in the decolonization movement. In Suriname, none of the leaders would play a role after World War II. In the words of political scientist F. S. J. Ledgister, in comparing class alliances and the roots of postcolonial democracy in Jamaica, Trinidad, and Suriname, the unrest in the latter country did not “produce a long-term mass movement linking demand for better wages and working conditions to demands for democracy and responsible government” and consequently “there is no continuity between the labor revolt of the 1930s and the political naissance of the 1940s” (Ledgister 1998: 136, 140, see also p. 167). Thus, the outcome of the 1930s in Suriname was very different from British Caribbean colonies.

Given that the social and economic situation did not improve markedly after 1933, the question is why there were no more riots. The answer seems to be multistranded. First, it is likely that the efforts of workers’ organizations had very little material effect and that these meager results discouraged people already exhausted by poverty. It seems that lives were sacrificed for nothing. However, the violence served as a reminder of what could happen if things escalated. Second, it was difficult to organize labor as ethnic lines and the accompanying different interests divided the working class. The “divide-and-rule” approach of the colonial state, especially during the governorship of Kielstra, made setting up organizations even harder. The participation of the Hindustanis and Javanese in 1931 and 1933 showed, however, that common interests could supersede ethnic rivalries. Third, police intimidation and repressive measures made organizing associations and meetings exceedingly difficult. Finally, the organizations lacked focus, continuity, structure, financial means, and leadership. Personal animosities blocked the formation of a united front. Alliances shifted rapidly, making it easier for the administration to obstruct efforts to organize people.

Class differences stood in the way of the formation of an alliance between the lower classes and more progressive members of the light-skinned Creole middle class.⁵⁰ The crisis hit the middle stratum hard as teachers and civil servants saw their salaries and pensions lowered. These social-economic developments undermined the goal of a secure income and standard of living. Yet, despite the threat to its status, this group did not organize. This lack of action may have been caused by the fear of losing their government jobs and the absence of employment alternatives now that migration was a rapidly fading prospect. The Kielstra-years with his Dutchification of the civil service and spending cuts deteriorated this group’s position even more and at the same time limited its margin for action. This group was closely connected to the colonial state and what it stood for: stability and modernity, including material progress and Dutch

language and culture.⁵¹ It was in their interest to maintain this language and cultural barrier to prevent the classes below them to compete with them for jobs.⁵² The middle class was raised with Dutch, Christian values, and taught to look down on folk culture, and acceptance by the colonial rulers required sharp social and cultural distinctions between the few and the many.

The more progressive middle-class people, who sympathized with the working poor, differed in their analyses and solutions. This group lacked leadership and focus as well. Generally, it concentrated its actions more on the administration and the political structure. Members of the *Staten* were present and spoke at mass gatherings in the early 1930s, but fear of violence, communist influences, and “primitive elements” made them step aside.⁵³ They were all silent when Doedel was institutionalized.

The 1930s probably more than ever showed that the class consciousness of this middle class and of the working people developed in relation to each other on the one hand, and to the continuing political power of the Dutch colonial elite—including conserving ethnic and cultural walls—on the other.

God Save the Queen, Down with the Government

Although the social-economic situation and the lack of response by the government spawned the unrest, neither the lower-class unions and organizations nor the dissatisfied middle class, hardly ever blamed the colonial status for Suriname’s precarious state of affairs. De Kom was the most important exception. Longstanding criticism of the Dutch government and the Surinamese administration did not lead to a sustained attempt to break away from the Netherlands. One of the exceptions was a pamphlet printed in the left-wing paper *De Banier van Waarheid en Recht* calling for self-determination and independence.⁵⁴ But this free-from-Holland movement did not gain many adherents in the 1930s. How is one to explain the difference in the perception of the Surinamese between the government and the “mother country”?

The Caribbean colony never figured large in the Dutch imagination or in politics; the Netherlands East Indies was the number one priority. In parliament, Suriname was one of the very last topics to be discussed in the calendar year and most issues were “automatically” passed. Knowledge of the colony was limited, although especially in the twentieth century there were a number of parliamentarians who, often through contacts with people in Suriname, were able to gather intelligence and make more sophisticated analyses.⁵⁵ They called for a comprehensive economic plan; ultimately, the influence of these members on government decisions was negligible, if only because they often belonged to the opposition. A promised plan in the 1920s was never sent to parliament as the colonial minister admitted that his lack of knowledge about the colony and the

contradictory recommendations and solutions made it impossible for him to draw up such a proposal.⁵⁶ Most colonial ministers were not familiar with the local situation in the Caribbean either; the true requisite for the job was expertise in the affairs of the Netherlands East Indies. There, the colonial state displayed its innovative qualities and technocratic presence in the form of credits, agricultural information services, education, and health care. The innovative engineer was the poster child of the ambitious, late colonial state.⁵⁷ Innovation and ambition were conspicuously absent in The Hague's policies for Suriname.

The one exception to this lack of consideration was the debate in 1868, five years after the abolition of slavery. As sketched in the chapter 2, this discussion on the merits of indentured immigration was framed in a larger argument on the future of Suriname. Should the colony remain a plantation colony (with indentured workers) or an agricultural colony (with a Creole peasantry)? When the majority voted for the first, it seemed as if the outcome was hewed in stone, although the plantations went into decline before abolition. Successive governments would be tunnel-visioned for decades by this idea of Suriname as a large-scale producer of tropical cash crops. Publications, reports, and speeches time and again emphasized the miserable situation and large-scale agriculture and immigration as the only solution. Smallholder agriculture by immigrants was encouraged in service of the plantations and to increase the productive population. Laissez-faire policies and Dutch economic self-interest dominated. The consequences were probably most visible in the 1930s, when on account of economic policies drawn up in The Hague, the high exchange value of the guilder and the drop in agricultural prices hit the colonies in East and West appreciably harder than the Netherlands itself. When the decision was made to finally steer away the course from plantations to peasant agriculture it was a unilateral decision without input from people from Suriname. Van Lier (1971: 307–309, 319–325, 329–331) concludes that Dutch wishes prevailed in the internal affairs of Suriname and that politicians and officials in The Hague paid little attention to the opinions and wishes of both the governor and the *Staten*. Only Governor Kielstra was able to partially reverse this trend, as discussed in chapter 2.

Suriname's precarious financial position required yearly subsidies, to the chagrin of the Netherlands. The colonizers monitored the budget and attempted to at least keep expenditures level. Part of Suriname's debt was due to loans to finance immigration, the exploitation of the Saramaccapolder, and the construction of the railroad. According to Hans Ramsoedh (1990: 18), the advantageous effect of the loans, totaling 50 million guilders in the period 1900–1930 was limited because of the lack of a long-range economic plan and Dutch pressure to lower the subsidies and repay the loans.

Because of the focus on large-scale agriculture, Dutch complaints about Suriname as a losing proposition seem disingenuous. There were no attempts to structurally change the economy. New products and new

venues were tried but always in the shadow of the plantation. It was not in the interest of the planters when new economic activities came up, as it would drive up wages. New economic products like balata or gold were welcomed, but little was done to develop a sustainable, large-scale exploitation. Suriname's rather haphazard balata-bleeding could not compete with the enormous plantations in Sumatra in the East Indies. The easy way the Americans gained control of the bauxite industry is not only an example of US technological and financial dominance, but also of the preoccupation with large-scale agricultural production and the partial blindness toward possible economic alternatives. The former director of the Surinaamsche Bank, C. F. Schoch, argued that bauxite, gold, and balata were "only accessories to an agricultural colony such as Suriname" (Schoch 1924: 517).

Author Albert Helman pointedly expressed the frustration with the Dutch government in an addendum to his 1926 novel *Zuid-zuid-west* (1976: 111).⁵⁸ He relentlessly attacked the, in his eyes, hypocrisy and neglect of the Dutch after the abolition of slavery.

I am sad, as a child of a land that I see dying and drowning in a bottomless swamp. And it saddens me, not because of lost happiness in the lives of many people you don't know . . . but more because of your righteous facial expression, oh excellent Dutchmen. Indeed, you are an estimable nation, with many appealing slogans.

And in reality? A faraway country that I see shriveling into a barren wasteland. And I dare to tell you, you merchants with your holier-than-thou expression: this is *your* fault. As thou took possession of this land—I don't want to speak of justice or injustice, only God knows—why has it lost your love, now that thou can't speak anymore about the Dividend? Thou only knows this country as a deficit in the annual budget.

This imperial attitude irked the middle class, of which Helman was a part, and especially the members of the *Staten* who complained about the absence of will and energy in both The Hague and Paramaribo as well as their own lack of true influence. Rumors about the selling of Suriname to the United States in 1919 did little to improve relations.⁵⁹ At the local level, the arrogance of the top-ranking civil servants and the difficulty to attain higher-level functions in the colonial bureaucracy irritated the middle class. In the end, however, stability was of greater importance than the uncertainty that would be created by social and political upheaval that would be caused by breaking away from the Netherlands. This group was closely connected to the colonial state and what it stood for: stability and modernity, including material progress, the nuclear family, and Dutch language and culture.⁶⁰ Henk Schulte Nordholt (2009: 107) observes regarding the Netherlands East Indies: "they did not yearn for a nation in the first place, but for a life style." And in both the East Indies and Suriname

that life style could only be achieved within the existing colonial setting. At this point in time, it was in the interest of the middle class to maintain the colonial regime and the ties to the Netherlands, as their familiarity with Dutch language and culture was the basis of their social position.

Local newspapers also expressed this opposition to change. They reported on the distress among a large part of the population, but renounced popular protests as a threat to the existing order. The exception was once again the newspaper *De Banier van Waarheid en Recht* that advocated a change in the relations by promoting a commonwealth among the Netherlands, the Netherlands East Indies, Suriname, and the Antilles. In addition, anticolonialism was not widespread in the Netherlands itself. Only the Communist Party advocated the independence of the colonies. Tellingly, this anticolonialism was focused on the Netherlands East Indies. Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles were an afterthought. Other parties did not think the “colonies” were ready for self-government, let alone independence. The colonized peoples lacked the qualities and virtues necessary for self-rule.

An important factor in the Surinamese reluctance or even refusal to question its colonial status was the monarchy. The royal house was popular: positive developments, such as the abolition of slavery, were credited to the king personally, while abuses would be remedied if only the monarch would know about them.⁶¹ The Surinamese population did not link the king or queen to problems with the administration in Paramaribo or the government in The Hague. Even the leftist *De Banier van Waarheid en Recht*, that advocated the commonwealth idea, was loyal to the monarchy. Staten member Putscher (1933: 24–25) expressed this feeling by writing that if the population of Suriname could only address the queen directly, to inform her about the situation, she would undoubtedly intervene. “The colony’s feelings are closer to the Queen, who is viewed as a Monarch by the grace of God, as the undoubted sacrosanct authority, as the guardian of the common good . . . and She represents unprejudiced, equal love and concern for all groups of her subjects and there exists unwavering belief and trust in Her power to help when the Government fails or is not diligent.” The monarch was not only appealing to the Creole population but to the Javanese and Hindustanis as well, who saw the queen as a protective mediator. The queen was the one person who transcended ethnic, class, and gender differences. And because of her geographical and social distance she remained “unreal” and unsullied by day-to-day affairs.

The queen’s birthday was the largest annual festivity in Suriname; it was celebrated until independence in 1975 (Figure 3.2). Royal births, engagements, weddings, and jubilees also were reasons for colony-wide joy. At the 25th jubilee of Queen Wilhelmina a larger-than-life statue of her at the square fronting the governor’s palace was unveiled.⁶²

Education played a large role in the reverence for the House of Orange and other Dutch heroes. These great men and the queen were the personification of the cultural and political ties between the colony and



Figure 3.2 Queen's Day Paramaribo, Circa 1910.

Source: Courtesy of KITLV, Leiden, the Netherlands 5338.

the metropolis. Both Anton de Kom and Albert Helman criticized the emphasis on Dutch history and culture in Surinamese schools. De Kom did so already in *Wij slaven van Suriname*, Helman in an interview in 1980: "The representation of Holland was completely glorified: everything was equally beautiful, everything was equally superb. The Queen was a creature sitting just below God's throne . . . For the rest one had little notion of the mother country, and also one didn't have the notion that one's country of birth was a colony."⁶³

In the end, there existed an almost enduring consensus in both Suriname and the Netherlands that Dutch power was beneficent. It had a logic of its own. The Netherlands exercised their authority as a moral entitlement and the legitimacy of this authority was questioned by only a few. As elsewhere, the colonial structure, education, and religion discouraged that people in authority, whether officials, teachers, parents or clergymen, were challenged. The metaphor of the colonizer as an adult or parent and the colonized as children was pervasive also in Suriname. In this metaphor, the well-intentioned adults knew best what was good for the children. The adults had the advantage of knowledge and reason, while the children were associated with backwardness and ignorance, they still had to be trained to reach adulthood and thus civilization. In fact, the children should be grateful for this benevolence. The idea of a monarch as a compassionate mother or father only strengthened this metaphor that would endure well after World War II.

CHAPTER FOUR

Resetting the Scene: Developments 1940–1975

The governorship of Kielstra turned out to be the ultimate expression of authoritarian colonial rule. World War II reshuffled the cards in Suriname and internationally.¹ In a twist of irony, in 1944 Kielstra was removed from his post because his administration fostered social unrest, thus undermining the war effort. This chapter reviews socioeconomic, political, cultural, and demographic developments in the decades between the beginning of the war in Suriname and independence. It was a heady time of economic progress and increasing political and cultural awareness.

The war jump started the economy. The expansion of the bauxite sector had great impact on the economic growth rate as well as on society. It is difficult to overestimate the importance of bauxite to Suriname's small economy. Between the end of the war and independence, the industry generated approximately one-third of GDP. In addition, the sector contributed immensely to government revenues through taxation and other transfers. However, volatility in world market prices, revenues, and income directly affected government spending. Bauxite revenues, and Dutch development funds, not only financed the growing civil service sector, but also comprehensive plans to strengthen and expand the economy. Many of these development plans focused on the interior and the systematic exploitation of natural resources. In the postwar era, the primary responsibility for setting economic objectives was in the hands of Surinamese rather than Dutch officials.

This changed relationship with the Netherlands was also an outcome of World War II. In 1954 Suriname became autonomous, with independence following in 1975. However, in the quest for more autonomy, the political landscape was divided by ethnic and religious affairs. As a result, the newly formed political parties were based on ethnicity, not ideology. A coalition of Creole, Javanese, and Hindustani parties governed the country in the late 1950s and 1960s. These political alliances linked class and ethnic emancipation as it advanced the interests of the Afro-Surinamese working class, the Javanese and the Hindustanis. This broad emancipation was

based on patronage: an increasing number of people joined the expanding ranks of the civil service on the basis of their political allegiance.

In the wake of the country's political emancipation came the development of trade unions. In Suriname, politics and trade unionism traditionally have been interwoven. When the unions became more independent from political parties, they slowly but surely increased their influence. The significance of the unions reached its peak between 1965 and 1975, as expressed during the massive strikes of 1966, 1969, and 1973. For the first time in history, union actions brought down a government.

Finally, this review chapter focuses on social and cultural developments—emphasizing the role of culture and education as both a vehicle of emancipation and as a way to strengthen Dutch cultural hegemony—and demographic transformations that changed Suriname from an immigration to an emigration country, when thousands of Surinamese per year left their home country in the years preceding independence.

World War II in Suriname

The Nazi invasion of the Netherlands on May 10, 1940 had immediate political and social repercussions: the governor proclaimed martial law and ordered the imprisonment of all Germans in the colony. In the early morning of May 10, 73 German men as well as several anticolonial activists were rounded up. Later, nine more German men, 45 women, and 35 children were incarcerated, regardless of whether they were Nazi sympathizers or not. Most of these Germans were members of the Moravian Church and their arrest could not count on much approval, particularly not among the older generation. The sinking of the German vessel *Goslar* by its crew in the harbor of Paramaribo was another immediate and visible reminder of the war situation (Van der Horst 2004: 15–18, 69–80, 90; Scholtens 1991: 8–9). In addition, Suriname bordered French Guiana, at that time enemy territory as it was in the hands of the pro-Nazi Vichy regime.

As in several Caribbean colonies there was active support for the Allied war effort. There existed a lively interest in the situation in the Netherlands. Hugo Pos, the first Surinamese to return from occupied Holland to his home country recalls in his autobiography that Bellevue theater was chockfull to hear him speak about his war-time experiences (Pos 1995: 53). Money was raised to support the Red Cross, buy a Spitfire, and send relief packages.

Local civil defense organizations, organized in 1942, drafted men of all ethnic groups to work together to guard the country against possible attacks and civil unrest, and to help with the rationing and distribution of food and fuel. At its height, the *Schutterij* counted some 5,000 men. At first the majority of Javanese and Hindustani recruits were not accepted as they did not speak Dutch. In 1943 this requirement was waved; in addition,

religion and diet were also taken into consideration. Some 1,400 Javanese and Hindustanis served in the *Schutterij*. The *Staten* at first objected to their inclusion, but for the Asian migrants and their descendants the defense organizations were an important vehicle of social emancipation (Scholtens 1991: 12; Gobardhan–Rambocus 2001: 306; Van der Horst 2004: 54–55; Jones & Captain 2010: 54–55).

The same was true for women who could join the female home guard; Suriname was the only Caribbean country with a female defense organization. This female home guard never counted more than 300 women. The churches, united in the *Comite Christelijke Kerken* (CCK, Committee of Christian Churches), spoke out against women in the defense forces and advised them to “stay true to their calling.”² Especially female activities in the transportation brigade drew widespread criticism. Not only did these women drive trucks, but pants and overalls were part of their uniform. The women who joined the forces did jobs that females in Suriname had never done before (Pengel 2006: 35–37). Most of the recruits were part of the Creole middle class and between 18 and 22 years old, but also included Surinamese Jews. “They had never socialized with each other before they entered the service” (Pengel 2006: 37). The female home guard was dissolved in 1946; those women who continued to work in, for example, teaching or nursing reported that their wages in the war had been appreciably higher than afterward (Pengel 2006: 39).

The war affected the whole of society as thousands came to Paramaribo as a result of the draft or in search of work in, for example, the construction of defense works. Others found employment in the bauxite industry or the service sector. The work was more attractive than agriculture, while often little education or experience was needed to obtain a relatively well-paid job. The arrival of US troops in November 1941, much against the will of a surprised Governor Kielstra, changed the country even further.³ An American writer and photographer who visited Suriname in 1941–1942 already foresaw that “during the present war Surinam . . . has enjoyed greater contact with the outside world than has been the case for many years, and new ideas have been brought in by American troops that will affect the outlook of the people and even their customs” (Hiss 1943: 174).

In US thinking, the Caribbean was seen as a “strategic key to the Western Hemisphere.” Brazil, and by extension Suriname, were “only two thousand miles from Africa” (Rodríguez Beruff 2009: 433). Suriname’s main importance, however, was its bauxite, a product that was of vital importance to the Allied war effort. An estimated 82 percent of US bauxite originated from Suriname during the war (Jones & Captain 2010: 47). With the troops, in 1943 there were 2,025 men stationed in Suriname to protect the airport and the bauxite mines, came even more construction of airfields and roads.⁴ As one informant tells it: “My father was a pork knocker, later a balata bleeder, thus he was away in the interior . . . we didn’t see him for a year or one and a half year until World War II broke out.

Then he stayed in the city, because with the Americans Suriname's development began, people could get work. Suddenly there were all kind of jobs because of the American presence . . . women could wash American clothes, that is how it started."⁵ Another informant aptly summarizes "the Americans very much pepped up things, and the economy too."⁶ In short, the economy was booming and for the first time in more than seven decades a budget surplus was achieved. Yet, the war also brought blackouts, price increases, and food rationing as imports and local agricultural production declined. Import substitution modernized and expanded local production and Surinamese businesses produced basic necessities as well as luxury items. Particularly in the bauxite mines work pressure was high, leading to a number of strikes (De Koning 2011b). In the end, however, many informants emphasize the positive change in society: "World War II, well we have celebrated . . . The Americans were here . . . there were parties . . . we lacked nothing."⁷

Suriname behaved as a more than loyal colony to a government in exile in London, yet the decreased involvement of the Dutch administration coupled to economic growth stimulated nationalist feelings among the light-skinned, educated Creole population. In this small group, social and political advancement was closely intertwined with a Dutch cultural identity. The wartime experience allowed this circle to take pride in their Surinamese as well as their Dutch identity. The goal was to move to more autonomy within the existing political structure. Kielstra's authoritarianism certainly strengthened these efforts and it also dampened some of the loyalty to the metropolis. In 1942, the *Staten* sharply reported to the new Colonial Minister H. J. van Mook in London that the lack of willingness of Surinamese troops to fight in the Netherlands East Indies was to be explained by the fact "that it doesn't make sense to fight dictatorship abroad when one experiences dictatorship within one's own borders" (quoted in Scholtens 1991: 13 and Van der Horst 2004: 54). But even after Kielstra had left the colony, the enthusiasm to join the forces remained lukewarm. Racism was another obstacle: in 1941, 400 volunteers were turned down by the Dutch army with the argument that troops from Suriname could cause problems with Dutch conscripts from South Africa (Scholtens 1991: 22). Approximately 200 Surinamese joined the (merchant) navy and in 1944–1945, 450 to 500 volunteers left for the East to fight the Japanese in the Netherlands East Indies.⁸

The quest for autonomy found support in the Atlantic Charter championing the right of self-determination for the colonies,⁹ and a speech by the Dutch queen. In December 1942, Queen Wilhelmina, in exile, proposed to create a commonwealth of the Netherlands, the Netherlands East Indies, Suriname, and the islands of the Netherlands Antilles. She spoke of "full autonomy" for each overseas territory and a new future in which Dutch authority would give way to partnership and shared solidarity. The queen did not mention the word independence, however (Oostindie & Klinkers 2003: 67–68). A year later a group of Creoles founded Unie

Suriname (Union Suriname) with the slogan “*baas in eigen huis*” (master in our own home). Thus, the war rhetoric of unity and support for the monarchy did not preclude nationalist pride.¹⁰ To Johan Ferrier, one of the founders of Unie Suriname, it was an instrument to bring the royal promise to fruition (Jansen van Galen 2005: 39–45). Unie Suriname attempted to unite all population groups; in reality it became a vehicle for the interests of the light-skinned Creole elite, who viewed themselves as the legitimate heirs to the Dutch rulers. As to be expected, this intellectual and political elite firmly based its plans on the Dutch colonial heritage, which hardly appealed to the majority of Surinamese. In July 1943, the popular teacher, artist, and politician Wim Bos Verschuur, in a petition to the queen requested the removal of Kielstra.¹¹ The latter immediately jailed Bos Verschuur, but this had a contrary effect as it created a political uproar, making Kielstra’s position untenable. Much to his chagrin, Kielstra was appointed ambassador to Mexico in January 1944. Kielstra’s departure was the end to an era of authoritarian colonial rule and an important step in the emancipation of the nation that was based on economic and political autonomy. This turned out to be a gradual process of adaptation and re-orientation.

Economic Developments

World War II created an economic boom on account of the expansion of the bauxite industry, the growth of agricultural production for the domestic market, and the expansion of domestic consumption and investment. Infrastructural investments, especially roads and the airport, strengthened the country’s economic basis. In contrast to the century’s first decades, comprehensive plans were developed to strengthen and expand the economy. In the postwar era, the primary responsibility for setting economic objectives was in the hands of Surinamese rather than Dutch officials. However, Dutch capital, in the form of loans and grants, remained essential in executing the ten-year plan (1955–1964), the complementary plans of 1962 and 1965 and the five-year plans for 1967–1971 and 1972–1976. To facilitate the process of planning and to improve the knowledge base, the so-called *Welvaartsfonds* (Welfare Fund) was established in 1947. In 1955, the Fund was transformed into the ten-year plan, designed by the National Planning Bureau (founded in 1951).

The main objective of the first plan was to attain economic independence by directly supporting production. Priority was given to the sector with the largest economically active population: agriculture. The state enlarged the area under production and improved conditions for small-holders by, for example, establishing credit facilities. Half way through the program, however, the emphasis shifted in favor of large-scale agriculture.¹² Investments in the district in Nickerie, particularly at the 10,000 ha experimental station of Wageningen, stimulated the production and

export of bananas and rice. In the period 1959–1969, rice production claimed almost three times more hectares of land than all other agricultural products combined. During those years, production increased from 78,693 tons in 1959 to 115,626 tons in 1968.¹³

A second priority was to tackle the obstacles caused by difficult and thus expensive transportation by improving the infrastructure. Construction of roads between Paramaribo and Albina and Nickerie, respectively (the East–West Connection), and the building of more facilities for air traffic were the most eye-catching projects. Industrialization was not part of the program as the size of the domestic market was considered too small to sustain any significant industry. Export production was hampered by high transportation costs.

The dynamics of the economy depended to a large extent on the investment boom in the bauxite sector. Especially, the so-called Brokopondo push, a short period (1964–1967) of high investment in the hydroelectric Brokopondo project enabling the production of alumina and aluminum, “generated by far the highest annual rates of growth of national income and income per capita.”¹⁴ Chapter 5 will detail the development of the bauxite industry.

The search for economic alternatives beyond the plantations had a radical impact on the interior and its inhabitants. As chapter 1 has shown, the search for gold, in particular, led to major changes for the Maroon populations in the early part of the century. After World War II, many of the development plans focused on the interior and changed it forever. A major aspect of the new planned economic policy centered on the systematic exploitation of natural resources.¹⁵ Economic rather than social or cultural considerations informed large infrastructural projects, such as the construction of roads and air strips.¹⁶ Operation Grasshopper (*Sprinkhaan* in Dutch), a project to search for natural resources from the air, was the basis of many development plans.¹⁷ For this project, seven airstrips were constructed in the interior from 1959 onward.¹⁸ For the Maroons themselves, boats remained the most important means of transportation, but the introduction of the outboard motor in the 1950s changed the pace and intensity of outside contacts within and outside the interior districts.¹⁹

The most far-reaching economic project was the 1959 Brokopondo Agreement between the state and Alcoa (Aluminum Company of America). A hydroelectric dam in the Suriname River near Afobaka was to supply electricity for the processing of bauxite. As a result, half of the territory of the Saramaka Maroons, including 27 villages, was used to create Lake Brokopondo; 6,000 people, the majority Saramakas, were forced to relocate.²⁰ Approximately 4,000 of them moved to the so-called transmigration villages closer to Paramaribo, the remaining opted to go south, deeper into traditional Maroon territory. According to historian Ben Scholtens (1994: 153) “the transmigration villages, which themselves hardly had an adequate electric supply, would in view of the disruption of the traditional economy and an insufficient availability of employment,

only become transition homes for the people leaving for town.”²¹ Young people, in particular, left for the coastal areas, thus upsetting the social and demographic balance. A Saramaka woman, quoted by anthropologist Richard Price (2011: 37), points at the cultural effects of the forced transmigration that undermined the beliefs of the Maroon society: “The gods and the ancestors, who were expected to protect the community, were unable to prevent these disasters. Traditional leaders who had assured their people that the water would not swallow their villages were proven wrong.” According to an expert on forced resettlement projects, forty years after the forced migration “the society has not healed” (quoted in Price 2011: 38).

After Brokopondo, more development plans for the interior were designed in Paramaribo. The objectives were to integrate the Maroons in society, while keeping them in the interior. The creation of larger, concentrated communities with more facilities was intended to foster economic and employment development. Politically the Maroons, and Amerindians, were counted when they were finally included in the population administration and received voting rights on the initiative of the Creole leader of the Nationale Partij Suriname (NPS, Suriname National Party), Johan (Jopie) Pengel. These linked developments took place only in 1963 (Breeveld 2000: 265–266). Related to this was the introduction of the name Bush Creoles (*boslandcreolen*), underlining the ethnic (and thus political) relationship between Creoles in the city and in the interior. Until the organization of Maroon parties in the 1990s, many Maroon votes went to the NPS, just as Pengel had hoped.²² Yet as journalist Hans Buddingh’ (2012: 424–433) states, the relation between the city and the interior remained complicated as the exploitation of natural resources and the issue of landownership became increasingly conflict-ridden, as will be described in chapter 8.

Operation Grasshopper also affected Amerindian populations in the interior. It introduced new actors in the region and accelerated the pace of change. The Amerindians were open to the newcomers, but had little inkling what their arrival would mean to their way of life. At the request of the government—the same happened in French Guiana—the Wayana moved down the river Lawa into “controlled” areas (Boven 2006: 89–120). This not only facilitated registration and the distribution of social services but also smoothed the path for the introduction of Christianity. American missionaries exercised control on behalf of the state. In the very early phases of Grasshopper, in 1959, two US Baptist preachers offered their services and their plane in assistance. In return the evangelists received government permission to carry out their Door to Life mission in an area of 70,000 km².²³ Anthropologist Karin Boven (2006: 100–109) describes how this official gesture sealed the fate of the Wayana, Trio, and Akuriyo in the designated area, that she calls an “American Baptist enclave.” In the 1940s, the state had already introduced political leaders by creating Amerindian “captains” and now

the missionaries created church leaders who quickly occupied central positions in their communities. The missionaries were also involved in linguistic research to introduce the Bible in native tongues. They organized literacy campaigns to teach the Amerindians to read religious texts. The missionary activities also led to multiethnicity in Amerindian villages, such as Kwamalasamutu, as in the 1960s Waiwai-speaking Amerindians from Brazil and Guyana were enlisted to evangelize the Amerindians in the south of Suriname (Carlin & Van Goethem 2009: 18).

The mission and the state worked together in the construction of air strips, roads, schools, churches, and clinics; the idea was that development would stop migration to the urban areas. "The missionaries in Suriname strongly disapproved of all expressions of a 'native' cultural identity. Traditional cultural usages, such as the ant or wasp trial, disappeared to make place for other practices, such as church services."²⁴ As was the case with the Maroons, Amerindians in small settlements were encouraged to concentrate in ribbon-shaped villages near the airstrips, with social and cultural facilities.²⁵ Money became more freely available through increased employment and trade. The opening up of the interior in Suriname as well as French Guiana changed the border area along the Lawa River into a far more dynamic place where military, police, traders, teachers, scientists, pork knockers, and health workers intermingled (Boven 2011: 15).

The economic development plans did not sufficiently address one pressing issue: education. Education and skills were the most important vehicles in socioeconomic emancipation. In the prewar era education was in decline because of deficient funding, low wages, a shortage of qualified teachers, insufficient control, the absence of a uniform curriculum, and a lack of books and other instruction materials. Particularly in the districts the quality of education was so low that few pupils could go to secondary schools or had the skills to find nonagricultural work. The so-called BLO schools (*Beperkt Lager Onderwijs*, Restricted Elementary Education) lacked both a curriculum and specific goals (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 344–345). In the words of former teacher Johan Ferrier, who was later to become governor and president of the country, BLO was a blow to education (quoted in Jansen van Galen 2005: 33). The situation in the *desa* schools was even worse. According to the Educational Inspector, these institutions were "completely outside the Department of Education" and not part of the regular educational system. The five *desa* schools were to provide low-cost low-level education; the financial aspect was more important than the educational one. As a consequence, the majority of Javanese remained illiterate (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 364–367).

After the war the educational system was reorganized. BLO schools disappeared and became district schools for Normal Elementary Education (*Gewoon Lager Onderwijs*). Educational expert Lila Gobardhan-Rambocus (2001: 453–487) indicates that considerable differences continued to exist between schools in Paramaribo and those in the districts regarding

curriculum and teacher qualifications. District schools did not prepare for secondary education: the percentage of children moving on to secondary education remained low among the Hindustanis and the Javanese, in particular, in the pre-independence period. Numerous contemporary experts and reports pointed at the language problem; many pupils were not fluent in Dutch and thus could not perform at the required level. Language(s) of instruction remained a hot issue in the postwar period, and a related question was how closely the Dutch educational model should be followed.

As will be elaborated in chapter 7, Paramaribo was Suriname's only center of education, culture, and employment outside of agriculture or mining. It was there that socioeconomic differences between population groups slowly disappeared. Yet the educational center was overburdened, as demand for all levels of education continued to grow because of population growth and urbanization. In turn, the fact that almost all non-primary schools were concentrated in the capital reinforced rural–urban migration.

Politics: From Autonomy to Independence

In the immediate aftermath of the war, Unie Suriname, a movement hoping to unite all population groups, attempted to capitalize on the new situation by pressing for constitutional reforms. Yet the façade of unity soon cracked when the *Staten* appointed a delegation of three of its members to travel to The Hague for discussions on the constitutional future; the absence of non-Creole delegates led to the formation of the Hindostaans-Javaanse Centrale Raad (Hindustani-Javanese Central Council) uniting 13 religious, social, and trade organizations (Gobardhan–Rambocus 2001: 322; Dew 1978: 57–58; Marshall 2003: 55–57). Discussions regarding the ethnic and religious background of delegates prompted the founding of the first true political party: the Moeslim Partij (Muslim Party) in 1946. Many other parties, uniting specific interests came into being, while Unie Suriname split into the Protestant Nationale Partij Suriname (NPS, National Party Suriname) and the Roman Catholic Progressieve Surinaamse Volkspartij (PSV, Progressive Surinamese Popular Party). According to political scientist Edward Dew (1978: 57), “By this time, the process of ethnic and religious mobilization was in full swing.” The most important parties in this period were the NPS, PSV, VHP (Verenigde Hindostaanse Partij, United Hindustani Party, 1946), and KTPI (Kaum Tani Persatuan Indonesia, Indonesian Peasants Union, 1947).²⁶

As the names of these political parties indicate, their basis was racial and religious, not ideological. In the words of historian Hans Ramsোধ (2001: 91), “institutional politics is based on ethnic mobilization and ethnic identification” and in that respect they may be regarded as “a continuation of the electoral associations from the first half of the twentieth century.” Consequently, the main goal was to guard the interests of the

“own” population group, leading to patron–client relationships between politicians and their voters.²⁷ Elected politicians could provide civil service jobs²⁸ or housing for their constituents. Dew (1988: 130) uses the term *apanjaht* politics: “the practice of voting for your own race, your own kind.”²⁹ In this context, Ramsoedh (2001: 91) prefers the label “political entrepreneurship” rather than political leadership. Coalitions are not based on compatible party platforms but on opportunistic or pragmatic considerations to gain power.

A second consequence, as pointed out by Ramsoedh (2001: 91–92), is that this system based on person-oriented networks is exceedingly vulnerable and unstable as personal feuds lead to secession and the founding of new parties, thus explaining the highly fragmented nature of the political tableau.

It is important to note that in Suriname politics and trade unionism have always been interwoven. Political leaders, including Jopie Pengel and later Eddy Bruma, started their careers by founding a union. These were oftentimes organized by the economic sector. In the early stages, unions were similar to political parties as they were not based on specific ideologies, and served as personal power bases for men with political aspirations.³⁰ Next to political parties, the unions provided a new way to gain personal status and prestige. This status hinged upon the size of the membership and results obtained in the form of wage hikes. Leaders, often heading several unions at the same time, became personal competitors in their fight for a larger following (Campbell 1987: 122–123, 137–138). These feuds and the tarnishing of other unions undermined the trade union movement as a whole. In this regard, the union leaders were not different from politicians. Larger unions were more powerful; however, the larger the union, the greater the distance between the leaders and the rank and file. As a consequence, members had less confidence in the leadership (Campbell 1987: 192–207).

Meanwhile, the Netherlands showed little inclination to meet the newly minted Surinamese politicians, as the metropolis was focusing on the bitter separation of Indonesia.³¹ Pressure from both Paramaribo and Willemstad, backed by the Atlantic Charter and spurred on by anticolonial sentiments in the region, forced the organization of the first Round Table Conference (RTC) between the Netherlands and its Caribbean colonies in 1948.³² In the end it took three RTCs to finalize a new legal order. In 1954, the *Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden* (Charter of the Kingdom of the Netherlands) formally recognized the internal autonomy of Suriname and the Netherlands Antilles. Defense, foreign relations, and the guarantee of good governance were in the hands of the Kingdom, read The Hague. Supposedly, the three countries were now equal partners and could not unilaterally withdraw from the Charter.³³

Political self-rule did not diminish the attempts to continue the pre-war “Dutchification” process, even though at the same time there was a plea for more room for ethnic culture. Knowledge of the Dutch language



Figure 4.1 Public at May Day Parade, Paramaribo 1961.

Source: Courtesy of KITLV, Leiden, the Netherlands, 511001.

remained an essential requirement for emancipation, if only because it was the language of instruction. Yet, political and socioeconomic emancipation also encouraged demands for cultural and religious equality. Political emancipation, in general, and voting rights, in particular, gave the descendants of enslaved and indentured workers a voice in society. The ethnic parties could not only demand equal treatment in the political and socioeconomic but also in the cultural and religious domain. Not surprisingly, these contradictory goals would not only lead to intense cultural debates but also to political ones.

Unie Suriname assumed that its members, including many teachers and civil servants, would quietly take the place of Dutch officials if self-rule would take shape. They did not desire for changes beyond the realm of politics. Dutch civilization and Christianity would be norm for Hindustanis, lower-class black Creoles, and Javanese. Johan Ferrier, Unie member of the first hour, proclaimed the ideal of “building a Greater Netherlands” (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 321). Yet, it was the colonial government that very gradually undermined this assimilation idea by, for example, the official press service (*Gouvernements Pers Dienst*) published monthly in *Ngoko* (informal Javanese) to inform the Javanese about developments in Indonesia and presented weekly cultural radio programs for Hindustanis (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 315–321).

The Netherlands regarded culture as one of the instruments to foster “harmonious democratic development” in the Netherlands, Suriname, the Netherlands Antilles, and Indonesia (Gordijn 1970: 7). To that end, in 1948 *Sticusa* (*Stichting Culturele Samenwerking*, Foundation for Cultural

Cooperation) was founded as the official medium for cultural policy and exchange between the four territories.³⁴ Later that year, in Suriname the operative institution for Sticusa, the CCS (Cultureel Centrum Suriname, Cultural Center Suriname) was established. Sticusa financed the performance of Dutch culture in the form of music, theater, dance, literature, and film, but Caribbean cultural expressions in the Netherlands were rarely funded. The impact of Sticusa was limited to Paramaribo's elites. Dutch dominance declined somewhat in the early 1960s, when a restructuring gave the Caribbean partners more say in the spending of the subsidies. Given the differences in scale and power, however, it is not surprising that the metropolis continued to call the tune. Equally important, to effectuate an equal cultural exchange it was essential to agree on national cultural values, which in the case of Suriname was exceedingly difficult due to the lack of cultural unity and the absence of a cultural policy. It turned out to be a mission impossible for Sticusa: either it waited for initiatives from Suriname or it could actively stimulate the cultural expressions of various population groups. Charges of cultural imperialism made Sticusa cautious and in the end it never made clear choices. Historian Peter Meel (1999: 233) argues that if "the board of Sticusa had been less timid and had developed a clear long-term vision, Suriname would have been better prepared for its independence."

In Suriname, CCS was successful in initiating and funding of libraries (buildings and busses), and amateur classes of musicians, dancers, artists, and actors. But like Sticusa it lacked a long-term vision to reach out to all population groups and all classes, and beyond Paramaribo. An administrative reorganization in the late 1950s was to pave the way for the implementation of a national cultural policy, but the Creole elite seemed blind to the emancipation of the working-class Creoles and Asian populations, in general, and the growing cultural nationalism of the Creoles and Hindustanis, in particular.

Earlier, this myopia had already manifested itself in politics. In 1948, universal suffrage to elect a parliament was introduced and as of 1950 Suriname could run its own internal affairs.³⁵ General elections in 1949 and 1951 gave the Creole NPS an edge, as the first-past-the-post principle favored candidates in the urban areas, which were at that time still dominated by Creoles. Internal divisions within the NPS between the light-skinned elite and the working class, however, gave coalitions of other parties a chance to govern after the elections of 1955.³⁶ These coalitions were pragmatic in nature. To regain control union leader Jopie Pengel, the champion of the Creole working class, sought to broaden political support by founding a pragmatic alliance with Jaggernath Lachmon of the VHP. *Verbroederingspolitiek*³⁷ (fraternization politics) enabled the NPS and VHP, a few years later in conjunction with the KTPI and PSV, to dominate politics from 1958 to 1967.³⁸ Ramsোধ (2001: 96) characterizes this coalition as a "the child of necessity, a political symbiosis of the three ethnic leaders on their way up."³⁹ This coalition based on *Realpolitik* then

combined the emancipation of the Creole working class with the political and economic ascent of the Javanese and Hindustani population groups. This class and ethnic emancipation plus the interests of the political leaders were the basis for the system of patronage: an increasing number of Javanese and Hindustanis joined the expanding ranks of the civil service. The socioeconomic effect of this policy will be discussed in chapter 7.

The administration of Prime Minister S. D. Emanuels (1958–1963) was the first to actively promote nation building not only by fraternization but also by adopting a flag, a national anthem, and a coat of arms. Simultaneously, the socioeconomic emancipation of the lower-class Creoles and Asian populations also encouraged ethnic and religious identification: in 1960, Emancipation Day, July 1, was declared a national holiday as “Day of Liberties” (*Dag der Vrijheden*) intended for the entire population.⁴⁰ Also in 1960 the Sanathan Dharm, despite strong Creole opposition, founded the first Hindustani mulo school (junior secondary education) in Paramaribo; in later years, schools run by Arya Dewaker and Muslim communities followed. The Creole argument against the Hindustani initiatives resembled those against the Asian marriage law in the 1930s: the Hindustani should assimilate and adhere to the prevailing Creole–Western norm, while Hindustanis, and to a lesser degree Javanese, pointed at religious freedom and demanded equality between Christian churches and Hindu and Muslim congregations. In 1970, Hindu and Muslim holidays were officially acknowledged (Jap–A–Joe, Sjak Shie, & Vernooij 2001: 208–210).

Internationally, the Emanuels administration intended to broaden its (trade) relations with the Caribbean, South and North America, and Europe. However, the *Statuut* did not leave much room for Suriname to expand its wings. It was one of the reasons for Suriname’s attempt to revise this charter in 1961.

Another motive was more local in nature. In the national political arena there existed a rift between the two main leaders, Pengel and Lachmon, on the question of independence, an issue that would haunt the country for the next two decades. Within Creole ranks, a group of nationalist intellectuals headed by Eddy Bruma founded the Nationalistische Beweging Suriname (NBS, Nationalist Movement Suriname). These nationalists promoted the emancipation of Creole culture, in general, and Sranan Tongo, in particular. Of course, the ultimate consequence of this cultural nationalism would be political independence.⁴¹ The most conspicuous effort of the Creoles was the emancipation of Sranan Tongo, the lingua franca, pejoratively known as “taki-taki.” Related were attempts to Surinamize education and the promotion of Creole culture in general. As in the 1930s, Surinamese migrants kindled the debate. The organization WES (Wie Eegie Sanie, Our Own Things), founded in Amsterdam in 1950 under the leadership of Eddy Bruma, was the embodiment of this Creole cultural nationalism. WES protested the overvaluation of Dutch culture and emphasized the value of Suriname’s own culture and history.

Its focus was the preservation and refinement of Sranan (Van Kempen 2003: 614–626, 653–681; Marshall 2003: 63–100). WES and NBS were closely related. The Hindustani slogan “unity in diversity” directly challenged these Creole nationalist sentiments. Active Hindustani youth pleaded for Dutch as the language of unity and a binding social agent.

In 1961, WES and other cultural and nationalist organizations rejected cooperation with CCS, yet a great number of Hindustani and Javanese organizations supported the reorganization and the further deepening of cultural exchange and development of Surinamese culture. Soon the debate was cast in terms of colonialism versus nationalism. The “colonialists,” convinced of the superiority of Dutch culture, wanted to use this culture to advance a Surinamese national culture. This policy thus promoted assimilation, anchored on the notion that Dutch was the language of instruction, and regarded the Dutch culture as an umbrella for all population groups, especially the urban middle classes. The “nationalists” rejected the dominant position of Dutch culture, without necessarily being anti-European or anti-Dutch. Given the hegemony of Dutch culture, they claimed that financial support should go to other cultures, that is, Creole culture in particular. The “nationalists” argued that Creole culture was the oldest and the most likely to absorb new elements and expressions, and thus the true culture of Suriname. “Even though Sticusa was not unwilling to support expressions of Creole culture, it refused to see this culture as the future national culture of Suriname” (Meel 1999: 238). In this respect, Sticusa generally had the support of the Asian population groups, who feared the dominance of Creoles, Creole culture, and Sranan Tongo.

The nationalist movement and its ideals were not only considered a threat to the non-Creole, pro-Dutch parties but also to Pengel who rightly feared that the NBS program would appeal to young people and recent graduates from Dutch universities, who in the Netherlands often had become fervent nationalists. This Creole nationalism did not attract other groups; in fact, it led to a counterreaction of more pronounced ethnic consciousness, particularly among young Hindustani academics who rejected Lachmon’s fraternization policy. This so-called Actiegroep (Action Group) feared that the NPS and the Afro-Surinamese would bolster their position to the detriment of the Hindustanis.

In an attempt to undermine the nationalists’ appeal, Pengel used the fact that Paramaribo never had wholeheartedly embraced the *Statuut* as it limited the country’s possibilities to pursue its own policies, including international relations. In 1961, Pengel called for a new Round Table Conference to (gradually) prepare for Suriname’s independence.⁴² Although fiercely opposed to independence, Lachmon supported Pengel. Again pragmatism trumped ideology: Lachmon feared a government crisis and the ascendance of the anti-Pengel nationalists. The VHP leader, however, did not, and given the opposition within his own ranks could not, commit himself to plans for independence. The VHP feared

that the Creole parties in their effort to gain more freedom from the Netherlands, would threaten the position of other parties / population groups, who preferred to remain under the Dutch umbrella (Meel 1994: 643–644). Especially Lachmon considered the Dutch as impartial arbiters who would protect the social, economic, and cultural emancipation of the Hindustanis. Lachmon's position made that the RTC failed before it had even started; the discussions about Suriname's constitutional future would foreshadow debates and events in the months leading up to independence in 1975. Lachmon's sentiments found resonance in Suriname, where demonstrations against independence organized by the Actiegroep were also fueled by racial conflicts regarding independence in Guyana and Trinidad.⁴³ In this chain of nationalist-ethnic reaction, the NBS founded the Partij van de Nationalistische Republiek (PNR, Nationalist Republic Party) in September 1961. The PNR changed the character of the nationalist movement, by giving it overt political goals. In the end, the PNR did not gain wide support, as its high-brow, rather philosophical message did not offer any materialist gains. In addition, it failed to attract a multiethnic following, as the PNR was seen as a Creole party. "A stigma which was further enhanced by the party's preference to discuss black history and culture . . . As a result, the mass nationalism the PNR favoured remained limited to an elite nationalism affirming the deeply-rooted power of ethnicity in Surinamese politics" (Meel 1990: 269). In the words of journalist Gerard van Westerloo (1983: 220), "among other population groups nationalism entrenches itself as a nightmare."

These tensions undermined the cooperation between Pengel and Lachmon and an economic recession made that after the 1967 elections fraternization was a thing of the past. Both Pengel and Lachmon had to look for new partners. Fraternization politics could work because the economy was expanding, thus allowing the major population groups to increase their share of the economic pie.⁴⁴ It assured political stability and ethnic calm, but did not create unity.⁴⁵ On the other hand, it depended on the relationship or even friendship between the political, authoritarian leaders, while the supporters were expected to unquestioningly follow these men. The question is, however, whether in the end the voters were more interested in ethnic differences than in commonalities. Political scientist Rob Hoppe (1976) used the term "elite cartel democracy," to describe the friendly relations among the leaders of the various elites, and between Pengel and Lachmon in particular, and the compliance of the masses.⁴⁶

In 1969, Pengel lost power when massive strikes fueled by social unrest caused by austerity programs and protest against his lordly style of governance and corruption paralyzed the country.⁴⁷ The strikes of the 1960s showed the power of the trade unions. When the unions became more independent from political parties, they slowly but surely increased their influence. In 1960, the Moederbond (Mother Union, founded in 1951) was the largest federation, representing more than 50 percent of all union

members (Campbell 1987: 59).⁴⁸ According to sociologist Eddy Campbell, the political significance of the unions reached its peak between 1965 and 1975, as expressed during the teachers strikes of 1966 and 1969, and the strikes by civil servants in 1973. For the first time in history, union actions brought down a government (in 1969); the strike in 1973, however, was more massive and violent.⁴⁹ According to Campbell, “during that period the main trade unions expressed the wishes of the masses better than the political parties” (Campbell 1987: 234). In all three cases, a similar pattern of action and reaction can be detected. First the state ignored the protests, then threatened with sanctions, and finally used open repression.⁵⁰ Thus, in the 1960s and 1970s the state continued to employ authoritarian means to repress labor disputes. In 1980, a union conflict and the government’s reaction would escalate completely, leading to a military coup (see chapter 6).

Campbell describes how the union movement increased its political power in the second half of the century by advising members on how to vote in general elections; by making union leaders stand as political candidates; and by their involvement in the formation of administrations, while the unions simultaneously participated in consulting and advisory organs. Paradoxically he notes that the unions’ influence on the government’s socioeconomic policy was limited. The unions did not influence overall social policy by attempting to reduce the income gap or other socioeconomic differences (Campbell 1987: 76–101).

At the company level, however, the institutionalization of collective bargaining was of great significance. As will be shown in chapter 5, foreign companies set the trend for collective labor agreements and the (conflict) regulation of labor relations. That is not to say that trade unions, or the government for that matter, could decisively influence the operations of foreign companies. Campbell concludes from his research that union members working in the mining, financial, and educational sectors favored the economically oriented unions over the politicized unions.

The political impact of the 1969 strikes went beyond the fall of Prime Minister Pengel (1963–1969). He resigned in February 1969 and new elections were called.⁵¹ Lachmon now became the power broker but he could not revive the old fraternization cooperation. To the contrary, out of fear of Hindustani political and economic domination the NPS formed a bloc with its former rival, the PNR. This Creole bloc won the election, making Henck Arron the new prime minister (1973–1980). He announced in February 1974 that Suriname would become independent in 1975. This unexpected announcement, the issue was not mentioned in the election campaign, tailed nicely with political developments in The Hague.

The *Statuut* gave the Netherlands leeway to militarily intervene to restore internal order in the overseas territories, but it was reluctant to do so. The Dutch government rejected the request of Paramaribo to provide military assistance during the 1969 strikes, but in that same year marines stationed in Curaçao suppressed riots in Willemstad (see Oostindie & Klinkers 2003: 96–102). These developments in a time of political protest

against the establishment in Europe strengthened the hand of proponents of independence for the territories in the Caribbean. In addition to these political developments, the social unrest caused by the influx of Surinamese migrants (see below) made that independence of Suriname (and the Netherlands Antilles) was high on the Dutch political agenda in the early 1970s. However, with the anti-independence VHP in power, the Netherlands did not manage to begin discussions on a new political and constitutional future. In the year that Arron took power in Suriname, a left-wing administration, led by the pro-independence Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid, PvdA) was formed in the Netherlands.⁵²

Independence was not a problem between the Netherlands and Suriname, but it was in Suriname itself. As will be described in more detail in chapter 6, there it was seen as a “Creole thing” (Van Westerloo 1983: 220; Oostindie 2000: 167), supported by only the smallest parliamentary majority. The specter of Guyana’s racial turbulence provoked by this country’s independence in 1966 haunted many in Suriname and emigration to the Netherlands increased. After two years of negotiations, Suriname became an independent republic on November 25, 1975. However, the Dutch presence would remain visible in two areas: economic development and military affairs. As will be discussed in chapter 6, it is exactly in those two areas that dramatic developments would occur.

Paradoxically, Ramssoedh (2001: 108) concludes that the process leading toward independence has “significantly undermined the legitimacy of politics and politicians in Suriname.” This is in sharp contrast to many other newly independent nations, where leaders who guided the constitutional emancipation are considered national icons. As will be seen in chapter 6, the postindependence period witnessed political and social collapse because of the constant fighting between administration and opposition, culminating in a military coup in 1980.

Demographic Developments

At the time of independence, about a quarter of the Surinamese population was living in the Netherlands. Before discussing this large-scale emigration, other postwar demographic changes are worth mentioning. Although large-scale immigration had stopped after 1939, the country experienced a high growth rate of 39.5 per 1,000 in the period 1939–1962, mainly on account of lower death rates and a higher fertility. According to the census data from 1964, Suriname counted 324,211 inhabitants. The percentage of Hindustanis had increased to 34.7 percent and was moving closely to the Creoles with 35.5 percent. The Javanese stood at 14 percent and the Maroons at 8.5 percent. For political and ideological reasons ethnicity was not registered anymore in the last twentieth-century census, held in 1980.⁵³ As the following Table 4.1 shows, the number of

Table 4.1 Population of Suriname According to Gender 1950–2003*

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Men</i>	<i>Women</i>	<i>Percent change</i>
1950	177,788**	88,284	89,504	
1964	324,211	161,855	162,356	+4.6
1972	379,607	190,497	189,110	+2.1
1980	355,240	175,818	179,422	-0.9
2003	481,129	241,837	239,292	+1.3

Source: ABS 2003: 15.

*In the first census year 1921 the total population was 107,723 (see chapter 1).

**According to an earlier publication by ABS (1992: 3) the population in 1950 was 183,723.

Table 4.2 Population of Suriname According to Ethnicity 1950–1972

<i>Year</i>	<i>Creoles</i>	<i>Hindustanis</i>	<i>Javanese</i>	<i>Maroons</i>	<i>Amerindians</i>
1950	75,100	64,100	36,100	n/a	n/a
1963	113,900	111,400	48,000	27,500	7,200
1971	118,500	142,300	58,900	39,500	10,200

Source: ABS 1972: 4.

inhabitants dropped in the period 1971–1980 due to a lower birth rate and emigration.

The registration of the population according to ethnicity is more complicated as through the years the categories changed; Maroons, Amerindians, and Chinese were not registered in 1950. It is evident from Table 4.2 that between 1950 and 1972 the Hindustani group had the highest growth, followed by the Javanese. The 1972 census takers noted that the number of Maroons in the Brokopondo district was much higher than expected, and linked this to more effective recording now that stability had returned after the transmigration period (ABS 1972: 5).

Since the 1970s, there is a sharp decline in birth rates from 46.1 percent in 1960 to 3.3 percent in 1971; this decline continued in the 1980s and 1990s to 2.1 percent in 1995. Thereafter, there was a small increase to 2.5 percent in 1998 (De Bruijne 2001: 27).

An even more important development was mass emigration. In the years 1974 and 1975, just before independence, one-seventh of the population left for the Netherlands. This was followed by a second, smaller migration wave to the Netherlands because the independence treaty stipulated that it would become more difficult to enter the Netherlands as of 1980. In total, more than one-quarter of the population left the country between 1970 and 1980. With an exception in 1982, when there was a small positive net migration, the 1980s and 1990s were decades of net emigration. Data on immigration from other countries, especially Guyana and Haiti, were not registered.

Traditionally, migration to the Netherlands almost was a “natural” phenomenon for the Surinamese upper and middle classes.⁵⁴ The mostly

lighter-skinned Creoles left for the metropolis to study, a logical continuation of their education in Suriname that followed the Dutch pattern. Surinamese school children were well trained in Dutch history, geography, and culture. “I already knew what the Netherlands would look like, because in school we learned nothing but about the Netherlands. Even in art class, we had to draw a house with a chimney.”⁵⁵ The Netherlands were presented and perceived as a “second home.” What changed in the 1960s were the ethnic and class background and gender of the emigrants. They no longer belonged to a select group as they were part of the middle and lower classes and included Hindustanis, Javanese, and Chinese.⁵⁶ Professionals, including teachers and nurses, students on grants, as well as skilled and unskilled laborers now left for the Netherlands. Data show that as of 1964 the number of women leaving the country was almost equal to the number of men, while before migration had been a men’s world.⁵⁷ In other words, a cross section of the population left the country.⁵⁸ In the mid-1950s certain large Dutch companies tried to recruit Surinamese men to fill the labor shortage in a booming economy (Budike 1982: 40–44). The importance of this experiment does not lie in the number of recruits, which was low, but that it opened up new vistas for the working population. The job growth in Paramaribo did not keep up with the population increase. In the 1960s, an estimated 30 percent of the urban labor population was unemployed; for many the possibilities, including social security, seemed better on the other side of the ocean. According to anthropologist Frank Bovenkerk (1983: 165–175), the migration of the “urban proletariat” started in 1968 (see also Budike 1982: 44–45).

In the 1970s, the fear of political independence and its consequences led to a rush to the Netherlands, when Hindustanis and Javanese, in particular, decided not to wait and see what independence would bring. Inhabitants from the districts, many without any experience of city life, moved to the Netherlands too (Budike 1982: 65; Bovenkerk 1983: 170). The outflow continued in the years after independence when socioeconomic development turned out to be disappointing. Often decisions to leave were taken within days. “It was a Thursday afternoon, I was at the office. I was called by an acquaintance: ‘You want to come to Holland, where you can study?’ I went home and told my mother that I wanted to go to Holland . . . On Saturday I went to the travel agency to buy a ticket.”⁵⁹ The migration from Suriname to the Netherlands was a typical example of chain migration, with the first migrant paving the way, also financially by paying tickets, for other relatives. The consequences for Suriname were dramatic: professionals or skilled workers and young people left, making it harder for those staying behind to attract employees or customers, clients, or students. Thus, emigration created its own dynamic, stimulating even more migration.

The other side of the coin was that houses, land, cattle, cars, and other durable goods could be bought at cut-rate prices. For example, anthropologists Wilhelmina van Wetering and H. U. E. Thoden van Velzen (2013: 273) describe how hundreds of Maroons acquired land, houses,

Table 4.3 Migration to the Netherlands
1972–1975*

1973	11,000
1974	17,820
1975	39,560

*An estimated 8,000 people per year left Suriname in the period 1970–1972.

Source: Budike 1982: 83.

shops, cars, and trucks in or near Paramaribo and changed their life for the better. A greater number, however, did not manage to make the same economic jump as they lacked the education and connections to enter the civil service, for example.⁶⁰

Within a decade (1970–1980) 120,000 migrants left Suriname (see Table 4.3).⁶¹ In 1976, a year after independence, more than 5,000 people re-migrated to their home country, but this number declined steadily to approximately 2,200 in 1980.⁶²

As a consequence of these demographic developments, the age distribution changed during the last decades of the century. In 1980, half of the population was less than 19 years old, and in 1995 less than 23 years (De Bruijne 2001: 28).

Conclusion: Economic and Political Transformations

Bauxite gave Suriname a new lease on economic life, as will be described in chapter 5. In the postwar years, large-scale investments were made in mining and processing facilities and in infrastructural works in support of the bauxite industry. The expanding bauxite sector not only had impact on the economy but also on society as a whole. The importance of bauxite to Suriname's small economy was enormous. Between the end of the war and independence, the industry generated between 30 to 33 percent of GDP, and bauxite, alumina, and aluminum were the most important export products. Economist Pitou van Dijck (2001: 58) states that “the contribution of the integrated sector to overall export earnings fluctuated between 70 and 80 percent of the value of merchandise exports from the beginning of World War II until the end of the century.”

In 1954, Suriname's national income per capita was below that of British Guiana and Trinidad and Tobago, but above that in Jamaica or Barbados (Bulmer-Thomas 2012: 261). The so-called Brokopondo push (1964–1967) generated high yearly growth rates of national income, yet Frank Bovenkerk noted in 1980 that (Dutch) development projects, with temporary comparatively high wages, instead of promoting economic independence stimulated migration to the Netherlands.⁶³ In the end, the large-scale projects did not result in long-term job creation on a large

scale. Moreover, the heavy dependence on one sector weakened incentives to stimulate growth in other sectors.

In addition, the bauxite sector contributed immensely to government revenues through taxation and other transfers. The other side of this coin is that volatility in world market prices, revenues, and income directly affect government spending and thus complicate sustainable longer-term planning and contribute to disequilibria in the balance of payments and the government budget. Ironically, given the relationship between the two countries, Suriname became a patient of the so-called Dutch disease.⁶⁴ An increase in revenues from natural resources, or inflows of foreign aid, will make a currency stronger compared to that of other nations, as is manifest in the exchange rate, resulting in other exports becoming more expensive for other countries to buy, thus making the manufacturing sector less competitive. An additional complication may be that increased government revenues during a boom result in structurally higher financial commitments, including wages and social benefits, which are hard to adjust when the boom ends.

In the years leading up to independence, the bloating government sector employed a growing part of the total labor force. Government spending soon exceeded government current income. About two-fifths of the active population was employed by the state, while the number of people in the agricultural sector declined. As in the previous decades, the educational sector provided the best chances for social mobility as teachers often had a lower-class background. However, their salaries were low when compared to skilled laborers. An increasing number of women were trained as teachers or nurses, but the majority still had to find employment as washerwomen, laundresses, seamstresses, and domestic servants (Buschkens 1974: 149). A government investigation among Creoles living in Paramaribo in the early 1950s found that more than half of a family's budget was spent on food (Ekker 1953).

Political independence had a profound impact on economic policy-making, despite the fact that Suriname had been autonomous for almost two decades. In 1975, a Surinamese-Dutch group of experts presented the Program for the Socio-economic Development of Suriname, providing the basis for a longer-term development program to be supported financially by the Netherlands. It was based on three pillars: the stimulation of commercial, social, and governmental services in Paramaribo, modern agriculture in the northern part of the western district of Nickerie, and a new growth pole in the western part of the country. This West Suriname project revolved around the building of a railroad from newly discovered bauxite deposits in the Bakhuis Mountains to a new harbor in Apoera on the Corantijn River. This ambitious plan to create a new growth pole away from Paramaribo by concentrating investment based on the exploitation of natural resources failed "due to policy inconsistencies, the discovery of commercially more attractive deposits in other parts

of the world and declining world market prices in the early 1980s" (Van Dijk 2001: 57).

Not only the West Suriname project failed but the real long-term growth performance in the last quarter of the century too "was extremely poor in comparison with the overambitious target set at the beginning of the period of independence. The economic model pursued by successive governments during this period tended to aggravate economic destabilization, generated only little real growth and was not capable to prevent large sections of the population to live in relative poverty."⁶⁵ The impact on the population of the economic downturn in the 1980s is described in chapter 6. Van Dijk (2001: 65–66) concludes that the lack of economic dynamism was related to external economic shocks (fluctuation of world market prices of bauxite) and to the economic policies (including political instability) that failed to stimulate private investment and generate growth of production and income. In addition, the suspension of transfers of financial aid by the Netherlands in the 1980s and 1990s contributed to the volatility in foreign-exchange revenues. A final factor negatively influencing economic performance was the brain drain in the 1970s and 1980s.

Not surprisingly, the unions were critical in improving social security and the legal positions of workers, especially in the major well-organized companies or in government sectors, including teachers, the effect was less or negligible for individuals in smaller enterprises. In fact, union activities increased the socioeconomic segmentation of the labor force between the employees of the state and large companies on the one hand, and those outside these sector on the other. It was in the economic sector that the unions were most successful, but they were not strong enough to structurally influence national economic policy. The political power of the unions ultimately rested on its ability to mobilize its members as was shown during mass strikes than on its leverage in the policy-making process (Campbell 1987: 234–239).

Nationalist sentiments triumphed in the political arena with independence in 1975, but by that time Suriname was not culturally unified. The socioeconomic emancipation of the lower-class Creoles and Asian populations also encouraged cultural emancipation as manifested in the establishment of religious schools, the erection of temples and mosques throughout Paramaribo, and the official acknowledgement of Hindu and Muslim holidays in 1970, while a decade earlier Suriname had adopted a flag and a national anthem to promote nation building. An independent Suriname would have had a better start if the issue of cultural unity would have been squarely addressed. In the 1980s, the military regime took up the issue, but given its repressive policies it inadvertently made Surinamization a contaminated issue for years to come.

CHAPTER FIVE

Bauxite Mining in Moengo: Remnants of the Past and Signs of Modernity

WITH ANOUK DE KONING

Major bauxite deposits were discovered in Suriname in the first decades of the twentieth century.¹ The exploitation and processing of bauxite transformed the chiefly agrarian economy into a mining economy. Suriname received a boost from the fact that World War I disrupted the supply of bauxite from Europe, while demand for military purposes rose sharply. American companies searched for alternative suppliers. In 1920, a subsidiary of the largest aluminum producer in the world, Alcoa (Aluminum Company of America), started mining in Moengo, an isolated Maroon village in the district of Marowijne in the eastern part of the colony. There the size, quality, and location of the deposits were most promising. This Surinaamse Bauxiet Maatschappij (Surinamese Bauxite Company, SBM), founded in 1916, and the exploitation of bauxite would have a towering role in the development of Suriname, especially since the start of World War II.²

The terms under which the Americans and later other companies could operate were, until the mid-1970s, very lucrative. Lack of expertise, disinterestedness, and other Dutch priorities gave the American multinational in effect free reign.³ Conditions in Suriname were much more favorable to Alcoa than in British Guiana (Buddingh' 2000: 267; Josiah 2011: 52–53). The *Staten* at first protested the granting of these conditions, but then unanimously voted in favor, out of fear that Alcoa might leave the colony. Alcoa managed to gain control over almost all deposits, nearly 34,000 hectares, known at that time. Moreover, the administration approved of the transfer of preferential mining rights for an additional 100,000 ha (Lamur 1985; Van Dijck 2001: 56). Journalist Hans Buddingh' (2000: 270) has calculated that it took Alcoa one year to earn back its total investments made between 1916 and 1935.

The bauxite sector was the mainstay of the Surinamese economy from the 1940s to the 1990s. It was the most important export product and foreign currency earner and the largest tax payer, enabling the expansion of the state apparatus. Because of its capital intensive nature, the sector was less important as an employer. That is to say, the number of employees was not overwhelming, not more than 10 percent of the economically active population, but these workers were considered the labor aristocracy. They belonged to the best-paid laborers in the country and were well provided for by their companies. In contrast to, for example, gold mining, agricultural work, or balata bleeding, the bauxite industry offered stability and predictability.

The American companies that were dominating the industry were regarded as modern. The supposedly prime examples of this modernity were the company towns, which were built on or near the sites of exploitation. These towns were solely constructed for the purpose of having a stable work force close to the job site. Only company employees and a few government officials lived in town. The first goal of the companies was to maintain a consistent workforce close to the mines, but facilities such as housing, health care, infrastructure, and schools as well as the financial remuneration served as a magnet to many. Aware of the nexus between well-being and productivity, the companies were able and willing to finance social policies. Company towns were prime sites of welfare policies and paternalism.

The first mine and company town at Moengo was located in the interior, more than 100 kilometers east of Paramaribo. Visitors gushed over the modern facilities and novelties in Moengo. How did this industry and the company towns keep control over employees? To answer this, the focus is on Moengo and its informal satellite village of Wonoredjo, not only because of its status as the first company town, but also because of its location. Moengo was an enclave in the interior, whereas other company towns were located closer to Paramaribo, which gave employees the possibility to commute. To accentuate the seclusion of Moengo, until 1945 visitors needed the company's permission to enter the town. Moreover, given Moengo's dominant position in the district of Marowijne it emerges more clearly from the census data on population movement and ethnic composition.

The bauxite companies were associated with modernity, but closer inspection reveals remnants of the organizational structure of large sugar plantations. The companies and their towns were thus examples of continuity and change. The occupational and ethnic hierarchy and the accompanying segregation that were part and parcel of large-scale agricultural enterprises were reproduced in the company towns. Moengo was a residentially segregated place, where the dividing lines were first based on race and ethnicity and later on income and occupation. Until the 1970s, the company discouraged social contacts between the different ranks. Throughout the decades the rigidity of extant race and class hierarchies

has relaxed while forms of labor discipline and authority have undergone changes as well.

The industry and the towns might have been socially conservative, yet that is not to say that the industry did not lead to social progress. As elsewhere, industrialization in Suriname spawned a trade-union movement. The degree of union organization in the sector was high, and the mining unions were in the vanguard of labor organization. The sector gave birth to modern social legislation.

In short, the bauxite industry was both an expression of American industrial expansion, modernity, and technological advances, and of the preservation of conservative social and ethnic hierarchies, until the last decades of the twentieth century. The company town of Moengo is a fine example of the importance of location: it shows a specific place and time in which people interacted in specific ways. Moengo was a class-based society with prominent ethnic and gender divisions, and thus mirrored Suriname's societal make-up. Focusing on this town enables us to connect location, class, gender, and ethnicity.

The First Decades of Moengo as a Modern Enclave

To get an idea of how a company town functioned before World War II, the focus is on Moengo. Paranam and Onverdacht (also known as Billiton) developed into company towns too, but they remained relatively small as the proximity to Paramaribo allowed workers to commute. In the course of time, many employees indeed opted to live in Paramaribo, where they could buy plots and build houses with financial aid by the companies. Moengo was more like an enclave, isolated in the jungle area along the banks of the Cottica River. This idea of enclave was further reinforced by time. "In Moengo the clock had been put forward one hour compared to Paramaribo. So that the day started earlier" (Lie A Kwie & Esajas 1996: 132).

Infrastructural changes, however, diminished the isolation over time and made the town's physical and social confinement less restricted. In 1936, a regular biweekly boat service to Paramaribo was inaugurated. Even more important was the completion of the road connecting Moengo to the capital in 1964. The time to reach Paramaribo remained considerable as the distance to the city was 100 kilometers and two rivers needed to be crossed by infrequent ferries.⁴

Moengo developed into a full-fledged company town, comparable to the larger bauxite town of Mackenzie in British Guiana.⁵ It never was a totally exclusive place as it housed several colonial officials, including the district commissioner.⁶ The company's headquarters were not located in Moengo, but in Paramaribo. The first account of Moengo is probably by Fred. Oudschans Dentz, who visited the new, only partially finished settlement in 1919 or 1920. Comparing it to a fairy tale,

he applauded the site in the middle of nowhere as “a piece of modern history and a monument to the will power and perseverance of the Americans” (Oudschans Dentz 1921: 485, see also 507). It was designed to accommodate 4,000 inhabitants: 1,000 workers and their wives and children.⁷ The visitor was impressed by the modern organization of the production process, the labor force, and the town with its advanced sanitary and health infrastructure. This infrastructure included a system for potable water, septic tanks and private sanitary facilities, a sewage system, and a hospital. Oudschans Dentz remarked on the orderliness and cleanliness and especially on the fact that after a rain shower workers poured petrol on the water puddles to eradicate mosquitos. Ration stores provided the employees with food at lower prices than in the capital; contract laborers received better rations than at the plantations. The power station (1500 horse power) supplied electricity not only to the factory but to the town (175 street lamps) as well.⁸ Things Paramaribo could only dream of. In the excited words of Oudschans Dentz (1921: 502), “Calculators are as of yet unknown in Paramaribo, and typewriters are busily typing away in this distant townlet in the jungle.” He expected that a wireless radio between Moengo and Paramaribo, to be built by SBM in the near future, would end the colony’s isolation (Oudschans Dentz 1921: 501). In other words, Moengo was a symbol of US capitalism and a can-do spirit.

When politician and journalist Willem Kraan visited Moengo a few years later he was less awe struck. Kraan was critical about the construction quality of the buildings, the selection of materials, and the lack of progress in building several facilities, but he too lauded the modernity of the place (Kraan 1928: 8–11).

Moengo’s original lay out was rigidly divided into sections for different ethnic groups. The Americans and later Europeans lived in the spacious American quarter or staff village with its wide avenues.⁹ The Javanese and Surinamese / Creole neighborhoods were more cramped; the housing for the Javanese was divided into family houses and barracks for single men.¹⁰ It is plausible that these barracks were also used for (families of) unskilled laborers. The account of the son of a skilled Javanese contract laborer shows this division, as he did not live in barracks but in a new house: “Our house was much better than in Java, it was an elevated house . . . I liked it there, but there were no children. Only Javanese children at the other side, near the barracks . . . Negro children lived two kilometers away” (Breunissen 2001: 10). In 1920, there was not yet a school in Moengo, and the boy plus a couple of other Javanese children were home-schooled by a Moravian. Not much later the Moravians would build a school, which in 1927 counted 80 students (Breunissen 2001: 10).

Oudschans Dentz (1921: 490) mentions the future construction of a camp for Javanese after the draining of a swamp. Anouk de Koning (2011c: 224) argues that it is likely that SBM wanted to create a partly self-sustaining labor reserve next to Moengo. It is very probable that

the reclaimed land is the origin of the Javanese village of Wonoredjo, Moengo's "informal shadow settlement."

The crisis of the 1930s also had its effect on community life in Moengo. Employees who were fired had to leave the town, thus depleting the population, and recreational facilities were (partially) closed. As one newspaper correspondent glumly concluded "sic transit gloria Moengo."¹¹ This prediction turned out to be premature, as the town would prosper again within a decade.

Production and Management

After a hesitant start, the first shipment of bauxite took place in 1922. In 1927, the newly built plant at Moengo was fully in operation. The export figure for that year was nearly as high as that of the five preceding years combined. The Great Depression hit the sector in 1931, reaching a low two years later. The economic turning point was in 1936 and bauxite exports rose quickly since that year: Suriname became one of the largest producers of bauxite in the world (Lie A Kwie & Esajas 1996: 55–73). Production depended on demand, prices at the world market, and the economic strategies of Alcoa. Production figures, and thus employment and revenues, showed considerable fluctuations over time, but overall the trend was upward.¹²

In late 1938, SBM started mining operations near Paranam, upstream from Paramaribo on the Suriname River.¹³ A few years later the Dutch company of Billiton, based in the Netherlands East Indies, developed activities in the bordering area near Onverdacht. These new developments moved the heart of the industry to Paranam / Onverdacht as Paranam soon produced more than the mine at Moengo. Production reached its first peak during World War II, when other supply lines to the United States were cut off. Nearly three-quarters of all bauxite used by the North American war industry originated from Suriname. The stationing of American military personnel to protect the mining sites and transport underscored the importance of Suriname to the Allied war effort.

The number of people employed in the sector rose from approximately 950 in 1939 to a then high of 2,634 in 1942. In 1943, mining companies paid 4 million guilders in taxes. Production was 1.6 million tons in that year. When a year later, however, Alcoa started mining operations in Arkansas, demand declined steeply and as a result production fell by more than 1 million ton and hundreds of employees were fired in Suriname. The state's revenues also nearly halved. However, in 1946 Suriname was still the origin of 94 percent of American bauxite imports. Gradually, Suriname lost its position and its share on the world market dropped from 30 percent in 1950 to 3.2 percent in 1991, even though export production kept rising in the late 1940s and 1950s (Lie A Kwie &

Esajas 1996: 90–94, 152–156; Van Dijck 2001: 56–57).¹⁴ Bauxite dominated the export performance from the 1930s until the 1960s, when it was replaced by alumina and aluminum.¹⁵

With the increase in production, employment at Billiton and SBM/Suralco rose. An important development was the construction of a dam in and a hydroelectric power station near the newly created Lake Brokopondo, providing fuel for an alumina plant and an aluminum smelter at Paranam.¹⁶ The so-called Brokopondo-push (1964–1967) generated the highest annual growth rates of national income and income per capita in the twentieth century.¹⁷ In 1961, the mining companies offered work to 4,125 people (4,055 men and 70 women) and three years later to 5,570 (5,387 men and 183 women). This was respectively 10 percent of the total male and 1 percent of the female labor force. Of this total number of employees 959 lived in the Marowijne district, read Moengo. The remaining was most likely employed at Onverdacht and Paranam or involved in the construction of the power station (Census 1964 quoted in De Koning 2011c: 225–227).

Bauxite and alumina / aluminum production remained the mainstay of Suriname's economy. Economist Pitou van Dijck (2001: 62) writes that during the period from World War II to independence, “the dynamics of the Surinamese economy depended to a large extent on the investment in bauxite processing facilities and the subsequent expansion of bauxite production.” Despite bauxite's dominant position in terms of national production, its role as direct employer has been limited. In this capital intensive sector, production growth did not automatically lead to increases in employment. During the period 1953–1982, the sector provided jobs to less than 10 percent of the economically active population. By 2006, this percentage had dropped to three. However, given that men always dominated the industry, these data do not reflect the importance of the bauxite companies as employers for the male labor force (De Koning 2011c: 220).

Although the Americans might have taken over the bauxite industry, it did not mean that the administration in Paramaribo had no influence at all. For example, Governor A. J. A. A. van Heemstra (1921–1928) requested that management of SBM would be in Dutch hands. In 1924, a Dutch engineer arrived and made some radical changes in the staff. More than 60 years later, the company, rather evasively, wrote: “Because he was of the opinion that the work could not be carried out well with the Americans present in Moengo—they were leading a ‘rather free life’ and ‘did not adhere to the provisions of the law of the colony’—a large part of the staff in Moengo was replaced by Dutch experts” (Lie A Kwie & Esajas 1996: 49).

According to Hesselink (1974: 52), until well after World War II only whites could hold management functions. When the race criterion was formally abandoned, the demand for specific competencies and experiences as well as educational achievement often formed an informal barrier for local applicants. During the time of Hesselink's research in 1970, 16 of 26 managers were white, even though Suralco had adopted a policy

of preference for Surinamese managers.¹⁸ The management at that time included eight Creoles and two (Surinamese) Chinese.

Labor, Wages, and Labor Organization

During the construction process of Moengo, SBM employed some 150 carpenters from Paramaribo, in all likelihood Creoles. Maroons supplied timber, while Amerindians worked as lumber jacks. Even if the management functions were held by Americans and later also Dutch men, the company offered attractive opportunities for Surinamese clerical staff. Wages at Moengo were significantly higher than elsewhere in the colony (Oudschans Dentz 1921: 497–502).

In the early days of exploitation, SBM signed a contract with the Surinamese administration for approximately 400 Javanese immigrants. In 1920, three ships transported 251 Javanese indentureds to work at Moengo. Most of these contract workers were in their twenties and early thirties, many were married and came as a family. Most Javanese seem to have been put to work as manual laborers, only a few held skilled jobs. The majority worked in the mine, in transport, or maintained the vegetable garden. Javanese women helped to transport the mined bauxite and washed the clay of the ore. Although the management was satisfied with these Javanese workers, the experiment with contract labor was not repeated. The Javanese, however, continued to make up a significant part of the manual labor force. Most of them were former contractants from plantations, especially Mariënborg, in neighboring Commewijne (De Koning 2011c: 224–228).

In 1924, more than 400 laborers worked at Moengo: 200 Javanese, about 100 Creoles and some 100 others, including French deportees, who had escaped from the *bagno*'s in French Guiana. One year later the labor force, including construction workers, had increased to 1,200. In 1933, at the depth of the crisis, only 242 workers were remaining (Lie A Kwie & Esajas 1996: 47–49, 68). The move from the plantations to the mines continued in full force during the war and after (De Koning 2011c: 218, 224–228). Earlier, in the late 1920s and 1930s, white overseers from Mariënborg had already left for Moengo where they could double their salaries, even though their European bosses were skeptical whether this group would find it appealing to work for Americans (Hoeft 1998: 99–101).

Creole and Javanese men dominated the labor force at Moengo. Although the share of these two population groups diminished in time, the Javanese and Creoles still constituted a little less than three-fourths of the labor force in 1970. Population changes were directly related to demand and production.¹⁹ The backgrounds of the Creoles and Javanese were very different though. For plantation workers the company was an escape hatch. In 1950, approximately 85 percent of the Javanese at Moengo had moved from the plantation to the mine and factory. Of the 1,134 Javanese living

in Moengo / Wonoredjo two-thirds had either been an immigrant or had been born on a plantation, in most cases in the district of Commewijne. Proximity but especially the predominance of (sugar) plantations explains this trek from one district to another. Relatively few people hailed from smallholder settlements.²⁰ In contrast, half of the Creole population at Moengo was born in Paramaribo.

The importance of Moengo as a much better alternative than large-scale agriculture is illustrated by an elderly lady married to a retired Suralco worker and a domestic for staff members herself. Anouk de Koning asked her whether a job at the company was highly thought of.

Well yes, you don't earn that much, but earlier at Mariënborg, you earned one guilder a week; now you are at Moengo, and you earn 20, 25 guilders per week.²¹ Is more, no? Those people are wondering. They are afraid to spend the money . . . My husband was a carpenter at Mariënborg . . . Then he went to Moengo, this is 1949. He went to Moengo, and again found work as a carpenter. Then he received 18.50 per week . . . My husband says, the Suralco is mistaken. So he put 10 guilders aside. *Afraid that they would come back to reclaim it?* Yeah . . . Till one day he asked a friend. Isn't the Suralco paying by mistake? Because I get 18 guilders every week. Then the friend says, No, this is what you earn.²²

A Javanese informant and former Suralco employee, describes how Moengo in the 1950s differed from plantation Constantia (Commewijne) where he was born; "it was more interesting, there were cars . . . decent housing, a large theater, recreation. Locomotives. It really is an interesting place."²³

Data for 1970 confirm the earlier figures regarding the workers' background. G. Hesselink (1974: 72, 93) finds that most Javanese were children of fathers with an agricultural background, while the fathers of over half of the Creole employees were low-level civil servants or artisans. In 1970, a quarter of the Creole and a fifth of the Javanese employees had been born in Marowijne and most could be qualified as "SBM / Suralco children." Hesselink (1974: 72) notes that the company preferred to hire family members of employees.

In the colony as a whole, bauxite offered important employment opportunities for Creole men, skilled laborers in particular. The sector, however, was an even more important employer to Javanese men, who were clearly overrepresented in the labor force in comparison to their share in Suriname's total population. The 1964 census provides the most detailed picture of the composition of the work force in the mining industry in Suriname. More than half of all employees were Creole (56 percent, compared to their share of 36 percent in the total Surinamese population), almost a quarter was Javanese (23 percent compared to 15 percent of the total population), while Hindustanis were registered at 14 percent

(35 percent of the total population). The sector offered work to 15 percent of the total employed Creole male labor force, to 11 percent of the Javanese men, and to 19 percent of the males categorized as “Other,” that is men of Lebanese / Syrian and Portuguese descent.²⁴ The bauxite industry itself offered few jobs to women. In Moengo’s early years Javanese women had been working as cart loaders and bauxite washers, but with increasing mechanization women seem to have been phased out of the primary production process. Employment in the company for women was now restricted to administrative and domestic services. De Koning shows that in 1964 the mining sector in Marowijne employed 915 men (95 percent) and only 44 women (De Koning 2011c: 232–233).

The higher ranks in the company town employed female domestics, most often the wives or daughters of laborers. These wives or children of lower-ranked workers could also have other (informal) sources of income. The mother of one Javanese informant tells how her mother sold food at parties. “The entire week she had to prepare what she wanted to sell on Saturday and Sunday and we had to help to cook.”²⁵

The company made a clear distinction between layers of employees by the way they were paid: by month, week, or hour. The monthly paid employees included professionals, skilled workers, and foremen. The monthly paid group formed a layer between the management and the labor force. This hierarchy in method of payment was reminiscent of the prewar sugar plantations (Hoefte 1998: 94–101).

The social and occupational divisions largely overlapped with ethnic and racial divisions, although during the postwar years the composition of the upper strata slowly changed. Hesselink (1974: 68–69, 77–78) concludes that whites and Chinese formed the top layer of the employees, followed by Creoles, Javanese, and Maroons. The Javanese in Moengo, however, were closing the educational and occupational gap with the Creoles in the 1970s.

Creoles (79 percent) dominated the monthly paid group. Both Javanese (43 percent) and Creoles (35 percent) continued to make up the majority of the weekly and hourly paid work force.²⁶ Data on Suralco employment and hiring policies are absent, but given the extant ideas among managers about the different ethnic groups in 1970, one can surmise that ethnicity continued to play a role in hiring practices. Hesselink (1974: 74) reports that according to managers, Javanese were reliable but lacked leadership skills and the necessary competitive streak. Well-educated Creoles made good leaders, but their work rhythm was inconsistent, while Maroons were hard workers, but considered less intelligent and not as reliable because of their various religious duties. The author concludes that it is likely that these prejudices and stereotypes handicapped the upward mobility of many.

De Koning (2011c: 235) argues that the presence of Creoles “in all strata masks significant social and racial differentiation that confirms rather than disproves the overlap of occupational / social and racial hierarchies.” The Creoles formed a diverse group in terms of class background,

“color,” and education. Hesselink (1974: 73) underlines that in 1970 there was a distinct difference between monthly paid and weekly or hourly paid Creoles in terms of social background, which expressed itself in, for example, religious affiliation and marital status.²⁷

The bauxite industry in Suriname, and also in Guyana, had the reputation of paying the highest wages in the colony. There is no overview of wages and salaries paid at Moengo during the course of time. Organized labor activities during the war and in the postwar period did have an upward effect on wages, and earnings in the mining sector were comparatively high as indicated by data from the 1960s and 1970s. In 1961, the mining sector paid the second-highest average wages and in 1973 average wages in the sector were the highest in the country at 10,000 guilders, as compared to 5,730 guilders in the second-highest sector (transport and communication). What these figures do not reveal is the pay to different occupational groups in a hierarchical sector. In 1961, the average wage in mining was 3,459 guilders; a mine worker would make 2,313 guilders while a mechanic earned 3,289 guilders, thus both earned less than the average (De Koning 2011c: 229).

The mining sector not only had a reputation for paying high wages but also as a good provider for its employees. Moreover, the sector offered opportunities for advancement for both skilled and unskilled employees. To illustrate the privileged position of the Moengo employees, Suralco (Lie A Kwie & Esajas 1996: 74) reports in its jubilee book that people from Moengo arriving in Paramaribo were often greeted with the song

Moengo boto doro na foto	The boat from Moengo has arrived in town
Me go luku den prodoman	I'm going to look at the dandies

In the postwar era, organized labor would make mining employees the highest paid and best cared for in the country. From the very start of the mining operations, the companies had to deal with labor conflicts as the work was demanding and conditions tough. Already in January 1920 a strike broke out in Moengo, followed by another one in November. In both cases, SBM summarily fired the strikers (De Koning 2011b: 34).

World War II ushered in a new series of serious labor conflicts. According to De Koning the strikes at Moengo in 1941 and 1942 were a landmark in terms of labor contestation and organization. “The strikes constitute a crucial period of contestation that laid the groundwork for future relations between labour, the company and the state.”²⁸ She describes how in August 1941 strikers demanded their annual wage increase and the reinstatement of a cost of living allowance, given that living costs had gone up considerably due to the war.²⁹ Moreover, their workload had become heavier because of expanded production. After a few days District Commissioner J. Postma, who reported on the labor actions to the governor, wrote that “for the time being,” the strike had

ended as wage increases had been granted (De Koning 2011b: 37). He concluded that increased pressure due to growing production and the rise in living costs were the main causes for the unrest. In a later missive he added another problem: the move of skilled laborers to the oil industry in Curaçao.

In January 1942, another strike broke out after SBM refused to meet demands for another 50 percent wage increase.³⁰ In addition, the protestors complained about housing, medical treatment, leave, and potable water. Both the district commissioner and the company used the war effort as a means to force the strikers back to work. In a radio address the DC said that at Moengo there were

well dressed, well housed, and well fed workers, who have till now been spared the horrors of war . . . It pays to calculate how many planes are produced out of every ship of bauxite that leaves Moengo. Therefore, anyone who, by attempting to strike, obstructs ships from leaving fully loaded and on time, is, I trust without realizing it, a traitor to our cause . . . I will use all the means necessary to keep the bauxite company at Moengo going; and I possess such means. A General Authority Measure [*Gouvernementsbesluit*] has recently been taken, opening the possibility to force anyone employed at certain companies or institutions to go to work. Violation of this legal measure is punishable with a jail sentence of maximum five years.³¹

This threatening speech did stop a part of the strikers. As earlier, the skilled shovel operators were at the center of the strike; a foreman and American soldiers now took over their work. Military troops escorted other workers to their job sites. More than 80 people were arrested and fired. Within a week from the radio address Governor Kielstra used his authority to declare that employees in the bauxite sector could not be terminated without the DC's permission. This measure stayed in force until late 1944. In late January 1942 production had returned to normal, but it was at some cost. The DC concluded that "The military intervention, whose necessity is not yet understood, has caused bad blood. They feel unappreciated, but they do not understand what every lost hour of bauxite production means to our armies at war."³² According to him, distrust of Europeans was widespread.

The strike had long-term consequences beyond ill feelings: it led to the formation of mining unions. On March 1, 1942, the Moengo Mijnerwerkersbond (Moengo Miners Union) was founded. Unions at Paranam and Billiton soon followed and the three later formed to Surinaamse Mijnerwerkersunie (Surinamese Miners Union). The organizers were G. Zaal, a civil servant and former politician, S. Helstone, a teacher, and J. de Miranda, a politician and lawyer. Its membership included dismissed employees. In 1948, the union, counting 2,200 members, was the largest in the country. In 1965, the Surinaamse Bauxiet en Metaalwerkers Federatie

(Suriname Bauxite and Metal Workers Federation) was formed (Campbell 1987: 75, 56; Lie A Kwie & Esajas 1996: 100–102).

Not much later, the government became more involved in labor negotiations by regulating labor agreements and instituting an official Mediation Council, which was still active in the first decade of the twenty-first century (Campbell 1987: 109–113). The miners were the first to sign a collective labor agreement in 1966 (Campbell 1987: 114). On the eve of independence the miners' union had 4,953 members; 67 percent of the labor force was unionized, that was the second-highest percentage in the country.³³ The miners' union was the most powerful union in Suriname. The hierarchical structure at the companies with its emphasis on class probably contributed to the development of class consciousness among the laborers.

Hesselink (1974: 63–64) notes that Suralco discouraged organizations across labor hierarchies to quash the unions. The management tried to secure the loyalty of the monthly paid employees to undermine the formation of an organized front of skilled and unskilled laborers. As was common in Suriname, managers were contractually barred from union membership, while known “agitators” were routinely fired. Nevertheless, the laborers in the mining enclaves have been the most active and successful in the country.³⁴

The mining unions used their strategic position to lead protests at various stages in Suriname's postwar era, as during the economically and politically unstable period 1966–1973, leading to the fall of the Pengel administration in 1969, when protests by teachers and civil servants turned into general strikes.³⁵ In all cases, the unions scored “glorious” victories (Campbell 1987: 78). Often wage issues were at the root of the unrest.

When the military took power in 1980, the miners showed after a few years that they were not afraid to take on the army. In 1983, the unions organized a massive strike to protest a tax hike, but in time the action adopted a more political character by demanding free and secret elections. None of the other unions dared to follow the miners. Fearing retaliation by the military, the leaders remained anonymous. The army sent in troops “to protect the non-strikers” but the commander in charge aborted the action when the group of strikers turned out to be much larger than he had been told by his superiors. Given the international complications that probably would arise from an army entering the territory of an American company, a problem the strikers were very aware of, the military backed down. It fired the administration of Prime-Minister Errol Alibux (1983–1984), which did not satisfy the strikers who wanted the military leaders to step down. Finally, the protestors made the best of the situation by dropping their political demands and accepting a financial deal after Alcoa had closed the plant for an unspecified period (Buddingh' 2000: 335).

Summing up, in the second half of the century there were gains on the labor front, but these were counterbalanced by changes in Suralco's economic policy, including disinvestment and outsourcing. In addition,



Figure 5.1 Aerial View of Moengo, 1950–1960.

Source: Courtesy of KITLV, Leiden, the Netherlands 510155.

the Surinamese government became more critical toward the company. The final blow to Moengo as a mining town was the Interior War, but the decline had already set in earlier with the depletion of easily accessible deposits and the multinational's apprehension toward the military regime, leading to a decline in American investments. All mining activities were stopped in 1986–1987. When mining resumed, the company's restructured operations required a considerably smaller labor force. In 1998, 2,300 people were employed in the mining sector, down from 6,200 in 1975.³⁶ The 1993 so-called bauxite agreement between Alcoa and Billiton on the one hand and the Surinamese government on the other was the basis for a long-term continuation of bauxite mining and production, leading to extensive investments in the sector in the last few years of the twentieth century, but not in Moengo. In 2003, Billiton and Suralco merged their activities, yet in 2009 ended their cooperation because of disagreement on future development. After 70 years Billiton sold its share in alumina production to Alcoa (Buddingh' 2012: 373–374, 464).

Moengo and Wonoredjo in the 1970s

In 1950 Moengo and Wonoredjo counted 2,687 people, in 1964 5,320, and in 1971 6,633 inhabitants (De Koning 2011c: 227). Some would compare Moengo to paradise, with decent, inexpensive housing, free water and electricity, a company farm producing dairy products and vegetables, and a company store (De Koning 2011c: 228). Students could apply for

scholarships. There was even the possibility to obtain loans to build a house in Paramaribo, in the so-called Moengo or Suralco projects. Not everyone was excited about these projects, however. As a Suralco employee told his wife when discussing his retirement plans “we have lived so many years with those Moengonese, with everybody, the same people, and then I’ll have to live on the project, and I will see those same people again. I don’t want to live there, we’ll look for some place else.”³⁷

More than half a century after Oudschans Dentz’s visit, social geographer G. Hesselink gave an updated impression of Moengo in his 1974 report. This author was more critical than his predecessor. Moengo was still a highly regulated, stratified, and well-organized place. It housed only employees who worked directly for the company; within two weeks after retirement the former employee had to leave town (Hesselink 1974: 95). Wonoredjo was an official village community since 1941 and largely dependent on Moengo. Casual laborers, pensioners, and domestic personnel lived there. As the name indicates, Wonoredjo was predominantly Javanese, but also counted some Chinese, Amerindian, Hindustani, and Creole inhabitants. The village did not possess the amenities of Moengo and lacked basic public services, but to its advantage it provided more freedom as the controlling influence of the company was largely absent.

Access to Moengo was restricted for a long time, while the *lurah* (village head) controlled access to Wonoredjo. Until 1945 one had to get a pass in Paramaribo to enter Moengo and a family member had to be present to escort the visitor to the town. Until the opening of the road between Moengo and Paramaribo in 1964, the maximum stay for visitors was two weeks and a medical inspection directly after arrival was mandatory. Even in 1970, Suralco checked for illegal inhabitants (Hesselink 1974: 51). Wonoredjo had some bars, Chinese shops, bakeries, tailors, and *warungs* (casual, often street-side food stalls), which were not allowed in Moengo, which at that time housed Rudy’s Store, a department store including a bakery and a butcher, and one Chinese shop.

Satellites such as Wonoredjo as well as a few Maroon villages were important to Moengo as a reservoir of casual labor. Hesselink (1974: 30) estimates that in 1970, 80 percent of Wonoredjo’s inhabitants were directly or indirectly working for Suralco. The company hired Maroon and Javanese workers only when necessary, and did not have to pay for facilities such as free water, electricity, and maintenance. The company provided loans to regular workers who wanted to build their own houses in the village to ease its financial obligations (Hesselink 1974: 51–52, 64–66).

Division of Labor, Division in Social Life

The move from the plantations to the mining sites gave access to modern facilities, yet some conditions remained strikingly the same. This was especially true for the strict occupational and social hierarchies that

certainly in the first decades were strongly related to ethnicity. The most obvious expression of this hierarchy was the segregated residential patterns, including entertainment and social accommodations. The system was first based on ethnicity, later on occupation. Then one's social positions were directly based on the place one held in the company's occupational hierarchy.

This notable change in the postwar era was illustrated by the fact that residential segregation was no longer based on race / ethnicity but on company hierarchy and income variables. The managers lived in a spacious neighborhood, including a swimming pool and a tennis court. This area used to be closed to other inhabitants. The quarters of the monthly paid group were less clearly delineated; the houses were less spacious and luxurious than those of the management, but of better quality than those of the laborers. A part of the middle group lived outside these quarters as no residences would be yet available after moving up the ranks or when people preferred to stay in their old house. The workers lived in smaller houses; given that they often had larger families their space could be cramped. Separate buildings housed bachelors and domestics, even though families were known to live there as well (Hesselink 1974: 52–53; De Koning 2011c: 230–238). As a Javanese woman recalls:

Moengo used to be a great place, I have fond memories of my life as a child there. It was very cozy . . . The neighborhoods were divided into different categories. There were weekly paid and monthly paid groups. Where you lived depended on your salary. Thus you knew everybody's salary, because you lived in that certain neighborhood. My father did not earn much, so we lived in a lesser neighborhood. There was an even lesser area, so we weren't in the worst one, but the house wasn't large. I believe we had only three bedrooms, a living room and a small kitchen, a small porch and a little garden . . . The streets were unpaved . . . and there was no running water.

This informant notes that the class divisions were quite rigid: "It did not worry me much, but I was still young. I can imagine that when you were older that is was not nice not to be able to go wherever you wanted, only because you did not make enough money. Looking back it was sort of discriminatory. I think it was pervasive, even the company Christmas boxes were different according to your status."³⁸

The social divisions were probably most clearly expressed in the clubs that Suralco provided for each group. The managers, including non-Suralco inhabitants in higher functions such as the headmasters, had the "magnificent" Casa Blanca at their disposal. The monthly paid group, including policemen and civil servants living in Moengo, could relax in their less comfortable club, while the workers' recreational facilities resembled a mess hall, according to Hesselink (1974: 54). Club membership was automatic.³⁹ One could visit the clubs of the lower ranks, but not

the other way around. Other manifestations of the three-way division in town included the hospital, home delivery of produce for management and monthly paid, and a special school for children of managers.

In an interview the wife of a school principal recalls the opening of the new theater in the 1950s, where the teachers' couple was seated in a box: "My son . . . worked for a year in the factory and therefore was paid by the week or the hour, I can't remember, but the monthly paid that was quite different. Well we were seated in the box, and my son sat all the way up front. So we just waved to each other . . . My children from Paramaribo, when they came over, were indeed allowed to sit with me in the box."⁴⁰ This story is noticeably similar to an account by the first Surinamese sugar boiler in the colony around the same time. At plantation Mariënborg his father, as sugar boiler, was ranked as a skilled laborer, and therefore paid monthly "that meant that he was respected." But as a trainee and thus a laborer, his son could not visit his father at the club. "They were so very tight. There it was at its worst, that division. My father was a staff member, but as his son I couldn't go in to visit him. Even though he was there all by himself . . . It was very, very regulated. But then there were his children living in Paramaribo, my older brother and sister. If you didn't live at Mariënborg, you could visit my dad."⁴¹

The restraint on social contacts between the ranks was lifted by 1970, but "one wasn't keen on it" (Hesselink 1974: 61). Hesselink (1974: 54–55, 115) notes a tendency to drop more and more management privileges, but that rigid regulations kept informing relations in Moengo. He argues that the company's stratification system caused relations to be "unpleasant" (Hesselink 1974: 113–115). The lower ranks often felt slighted, but had no way to express their frustration because of their dependence on higher-ranked employees for work, promotion, and housing. The clubs were the main bone of contention as they were the clearest examples of segregation imposed by the company.

Children might have had different experiences in the protected environment that the town provided. A Javanese woman who was born in Moengo in the 1950s has happy memories about her childhood there. She remembers the class divisions, but also how she played with Hindustani and Creole children her age.

We just went with a whole group, doing what they did. That could be the pinching of oranges, stealing at the farm, just taking it. And then they would complain to the parents and we would get a nice whacking . . . We lived close to the forest and we built a little house in a tree . . . where we all cooked in jars, we pinched stuff from our mother's kitchens, rice and stock cubes and such . . . With the children it was fun, and with those same children I went to school, and with the same children I did naughty things and such, and we all got the same whacking when we came home and our mothers had found out . . . It was enormous fun.⁴²

Even in the economically difficult 1980s, Suralco continued to make a difference between the monthly paid group and the weekly and hourly paid workers. During the food scarcity in the 1980s, the company provided food parcels with 25 items including oil, onions, potatoes, cheese, garlic, and flour. “Only monthly-paid employees got it . . . Weekly and hourly paid would get Christmas boxes . . . We would get a parcel every three months.”⁴³ Even more important was that during the economic crisis of the 1980s and 1990s with high inflation, retired Suralco employees had the option to have their pensions paid in hard currencies through the Netherlands or the United States.

The End of the Company Town

Independence did not seem to have had a great impact in Moengo. According to informants, there was no large-scale migration to the Netherlands. As the same Javanese woman who had cherished her childhood at Moengo expressed it “I think that many laborers who were tied to Suralco had a good job, that gave them some security . . . Suralco took care of many things people needed. I remember the good infrastructure, the recreational facilities, you could count on a regular wage, per week, per month, education was good . . . So nobody thought about leaving, it was too idealistic, no?”⁴⁴

Yet a decade later, Moengo would undergo drastic changes. As a result of the changes in mining activities due to depletion of the bauxite deposits and the Interior War of the 1980s, the old Moengo disappeared. The area around Moengo was the cradle of the war between Desi Bouterse’s national army and the so-called Jungle Commando, which lasted from 1986 to 1992.⁴⁵ The district of Marowijne was the hardest hit; counter insurgency operations forced 25,000 people to flee the area for Paramaribo, refugee camps in French Guiana, the Netherlands or the United States (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 270). A scorched earth policy destroyed the towns of Moengo and Albina and villages as well as the infrastructure in Marowijne. In 1986, bauxite production came to a halt when the Jungle Commando took over, only to be driven out by the army a few weeks later. At that time some 550 people were still working at Moengo, who soon lost their pay. Suralco was forced to import its ore (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 160–172). Moengo and Albina became a no man’s land. In skirmishes the Jungle Commando blew up bridges and power pylons, disrupting the transfer of electricity to Paramaribo, but by December 1986 the Jungle Commando had actually lost the war. It took another six years, however, before a peace was settled. In 1992, many refugees, forced by the administration in French Guiana, returned after the Lelydorp peace agreement, although many continued to live on French soil (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 233–234, 272).

Those who returned found their town in shambles. Government reconstruction plans never materialized.⁴⁶ Besides the material damage, the social impact of the war was considerable. Between 1986 and 1989 there were no functioning educational facilities in the Moengo–Albina–Bigiston triangle, elsewhere teaching and attendance was very poor. According to a 2002 report by anthropologist Henna Guicherit “the army of illiterates that originated during the Interior War is only increasing” because school attendance is low (Guicherit quoted in De Vries 2005: 104). According to journalist Ellen de Vries (2005: 104), in contrast to the prewar period, Maroons in Marowijne barely speak Dutch anymore. Another problem is that traditional authority structures are undermined and role patterns have changed. Men have difficulty finding jobs, while women are active in the informal economy. They trade goods on market days in St Laurent, and are often away from home (De Vries 2005: 39, 148). Nevertheless, Moengo experienced growth again in the late 1990s. In 1997, the enumeration district Moengo officially counted 6,998 inhabitants and this figure had gone up to 7,788 in 2002. Only a handful of former employees are still living in Moengo. The great majority is now formed by Maroons. As one informant says, “Now there are only a few Javanese, Hindustanis, and Chinese left in Moengo, so now Moengo has become a small piece of the interior.”⁴⁷

An Economic and a Social System

The organizational structure of the bauxite industry contained remnants of large-scale plantation agriculture in its emphasis on labor hierarchy and the way this was expressed in payment and residential patterns and relations between the different ranks. There seems to be a direct relationship in the socioeconomic configuration of the plantation and the mining enclave. Yet, the analogy between plantations and the mining industry goes further. Economists Norman Girvan (1975) and Lloyd Best and Kari Polanyi Levitt (2009) point at the macroeconomic side of the dominance of foreign-owned and managed businesses in Caribbean economies and the economic consequences resulting from this dependent, vertical integration into metropolitan economies. Another characteristic of a dependent, capital-intensive mineral-export economy is that the tax revenues from the mining sector facilitated the expansion of the state apparatus, including the civil service. The result is that there exists two relatively stable and high-income groups; the employees of the mining companies and that of the state. As many economists have noted, this leaves the state in a vulnerable position. In Suriname, the state became the largest employer and the most important sector of the domestic economy in the second half of the twentieth century, yet its dependency on revenues from a single commodity export sector left it exceedingly vulnerable to fluctuating demand and prices on the world market, and thus the value

of production and foreign-exchange revenues, strategic decisions and investments by multinational companies based elsewhere, and the availability of natural resources. In short, the state had little or no influence on these variables, but they affected the state's revenues, and therefore its ability to sustain its spending (Van Dijck 2001: 58).

At the micro level, the mining industry was not only a system of production, but also of community, especially at Moengo. Mining investment also brought social investment. Work and social life were inseparable as the economic organization extended to social relations. As a result, the community was imbued with a rigid system of stratification and the mine was a way of life, not just an employer. A telling example of this interwovenness of company discipline and town is the loud whistle, to be heard in the whole of Moengo, which summoned the employees to their work shift. Girvan (1975: 20, 27–28) emphasizes the importance of “ethno-cultural racism” in the occupational and thus social hierarchy. The higher and middle ranks were expected to adhere to white cultural standards, regarding, for example, speech, religion, the activities of wives, and matrimonial status.⁴⁸

It is important to note that this type of regulated communities was not restricted to the bauxite industry or the sugar plantations. At the village of Wageningen in Nickerie on the other side of the country, the Foundation of Mechanized Agriculture (Stichting Machinale Landbouw, SML) had built a village for its employees as well.⁴⁹ It was not a company town, but segregation between the ranks was strict nevertheless. As the wife of a teacher who moved there in 1961 tells it, “There was the director's house, very big and fancy, and staff housing. You also had houses for the teachers . . . two bedrooms, bath and lavatory, living room and a little balcony. [The laborers] also had everything, but a communal bath and lavatory . . . and one room for a family. That's where they lived. [In the club] only monthly paid and managers were allowed. We were management, so we could go there . . . I've had a good time at Wageningen, life there was very organized.”⁵⁰

Labor discipline at Moengo was based on rewards and punishment. Most material benefits in the community stemmed from a satisfying job performance, while underachievement or, in the eyes of the company, unacceptable behavior could lead to dismissal and thus immediate expulsion from town. Moengo's *raison d'être* was the mine; it was developed to tie the employees to the job. To make life in the isolated enclave more attractive and to ensure the stability of the labor force the company offered higher wages and better secondary provisions than elsewhere. Corporate paternalism provided education, scholarships, housing, health care, and sports and entertainment. It also forged a sense of community. The flip side was that employees were unilaterally dependent on the company, giving it leeway to enforce its ideas of labor and social discipline and the concomitant hierarchical system and rules. The movement of both inhabitants and possible visitors were restricted for decades, not only to leave or

enter Moengo, but also in the town itself, where company police patrolled the neighborhoods to keep out unwanted town dwellers and to watch out for “deviant” behavior.

This paternalistic management style could adapt to changing circumstances in production and labor relations. Hesselink’s report from 1974 was written in a time of change when privileges were revoked and restrictions were loosened or lifted, although Moengo still remained a highly stratified society. The spirit of the times reached Moengo too. Rules and regulations gradually relaxed over time, yet there is no denying that SBM / Suralco stamped the mark of a class-based society on Moengo. However, this by no means entailed that the ethnic / racial divisions, including stereotypes and prejudices, were less prominent. The company added another division that largely determined social relations in town on the existing occupational boundaries. An employee’s place in the hierarchy determined his access to housing and services.

Moengo was also a gendered space. The status of women was directly related to their husband’s position in the company. Spouses of the higher-ranked men were stay-at-home housewives, often served by the wives of lower-ranked personnel. The town was a masculine world, where women on the lower end of the hierarchy had to find alternative ways to earn money, either in other family’s houses or at the margins of mining production, including petty trade, tailoring, and catering. Class and ethnicity established boundaries to women’s social and economic possibilities, thus influencing the fashioning of gendered spaces.

The large degree to which ethnic divisions, class, and gender were interlaced at Moengo reflected existing divisions in Surinamese society at large. It seems, however, that the location of Moengo made these class, ethnic, and gender boundaries even more clear cut.

CHAPTER SIX

Economic Collapse, Social Dislocation, and the Military Regime

Relatively quiet and peaceful Suriname appeared on the international radar screen in the 1980s when it experienced a military coup, revolutionary experiments, including human rights violations, the difficult process of redemocratization, guerrilla warfare supported by outside forces, and economic implosion.

In order to provide some structure in the complex developments between 1980 and 1990, the decade can be subdivided into four inter-related periods: the intervention or the coup, starting with the military takeover of February 25, 1980 by 16 noncommissioned officers and ending with the ouster of President Ferrier (1980–1981); the revolution and military dictatorship (1981–1984), including the execution of 15 opponents of the regime in December 1982; the hesitant redemocratization process (1984–1988), which was complicated by the Interior War (1986–1992); and parliamentary democracy with the army prominent in the background (1988–1990).

The first question to be addressed is why the coup of 16 sergeants took place and whether it was indeed as unexpected as it was presented in contemporary accounts and also in later analyses. It is important to note that at first the military coup, breaking the political inertia of the late 1970s, was greeted with relief as new brooms were expected to sweep the old order out. However, what was at the time presented as a brief interventionist phase, became a self-proclaimed revolution.

What were the political, social, and economic consequences of this new regime? Politically, the sergeants turned out not to have postcoup plans, leaving room for small left-wing parties to experiment with “new politics.” These parties never had held power before, but now offered themselves as partners to the military. Soon it became evident that the military was not ready to return to their barracks after the intervention. In the end, ten different administrations governed the country, making it exceedingly difficult to closely follow political developments.

Meanwhile, the top brass institutionalized their political position. It is safe to say that Suriname's political system militarized in the 1980s. When the promises of democracy waned and repression increased, the army leaders began to lose popular support. Since trade unions had brought down the administration in 1969, had created major civil unrest in 1973, and the formation of a union was the immediate cause for the coup, the question is what role the unions played during the military period. Open protest against the regime ended when 15 prominent men, accused of staging a counter-coup, were executed in December 1982.

The consequences of these so-called December murders, including international isolation, domestic fear, and economic decline, are addressed next. The Netherlands suspended its financial assistance, causing an economic tailspin. The sharp drop in bauxite revenues only worsened the situation. The successive governments lacked coherent strategies to react to the crisis. Union actions in 1983–1984 brought the military-backed left-wing administration down, but did nothing to improve socio-economic conditions.¹ Attempts by army leader Desi Bouterse to gain financial backing in Libya, Colombia, or Brazil failed. By then, the regime's isolation in both domestic and foreign arenas was evident.

The final phase of the revolution was the redemocratization process. After three years of negotiations with trade unions, business organizations, and the "old" parties, represented by their "old" leaders, the military would go back to the barracks. This process of democratization that started in 1984, ran partly parallel with an armed revolt by a group of disgruntled Maroons in the interior. Guerrilla leader and self-proclaimed liberator of Suriname Ronnie Brunswijk lacked arms, men, and discipline to defeat the National Army, but he managed to control large parts of eastern Suriname. Violent antiguerrilla actions by the army claimed hundreds of lives, while thousands fled the interior to French Guiana or Paramaribo, often a place of transit to the Netherlands or the United States. Elections were held in 1987, but it took another five years before peace was signed with the Maroon guerrillas, and Bouterse was forced to resign as chief commander. Did redemocratization lead to a national purge? In other words: were the crimes committed during the military period openly addressed, was reconciliation attempted, and did the political structure, the leading cause for the coup, change?

Suriname has not been able to fully digest this past yet. The silence has not been broken so far. Military strongman Bouterse was elected president in 2010, while the prosecution of the December murders has been protracted for years by indecisiveness and legal manoeuvring (see chapter 8). The dust has not settled yet and a systematic investigation of what really happened is still lacking. Some protagonists have died, others only deliver self-serving accounts. This chapter will provide the most important events in this turbulent time as well as the recollections of informants who were not directly involved in political, military, and economic decision making.

An economic downturn accompanied the political turbulence. Several interruptions of financial support from the Netherlands, falling bauxite revenues, and policy failures crippled the economy well into the 1990s. Most of the extant research focuses on economic developments at the macro level; studies on the impact of the crisis on the individual or household level has barely been documented. This chapter pays attention to the effect at the household level. The absence of detailed studies and reliable statistics make open interviews with contemporaries an important source of information. Daily life in the 1980s, and also in the 1990s, became much more complex for the great majority of the people, but the interviews reveal that the consequences of the crisis and the coping mechanisms were more intricate than is generally assumed: class, labor position, age, gender, and the strength of social networks intertwined when determining the socioeconomic position of households in the last decades of the century.

A Dutch Colonial Legacy with a Latin American Twist

Four years and three months after the proclamation of Suriname's independence a military coup d'état surprised the nation. In hindsight, the writing was on the wall: the construction of the new republic was flawed and it did not take long for these imperfections to become visible. To name but the three most glaring ones: the Hindustanis were against independence and felt excluded from the discussions on the political future of the country; Dutch financial aid destabilized the economy and caused constant friction in the relation with the Netherlands; finally, a small national army was erected. Yet, few would have predicted that these flaws would lead to a military takeover.

In 1974, Prime Minister Henck Arron's announcement that his country would become independent by "ultimo 1975" caused more anxiety in Suriname itself than in the Netherlands. The metropolis was ready to let Suriname go, and even before Arron's statement, a number of political parties in The Hague had proclaimed that Suriname should become a republic soon. In Suriname, the Arron administration turned a deaf ear toward the objections by not only Hindustanis, but also Javanese, Maroons, and Amerindians. Arron and the Dutch government ignored calls for a plebiscite. Radical Hindustanis took to the streets; some protesters even demanded the partition of Suriname in Creole and Hindustani sections. Meanwhile, in parliament 19 members were in favor of independence and exactly as many were against. Hindustani parliamentarian George Hindorie broke the tie, giving the "*independistas*" a one-vote majority. In other words, in Suriname independence did not gain great political or popular support.²

Early in the decade, migration to the Netherlands had increased, mainly because of the economic recession and the lack of opportunities at home, yet

with independence in the offing, many more decided to leave. According to a popular expression, the Surinamese did not get their referendum, but they voted with their feet. Horror tales of what would happen when the Creoles would take power, frequently referring to ethnic violence in Guyana, often served as the last push. "Most of them were Hindustanis and mixed people, who lost hope because everybody feared that a civil war would break out."³ Moreover, a political leader of the Javanese, Paul Somohardjo, used migration as a threat in the hope to postpone independence, by proclaiming that he would transport a thousand Surinamese Javanese to the Netherlands per day. Here he followed Hindustani leader Lachmon, the most vocal opponent of independence, who earlier had "promised" to send his followers overseas (Bovenkerk 1983: 170; see also Budike 1982: 85–90; Ferrier in Jansen van Galen 2005: 86). In the period 1970–1980, 120,000 migrants left Suriname for the Netherlands (Bosma 2009: 151–152). This exodus peaked in the years 1973–1975 and 1979–1980.⁴ However, fewer, especially educated people returned to Suriname to help with building up the new nation. Others made a conscious decision to stay: "We never considered leaving the country when independence came. On the contrary. Personally I agreed; I drove around with a bumper sticker . . . No there weren't many with a sticker. Thus I am a real Surinamer."⁵

A few days before the official proclamation, the Creole and Hindustani leaders, Arron and Lachmon, openly reconciled. On November 25, schoolchildren formed a giant Surinamese flag on the renamed "Independence Square." The new flag was one of the few visible things marking the difference between the old and the new state. As journalist Gerard van Westerloo (1983: 219–220) expressed, "Nobody . . . had developed any thoughts on the new polity, other than that things would continue as always, complemented by their own flag, their own army, their own embassies, and their own Olympic Committee. Even the man who had served the Dutch for years as governor, now became the first president of the young independent nation." This governor / president was Johan Ferrier, one of the founders of Unie Suriname, which in the 1940s had called for self-rule.

In the postwar years, financial aid increased considerably when Dutch loans and gifts fueled the economy. In 1975, the social-democratic administration in The Hague, wanting to repair damages for 300 years of colonialism, settled on an outright gift of 2.700 million Dutch guilders (US\$1.200 million) and let Suriname off its remaining debts totaling more than 500 million guilders (US\$220 million).⁶ The allocation of these so-called Treaty Funds, centering on the question of whether the donor or the recipient was to allocate the money, caused years of irritation and even animosity between Paramaribo and The Hague.⁷ In the period up to 1980, most of this money was spend on megaprojects to develop Suriname's western districts and on the expansion of the civil service. Early in 1974, the state employed 25,000 civil servants, four years later

this number had risen with more than 10,000.⁸ This expansion withdrew money from investment funds.

The formation of an army was certainly not high on the list of the administration in The Hague. Up until independence, defense was in the hands of the Netherlands: a couple of hundred troops under Dutch command were permanently stationed in Suriname. Dutch negotiators were not keen on establishing an army and preferred to set up a paramilitary police force consisting of a few hundred men. Eddy Hoost, Surinamese minister of Justice and Police, insisted on creating a national army. According to him, a comprehensive military force was part and parcel of a sovereign state. The cooperation between Suriname and the Netherlands in this matter was strenuous.⁹

The majority of the Surinamese noncommissioned officers (NCOs) came from the Dutch army,¹⁰ which had not escaped the yearning for democratization in the 1960s. The returnees found it difficult to adjust to a more formal and hierarchical structure in Suriname. They hardly took commander Yngwe Elstak seriously and contacts between the commander and the troops were substandard.¹¹ Looking back, Desi Bouterse, one of the returnees, damningly stated that discipline and leadership were sorely lacking, and that everybody just went their own way.¹² The lack of interest in the armed forces among politicians only further frustrated the military and fueled the demand for more democracy in the army (Fernandes Mendes 1989: 81–167). The Arron administration, however, turned down every request to recognize the union NCOs. This minor issue for the administration would unleash a military takeover a few years later.

Politically, Suriname almost came to a standstill after the elections of 1977. Parliament, cynically known as “circus stupido,” rarely met and corruption scandals dominated the news.¹³ Parliamentary democracy was rapidly losing its legitimacy. The ineffective policies also led to increasing unemployment and social malaise. In 1977, 18 percent of the active working population was unemployed; in addition, the labor market was unbalanced as the demand for unskilled labor was high.¹⁴ Both in the army and in politics a feeling of frustration prevailed, which spilled over to the population at large. Civil servants went on strike; drinking water was in short supply. Some believed that the country was on the brink of ruin. The migration to the Netherlands continued. Elections were scheduled for March 27, 1980 and politicians and parties were jockeying for position. With the spotlight on this political manoeuvring, another development caught less attention.

After military actions against the government in 1978, the founding of a union by sergeants of the Surinamese Armed Forces, strikes by these sergeants in early 1979, the refusal of the Arron administration to recognize the union set fire to the powder. Open protests against organizational and disciplinary problems in the army, including the authoritarian senior command, and the passivity of the administration and parliament were not addressed adequately by Arron, who ultimately

was responsible for the army. Well aware of the power of the unions in the crises of 1969 and 1973, he refused to let the disenchanted military dictate policy. Moreover, Arron did not seem to show sufficient respect for the professional qualities of the NCOs. However, the lack of response in early 1979 did not bolster Arron's position but rather resulted in a crisis of authority.¹⁵ In January 1980, the authorities arrested three union leaders.¹⁶ In a reaction, the NCOs took over the barracks in Paramaribo, demanding the release of the three. The administration, in turn ordered the armed police to "liberate" the barracks. The police eventually turned back without firing a shot.¹⁷ The civil unions backed the military, and popular opinion also was in support of the "rebels." According to sociologist Eddy Campbell (1999: 81), the failure of the state to peacefully solve the labor disputes in the 1960s and 1970s (chapter 4) partly explains the overreaction in this case.

The three sergeants faced a court-martial on February 20, the verdict was due six days later. Yet by February 25, 16 NCOs—and the three sergeants, who had been liberated by the "group of sixteen"—had taken power, executing a longer standing plan.¹⁸ It seems likely that the Dutch military attaché, Hans Valk, was somehow involved in this action.¹⁹ The most dramatic and also symbolic aspect of the coup was the burning of the police station in downtown Paramaribo.²⁰ The group formed the National Military Council (*Nationale Militaire Raad*) of seven NCOs and one officer.²¹ Bouterse replaced Elstak as commander in chief.²² A curfew was established for Greater Paramaribo, while the news media were monitored or even temporarily closed. Generally, enthusiasm greeted the coup. The headline in the newspaper *De Vrije Stem* read "EINDELIJK!" (FINALLY!).

After the Takeover

To downplay the effects of their action, the military at first did not use the word "coup," preferring "intervention" instead. They had no overall message: their immediate goals included poor relief and a stop to corruption. Also, to the delight of the Dutch government, the new rulers preferred small-scale economic projects over mega investments. But the rest of the political plans were vague; ideological discussions had not been held in preparation of the takeover and they only had a passing acquaintance with government affairs. Months later, on May Day, the government announced that February 25 was a break with the past: "on this day a system that was imbued with injustice, corruption, social inequality, bureaucracy, and clientelism met an inglorious end. To the people of Suriname, 25 February is a day of liberation, of new hope, a rebirth."²³

President Johan Ferrier tried to normalize political relations as much as possible and within a month a new "government of reconciliation" or "national construction" was installed under the leadership of internist

Henk Chin A Sen. It was the first administration that included women: Nel Stadwijk-Kappel and Siegmien Power-Staphorst. According to anthropologist Gloria Wekker (2001: 174), during the military period “more legal repair was done on behalf of women than in the preceding eighty years.” Gender discrimination became illegal and equal pay for equal work was “guaranteed.”²⁴ Most of the ministers of this technocratic cabinet were nationalists or from small leftist parties or unions.²⁵ The relationship between the government and the military were close. In contrast, the “old order” had to adjust to a new regime: former “corrupt” political leaders were put on trial and jailed, while civil servants were to be “re-educated.”²⁶ The new order had popular support because of the unpopularity of the Arron administration and because it started infrastructural projects, including repairing roads and street lights, and put youngsters to work. The Hague, too, gave the new regime the benefit of the doubt. Chin A Sen, in particular, inspired confidence and money flowed more easily, but certainly not freely.²⁷

In the months after the “intervention” Bouterse remained in the background, but he consolidated his power, with Roy Horb as his right-hand man. In the almost two years between March 1980 and February 1982 a complicated struggle between the commander, the president, and “super-minister” André Haakmat dominated the political arena.²⁸ Within the military council an ideological debate regarding the future of Suriname was going on: should the country remain a Western-style democracy or become a people’s democracy like Cuba or Nicaragua? Prime Minister Chin A Sen seemed to be the man in power, but at the same time the military council together with some leftist parties set up people’s committees to “govern from below.”

The “intervention” was rebranded as a “revolution,” but this did not mean that the ideological lines became much clearer. After the coup a number of (would-be) politicians, who in normal circumstances would not have much chance to gain power, now saw their opportunities.²⁹ Bouterse and his regime moved to the left, but the ideological base remained shaky. Haakmat stated that he had never heard Bouterse utter a single political idea, while Michiel van Rey argues that Bouterse will adhere to any idea that will give him the most power.³⁰ Chin A Sen commented that Bouterse’s lack of intellectual baggage made him a toy of all kinds of ideological fortune seekers.³¹ Despite his supposed lack of political baggage, Bouterse soon gained a strong leftist reputation.³²

As a consequence of this move to the left the support of the Netherlands, the colonial and capitalist metropolis, for the revolution became a burden, rather than an asset. Despite the fact that in these years the highest amounts of financial assistance were given to Suriname, some members of the military regime set out to provoke the Netherlands. Displaying the ideological gap within the military council, Bouterse questioned this move and in August 1980 staged an internal coup to remove (and jail) the three most outspoken men as well as some leaders of the recently founded

RVP.³³ Simultaneously, President Ferrier was ousted and replaced by Chin A Sen, while Haakmat became “superminister.” The fall of Ferrier ended the first stage of the coup. The military now declared the state of siege and, on Haakmat’s advice, suspended the constitution. Thus in August 1980, the contours of a military dictatorship became visible. The military authority (*Militair Gezag*) now instructed the president and the council of ministers.³⁴ Bouterse became chairman of all the important army and government bodies. In the following months, Haakmat provided the legal basis for this dictatorship by abolishing parliamentary legislation.

Yet, it was Haakmat who became the next political victim; apparently he had become too powerful to Bouterse’s taste.³⁵ After a dispute with Chin A Sen in February 1981, Haakmat was removed from the center of power after less than five months and in August he became director of a non-project.³⁶ Haakmat had not been able to read the hidden agendas and bridge the ideological divides. With Haakmat out of the way, the military authority changed direction. Now the army leaders labeled themselves as “revolutionaries” and welcomed back the leftist “wise guys.” Bouterse apparently came to the conclusion that a revolution needed an ideological underpinning and openly committed himself to socialism and people’s mobilization. On May Day 1981, the revolutionaries proclaimed the “Manifesto of the Revolution.” Externally, diplomatic relations were established with Cuba, the Soviet Union, Nicaragua, Libya, Grenada, Algeria, North Korea, and Mozambique.³⁷ Internally, the already existing popular committees were reinvigorated and several new committees were established in and around Paramaribo. At the same time, the military authorities became more involved in civil society, for example, through extended censorship and physical violence against journalists and newspaper editors.³⁸

On December 17, 1981, it became manifest that all attempts to re-establish some sort of democracy had failed. Earlier Bouterse had rejected a new draft for a constitution with the argument that it lacked revolutionary spirit and now he openly proclaimed the “Revolutionary Front.” It was the beginning of the end of the Chin A Sen presidency, which had been undermined already by Haakmat. In February 1982, two years after the takeover, the military had gained total political control.³⁹ The military created a new “*Beleidscentrum*” (policy center) as a political steering and control committee with the shrewd Bouterse as chairman. He now signed all political decrees. In fact, the military assumed political tasks, the function of the cabinet ministers was now purely managerial. The ever increasing influence of the military as well as radicalization of the revolution did not bring peace as whispers about coups and countercoups were heard in Paramaribo (and the Netherlands).

On March 11, 1982, these rumors became true when Sergeant Major Wilfred Hawker and Lieutenant Surindre Rambocus attempted to stage a coup. Hawker was arrested and tortured; he was ordered to march in his underwear past the assembled troops. Afterward, he was forced to make a televised statement and then he was summarily executed while laying on a

gurney. Rambocus was jailed.⁴⁰ This “never-again-experience” forced the regime to demand absolute loyalty of the army cadre: eight men opted for a ticket to Amsterdam. A paramilitary organization, the *Volksmilitie* (People’s Militia) was founded to defend the revolution. Its most important task was to enforce the curfew. Armed university personnel and their supporters now patrolled the streets.⁴¹ The Rambocus coup showed Bouterse’s command of power and how far he was willing to go to defend his position.

At this point the military had lost the support and sympathy of many Surinamese because changes did not materialize and elections were not in sight. Traditional civic organizations organized protests among university and school teachers and students, postal workers, fire fighters, police officers, health workers, and rice farmers. Attempts by Bouterse and Horb to appease civic society were unsuccessful; meanwhile left-wing leaders called for a confrontation, an approach that appealed to some in the military. Horb, the informal leader of the “moderates,” had close contacts with the ousted Haakmat, who also served as advisor to union leader Cyrill Daal. At first, the union movement was the sole effective source of resistance against the regime. The social unrest and protest gave the unions, especially the largest, the Moederbond (Mother Union), moral and actual authority. Through Daal and the Moederbond Haakmat tried to return to power (Boerboom & Oranje 1992: 40–41).

With the Rambocus trial in October 1982 the situation escalated further. The three lawyers defending Rambocus openly attacked the government, and thus the Military Authority.⁴² The visit by Maurice Bishop, the revolutionary leader of Grenada, on October 30 put an end to any hope at reconciliation between the military and civic society. Bishop’s visit was intended as a triumphant manifestation for the military and the revolution, but Daal and his Moederbond won the day. Many more people attended the union meeting than the Bouterse-Bishop manifestation.⁴³ As one informant recalls: “The unions were strong, they had called for a mobilization of the people; to return the country to democracy. So when Daal started his protest, you should have seen it, the town was full, it was busy, and all people, except a few, wanted redemocratization . . . Some people were afraid to go, but it was really crowded.”⁴⁴ Daal called for the military to retreat to the barracks and the return of power to the people. Daal’s speech was aired live on ABC radio (Suriname).⁴⁵ In other words, Daal used classic social-democratic weapons like strikes and mass demonstrations. As a matter of fact, during the period 1949–1985, 1982 was the year with the highest number of strikes, 53 in total involving more than 8,000 people (Campbell 1987: 110). Moreover, Daal humiliated Bouterse; giving into popular demands, therefore, had become impossible for the military leader. The confrontation was cast as a fight between good versus evil. During this time Roy Horb was in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, visiting former president Chin A Sen. On his return Horb tried to mediate between Daal and Bouterse. The latter reacted by eliminating Horb from the Military Authority.

With no chance at reconciliation between Daal and Bouterse, other leading public figures came forward. The dean of the Bar founded the *Associatie voor Democratie* (Association for Democracy).⁴⁶ This movement included, among others, representatives of the Bar, churches, the opposition press, and part of the business community. Protesting students also supported this association. In the afternoon of December 7, the 16 original insurgents minus the executed Hawker, made up a list of about two dozen “enemies of the revolution” who were to be arrested (Boerboom & Oranje 1992: 55–58). That same night, most of them gathered at Fort Zeelandia in downtown Paramaribo, the (new) military headquarters, determined to put an end to the unrest and (attempted) coups.⁴⁷ First, the buildings of the *Moederbond*, two radio stations, including ABC, and the newspaper *De Vrije Stem* were burned to the ground. Two press agencies and five papers and magazines were closed.⁴⁸ Around 1.30 a.m. the first prisoners were taken to the Fort; they were accused of counterrevolutionary activities.⁴⁹ Journalists Kamperveen and Slagveer, in the company of Horb, were forced to read a statement on national television. They obviously were beaten up when they “confessed” that a Dutch-US coup had been in the making. What exactly happened afterward at the Fort is still not exactly clear: union leader Derby was released, while the other 15 men were executed.⁵⁰

The so-called December murders caused the shock that the takeover of February 25, 1980 had not generated. Many civilians and some military fled the country, and the great majority of those who stayed behind were paralyzed with fear.⁵¹ The murders caused a new migration wave to the Netherlands, and to a lesser extent to the United States of America, yet it was smaller than the migration preceding independence. The loss of intellectual capital was enormous, however. “One of the university board members was shaking with fear. A business acquaintance, knowing that I regularly went to French Guiana where I had a company, asked me if there was a way to take this man with me. And so I clandestinely put him far across the border in Albina.”⁵² Most people knew these prominent members of society, and given the relatively small population, many were acquainted with or related to one or more of the victims. “It was really a shock, because in Suriname, everybody knows everybody . . . it was never accepted by Suriname.”⁵³ Long-term NPS parliamentarian Ruth Wijdenbosch relates how church-organized protests continued, in which women in particular participated.⁵⁴

Bouterse later declared that it was “us or them,” while his civilian advisors claimed that a “fifth column” of CIA and Dutch military intelligence had been eliminated.⁵⁵ According to them, the executions would provide five years of peace to turn the country around without internal opposition. The next victim was Roy Horb, who was arrested in early 1983 and charged with plotting to assassinate Bouterse. He was found dead in his prison cell a few days later.⁵⁶

Errol Alibux (1983–1984), one of the leaders of the extreme left, who is said to have also been present at Fort Zeelandia on December 8, became

the leader of the new cabinet, but Desi Bouterse was unquestionably the leader of the country. His revolutionary military government supported Third-World socialism, and internally the government relied on the people's militias as a support pool for the military.⁵⁷ "People's participation," to be guided from above, replaced elections to express the will of the people.

Within days after the December murders the Netherlands suspended relations with Suriname, and the former metropolis pressured other countries not to grant loans to Suriname. The United States, Venezuela, and Brazil in particular showed their displeasure at the course of events. US Secretary of State George Shultz (1993: 296) later testified that after the December murders the CIA had planned to kill Bouterse by 50 to 175 Korean mercenaries. After this idea had been dismissed, the United States requested a Dutch invasion with US assistance. The Dutch refused to participate as they feared political difficulties and also because Dutch intelligence services, supported by the US embassy in Paramaribo, believed that there was no alternative to Bouterse (De Graaf & Wiebes 1998: 367–368). In late 1986, the Dutch government made a blueprint to arrest Bouterse with the military help of the United States. This plan was made at the request of three government officials, including Surinamese Prime-Minister P. S. R. Radhakishun (1986–1987). In early 1987, The Hague cancelled the invasion, fearing casualties among Dutch troops and civilians in Suriname, and again citing the lack of a viable political alternative to Bouterse.⁵⁸ Thus, invasion and assassination plans were made in Washington and The Hague; Brasilia sent a different yet clear message by dispatching general Danilo Venturini in April 1983. In no uncertain terms he expressed Brazil's displeasure with Suriname's move to the left and its relations with Cuba. However, he offered technical assistance and military training facilities. Suriname thus became part of Brazil's geopolitical sphere. The Surinamese leadership used this new relationship with its neighbor to the South to loosen its ties with Cuba; on the day of the US invasion of Grenada Suriname cut its diplomatic relations with Havana.⁵⁹

The events in Grenada as well as internal unrest shook up Bouterse enough to fire the Alibux administration, the most leftist administration ever in Suriname. The murder of Daal had temporarily silenced the unions, but the labor movement came back to life when workers in the bauxite industry started a wild cat strike to protest tax increases and other unpopular fiscal and economic policies.⁶⁰ The strikes soon spread to Paramaribo, paralyzing public service corporations. Especially, the strike by workers of the electricity company, closing down Suralco in Paranam, hurt the economy (Campbell 1999: 85–86). Bouterse's firing of Alibux signified the end of the socialist experiment.

Not satisfied with the small leftist parties, the military now founded its own political movement. This new movement with the name "Stanvaste" included members of the armed forces and the popular militia's, as well as sympathizers (mostly from the left).⁶¹ Once more, Bouterse showed

his unpredictability by moving toward the pillars of civil society: the business community, producers, trade unions, and traditional political parties. The informal role of the unions and the commercial associations was now formalized. The curfew and censorship measures were lifted. In 1985 a parliament, with designated members, was re-instated. A new organ, the so-called *Topberaad* (Summit Council) was the vehicle for negotiations between the army leadership and the “old” politicians, including civil organizations, with the goal to restore democracy and normalize relations. The parties were on speaking terms again, but anonymous physical and verbal intimidations prevented a true easing of relations. Throughout all these changes, Bouterse remained the undisputed leader of the country, although his position was weakened by the alarming economic crisis.

Economic Crisis and its Social Effects

After the break in relations with the Netherlands, Paramaribo, confident that The Hague would come around soon, financed current projects from its own funds. Yet the Dutch did not change their policy: the December murders would dictate Dutch actions toward Suriname until 1987.⁶² As a consequence, the government soon had to deal with an economic crisis caused by a shortage of financial resources, also because in 1982 bauxite revenues declined sharply.⁶³ The bauxite revenues and the Treaty Funds accounted for more than 80 percent of the country’s revenues in 1980. Thus, when both sources fell nearly dry, the economy went into a downward spin.⁶⁴ Given Suriname’s dependence on imports, increasingly fewer goods entered the country. Next to the December murders, the shortages and long lines caused by the economic crisis are remembered vividly by Surinamese: “Sometimes you went into town to stand in line for a whole day, begging for a couple of bottles of oil.”⁶⁵

Monetary financing was the administration’s solution to tackle the increasing currency shortages. For a short period, this policy masked the enormous problems, yet by 1985 the economic downturn could no longer be hidden. Inflation, import restrictions, unofficial exchange rates, and shadow economy, including money laundering on a grand scale, became the new buzz words. For most Surinamese the downturn led to a sharp decline in their standard of living, because prices went up much faster than wages. Real wages increased between 1980 and 1985, but declined sharply in 1986–1987, when the increase in nominal wages lagged behind the high rate of inflation on account of high consumer prices (Vos, De Jong, & Dijkstra 2001: 202–204). Real income was halved in the years 1982–1987; the absolute number of jobs decreased by 10 percent.⁶⁶ This development especially affected people with a fixed or a relatively small income, including teachers, nurses, clerks, and government employees.⁶⁷ Their incomes dwindled, while prices soared.

In effect, these groups lost their position in the middle class, as will be detailed later in this chapter.

In 1983, the regime implemented a strict import and price-setting policy. The CIS (Centraal Importbedrijf Suriname, Central Import Agency Suriname) monopolized the import of basic consumer goods and acquired the necessary dollars against the favorable official exchange rate.⁶⁸ The goods were then distributed to fixed outlets, where people with a pass could obtain necessities at a fixed low price. This system did not satisfy existing needs and not surprisingly, it was exceedingly vulnerable to theft and corruption.

Stores were almost empty, and in 1986 long lines formed when state-subsidized vital provisions went on sale. A lively black market economy developed offering tooth paste, sugar, coffee, cooking oil, and tea at famine prices. As a result, the men in power flourished economically, often with rather shady import and export businesses. They formed a new (economic) elite. "People have become filthy rich by selling stuff. For example, loads of sneakers came in and they sold them. People were filthy rich. And that is how they did it. Also goods that were supposed to be sold [at the official outlets] were for sale on the black market."⁶⁹ This new business elite, often with access to "cheap" dollars, imported merchandise or smuggled large amounts of goods from the neighboring countries. In addition, traders kept imported goods in store to create more scarcity and raise prices, thus circumventing official policy.

As Verrest (2010: 8) explains, households could try to cope with the deteriorating circumstances by either developing income-increasing strategies or by consumption reduction. Few formal jobs were available in a shrinking economy with high unemployment. Informal jobs, in Suriname known as *hosselen* (hustling), have always been part of the economy; in the last decades of the twentieth century, however, more people depended on informal employment, often in addition to a regular job. Sociologist Jack Menke notes an increasing informalization between 1978 and 1993. Many informal jobs are in "personal and community services," building and construction, and trade and transportation.⁷⁰ With this informalization of the labor market, the degree of unionization declined, particularly after 1986: before 1974, almost half of the persons who entered the labor market belonged to a union, compared with only 18.3 percent in the period 1986–1989 (Menke 1998: 168). But even in informal work the decline was evident, as customers no longer had money to have their cars fixed or buy a new dress. According to Verrest, there is no doubt that more people than before relied on the informal labor market, even though people may not have increased their income to a significant degree.⁷¹ Verrest (2010: 9) argues that "the residents of Paramaribo experienced an informalisation and increased insecurity of their labor activities and most likely an increase in the hours spent on paid labor. However, this has not resulted in substantial increases in incomes earned through such activities."

A second, well-documented strategy to increase income was the mobilization of foreign networks of relatives and friends.⁷² In 1980, three-quarters of the urban population had immediate family, especially siblings, in the Netherlands. However, not all socioeconomic or ethnic groups had equal access to these networks: the better-off also had greater access. Among ethnic groups, 90 percent of the Creoles had family abroad, compared to 74 percent of Hindustanis and 57 percent of Javanese. The most marginalized groups, such as Amerindians and Maroons, had the fewest number of overseas relatives. Particularly in the Netherlands, a lively business in sending basic necessities to Suriname emerged. In 1987, the largest shipping company sent 100,000 boxes with an average worth of 300 Dutch guilders (De Bruijne & Schalkwijk 1994: 6, 8, 16–17).⁷³ Later, when high prices replaced shortages as the main problem, the transfer of money in hard currencies led to the development of foreign exchange *cambios* (De Bruijne & Schalkwijk 1994). The importance of help from abroad became obvious on both macro- and micro levels. In effect, the support from abroad created a new division in Surinamese society. A single mother and teacher who lacked foreign support explained that it was easy to see who had relatives abroad “you saw their food, their clothes” (quoted in Verrest 2010: 10). Others testify to the importance of receiving goods or money “without my family we would not have survived. [Every month] they sent us a box with the basics and later shifted to 100 Dutch guilders a month. It was an absolute necessity. But it caused problems as well though: my family was telling me [a young student] to leave Suriname and they were putting pressure on us. I felt very uncomfortable because I felt someone else was telling me what to do with my life” (quoted in Verrest 2010: 10).

Next to the increasing of income through (informal) jobs or foreign support, a decrease in consumption took place. Numerous are the stories of waiting in line for basic goods including sugar, cooking oil, bread, and gasoline. (Or about rushes when it became known that certain items were available.) Consequently, much more time was spent on unpaid household labor—thus decreasing time for other paying employment, especially for women. Most people were forced to limit their spending on absolute necessities, such as food, transportation, and education. Other investments in, for example, housing and (business) equipment fell rapidly. In addition, it was exceedingly difficult to import goods, including spare parts for cars, busses, and trucks. The lack of serviceable vehicles and high fuel costs limited the transportation of people and goods.

French Guiana with its well-stocked stores was a temporary escape route, but that stopped with the Interior War (see below). Persons making business trips abroad used the opportunity to buy goods varying from medicine to toilet paper. As to be expected, the shortfall in imported goods created opportunities for local production, as for example cassava flour replaced wheat flour and plantain chips with potato chips.⁷⁴ Others started their own market garden or raised chickens or ducks. But in the end, the

great majority of households, especially in Paramaribo, were stretched to the limit. For example, families moved in together to save on housing. In addition, due to devaluations of the local currency, savings were wiped out if they were not in dollars, Dutch guilders, or valuables such as gold.⁷⁵ Local credit dried up as well, as banks and credit unions no longer could furnish loans to businesses and private clients.⁷⁶ Only people with access to foreign networks were able to procure small loans. The effects of the crisis were not evenly spread. With regard to location, the shock for people living in rural areas was cushioned by their self-reliance and the barter of local (agricultural) products.

The crisis battered both middle- and low-income groups. The Dutch-Surinamese team of De Bruijne and Schalkwijk (1994: 13; Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997: 58–60) divides the population according to the possession of consumer durables.⁷⁷ The small elite, including expatriates, managers, some local producers, international businessmen, and highly educated professionals, changed in composition between 1980 and 1992. High-level civil servants dropped out, while a select group involved in international and currency trade became part of a new business elite, some trafficked drugs or weapons as well.⁷⁸ Quite noticeable was the sudden wealth of some army commanders or individuals connected to them: “a look at the houses of some of the original ‘revomen’ shows that directing a revolution and the army was a lucrative business” (Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997: 62). Ethnically, this group consisted of people with a mixed background (27 percent), Creoles (29 percent), and Hindustanis (24 percent). Within their own group the Creoles and the Hindustanis were only a small minority (5 percent).⁷⁹ By and large this group was well educated and had extensive transnational connections and experience.

In real terms, low-income groups suffered most as their already vulnerable position eroded even more because of the poor opportunities to make money, rising prices, and limited access to foreign networks. Half of the total population belonged to the “popular class” or *volksklasse*. Ethnically all groups were represented, except Europeans and Chinese. The relatively largest groups were the Creoles (58 percent), Hindustanis (45 percent), and Javanese (49 percent). The popular class counted considerably more female-headed households (29 percent) than the middle class (10 percent). The state was the most important employer as it provided jobs for one-third of the heads of households. One-quarter was (officially) unemployed. According to De Bruijne (2001: 30), “Poverty that was present in the 1960s had disappeared during the 1970s, but returned in the 1980s” when people lacked money for food, clothing, or housing. Schalkwijk and De Bruijne also identify an “underclass” (*onderklasse*) comprising 16 percent of the urban population. In this “underclass,” approximately 30 percent of the households was female headed. Contrary to popular belief, in this group the Hindustanis (39 percent) formed the relatively largest group. Schalkwijk and De Bruijne (1997: 70) argue that the real poor had no effective relations, not even horizontal ones within their own community;

the lack of vertical relations made it almost impossible to obtain work or benefits. Those with relatives abroad (55 percent) received no overseas support in the majority of cases. Women, in Greater Paramaribo in one-fifth of the cases in charge of the household, were hardest hit by the crisis in terms of money and time (Kromhout 2000; Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997: 70). Most working women were employed by the state, while 15 percent (compared to 4 percent of men) claimed to have no income at all. More than 80 percent of the female heads of households belonged to the two lowest income groups. Sociologist Mayke Kromhout (1995) shows that women's survival tactics included social networking, multiple jobs, financial arrangements with relatives or men, institutional support, and overseas gifts. Generally speaking, women were more adept than men in exploiting vertical, horizontal, and overseas networks.

Comparatively speaking, however, the middle class was affected most by the crisis (Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997: 57–83). Up to the 1980s, this group, including teachers, public servants, and most entrepreneurs, was able to save for emergencies or extras and had access to good-quality education, health care, and housing. The relatively largest ethnic groups belonging to the middle class were Creoles (33 percent) and Hindustanis (34 percent). Because of the crisis, consumption levels were reduced, reserves were depleted, and access to adequate social services limited. Especially, people dependent on state employment could not keep up their standard of living, unless they received overseas assistance. The middle class shrank in size, because of downward mobility and the emigration of younger, educated people. Verrest (2010: 16) argues that although similar processes took place in Jamaica or Trinidad and Tobago, the case of Suriname was different. In contrast to these countries, the ruin of the middle class was not so much caused by loss of employment but by decline in real income.

Verrest notes that her informants pointed at the impact of age and acquired property, in the form of mortgage-free land and housing, as well. Young people at the beginning of their careers remained financially dependent on family members as their opportunities for decent employment and housing were reduced compared to their parents' generation (see also Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997: 72). People with private houses had one less worry.

Summing up, life revolved around getting basic consumer products. In this quest, money, local and international contacts, and time and willingness to queue determined how a person pulled through the economic crisis. Schalkwijk and De Bruijne (1997: 74) conclude that despite the crisis the socioeconomic polarization in Greater Paramaribo in the 1980s was not as unequivocal as one may expect. Overseas networks provided a safety net. And in some areas there was even some progress, for example regarding access to drinking water or telephone lines.⁸⁰

The few extant studies emphasize the informalization of the economy and the crucial importance of social networks to cope with the crisis. These

networks could be abroad but also in Suriname itself, including close ties with a shopkeeper. These support mechanisms not only provided necessities and money through relatives and friends, but also information on where goods were (temporarily) for sale, or which employment opportunities opened up. As always, clientelism remained important, only now the military and not the traditional parties were in charge of the patronage networks.

The Interior War

To add to the economic woes a full-fledged Interior War developed out of minor criminal skirmishes and some rather mysterious events, including guerrilla leader Brunswijk's claim that he escaped from prison by using magic.⁸¹ Bouterse, who is part Amerindian and part Creole, had (and still has) considerable support in the interior. After the coup, a number of Maroons and Amerindians joined the expanding army.⁸² One of the new recruits was a young Ndyuka Maroon by the name of Ronnie Brunswijk, who rose through the ranks, was sent to Cuba for commando training, and became Bouterse's personal bodyguard. However, after a conflict with his commander, Brunswijk was fired from the army in 1984.⁸³ A year later Brunswijk's name was connected to a series of armed robberies. In any case, he was well-off and acted as a local Robin Hood distributing money, champagne, whisky, cheese, and medications among the Maroons in the interior. Curiously, despite the fact that the police wanted Brunswijk, he freely moved around Paramaribo for a time.⁸⁴ After his arrest by the police, he was released or escaped from military custody in Fort Zeelandia, after a few days, as described above. Yet, in the spring of 1986 Brunswijk apparently had lost his military protection and a commando moved into Brunswijk's "hiding place" Moengo in June. Brunswijk himself had found a new kind of protection in the form of Dutch journalists.⁸⁵ By the time the commando reached Moengo, Brunswijk and the journalists were high and dry in French Guiana. Frustrated, the military burned down the town and arrested a number of people. This action had two effects: it angered the Ndyuka's near Moengo and revived the various Surinamese resistance groups in the Netherlands, that were founded after the December murders.

Brunswijk and André Haakmat, now living in Amsterdam, met in Paris. The journalists played a key role by providing Brunswijk with a false passport and paying part of his ticket.⁸⁶ It is unclear whether Brunswijk planned to ask for political asylum in the Netherlands;⁸⁷ what is evident is that Haakmat wanted Brunswijk to start a guerrilla against Bouterse: eighteenth-century history was to be revived two centuries later with a Maroon armed uprising against the authorities (Haakmat 1987: 216–217). Haakmat's *Amsterdamse Volksverzet* (Amsterdam Popular Resistance, AVV founded in 1983) provided Brunswijk with some training and a limited amount of cash.⁸⁸

Back in Suriname, Brunswijk formed the “Jungle Commando” with six other Maroons he knew from boarding school. Soon, on July 21, the group raided a military outpost, Stolkertsijver, taking 12 troops captive.⁸⁹ Another raid at the military barracks in Albina was not successful; the military, however, retaliated by closing the Marowijne River, thus preventing Maroons to (illegally) trade with French Guiana. July 21 is considered the starting date of the war. In the eyes of the military, all Maroons were suspect now. Maroons living near Moengo and along the road between Moengo and Albina were intimidated, abused, robbed, and taken captive; in the army’s counterinsurgency operations several villages and hamlets were plundered and destroyed. In the early days of the war, the Jungle Commando targeted military objects—including infrastructural works to hamper the army’s mobility—later economic targets (lumber, oil palm, and bauxite) were attacked.

In the Netherlands and the United States, friends of the Jungle Commando were stirring.⁹⁰ Haakmat was the spokesman in the Dutch press, while other Surinamese living in Holland financed an operation with American mercenaries; the FBI arrested this group of 12 before they could board a plane to Suriname. Later in 1986, three British mercenaries joined the Commando following a paid notice in the *International Herald Tribune*: “MEN WANTED. Ex-military personnel to work abroad.”⁹¹

In the country itself, several skirmishes caused a number of military casualties and to the evacuation of Moengo in the late summer of 1986.⁹² The commandos were freely moving in Ndyuka territory along the Marowijne and Tapanahoni Rivers, but that was not the case in the Cottica region, where the war had begun. Marowijne was hit hardest by the war. Meanwhile, the conflict escalated into an ethnic war, also in Paramaribo where the authorities intimidated and jailed Maroons on often vague suspicions (Van Wetering & Thoden van Velzen 2013: 281–283). Non-Maroon inhabitants, however, were barely affected by the war. As one informant expressed, “In the city you did not notice a bloody thing. There were no pictures, you only got pictures on cassettes from people coming from Holland, because Holland tried to make a point.”⁹³

Among the inhabitants of the interior loyalties were split: the Matawai and Amerindians were against Brunswijk, while the Saramakas were divided. As one informant, an urban-based Saramaka stated: “It was terrorism by Brunswijk,” who, according to him, was used by oppositional political forces to their bidding.⁹⁴ One can only conclude that the actual power of Brunswijk was limited, also because his troops lacked structure, unity, discipline, and long-term vision. This lack of coherence also characterized the political resistance (Raad voor de Bevrijding van Suriname, Council for the Liberation of Suriname) in the Netherlands. In Paramaribo, Brunswijk had little political or popular support.

The Jungle Commando escaped unharmed from armed clashes, which they attributed to rituals and magic, a phenomenon that captured the imagination of a few Dutch journalists.⁹⁵ The Dutch press was fascinated by Brunswijk and his men, but the opposite was true in the Surinamese media; radio and TV stations were still pro-Bouterse, while the newspapers were self-censored. The jungle war was also a media war, with, as so often, impartiality as one of the first casualties. Both parties ignored attempts at mediation, for example by religious leaders.

Both parties were too weak to control the vast interior and a military stalemate ensued. Things turned for the worse in December 1986, when the National Army's offensive in Eastern Suriname resulted in mass murder in several villages, including Moiwana. At least 39 individuals from this village were shot to death; almost half of them were younger than ten years, the majority of the victims were females.⁹⁶

As one eye-witness⁹⁷ recounts:

I saw the soldiers coming and warned my granddad . . . Then I heard a shot and saw that somebody was hit in the head. I and my aunt hid in my granddad's house and I saw through a crack that my granddad was killed by several bullets, afterwards they hit him on the head with an ax. My aunt ran outside to look at my granddad and I saw that she first was hit in the breast, then her neck and then her head and she dropped dead. Then we all fled to my grandfather's house, and here everybody started screaming. More shots followed and people went down on the floor. I started to look around and saw my little brother lying in my lap. I turned him around and saw that he was hit in the neck, he was dead. Next soldiers started yelling that we should come outside. We did go outside, and we were placed in a single file and kept within reach. The soldiers called upon people to step forward. The first one called forward was my fourteen-year-old nephew. I saw him begging not to be shot. I heard nine shots and my nephew dropped dead to the ground. Then my little three-year-old sister was taken from my mother. One of the soldiers was going to toss her in the air and the other soldier would fire. When my mother saw this, she attacked the soldier immediately. [The mother was shot in her foot; most women started to run away; this eye-witness also fled into the woods but ran into soldiers there and had to return to the village.] There I saw than one of the soldiers shot a baby by putting a pistol in the baby's mouth. (quoted in MacKay 2006: 39–40)

The violence in Eastern Suriname caused an exodus to Paramaribo and French Guiana; even before "Moiwana" hundreds of Maroon and Amerindian refugees had left their homes. Most of the survivors of the massacre spent six years in camps in French Guiana (Van Wetering & Thoden van Velzen 2013: 283–288). In mid-1987 some 10,000 Surinamese refugees

were living in French Guiana.⁹⁸ Brunswijk became even more isolated when Ndyuka *granman* Gazon turned against him, now that the Maroons had become pawns in a power struggle in which they had little or no stakes.

Return of Democracy?

By December 1986, the National Army effectively had won the war, which did not mean that the fighting had stopped completely (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 164–200). The guerrillas and some mercenaries still hit out by, for example, blowing up power pylons, causing a blackout in the capital. Commander Bouterse had attained another moral blemish; it should be noted, however, that the December murders generally were seen as the greater crime. While the war was raging in the interior, the old political establishment was negotiating with the military about the return of democracy (Dew 1994: 106–110). This retreat of the military had partially to do with the Interior War, but mostly with the poor state of the economy.⁹⁹ The economic malaise, caused by the breaking off of Dutch financial aid and the slump in world bauxite prices could not be averted by increasing bauxite production because of the war. Ore had to be imported to keep production afloat. For the general population the rationing of food was the clearest sign of the economic depression. According to the majority of the Surinamese, only Dutch aid could revive the economy. For this to happen, democracy and peace would have to be restored.

In the first months of 1987 a new constitution was drafted, elections were organized for November 25, 1987, and in July the military founded a political party, the Nationale Democratische Partij (NDP, National Democratic Party) with Bouterse as its leader. A few days earlier, on July 1, the Surinaamse Partij van de Arbeid (SPA, Surinamese Labor Party) was born; its leader was Fred Derby.¹⁰⁰ A month later, the “old” political parties (NPS, VHP, and KTPI) joined together in the Front voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling (Front for Democracy and Development). Its symbol was an old, thus comfortable, shoe (*owru s'su*); soon, old shoes were everywhere on display in Paramaribo. On election day, turn out was high, but few voters in the interior casted a ballot and the results there were nullified. That meant that 10 seats of the National Assembly remained vacant; of the remaining 41 seats, Front won 38 and Bouterse's NDP 3.¹⁰¹ These Assembly members elected the agricultural economist Ramsewak Shankar (VHP) president of the republic. Henck Arron, ousted in 1980, returned to the scene as prime minister / vice president. In the democratic euphoria, many seemed to have overlooked the continued role of the military and its commander Bouterse.¹⁰² Two constitutional articles guaranteed the army's role in defending Suriname's autonomy, the building of the nation, and most importantly, the guarantor of a peaceful transition to a democratic and socially fair society. The parameters of such a society remained unwritten.

More familiar was the return to the old practices of patronage and corruption (Ramsoedh 2001: 103).

Following the return to democracy, diplomatic relations with the Netherlands were restored, but peace talks between the Surinamese government and the Jungle Commando did not come off the ground. Bouterse was dead set against negotiations, and President Shankar (1988–1990) adopted the army commander's terminology by referring to the guerrilla troops as "terrorists" (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 207). As a consequence, talks between Suriname and the Netherlands about the restoration of financial aid were complicated as The Hague demanded that Paramaribo would first implement structural economic adjustment plans and end the war.¹⁰³ Human rights violations in the interior continued under the new regime, as is demonstrated by the beating and torture of more than 20 Saramaka civilians by National Army soldiers in Atjóni on December 31, 1987 and the execution of six of them by government troops in the first days of 1988. The army accused the Saramakas of belonging to the Jungle Commando. Suriname was not interested in a friendly settlement of the case and in 1990 it was referred to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In 1993, the IACHR ordered Suriname to pay reparations.¹⁰⁴

The stalemate between civilian and military powers seemed to end when in June 1989 a government delegation and Brunswijk signed a peace agreement in Kourou, French Guiana.¹⁰⁵ The military, however, adamantly opposed the deal as it provided the Jungle Commando with jurisdiction over the interior. When the Assembly lifted the state of emergency, which gave the army special powers, a group of Amerindians, who called themselves Tucayana Amazonas, put up armed resistance protesting the Kourou Treaty, that would encroach on the autonomy of the Amerindians in the interior. Bouterse armed a number of new paramilitary groups, including the Tucayana Amazonas to spread the conflict to other parts of the country.¹⁰⁶ In a reaction, the Jungle Commando occupied Moengo in October 1989; the Tucayanas did not succeed in ousting the guerrillas. In June 1990, the army launched a campaign; the Jungle Commando in response blew up part of the infrastructure and the Suralco offices, before retreating.

In Paramaribo meanwhile civilian rule did not end the political role of the military: on Christmas Eve 1990, the military regained power by one simple telephone call to President Shankar.¹⁰⁷ In contrast to the political parties, the trade unions resolutely denounced this so-called telephone coup. Before this intervention, popular frustration about the government's inability to control the black market, to rein in the army, and to restore Dutch aid manifested itself in a general strike in May 1989. The Shankar-Arron government was deeply unpopular because of the economic and political paralysis. Yet, the majority of voters (55 percent) opted for the New Front (NPS, VHP, KTPI, and SPA) in the elections of 1991. The New Front now held 30 of the 51 seats in parliament, NDP 12. A year later, parliament removed the clauses about the role of the armed forces

from the constitution. The administration purged the army high command, including Bouterse.

In that year too, peace was concluded between the National Army and the Jungle Commando.¹⁰⁸ The majority of the 10,000 refugees returned to their overgrown and partly destroyed villages.¹⁰⁹ The Interior War had lasted from 1986 to 1992, killing a few hundred civilians and combatants.¹¹⁰ The war not only ravaged the interior's infrastructure by destroying roads, utility services, villages, schools, and hospitals, but it also undermined the social structure.

The emphasis on economic recovery, largely based on restoring ties with the Netherlands, and the conclusion of the Interior War, obscured the fact that political powers in Suriname did not attempt to address the gross human rights violations and the crimes committed by the military regime. Victims were not given a voice in Suriname itself, nor was the military asked to testify. In Paramaribo, no public hearings or other public testimonies which would have been a crucial component of the transition to full and free democracy were held. It seems that the parties in power made a pragmatic decision not to seek truth and reconciliation in an effort to please the military and thus prevent further conflicts. The human rights violations committed during the Interior War were condemned in international courts. In Suriname it would take until well into the next century before the perpetrators of the December murders were prosecuted.

The Social Aftermath of the 1980s

Even more than two decades later, many people still speak of the fear they experienced during the military regime. "We had not known fear before, therefore it was really bad. That you are really scared . . . People with arms and such and the curfew eh, you had to be home by 7 o'clock, because if you weren't home you were taken to the camp . . . older people had to sweep or clean the grounds, pick up paper, all kinds of humiliating stuff, but yes, praise God that time is past."¹¹¹ "The tanks, it was during curfew, drove past our home after 7 p.m. You closed the curtains and it felt like you were living in a war zone with those tanks constantly passing by your house. It was . . . Suriname had become a prison with military and tanks."¹¹² Others remember the curfew with more fondness as a license to party all night: "when you went to a party you would stay there till 6 in the morning."¹¹³ A supporter of the military claims that he was the one living in fear after the December murders, and that in contrast to popular belief the opponents of the regime were free to speak their minds: "I could not speak out, I couldn't say that the military was right." In the eyes of this informant, the December murders were part and parcel of the decolonization process. He questions Dutch policy: "why do they [the Dutch] have a problem with Bouterse? Only 16 people [sic] were killed. If he has done

it at all. What they allege. What is the problem? Apparently he doesn't represent their interests."¹¹⁴

Perhaps more permanent than the fear was the feeling that the 1980s were a lost decade, not only for the country, but also personally. One informant bitterly explains that his education was stopped, thus limiting his career options. Some of his friends had parents who could afford to send their children abroad, but he had to stay. "That chance was taken from us. While the people in the 1970s did get their chance, they already had their houses and that sort of things etcetera."¹¹⁵ The well-to-do, whose world generally was already bigger than Suriname, often send their children to Europe, Brazil, or the United States for study and work (De Bruijne & Schalkwijk 1994: 11–12).

Another painful issue is the perceived loss of (moral) authority. Some informants, for example, point at the loss of authority of the police force: "the police have been humiliated, so that citizens had no more respect for the police . . . it's the [moral] collapse of Suriname."¹¹⁶ Parliamentarian Ruth Wijdenbosch similarly speaks of the loss of values, and the breaking up of families and friendships.¹¹⁷ Ironically, the initial support for the military was based on the restoration of public order: "in the early days there was some enthusiasm about that revo[lution], something new was going to happen. And those thieves were dealt with . . . but with the passing of the months and years you saw that they only looked after their own interests."¹¹⁸ The broken promises regarding elections added to the declining support: "Look, these boys could have done really well, if only they would have listened. After they had sent that government home, people expected new elections and I can guarantee that these men would have been praised."¹¹⁹ More generally, "yes with the coup we thought that things would improve, but . . . it only brought misery."¹²⁰

This sentiment of moral collapse and loss of dignity is foregrounded in recollections on the economic crisis. The shortages of food and other basic needs, the steep decline in real income, the loss of savings, and social distrust had transformative effects. The high dependence on relatives and friends or the lack of essentials, such as toilet paper, almost a trope in the collective memory, are mentioned as examples of loss of dignity.¹²¹ The visible greed and institutional theft as well as corruption at all levels were for many informants the signs of a moral breakdown. Numerous are the tales about the sale of sugar mixed with sand, tea with sawdust, and oil with urine or water.¹²² More positive aspects that were mentioned were the creativity needed to put food on the table and the solidarity between neighbors, friends, and family. On the other hand, fear and allegiance or opposition to the regime broke up friendships and families.

Supporters of the regime point at successes in the social and cultural sector. One former civil servant explains that there were efforts to introduce social security and health insurance; the United Nations assisted the government with the implementation, but after the December

murders and the economic collapse plans were not executed. In the early 1980s, the government with Dutch financial assistance indeed built a few social housing projects, such as Flora and Geversvlijt in Paramaribo.¹²³ Another informant acclaims that apathy vanished from society. "People themselves came up with ideas such as 'let's ask them to give us some bricks and on Sunday we'll pave this road.' And well, people did it themselves; nowadays, everybody is sitting back and waiting for the state. We're back to the same apathy."¹²⁴ In the sociocultural sector, supporters point at the growing self-consciousness of population groups, such as the Amerindians, and the temporary creation of unity and a Surinamese identity.¹²⁵ The army, in general, and Bouterse, in particular, were considered the champions of the "Surinamization" of politics, economic and social life, jurisdiction, and culture.¹²⁶

The fear of as well as the support for the military was largely localized in Paramaribo, certainly in the period before the Interior War. As one policeman in the eastern town of Albina along the Marowijne recalls: "to be honest, in the districts you did not notice much . . . We received an order to hand in our weapons, but the commander in Albina said, 'no, keep them' and so we didn't turn them in. Together with the military we kept peace and quiet in the area."¹²⁷ To the west, in Wageningen, an informant recalls a certain placidity: "we didn't experience it as in the city. No, the atmosphere was completely different. We didn't feel the kind of fear we heard that other people had."¹²⁸ Even in Paramaribo itself, the place of residence or work mattered for the degree a person noticed the presence of the military or the protests against the dictatorship. "It sort of passed us by. We didn't know exactly what went on. News was passed on by word of mouth . . . Our lives went on as normal."¹²⁹ The economic crisis hit harder in Paramaribo than in the non-urban areas, where it was easier to be self-sufficient, for example by fishing and hunting, and to barter goods.¹³⁰

Conclusion

Initially, the coup enjoyed popular support, mainly because of disappointment with the "old regime," including its lack of transparency and decisiveness. Subsequent events, the numerous violations of human rights and the economic collapse in particular, often seem to obscure that early support. The new army leader Bouterse became the personification of the ideal of Surinamization, a true "national leader" who had risen above old political and ethnic divisions. The army served as an institution to instill this Surinamization, by ethnically mixing platoons and sharing responsibilities. An informant refers to it as "a buddy system" that was consciously promoted by the commanders.¹³¹ Moreover, Bouterse cherished close ties with Caribbean nations and other Third-World countries and championed a nonaligned foreign policy.

Yet, despite all the rhetoric, Bouterse may not have been that different from other politicians. He acted as an opportunist, ready to close a practical deal if it suited his interests.¹³² Several observers have identified Bouterse as a *wakaman*, a Creole lower-class man who exploits his social skills and network to survive (see for example Meel 1993: 140; Verhey & Van Westerloo 1983: 49–59). Others compare him to the trickster spider Anansi (see Buddingh' 2010: 80). Bouterse was both a tumbler and a chameleon: always landing on his feet and ready to change color if need be. He first and foremost was an officer and a man of action, who was not particularly interested in administrative issues.¹³³ His main base was and remained the army, especially after the top purged dissidents such as Rambocus and Horb. The self-proclaimed “revolution” ultimately did not uproot the political culture and traditions, and therefore the return of the “old parties” was relatively painless. Bouterse made this turn when he had become so isolated that he needed the support of the “old politicians” and the Netherlands and other international donors to survive.

The immediate aftermath of the coup showed how ingrained political and personal rivalries and distrust were. That was not only true for the ethnic / religious parties, but also for the left and the military itself. Historian Peter Meel (1991: 318–319) introduces the mechanism of “wounded pride” to explain developments in the 1980s. According to him, this phenomenon motivated critical actions such as the coup of February 1980, when the government and the military leaders did not take seriously the grievances of the NCOs; the countercoup by Rambocus in March 1982, who felt slighted because Bouterse excluded him from “the group of sixteen”; the protests and opposition in late 1982 were framed as a battle between good and evil and a personal contest between Bouterse and union leader Daal; the guerrilla war that was the result of personal feuds and Brunswijk’s unwillingness to no longer accept Bouterse as his superior in command; and the “telephone” or “Christmas” coup when Bouterse felt slighted by the way he was treated by both President Shankar and the Dutch government.

As to be expected, public memories on this period are mixed, and also dependent on location. Experiences in the districts differed from those in Greater Paramaribo. Many recall the disappointment when the military—in the first month after the coup fondly known as “the boys”—turned out to be no better than their predecessors. Patronage, graft, and corruption remained part of Surinamese society. Two decades later the fear, illustrated by tanks, curfews, and arrests, was still evident. The most vivid memories, however, related to the economic crisis and the scarcity of basic consumption goods. Supporters of the regime pointed at the Surinamization of the economy, with its focus on small-scale projects, and the attempts of the regime to overcome ethnic differences. The creation of a true “Surinamese man,” somewhat analogous to Che Guevara’s “New Man” after the Cuban Revolution, was an example of this new ideology.

Ultimately, the proclaimed revolution, which goals were never clearly defined,¹³⁴ never took root and failed, however not without claiming hundreds of lives, uprooting thousands, and destroying the economy. In the end, the major discontinuity was not political but socioeconomic in nature. Not independence or a failed revolution, but the abrupt end to a period of relative prosperity and growth turned out to be a rupture in Suriname's history. The fear of "another Guyana" had materialized, not in the form of ethnic violence between Hindustanis and Creoles, but in the form of severe economic decline and social dislocation.

CHAPTER SEVEN

The Development of Paramaribo in the Second Half of the Century

WITH HEBE VERREST

Visitors to early twentieth-century Suriname would enter Paramaribo from the wharf in the Suriname River. Their first sight was the row of impressive colonial mansions along the Waterkant. Looking to their right, they would see Fort Zeelandia, located along Oranjeplein, the main city square. The tropical breeze would mitigate the colony's oppressive humidity and motorized traffic was sparse. Since the 1960s, Zanderij airport, later renamed Johan Adolf Pengel International Airport, has become the main entrance point to Suriname. Consequently, entering the city has become a very different experience. The airport is situated approximately 40 kilometers south of Paramaribo in the district of Para and can be reached only by a two-lane road. Traffic south of Lelydorp indicates that a plane is due to arrive or depart. Driving along the road toward the city one travels through the savannah demarcating the transition from the rainforest to the coastal zone. Tiny Amerindian and Maroon settlements break the monotony of woods and grasslands. This changes abruptly when entering Lelydorp. This former *desa* has evolved into a bustling suburb, well known for its Javanese food stalls. After Lelydorp, the sprawl of modern-day Paramaribo begins in the district of Wanica. Significantly, the road that was known as Pad van Wanica (Wanica Path) has been renamed Indira Gandhiweg (*weg* means road), reflecting urbanization as well as Hindustani emancipation and globalization.

Along Indira Gandhiweg, the visitor encounters the country's socio-economic, ethnic, and religious diversity. This reflects the changes in Paramaribo since World War II. Traffic is heavy and slow, giving ample time to observe children playing soccer, teenagers "liming on the block," and adults from all population groups going about their daily business. One sees a mixture of social housing, mansions, American style bungalows, and traditional wooden Surinamese houses on stilts. Residential

buildings are frequently interspersed with temples, mosques, churches, and commercial establishments. Supermarkets are abundant and mostly run by Chinese. Lack of systematic planning is obvious, which is indicative of much of Paramaribo's twentieth-century growth.

The visitor gets a different view of the city, not only because of the new point of entry but also because the capital itself has changed. This is the result of socioeconomic developments, political events, and social-cultural changes that took place in Suriname. This chapter describes the transformation of Paramaribo between 1950 and the early twenty-first century. One of the questions it addresses is how rural-urban migration and natural population growth have reshaped the social-spatial structure of the city.¹ The demise of large- and small-scale agriculture served as push factor, while education and employment were two closely intertwined pulling factors. The city was a crucial place in the search for upward social mobility. In the diversifying urban labor market, education and skills were important, if not the most important, tools of selection. The educational system was very much geared toward training for administrative functions as the, steadily expanding, civil service sector offered the best job perspectives; there existed only limited opportunities outside this sector. Paramaribo was the only center of employment (outside of mining and agriculture), education, and culture and therefore worked as a magnet continuously attracting more people, which in turn strengthened the tendency, if only for practical and financial reasons, to concentrate work and services there. World War II and the resulting socioeconomic changes had made the policy to keep the population in the districts obsolete.

This chapter also analyses shifting spatial residential patterns with a focus on the impact of class and ethnicity. The history of urban expansion shows that the role of the government was limited and therefore Paramaribo has developed in an unstructured fashion, causing various infrastructural problems, but also leading to residential patterns mixing class and ethnicity. Social geographer Ad de Bruijne (1976a) argues that until 1950 residential patterns are to be explained by the time of arrival in the city, labor specialization, and socioeconomic status. This chapter explores whether this remained the case in the second half of the century by examining shifting roles of class, ethnicity, and arrival time. We conclude that economic crises, social relations, and the absence of a strong planning tradition have reduced the role of class in explaining residential patterns and that arrival time in the city is the remaining dominant factor.

We then turn inward and study social and economic life in Paramaribo at various moments in time. We focus on occupational opportunities, social networks, and economic inequality. We explore what factors shaped social and economic differences between population groups and point, again, at the importance of time of arrival to explain the leveling off of old inequalities and the emergence of new ones.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of the impact of economic growth and downturns on the land and housing market. What was the impact of the economic crises of the last decades of the century on a social and economically mixed city? The social and economic differences within Paramaribo have become more pronounced, but compared to many other Caribbean cities these do not seem to have a strong spatial component in Suriname's capital. We explore why mixed neighborhoods remain the norm, even though there are a few areas that seem to deviate from this trend, without, however, becoming no-go areas.

We begin with the question of how typically Caribbean a city Paramaribo was by focusing on similarities and differences with other Caribbean cities.

A Caribbean City?

Suriname is a highly urbanized country and Paramaribo is an excellent example of a primate city. Here resides the majority of the population, it clusters the main political, economic, social, and cultural functions and is the prime hub through which interaction with other nodes in and outside the country are shaped (Potter 2000; Jaffe, De Bruijne, & Schalkwijk 2008). In this regard, Suriname is not unique in the region as many other Caribbean states and territories can be characterized as highly urbanized with over 75 percent of its population living in urban areas (Potter 2000). The majority of these cities, with exceptions such as Kingston and Havana, do not exceed half a million inhabitants, yet they are very dominant in the country, housing between 30 and 60 percent of the population.

It is however the lack of any other significant urban areas that make Paramaribo an extremely primate city. In the census year 2004 about half of the country's population resided in the capital and about two-thirds in Greater Paramaribo (ABS 2005). The second and third largest urban settlements of the country in that year were Lelydorp with 15,945 inhabitants and Nieuw Nickerie in the west (population 13,842).² In the census of 1950, population figures for Lelydorp were not available, indicating its insignificance, but Nieuw Nickerie counted 3,855 inhabitants (Welvaartsfonds 1956a: table 15). A report included in the 1950 census extensively analyses the primacy of Paramaribo. It indicates only two urban centers in the country, Paramaribo and Nieuw Nickerie, and points at the concentration of the country's population and economic functions in the capital. In this regard, Suriname differs from Trinidad and Tobago or Jamaica where important secondary towns have developed (Verrest 2007b; Jaffe, De Bruijne, & Schalkwijk 2008).

Paramaribo's development pattern resembles that of other Caribbean cities that originated as relatively small, main settlements for colonial traders. Robert Potter (1998) has coined the term "plantopolis" to describe such towns. In the postwar period, the dominance of the capital city further

increased and the so-called mini-metropolitan regions emerged throughout the Caribbean (Potter 1993: 2; Potter 1998). This is applicable to Paramaribo as well that from its start until today, it is the main political, economic, cultural, administrative, and residential center of the country.

The location of the city, along a deep section of the Suriname River just 20 km from its mouth made that Paramaribo became the central node in the flows of goods and people leaving and entering Suriname. Despite the fact that the natural resources that are so important for the country's economy, bauxite, gold, oil, and timber, are exploited outside of Paramaribo, its main economic profits are distributed via the capital. Trading, including the import and export of goods and capital, predominantly takes place in the city. The local headquarters of mining and trading companies are located in Paramaribo. In addition, the heart of the government and administration is situated there as well. The city serves as the control center of the country and the main connection with the outside world. Although Paramaribo is a Caribbean city, traditionally its primary socioeconomic and cultural links have been with Europe and the United States and less so with surrounding countries. This started to slowly change in the last decade of the century, especially after Suriname had become a member of CARICOM in 1995 (see chapter 8).

In the postwar era several initiatives to decentralize various government and economic functions to the districts were taken, but these did not yield any significant results to date.³ That being said, the authority of the central government is somewhat limited to and much focused on the coastal area. The sparsely populated interior has always lacked strict government control and is a "free zone" where Maroons, Amerindians, and foreign fortune seekers from the coastal areas and abroad could and can exploit natural resources (gold, timber) without much official oversight. It is also a "forgotten area" where the government fails to provide adequate educational and health facilities and utilities such as water and electricity.

Urbanization and Population Growth

Over the course of the twentieth century Paramaribo has experienced a steady growth. Until 1950, the growth rate was moderate: from 32,000 at the start of the century to 71,000 inhabitants in 1950.⁴ From then on, population growth was rapid and the city counted 110,000 people by 1964 (55 percent growth) and 170,000 in 1980 (55 percent).⁵ This trend was reversed in the mid-1970s, when population growth slowed down to reach 243,000 or 43 percent in 2004.⁶ In comparison, the population of Suriname grew from 178,000 in 1950 to 324,000 in 1964 (82 percent), 355,000 in 1980 (9 percent), and 486,000 in 2004 (36 percent) (ABS 2005: 11). Hence, the growth of Paramaribo until 1964 was less than that of Suriname as a whole. From 1964 the growth of the city has exceeded that of the country by far. In the early twenty-first century more than half of the country's

population lives in Paramaribo. It goes without saying that population density in Paramaribo has always been the highest by far: in 2003 it was 1,338 inhabitants per km², next came the districts of Wanica with 193 and Commewijne with 10 inhabitants per km².⁷

As sketched in the introduction to this chapter, the urban agglomeration of Paramaribo stretches beyond the city borders to include significant parts of the highly urbanized Wanica district. The population of Greater Paramaribo⁸ grew from 170,000 in 1971 to 230,770 inhabitants in 1980 and 328,932 in 2003. This means that close to 67 percent of Suriname's population lives in Greater Paramaribo.

Since 2000 a bridge across the Suriname River, the Jules Wijdenboschbrug, connects the city with the district of Commewijne; it is expected that part of Paramaribo's urban expansion will take place in this district, in effect making the western part of Commewijne a suburb of the capital.⁹ Private and public housing projects are under construction across the river. Before the bridge was built traffic crossed the Suriname by official ferries or informal small boats. The heavy use of the steep bridge and the concomitant traffic jams have, however, reinvigorated the use of water craft to travel to and from Paramaribo.

The growth and composition of Paramaribo's population reflect the city's turbulent history. Populations from various ethnic, geographic, educational, and class backgrounds arrived and left the city at different times. Thousands of Afro-Surinamese settled on the then town fringes after the abolition of slavery. Since the early twentieth century, the decline of agriculture and the availability of educational facilities in the city further encouraged the urbanization of rural populations, mostly of Hindustani and Javanese origin. Later, in- and outmigration of qualified laborers, professionals, and students, to and sometimes from the Netherlands, reshaped the composition of Paramaribo's population. Maroons came from the 1960s onward in search of employment opportunities but later, during the Interior War, they came, along with Amerindians, to seek shelter from the violence (De Vries 2005; Jaffe & Sanderse 2010). Around the turn of the century, there was a notable increase in the number of Chinese and Brazilian immigrants, although exact numbers are not known (De Theije 2006; Tjon Sie Fat 2007). After 2000, a few communities along Tourtonnelaan have developed into a "Brazilian" neighborhood, locally known as "Klein Belem" (Little Belem), with Brazilian supermarkets, restaurants, and bars.

Paramaribo's growth in the second half of the twentieth century was partly the result of high urban birth rates and partly due to migration of rural households searching for work and schooling. With the decline of agriculture, employment in the districts decreased. At the same time labor and educational opportunities in the city expanded, pulling many rural households to the city. This often took the form of chain migration, with one or a few family members leaving first, while others followed later. As mobility increased and became available to lower classes through

bicycles, buses, and motorbikes, the orientation of rural communities surrounding Paramaribo shifted to the capital. Thus, Paramaribo's growth was also the result of densification and urbanization of rural areas surrounding the city, such as along Kwattaweg to the west and in Wanica to the south (De Bruijne & Schalkwijk 2008). Hence, a combination of push and pull factors resulted in urban expansion.

The influence of internal migration can be detected in the prevalence of urban roots among the city's residents. In 1921 and 1950 nearly two-thirds of the population was born in Paramaribo (Welvaartsfonds 1954: 71). This declined to 58 percent in 1964 on account of the rural-urban migration of Javanese and Hindustanis in particular (Buschkens 1974: 133-134). However, in 2004, 68 percent of the population of Paramaribo was born in Paramaribo and another 7 percent in the districts of Suriname or Wanica (ABS 2006b). Hence, in 2004 three-fourths of the population of Paramaribo was born in Greater Paramaribo.

An important factor that attracted new residents was education. It was generally recognized that huge differences existed between schools in Paramaribo and those in the districts regarding curriculum and teacher qualifications. Generally, children from district schools lacked the skills and knowledge to succeed at secondary schools (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 453-454). In mid-century, opportunities for education beyond the level of primary school were concentrated in Paramaribo, at first mainly through the mulo and ulo, junior-level secondary education schools.¹⁰ In 1948, the city had four mulo and four ulo schools. In 1960, this number had grown to nine mulo schools and six ulo schools, while there were no ulo schools and only two mulo schools in the districts: in Nieuw Nickerie and Moengo (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 457). Between those years the number of mulo students grew from 2,144 to 8,249, while the attendance at ulo schools saw a tenfold increase. A gradual decentralization of secondary education was achieved, but in 1975 only six of 32 mulo schools were located outside of Paramaribo and the district Suriname. In 1950, the first senior secondary school providing a three-year education over and above the mulo level started. Demand for the AMS (*Algemene Middelbare School*, General Secondary School) was so high that a *numerus clausus* had to be introduced; in later years entrance exams were required. In 1966, the first six-year high school (*het Lyceum*) started with 260 students, five years later the school counted 1,360 students (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 458-463).

Vocational schools, such as teachers' colleges and agricultural or trade schools, were also located in Paramaribo. In 1966, the *Staten van Suriname*, in celebration of its hundredth anniversary, presented the country with a university. Professor R.A.J. van Lier, author of *Frontier Society*, gave the inaugural address in 1968. The university started with a Law School, followed in 1969 with a Department of Medical Studies. These two colleges were, in fact, not new, as a medical school was founded in 1882 and a training institute for law (*Surinaamse Rechtsschool*) in 1948.¹¹ The

university then was partly a reorganization and centralization of existing schools. In later years new departments, including Social-Economic Studies and Technical and Natural Sciences, were added to train much needed specialists to build the nation, rather than to rely on foreign universities to do so. In 1976, the university began the construction of a campus in southwest Paramaribo.¹²

The increasing opportunities reflect and reinforce the popular perception that education is the road toward increased wealth, respect, and social mobility. Paramaribo as the only center of education was (and is) overburdened, as demand for all levels of education continued to grow because of population growth and urbanization. This concentration of schools in the capital further reinforced rural–urban migration.

Children from the districts and the interior who had to go to Paramaribo for their education were boarded with family members or in boarding schools. Many of the boarding schools were erected by religious institutions and were based on ethnicity and gender. Because of educational decentralization and rural–urban migration of entire families, many of these institutes closed their doors in the 1970s. The switch to the city was immense for many young students because of the differences between the districts and Paramaribo. As a Javanese informant recalls his experiences in the 1960s: “I had never seen the city, I even had never worn shoes. I went from a village to the city, with completely different values and a different language. It was hell, in quotation marks. I remember that when I left and walked through my village, people were waiting in front of their houses to wave goodbye and wish me luck . . . I was a twelve-year-old boy, I knew nothing about the city. With the boat it took a whole day of travel.”¹³

Along with the schools various other educational facilities, such as libraries were also concentrated in Paramaribo.¹⁴ That was certainly the case for movie theaters: mid-century Paramaribo always counted several cinemas, while there were also theaters (some showing only silent movies) in the districts. After the war, travelling shows brought movies to locations outside the city.¹⁵ At the end of the century, however, there were no more movie theaters in Paramaribo, as they were crowded out by (illegal) home videos from Bollywood, Hollywood, and Nollywood in particular. This changed again in the following decade, when new cinemas opened their doors, very occasionally showing local productions. Cultural centers and theaters were also clustered in the city, although in the postwar years conscious attempts were made to bring entertainment, ranging from classical European music to Surinamese cabaret, to the districts in places like Wageningen, Moengo, and Nieuw Nickerie (Ockhorst 2012; Reeser 2012). In addition, traditionally all major media outlets are located in the capital. In 2012, more than 20 radio stations, more than a dozen television stations, four newspapers, and a professional online news site were active in the city.

Apart from education, an expanding urban labor market and a decline in the agricultural sector pulled people to the city (De Bruijne 1976b).

Employment in the public sector, in particular, grew. In 1921, 6 percent of the urban working population was employed by the government, and in 1950 this percentage had risen only slightly to 6.4 percent according to De Bruijne (1976b). However, a sample from the census claims that 26 percent of the urban workforce was paid by the government. In 1960s, this was true for 25 percent and in 2000 for almost 50 percent of the labor force.¹⁶

Paramaribo's Spatial Expansion

Paramaribo's population grew from the beginning of the century when mainly Javanese and Hindustani farmers moved to the city. Some of these newcomers settled in the urban fringes but until the late 1940s the new urbanites were mostly housed in the existing urban area, thus increasing population density. At the time Paramaribo consisted of the city center and its surrounding communities, such as Ondrobon and Anniestraat. Typical timber buildings exemplifying eighteenth- and nineteenth-century architecture dominated downtown. The color schemes, white for the building, green for shutters, and reddish brown for the doorsteps, gave the feel of homogeneity. The only exceptions were the stately brick offices near the central square that were built after the major municipal fire of 1832.¹⁷ The city's anchors were the palace of the governor (later the president) and Fort Zeelandia, both located along the grass field serving as the central square.¹⁸ In the back of the stately houses often were yards where house staff was living in barracks. To date one still finds small wooden houses and a few barrack yards "exemplifying the living conditions of the less well-to-do in past as well as more present times" (Verrest 2010: 52). Small enclaves of Hindustani and Javanese residents could be found in, for example, Koningsstraat.

Since the 1950s, the city center lost its residential function when government and private sector activities demanded more inner city space. As stated above, the city population grew considerably during this period. This led to large-scale suburbanization to the north, west, and south of the city, mainly through the conversion of agricultural land to residential land. Between 1950 and the mid-1980s, seven plantations to the north were converted into residential areas that kept their original names including Ma Retraite, Tourtonne, Elisabethshof, and Rainville.¹⁹ The large housing demand made that people were sleeping in front of the office when a new project opened up. Most of the potential customers came from crowded and expensive inner-city neighborhoods or from the districts. The actual execution took 30 years, using the profits of one subproject to finance the next. The variety in plot size between projects created class-based differentiation. Within subprojects, however, socio-economic homogeneity was achieved. A small part of the area (Tourtonne 6) was sold to the government for the development of a social housing project. Additional parts of land were allocated to the government for public

facilities such as sports fields and schools. However, some of these appear to have been sold by the government for housing or commercial use.²⁰ To the south of Paramaribo the government was involved in the planning and execution of the neighborhood called Zorg en Hoop. The plan catered for a social housing project but also provided private lots for the middle and higher classes.²¹

To the west and southwest of the city center agricultural lands were subdivided and sold by their owners and became residential areas such as Van Brussel, Van Dijk, Janki, and Beni's Park. Many have retained the names of the former owners. These projects were often much smaller than the conversions of plantations in the north, and not part of a larger urban development plan. The parcels of land sold here targeted both middle- and upper-class groups. South of the geographical boundary of the Saramaccadoorsteek Canal, small landholders subdivided their land and made them available for mainly low-income groups. Most of these grew without any planning and provided small lots with relatively poor-quality services. Ramgoelam, Ephraïmszegen, Pontbuiten, and Nieuwweergevondenweg consist of such small subdivisions. In 2003, residents of Abrouaweg in Nieuwweergevondenweg described how in the 1950s a small landholder and member of the Seventh Day Adventist Church subdivided his land and made it accessible to members of this church. In addition, he provided space for a Seventh Day Adventist primary school. The residents recall that they lacked electricity when they moved into the area and also how they build their own houses. From their stories it is not clear whether legal tenure was established immediately.²²

From the mid-1970s the expansion of Paramaribo slowed down. Mass migration to the Netherlands and later the economic crises reduced real demand for housing. In the 1980s and 1990s, both the private sector and the government had difficulty financing the development of new areas. Even more pressing was that it became exceedingly difficult for people to buy land or build a house as they lacked the means to finance such purchases. Plots of land that had been sold remained empty waiting for better times. Their owners lived abroad or with family members in the hope that their economic fortunes would turn.

At the start of the twenty-first century new building projects are being developed. Mortgage opportunities have increased, thus giving upper-working-class people opportunities to buy land and housing. Some of the new projects are developed within the city boundaries on low-lying lands in the upper south or north, including along the newly constructed belt way. These lands are subject to flooding after rain storms in combination with high tide.

Thus, the development of Paramaribo was mostly carried out by the private sector. The developers acquired land from farmers, subdivided it, and sold parcels with access to amenities to individuals. The government provided housing for low-income groups in the form of social housing projects. The first of these projects was in the aforementioned Zorg en Hoop which

included a social housing section. Later projects such as Latour, Marowijne project, Peu et Content, Flora A, Geyersvljijt, and Flora B provided ready-made houses for rent, sale, and hire purchase.²³ The last successful project was Geyersvljijt, established in the early 1980s. In the last decades of the century Stichting Volkshuisvesting Suriname (SVS, Social Housing Corporation Suriname), manager of the social housing projects, had to cope with a number of problems including illegal occupation of housing and late payments. Between 1951 and 1983 over 6,283 houses were built by SVS in Paramaribo and in Phedra (Brokopondo). Many have been sold to former renters; in 2008, only 1,000 units were still managed by SVS (Maks & De Bruijne 2008).

Paramaribo is a widespread and sprawling city. High-rise buildings are limited and high-rise residential housing nearly absent. Individual lots of housing are relatively large, starting at 300 m², even for low-income social housing (see Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997). Driving through the city one sees many empty lots, often overgrown with lush vegetation. The idea easily rises that there is an abundance of land available for housing, but as stated above, most of these lots are sold. However, the need for housing in the city is substantial though the exact demand is unknown.²⁴ Maks and De Bruijne (2008) calculate based on demographic developments and housing quality a yearly need of 1,575 houses. A much larger number of houses need renovations, particularly as housing quality after 1980 became poorer.

In the period between 1950 and 1980 when Paramaribo expanded, the increased demand for housing was countered by new projects. Large parts of the population acquired a piece of land and built a house themselves. Strategies included do-it-yourself, by building step by step, with the help of family, friends, and small contractors but also with larger formal contractors. Households would either buy land from a private sector developer, such as the Ma Retraite Cultuurmaatschappij, or access government land or a government-developed project, such as Zorg and Hoop. In addition, private companies, such as Suralco,²⁵ or government agencies provided their employees with opportunities to buy land or a house in a specific housing project. A small land and housing project on government land in Toenalaan in Voor-Maretraite, for example, provided housing to employees in the police force, customs, and health care. The Stichting Volkshuisvesting was in charge of the project and through a system of hire purchase the residents became owners. Many people expanded their house in the course of time. A son of a police officer who acquired a house in the late 1950s states, "Yes they have done that [expanding] and that is my mother's doing. How she ran the household . . . that was like a company at microscale. She managed to save in a *kasmoni* [a rotating saving and credit association], a typically Creole thing, and from those savings my parents were able to finance the extension of the house with two larger rooms. One was a bedroom and the other a room where children could find a quiet place or play without having to go outside or be in the living room."²⁶

An informant familiar with the Ma Retraite Cultuurmaatschappij describes how economic position determined who bought a piece of land in a specific project. Ethnicity did not play a role in the business of these land developers. The projects with larger lots (750m² or more) were accessible for higher-income groups, whereas smaller parcels attracted working-class (350–500m²) or middle-class (500–750m²) households. According to him, most families came from the expensive and crowded downtown areas and to a lesser extent from the districts.²⁷ The lowest-income groups could not afford to leave congested living conditions in the inner city but the established working class, middle class, and upper class left downtown and moved to the south, west, and north. Where newcomers to the city settled and still settle, one finds clusters of specific ethnic groups (De Bruijne 1976a).

Until 1980, housing finance was available through hire purchase or informal assistance.²⁸ Most people paid for the land in a few instalments and the house was financed through informal lending, family assistance, self-help construction, or piece by piece incremental building. Higher-income groups may have had a mortgage. Where housing projects were offered through companies or the government, these agents provided financing. The 2008 survey confirms the low mortgage share among homeowners in Paramaribo. Close to 60 percent of all homeowners never closed a mortgage. That percentage was even higher (70) for people who had been living in the same house for more than 30 years. In the 1980s, the development of new projects stagnated. Real demand as well as financing opportunities for new projects decreased and only slightly improved toward the end of the century. This is illustrated by Maks and De Bruijne (2008) who show that whereas in 1980, 20 percent of houses were younger than five years, this had decreased to 5 percent in 1992.

As a result of this low density of housing, the actual costs of the development, utilities, and maintenance of residential land and services are high. Moreover, availability of accessible residential areas with utilities in the coastal areas is limited. This scarcity and the high development costs mean that only high-income groups have access to private land. Government land (*domeingrond*) is, in theory, accessible to every resident with Surinamese nationality. Yet, the procedure to acquire government land is complex, bureaucratic, time-consuming, and highly subject to corruption. The fact that Suriname lacks a comprehensive system of land registration resulting in unreliable information on availability, ownership, and status of land complicates matters even more. Consequently, access to urban space and housing is often a decidedly political affair. Moreover, most government lands within the city boundaries have been allocated, though not always used. As a result, access to government land is limited to plots of land at considerable distance from downtown. This means that access to new urban land is limited to those with substantial incomes or with good social and political networks. For others, the opportunities are limited to renting, squatting land or a house, or staying on land that has been purchased in the past by themselves or family members.

Homeownership is highly desired in Suriname, not least because of its role as safety net in times of economic hardship. Renting is seen as an option of last resort for those not able to buy a house or who are new in the city. Renting became rather expensive toward the end of the century when the demand for housing by (re)migrants, foreign interns, and tourists pushed up prices. In addition, rent has to be paid in US dollars or Dutch guilders / Euros. Finally, laws are highly protective of renters, reducing the offer of houses on the market. For example, the still valid rent protection law of 1949 states that homeowners only can terminate contracts when a tenant is in arrears, causing damage or nuisance, or when the owner can prove to be in urgent need of the house for personal housing (Bureau Sociale Rechtzorg 1988: 11). The 2004 census shows that 24 percent of housing titles is rented and 66 percent is property.

Informal occupation or squatting in Paramaribo has been a growing phenomenon and takes two forms. The first is squatting of houses provided by the government as part of its social housing policy. From the mid-1980s onward, such houses have been occupied before the actual completion of the building process, meaning that these generally lacked windows and other utilities. Examples include Pontbuiten, Sophia's Lust, Hanna's Lust, and more recently Sunny Point; the latter project was financed by the Chinese government. The second form of squatting entails occupation of empty parcels or patches of land randomly all over the city. Some of these lands had no clear function and the government condoned occupancy. Well known are the settlements of refugees who fled to the city during the Interior War, for example, in the area behind the NIS stadium (Nationaal Indoor Stadion), "Achter Nis," and Goede Verwachting (Maks & De Bruijne 2008). Twenty years later these areas still lack proper utilities. In other cases, such as Texas (Devisbuiten) and Ramlahal, squatters found themselves fighting for claims to ownership. Squatters or occupants are mostly people who have come to the city after 1970 when it became much more difficult to gain access to land. Among squatters, Maroons are dominant. Squatter settlements may come into existence as the result of an organized action or gradual settlement by individual households.²⁹

Despite the lack of government initiatives in postwar housing development and the limited access to government land working and middle classes still expect the government to provide low-cost and high-quality housing in acceptable locations. Therefore, the promise to deliver housing is part and parcel of any postindependence election campaign.

As may be inferred from this overview of urban expansion, Paramaribo has developed in an ad hoc, largely unstructured manner. Urban planning in Suriname is underdeveloped. The Urban Planning Act of 1973 defines the urban area and calls for zoning and structure plans. However, no zoning, regional land-use plans, urban destination plans, or physical development plans are in place (Struiken & Healy 2003: 340). The most important law defines rules and regulations with regard to subdivision projects. The lack of planning particularly affects water management and

traffic regulation. Urban developers often create only one road, as narrow as possible, through the developed land with rather narrow but deep plots of land on both sides. Connections from one area to the next are directed through the main roads, resulting in heavy use of these roads, unnecessary long distances to be covered between point A and point B, and traffic jams. Monocentricity and the absence of circular roads (until the opening of a beltway in 2008) create traffic congestions on the main roads and in the center, in particular. Bicycles, scooters, motorbikes, buses, and a spectacularly growing number of cars fight for space on the busy, narrow roads. The main roads are tarred but side roads in communities are often dirt roads. Many roads suffer from poor maintenance; potholes caused by heavy rains or heat are part of life. Toward the end of the century a major renovation plan for the roads was implemented with the help of the Chinese government.

The city is situated on plain, low-lying clay ground intersected by shell deposits. Water runs off through a combination of open and closed drains in the direction of the Atlantic Ocean, the Suriname River, and the Saramaccadoorsteek Canal. Flooding has always been a problem. Improvements were made when sewers were built but lack of maintenance of drains and pumps, the undercapacity of the main canal discharges, and increased building in low-lying swamps in the second half of the century led to frequent overflows (Blufpand 2006). Most developers connect their small waterways to a few main canals. These, however, are not equipped for the number of households and plots of land connected to them, creating flooding. In addition, Suriname is among the ten countries most threatened by the adverse effects of rise in sea levels (see also Dasgupta et al. 2007; McGranahan, Balk, & Anderson 2007; Linnekamp, Koedam, & Baud 2011).

Development of commercial and industrial areas has been limited. As in many other Caribbean countries, most industrial activities are confined to the local market. Only the areas near the port, surrounding the Saramaccadoorsteek Canal, and a section in Geyersvlijt are designated as industrial and commercial areas. As a result, one finds many economic activities in residential areas. Daily retail outlets, such as supermarkets, fresh produce markets, and bakeries may be found throughout the city, concentrated along major roads, or as single units in residential areas. For more specialist products, such as clothing, the downtown area was the main locus. With the arrival of US-style Hermitage and Ma Retraite malls after 2005, located in the south and north, this monocentricity is somewhat decreasing. These malls cater primarily to middle- and upper-class patrons, while the downtown area remained popular with younger and lower-class customers. The end of the century also saw the rather late appearance of global chain restaurants; starting with Kentucky Fried Chicken, Popeye's, McDonalds, Pizza Hut, and Burger King have found a market in Suriname. Some local restaurants have picked up this chain and drive-through concept. At that time international hotel chains such

as Marriott and Best Western were built to accommodate the growing number of tourists.³⁰

Settlement Patterns: The Role of Class and Ethnicity

The arrival of various groups in the city has changed the overall structure of the urban population. Although in 1921 Afro-Surinamese formed 80 percent of Paramaribo's population, this proportion was reduced to 59 percent in 1964 and 52 percent in 1971. The percentage of Hindustanis increased from 11 percent in 1921 to 26 percent in 1964, and 27 percent in 1971. For the Javanese these percentages were respectively 3, 7, and 10 (De Bruijne 2001: 37–38). The 2004 census again shows a more equal distribution with Creoles, Hindustanis, Javanese and residents of mixed decent accounting for 28, 22, 12, and 16 percent, respectively (see Figure 7.1).³¹

Figure 7.1 shows the change in share of the Javanese and Hindustani population in Paramaribo's total. From less than 10 percent in the beginning of the twentieth century these groups now comprise one-third of the population of Paramaribo. At least as significant is the increase in share of the population of Maroon descent. They were first counted in 1950 (0 percent) and grew from 0.6 percent in 1964 to 2 percent in 1971 and 10 percent in 2004, making them the fifth largest group in Paramaribo nowadays. Their share of the population is expected to grow in the near future both as a result of immigration and high natural birth rates.

The changes in the Creole and mixed population are large as well but need to be interpreted in a more nuanced manner as a result of changing census categories. Remarkable is the large percentage of people of mixed




Figure 7.1 Share of Javanese and Hindustanis of Total Population Paramaribo 1921–2004.

Sources: Census data 1921, 1950, 1964, 1971, and 2004.

descent in 2004 (16 percent—the third group in the city) and in 1950 (44 percent). However, it is important to note that these categories cannot be compared one on one. The 2004 census was the first time predefined categories were allowed for a category “mixed,” going beyond the strict categorization in “pure” strata of Creole, Hindustani, Javanese, etcetera (De Koning 2011a). In the 1950 census ethnicity was dealt with in a rigid manner, when the interviewer listed the race of the interviewee and his ancestors.³² As a result, it was concluded that 45 percent of the urban population was ethnically mixed (Welvaartsfonds Suriname 1956a: 13). Hence, the group considered mixed in 1950 is much larger than the group who considers itself mixed in 2004; yet the 1950 group included many people who, though having mixed origins, probably would have self-identified as Creole. The census in 1921, 1964, and 1971 did not acknowledge mixed as a separate group but considered them as part of the Creole population. The decrease in the share of people of Creole descent from 52 percent in 1971 to 28 percent in 2004 is partly due to the exclusion of people who consider themselves mixed. Figure 7.2 shows the distribution of the urban population according to ethnicity in 2004. This analysis shows that the relative size of ethnic groups changed over time and the shares of groups in the total population have been developing toward a more even distribution. Hence, diversification, mixing, and blending is an ongoing process, continuously changing the features of Paramaribo’s population.

Paramaribo’s residential patterns in the early twentieth century are to be explained by time of arrival in the city, labor specialization, and socio-economic status (De Bruijne 1976a). These factors have shaped ethnic patterns of settlement. At the beginning of the century, the white urban elite still occupied the large, timber townhouses in the center. Their servants and families lived in small barracks (*erfwoningen*) in the yards of these houses. Working-class Afro-Surinamese settled in the narrower




Figure 7.2 Population of Paramaribo According to Ethnicity in 2004.

Source: ABS 2005.

streets in the center and in neighborhoods such as Frimangron. Hence, ethnic clustering followed class structures. With the arrival of new urban residents (especially Hindustanis and Javanese), Paramaribo developed into a relatively mixed city at the end of the 1940s (De Bruijne 1976b). We contend that it was *relatively mixed* as the 1950 census shows that the “black-colored group” dominated in each area of the city with percentages ranging from 53 percent in some neighborhoods to over 80 percent in others. The average percentage of Hindustanis was 18 but ranged from a low of 7 in one neighborhood to a high of 34 percent in another.³³ This same census shows that in 1950, 40 percent of the country’s population lived in Paramaribo, whereas 70 percent of Creoles, 77 percent of Chinese, and 67 percent of Europeans were living in the city and only 21 percent and 10 percent of the Hindustani and Javanese populations.

As discussed above, in the course of the century the Creole population lost its demographic dominance in the city. In addition, ethnic groups have come to live evenly spread throughout the city and it has become much more difficult to indicate specific Javanese, Creole, or Hindustani areas in the city. Schalkwijk and De Bruijne (1997) have shown, based on data from 1980 and 1992, that socioeconomic status was more important than ethnicity in spatial residential patterns. They also conclude that because socioeconomic differences between the main population groups in the city were not very large, Paramaribo is ethnically not much segregated. The ethnic composition of most neighborhoods reflects the city’s ethnic pattern.

De Bruijne and Schalkwijk’s analysis of 1992 data shows that there exist several exceptions. The center and its surrounding communities are mostly Creole and Maroon and the urban fringes are mainly dominated by the Hindustani group. Social housing communities are generally Creole as is the Creole-dominated government project Latour. The lower-class communities in between and to the north and west are ethnically mixed.

The 2004 census results are only available at *ressort* level. At this level, the census shows no dominance of one specific ethnic group, except for Pontbuiten and Latour where more than half (56 percent) of the urban Maroon population is living. Whereas Maroons comprises 10 percent of the population of Paramaribo they make up 30 percent and 28 percent of these areas. In Pontbuiten, Maroons are the largest population group and in Latour they are second to the Creole group. Many Maroons have acquired a piece of land in those neighborhoods, squatted land or housing, moved in with family members or built a house within the family compound.

Despite the existence of many ethnically mixed neighborhoods, single streets within such can be ethnically homogenous (Verrest & Post 2007). Side streets to the ethnically mixed Nieuwweergevondenweg, for example, are homogeneously Hindustani or Maroon (Verrest & Post 2007). An informant in one such street told how her father-in-law had subdivided his land and given out multiple parcels to each of his children. The children used some lots for their own houses but have sold or rented out other

plots of land (usually with a house) to non-family members. The practice is that these third parties have to be of Hindustani descent.³⁴

De Bruijne (2001) notes that throughout the century even in a city as mixed as Paramaribo ethnicity largely determined contacts outside the school and the work place. In the social networks of urban residents extended family plays a central role, next to churches, for example. Neighbors are preferably kept at some social distance (Verrest 2007a). Both family and churches, except for the Christian churches with the exclusion of the Moravians / EBG, tend to be rather ethnically homogeneous. As such, De Bruijne's (2001: 38) claim that "ethnic background, thus, determines the social network of every urban resident," is correct. However, the work place, school, and neighborhood to a large extent shape daily life and most of Paramaribo's residents thus spend their lives primarily in a multicultural setting. Class has been much more important than ethnicity in determining residence in Paramaribo. Before 1950, one would find residents from different classes living in close proximity. The yard dwellings housing low-income workers and before 1863 enslaved, on the compound of the grand houses of the well-to-do are the best example of these mixed residencies (cf De Bruijne 1976a). However, relations between these groups were very unequal and living in proximity did not mean that lives, experiences, or even spaces within the compound were shared. Beyond these mixed compounds it was abundantly clear where in Paramaribo the well-to-do resided, the middle class lived, the working class and civil servants were housed, and the poor had settled. But, as opposed to for example Port of Spain, where the informally developed areas in East Port of Spain were mostly homogeneous low-income areas, Paramaribo's low-income areas were and are surrounded by middle- and even high-income areas. A case in point is the lower-middle-class community Marowijne Project that is located adjacent to higher-middle-class Via Bella and the middle-class area of Flamboyant borders the low-income area of Land van Dijk.

From the 1950s to the 1980s, people from all classes, except the very poor, could gain access to land. Where they would find residency depended on their socioeconomic position (De Bruijne 1976a, 2001; Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997; De Bruijne & Schalkwijk 2008). The large agricultural estates to the north and west provided high-quality, large parcels for mostly wealthy classes. Landowners in the south of the city possessed small pieces of low-lying land that were accessible to poorer groups. Thus, a residential pattern developed with a city center without a strong residential function surrounded by old low-income neighborhoods. To the north and west, middle-class and elite areas came into existence, whereas working- and lower-class developments came into being in the south.

Thus, in general, residential patterns in Paramaribo are mostly based on socioeconomic status and not (as much) on ethnicity. Yet, in the last decades of the twentieth century the socioeconomic profile of communities has become less clear. Schalkwijk and De Bruijne compare the years

1980–1992 and 2001 by using a wealth index based on the possession of durable consumer goods (see chapter 6) to demonstrate that differences between neighborhoods did not grow. This indicates that spatial clustering of socioeconomic position had not grown over time, despite the fact that overall inequality was on the rise. Most neighborhoods inhabit a mix of socioeconomic classes. Within one single street one finds different sizes and quality of houses and households with distinct socioeconomic positions (Verrest & Post 2007). Exceptions exist, in for example the villa project development Elizabethshof in north and the low-income communities of Land van Dijk and Ramgolam in the south.

Social and Economic Change and Inequalities in Paramaribo

In urban geographies of Caribbean cities, including Paramaribo, ethnicity is often a central analytical frame.³⁵ Paramaribo is considered a mixed city, yet urban life is argued to be organized primarily along ethnic lines (De Bruijne 1976b; Kromhout 2000). This pattern is, for example, reflected in the choice of partner. In 1950, 80 percent of Creoles had a Creole partner and among Hindustanis and Javanese over 90 percent had a partner within the same ethnic group. In 1992, endogamy was still over 80 percent in each major ethnic group. However, more recent data counter these observations. A study among mothers and daughters shows that only one-third of mothers demand that their daughter chooses a partner within the same ethnic group (Verrest 1998). Even more importantly, the 2004 census shows that among 0–9 year olds, children of mixed descent (10,099) are the second group (after Creoles, 11,333), whereas among 25–34 year olds they comprise the fourth group (after Creoles, Hindustanis, and Javanese), indicating that interethnic relations are on the rise (ABS 2006b). Another indicator is the language spoken in urban households. De Bruijne and Schalkwijk (2005: 252) note that at the end of the century in Paramaribo the use of Dutch in private settings was gaining ground. In 1992, in 55 percent of the households Dutch was indicated as the main language and according to the census in 2004, this had grown to 66 percent.³⁶

For most of the century, ethnic background was also an important factor in occupational choice, although this has become less dominant toward the end of the century when the urban labor market became less segregated, despite the survival of some specific ethnic employment niches. Since 1950, Creoles have dominated the civil service. At first because the middle-class, light-skinned group held an educational lead. Later however, government jobs served as an emancipation device for the lower-class, darker skinned Creoles as well as for Hindustanis and Javanese. Government jobs provide a social safety as it guarantees an income and access to health insurance and as such prevent unrest. From a sample of the 1950 census it was derived that a quarter of the city workforce worked for the government. Europeans and the light-skinned Creoles dominated the

sector at the time: 55 percent of the government sector consisted of people of European descent and 38 percent was classified as colored. In 2004, 30 percent of the working population of Paramaribo earned its income in the government sector or in education or health care. However, this was 45 percent of the Creole working population and around a quarter for both the Hindustani and Javanese working population. In the industry and trade sector, people of Hindustani descent are dominant in absolute as well as relative terms: they comprise 27 percent of the workers in these sectors but only 22 percent of the total work force. Hence, some ethnic groups indeed dominate some occupational groups. However, the domination is moderate and decreasing rather than increasing.

What is remarkable, however, is the presence of Creole women in the government sector: in 1992, 70 percent of all employed Creole women worked for the government, compared to 52 percent of the Hindustani and 40 percent of the Javanese women with a job (De Bruijne 2001: 40; De Bruijne & Schalkwijk 2005: 255). The 2004 census shows a similar picture. Of the female working population of Creole origin 64 percent works directly for the government or in the education and health sector. This was 39 percent for the women of Hindustani and 35 percent for those of Javanese descent (ABS 2006b; see also chapter 8). Hence, particularly among women there is a more ethnic based stratification of the labor market.

Labor participation of Hindustani and Javanese women is still lower than that of Creole women. In 2004, 53 percent of Creole women between 15 and 64 years had a job and 8 percent was unemployed or a discouraged worker. For Hindustani women this was 33 percent and 6 percent and for Javanese women 46 and 3 percent, respectively (ABS 2006b: 65). Creole women's experience as laborers and household heads is longer, and this may explain their preference for government work. Government work contributes to income security, which this group of workers considers more important than the level of income. The large share of women working for the government, in general, can be explained by the more limited labor opportunities for women vis-à-vis men. "Classic" feminine professions for educated women are in health, education, and administration. All of these sectors are predominantly government sectors. Women with limited education find employment for the government as cleaners or lower clerks. Although data are lacking, it seems plausible that higher educated women in Hindustani or Javanese groups find employment in the private sector as well as the government sector whereas lower-educated groups are self-employed, not employed, or assist partners.

Household incomes and expenditures underwent great changes in the postwar period. An important economic characteristic of urban life is its base on a cash economy. Urbanites pay for nearly all of their living expenses, whereas people living outside the city can rely to some extent on home produced food, barter trade, and natural resources. Therefore, increases in prices of goods have a serious impact on levels of welfare. Four

household budget surveys, conducted in 1952, 1968, 1999, and 2007, give a good overview of household expenses on food and other products. A comparative analysis in Table 7.1 indicates general changes.

A rule of thumb is that if wealth increases, the fraction of income spent on food decreases. Given that in the 1950s expenses for food took up approximately half of the urban household budgets, and clothing more than 10 percent, the price increases in the 1940s and 1950s had a great impact on the standard of living.³⁷ Table 7.1 shows that overall welfare in Paramaribo increased between 1953 and 1968, and stabilized in the following 20 years. The shift in household expenditure on housing and clothing to other expenses in the years from 1968 to 1999 is striking. During this period, in particular, transportation costs increased and took up a large share of household budgets: 14.6 percent in 1999 and 13 percent in 2007. These costs are equal to those for housing. The lower expenses on housing confirm the argument in this chapter that investments on housing have decreased during times of crises, which allowed for increased expenses in other sectors such as food and transportation. A comparison between income and prices in the period 1954–2007 indicates that overall wealth decreased during this period.³⁸

Economic inequality in the city for a long time conflated with ethnicity and time of arrival (De Bruijne 1976a). This becomes clear from studying housing conditions at the time. In the 1950s, the large majority (75 percent) of residential buildings were one-family houses and about a quarter was secondary buildings in a yard, mostly of much poorer quality than the main houses.³⁹ Houses in Paramaribo were generally of better quality than in the district. Wood was the dominant material (95 percent) in the city, whereas outside the city pile work and wattle was still common. In mid-century three-quarters of Paramaribo's houses had a water connection and slightly more than half had electricity (Welvaartsfonds 1956b: 47). Differences in housing conditions in term of ethnicity are obvious. On average 77.5 percent of Suriname's inhabitants lived in a wooden construction. Maroons, Amerindians, and Javanese often lived in houses made of organic material (Welvaartsfonds 1956b: 56). The survey by Schalkwijk and De Bruijne in 1992 shows that at that time approximately one-third of the houses were constructed of wood and 43.6 percent a combination of wood and stone. Ethnic differences were

Table 7.1 Weight of Individual Categories in Total Consumption of Households in Paramaribo 1953–2008

<i>Category</i>	<i>1953</i>	<i>1968/1969</i>	<i>1999</i>	<i>2007/2008</i>
Food	55.8%	40.0%	42.6%	38.3%
Housing and home furnishings	19.5%	23.6%	14.9%	15.1%
Clothing and shoes	9.8%	11.0%	4.1%	3.6%
Other expenses	14.9%	25.4%	38.1%	43.0%

Source: compiled from ABS 2002 and 2009.

appreciably smaller, although Javanese and Maroons more often lived in wooden structures.

In many lower-class areas overcrowding used to be a serious problem. In 1939, more than 80 percent of the houses consisted of one- and two-room constructions and more than half of the one-room dwellings were occupied by more than two individuals.⁴⁰ An in-depth analysis by Maks and De Bruijne (2008: 8) shows that currently less than 5 percent of houses in Paramaribo are overcrowded, counting more than 2.5 persons per room. Similarly, access to infrastructure and services is generally at a reasonable level in Paramaribo. The large majority of houses have access to running water, electricity, and adequate sanitation (see for example Maks & De Bruijne 2008; ABS 2005). Nevertheless power outages, limited provision of water, and flooding streets are regular phenomena.

In 1950, 30 percent of the urban population owned their house and 58 percent rented.⁴¹ Again, ethnic differences were substantial. Table 7.2 shows changes in homeownership according to ethnicity at four moments between 1950 and 2001.⁴² It is clear that homeownership is on the rise in each population group and that differences between groups are decreasing. An exception is the ownership among the Hindustani population in 2001, which appears to decrease in comparison to 1992, be it in moderate numbers; the Maroon population shows the same trend. The latter may be explained by their recent urbanization. Newcomers to the city rely on renting more often than ownership.

Urban inequalities in terms of ethnicity and arrival time in the city are closely connected to access to education. Generally, the quality of schooling in the city was considerably higher than in the districts. Urban Hindustanis and Javanese, for example, lagged behind the Creole population in the 1950s. However, these groups caught up in the course of the century. De Bruijne and Schalkwijk (2005: 259) conclude that in 1992 “the relatively backward position of the Hindustani and Javanese as far as education, access to civil service jobs, and income has disappeared.” These researchers point to the importance of access to education and to

Table 7.2 Homeownership in Paramaribo According to Ethnicity 1980–2001⁴³

Population group	Year										
	1950		1980			1992			2001		
	Owned	Owned	Owned	Family owned	Total	Owned	Family owned	Total			
Creole	33	41.5	55.7	7.7	63.4	64.7	10.8	75.5			
Mixed	31	NI	56.5	17.4	74.1	62.3	9.8	72.1			
Maroon	NI	NI	47.6	14.3	61.9	52.4	0	52.4			
Hindustani	56	73.3	74.2	7.8	82	65.2	11.4	75.6			
Javanese	7	73.5	57	23.3	80.3	62.9	15.3	78.2			

NI: No Information

Sources: Census 1950, surveys 1980 (n=488), 1992(n=480), 2001 (n=496).

government jobs in explaining how these two groups could draw level. Education levels in the city among these three groups indeed have leveled in the course of the century. In our sample of the 1950 census close to one-third of the Hindustanis and over two-thirds of the urban Javanese had not followed any formal education. Ninety percent of Creoles at the time had a primary school education. In the 2004 census however, 38.6, 45.1, and 49.2 percent of Hindustanis, Javanese, and Creoles, respectively, had at least junior secondary education (VOJ) and 9.4, 6.0, and 11.3 percent, respectively, had obtained a higher education degree.⁴⁴ Data on education by Schalkwijk and De Bruijne from 1980, 1992, and 2001 further confirm this leveling. In addition, their index of durable consumer goods (including TVs, refrigerators, and cars) shows smaller differences between ethnic groups toward the end of the century. Therefore, we argue that it is not ethnicity as such but arrival time in the city that shapes socioeconomic differences. This is confirmed by the fact that at the end of the century, the newest residents, Amerindians and Maroons in particular, ranked lowest in any socioeconomic classification, be it in terms of education levels, employment, or occupational status.⁴⁵ The lack of access to formal education seems to be the basis of this socioeconomic disadvantage. The following shows the highest education level per ethnic group in the city in 2004.

The 2004 census shows the average unemployment percentage for the city to be 9 percent. However, for people of Maroon descent it was 18 percent. Hence, as inequalities between Creole, Hindustani, and Javanese groups have decreased over the century, new class disparities between Maroon and Amerindians on the one hand and the “rest” on the other appear to be on the rise. As many Maroons have arrived in Paramaribo after 1980, the pattern that newcomers to the city lag behind those who have been in the city longer seems still valid in the twenty-first century.

These inequalities have a spatial component as well, although differences between neighborhoods are not as significant as those between population groups. Yet, the two southern *ressorts* of Pontbuiten and Latour show higher unemployment (over 15 versus 9 percent overall in the city), lower education levels (80 percent junior secondary at the highest versus 60 percent for the city), and poorer living conditions than in other areas in Paramaribo. However, parts of these neighborhoods as well as individual streets show substantial differences in work, income, and housing.

Overall inequality in income and wealth in Suriname is large and has been on the rise since the 1980s. This is certainly the case in Paramaribo where ostentatious wealth and sheer poverty are visible in, for example, housing but also in transportation means. Low-income groups travel by foot, public transport, bicycles, or scooters. Cars, varying from the broken run-down version to expensive four-wheel drives, are for the more well-to-do. Some mansions even have helicopter pads.

In terms of housing quality there exist enormous differences. Overall the quality of houses seems to have decreased after 1980 when the economic

crisis reduced opportunities for residents to maintain or improve their house. Several surveys (Maks & De Bruijne 2008; Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997) show that about 20 percent of houses toward the end of the century were in poor condition. These are mostly wooden constructions. This is in sharp contrast with the large, new mansions in Paramaribo North but also along Indira Gandhieweg to the south.

It is important to note that there are significant differences in wealth and inequality within population groups. In particular, the wealth inequalities within the Hindustani group are larger than among Creoles or Javanese (Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997). Also when considering education levels, a strong indicator of socioeconomic status, the strong representation of the Hindustani group in the lower educational strata as well as in the higher, indicates clear differentiations within the group. Of the urban Hindustani population over one-quarter had primary education or lower, whereas the urban mean was less than one-fifth (raw data census 2004). Within other ethnic groups, this spread is much less dispersed.

Explaining Patterns of Settlement

The transformation of Paramaribo from a city where ethnic and class differences and inequalities had strong spatial implications to a spatially mixed city in the last two decades of the century can be explained by looking at three developments: the economic crises in the 1980s and 1990s; the development of the land and housing market; and the importance of neighborhood and social relations. Two processes intertwined in the development of social and economically mixed areas: the fact that people did not and could not move from a community when their socioeconomic position had changed and the absence of no-go areas.

Economic developments from the 1950s onward showed economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s and economic crises for the remainder of the century. The effects of the economic crises have been detailed in chapter 6. Since 1980, real wages shrunk and in 1993 wages were often down to 30 percent of the 1980 level (Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997). Many wages improved in the late 1990s but decreased again in 1999. Moreover, the income was distributed unequally (ABS 2001; Vos, De Jong, & Dijkstra 2001). These developments impacted strongly on class formations and distributions. The middle class grew in the 1950s to 1970s but was hard hit during the crises. As Mayke Kromhout (2000) and others have indicated, the crises hit the vulnerable groups the hardest, that is women, the poor, and the elderly.

In times of crisis, households develop coping mechanisms. In general, households cushion themselves against economic hardship by increasing their income, mainly through additional sources of income, or reducing consumption. In Suriname, important income generating strategies were self-employment and reliance on remittances from overseas relatives (see chapter 6). Reducing consumption included the reduction of housing

costs or home production of food. Households with better opportunities to reduce costs or increase income were more resilient to deal with the negative effects of such crises. As a result, the impact of crises differed within similar socioeconomic groups and within neighborhoods. Some households within socioeconomically homogeneous communities severely felt the crisis and visibly impoverished. Yet, immediate neighbors may have been more resilient, for example, because they received regular remittances, and had managed to stabilize or even improve their economic position. As a result, neighborhoods that were social and economically homogeneous in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were much more heterogeneous at the end of the century.

The question is why people with significantly improved or worsened socioeconomic positions did not move to more expensive or cheaper areas. Such patterns would have reinforced the existing class-based spatial distribution. The 2008 survey shows that two-thirds of the people interviewed have never moved (20 percent) or moved only once (45 percent) in their lives, and very few of these changes of address took place between 1985 and 1997. In other words, there was hardly any house moving. An explanation, for upward- and downward-moving groups, can be found in the importance of low housing costs in efforts to reduce consumption. Households that obtained a house before 1980 often had no mortgage and as such no high fixed costs. It helped many households to survive in those difficult years. New housing, to the extent that it was available at all, imposed additional stress and budget risks. Hence, the great majority of people tried to stay on existing property. In addition, as described above, access to land and housing was limited, subject to corruption, and expensive. As a result, the land and housing market in Paramaribo has slowed down the internal movement of people. People who had acquired land before the 1980s generally stayed there and, if necessary, refurbished or renovated their house. Adult children with families often stayed with their family (De Bruijne & Schalkwijk 2008).

The 2008 survey in eight neighborhoods shows that most people who own a piece of land have no intention of leaving because of this ownership. This is also true for people in government social housing projects. A walk through one such area, Geyersvlijt, in January 2008 revealed how small houses in their original state are interspersed with houses that have been expanded or sometimes completely rebuilt. Furthermore, “staying put” is linked with the widespread tradition to inherit land from parents or grandparents. Such properties are usually not divided (*onverdeelde boedels*, undivided estates) and make up a substantial part of all “titles,” formal or informal, in the city (Struiken & Healy 2003). Estate titles were and are not acknowledged by banks as collateral, but they are an important asset for individuals without other opportunities to obtain land. For example, informants in the Mahonylaan, north of downtown Paramaribo, describe how a large plot of land is used to house many relatives who have no access to other housing. Many empty lots in Paramaribo are thought to be

part of such estates, creating problems for efficient urban planning (Maks & De Bruijne 2008). In sum, the limited availability of and access to land and the availability of an alternative informal housing market slowed down the internal movement of people. As the crises affected different households in various ways, socioeconomic homogeneous neighborhoods developed into more heterogeneous ones.

Obviously, as any city, Paramaribo has neighborhoods that are popularly referred to as “bad” neighborhoods, including Latour and Ramgolam. Their reputation is based on poor physical living conditions, including regular flooding, inferior housing, and inadequate infrastructural provisions. In addition, characteristics such as real or perceived crime rates and lawlessness determine a neighborhood’s social standing. Data are scarce, but available figures indicate that Suriname has lower rates of criminal violence than other Caribbean countries (UNDP 2012: 23). The homicide rate (2008–2010) is the lowest in the Caribbean; there is, however, a noticeable increase in the number of robberies.⁴⁶ Street gangs are major contributors to the high rates of violence in the region, yet in Suriname there has been no research on street gangs and data on street gang crimes are absent.⁴⁷ The Caribbean is the second-most violent region in the world, after Central America, but in the region Suriname and Barbados record low levels of officially reported violent crime, and high percentages of the respondents there indicated they felt secure from crime (UNDP 2012: 19, 36). Residents in all seven nations that were surveyed by the UNDP had little confidence in the ability of the police to control crime, but confidence in Suriname was appreciably higher than the average, only second to, again, Barbados (UNDP 2012: 86). However, it is important to note that region-wide social problems related to the economy were considered a more serious problem than crime: almost 53 percent compared with more than 27 percent for crime (UNDP 2012: 153).

In Paramaribo, not one single neighborhood has developed yet into a no-go zone and all neighborhoods feature in the mobility patterns of nearly all citizens. Mobility patterns, connecting home to work, schools, hospitals, family and friends, shopping centers, and places of entertainment, cover the entire city and cross all neighborhoods (Verrest 2010: 59). In addition, “bad” neighborhoods are often situated adjacent to “good” areas and / or contain pockets of wealthier people.

In Paramaribo, people have no strong identifications with their neighborhood. This seems somewhat in contradiction with the notion that people hardly move and spend a large part of their lives in the same neighborhood. One explanation is that the relatively large plots of land brings about that lives takes place within the own compound and not outside of it, on the street, reducing chances for the development of a strong neighborhood spirit. In addition, social networks are mostly family-oriented or based on school, church, or work place. Relations with neighbors are considered important but their strength lies in the fact that people are supportive but not interfering with each other’s lives. Community organizations are

relatively scarce and to the extent that they exist they are often not spatially organized. A well-known community organization is Stibula (Stichting Buurtorganisatie Latour, Neighborhood organization Latour) but this also serves other neighborhoods. Sport organizations or churches do not have a strong community affiliation either. When asking people in the questionnaire in 2008 what they liked or did not like about their neighborhood, positive values were attributed to quietness, not much interference with neighbors, and good services. Negative values were attributed to the exact opposite but generally people were positive about their neighborhood. Even more important, the neighborhood is not mentioned as a reason for people wanting to move. As a result, few neighborhoods are stigmatized and people have no motivation leaving their land because of the community. People are used to their area, have been living there for a long time, and feel comfortable. Yet, this does not mean that their neighborhood is an important space for identification. *Ik groet maar bemoei niet* (I say good day, but I don't mix) is the appreciated *modus operandi* (Verrest 2007a).

Conclusion

Like other Caribbean capitals, from 1950 onward Paramaribo experienced high population growth as employment opportunities and education attracted people from the districts to the city. In the postwar era, Paramaribo's population increased from 70,000 in 1950 to 240,000 in 2000. At the end of the century, two-thirds of Suriname's population lived in Greater Paramaribo. The city is dominant in terms of its population size and its economic, social, cultural, and political significance. Paramaribo is also the primary node connecting Suriname to the outside world. This used to be mainly the Netherlands and to a lesser extent the United States. However, toward the end of the century, the Caribbean region, South America, and links with for example China were becoming more important as will be discussed in chapter 8. The influx of Chinese migrants since the second half of the 1980s has been noticeable in the city, although Chinese were only a minor part of registered incoming nonresident aliens in the period 1985–2004. New Chinese shops mushroomed all over town (and not much later also in the districts and the interior), “and in a break with the stereotype of [the] Chinese shopkeeper, these new shopkeepers spoke no Sranantongo” (Tjon Sie Fat 2010: 187). They are commonly referred to as “new Chinese”; these newcomers—shopkeepers, but also construction workers—are popularly seen as a threat to the Surinamese workforce because they jeopardize employment and undercut wages.⁴⁸ The same popular sentiments in, for example, the media are expressed regarding Haitian agricultural workers or Brazilian *garimpeiros*.

This chapter shows that the social and economic developments in Paramaribo have impacted on spatial patterns. Moreover, neither ethnicity nor class is an overriding factor in the city's spatial patterns. Arrival

time in the city appears to be a much more decisive factor. Socioeconomic differentiations within Paramaribo are large but as opposed to the situation in many other Caribbean cities, these do not seem to have had strong spatial component in Suriname. The limited opportunities from the 1980s to move on the one hand, and the absence of the need to do so on the other, explain why people did not change residence, resulting in socioeconomic mixed neighborhoods. However, from 2000 a trend toward more socioeconomic polarization is becoming increasingly visible. In Paramaribo South, neighborhoods develop in a largely unstructured manner. They house newcomers to the city, Maroons in particular, who often have few educational qualifications and limited access to the labor market. Hence, these *ressorts* may become spatial concentrations of people with fewer opportunities and a lower standard of living. Maroons and Amerindians experience more unemployment, poorer housing conditions, and lower levels of education. If arrival time in the city is the cause of this inequality, then in time these groups, like earlier urban migrants, will catch up with the rest of the population. However, it is possible that social exclusion, stigmatization, and spatial isolation will last longer and thus reinforce the existing equalities. The lack of planning in particular results in the virtual absence of public services such as schools, health facilities, and recreational spaces in these poor neighborhoods in the city's south.

The development of the capital in the second half of the twentieth century shows a process of mixing and blending that is strongly shaped by political, social, and economic changes. It makes Paramaribo both a typical and an atypical Caribbean city.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Leaving the Scene: A New Century

In the introduction of this study, the question was raised on how the culture of domination and contestation manifested itself in twentieth-century Suriname and whether social changes affected the nature of this culture. I listed a number of continuities and discontinuities in the country's history. In this concluding chapter I revisit these six points—demographic movements, political and constitutional changes, economic transformations, the multicultural society, Dutch influence, and economic dependency—to analyze the state of these affairs in the last decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of the twenty-first century.

After two lost decades at the end of the century, Suriname's economy is on the rebound. Yet, as this chapter will show, after the transition from large-scale agriculture in the 1930s and 1940s, the economic base—the exploitation of natural resources, development aid, and remittances—has largely remained the same, even though direct money transfers from abroad are losing their significance. What has changed is the exploitation of “new” products, including gold, oil, and timber. In the new century, the economy's annual growth rate is better than in many other countries in the region. Suriname's economic dependency, however, has not lessened as this rent-seeking state has to attract foreign investors to exploit its resources and build the necessary infrastructure. Factors of production for mining, logging, and agriculture need to be imported. Moreover, world demand and prices determine the lucrateness of the exploitation of gold, bauxite, oil, and timber or the cultivation of rice and other agricultural products. This integration in the global market makes that the country continues to be highly vulnerable to price fluctuations it cannot influence or mitigate.

The growing economy attracts foreign laborers, thus making Suriname an immigration country once again, after losing more than one-quarter of the population due to outmigration in the decade between 1970 and 1980. Recent immigrants from Haiti, Brazil, and China, in particular, add to the multicultural population but also raise new questions about inclusion or exclusion of new migrants. This pressing issue also affects Maroons

and to a lesser degree Amerindians, who are the latest groups of urban migrants and face problems previous migrants to the city, such as Javanese and Hindustanis, experienced in the decades after World War II.

I argue that constitutional changes, autonomy in 1954 and independence in 1975, have not affected the political culture. What has changed in the last decade is the relation with the former metropolis. In 2000, Suriname's main foreign partner was still the Netherlands, but since then the country decidedly opened up to other countries in the region and beyond. Starting with the reluctant entrance in the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in the 1990s, Suriname lifted its geographical isolation by intensifying cooperation with Caribbean and South American nations, and China. This is partly a positive choice, but also the outcome of the complex and sometimes acrimonious official relationship with the Netherlands. Nevertheless, the Netherlands remains an important frame of reference if only because of the strong transnational connections with the large Surinamese overseas community and the cultural ties between the two countries. After independence, Dutch has remained the official language and it actually strengthened its position as the language most spoken in Surinamese households.

This conclusion stresses the importance of geographic space in the processes of transformation and continuity. In the chapter 7, developments in the only city were analyzed, while this chapter pays ample attention to changes in the interior, where resource exploitation, migration, ecological hazards, large infrastructural projects, and disputes regarding territorial rights make the rainforest rather than the capital into a cauldron of change and contestation.

In this conclusion, I also discuss why and how authoritarianism continues to be a force to be reckoned with in contemporary Suriname and how this dominance is contested (or not). This chapter includes a rather detailed description and analysis of political developments in the postmilitary period as politics are a primary factor in sustaining an authoritarian culture in Suriname. What is the character of state in Suriname in the early twenty-first century? A central influence is clientelism or patronage tying individuals to a sociopolitical network that represents their specific interests.

I link the culture of domination and contestation to the interaction between ethnicity, class, and gender. I briefly return to J. S. Furnival, and R. A. J. van Lier, who expected that decolonization would lead to the disintegration of the plural society and thus to anarchy. They contended that the various ethnic groups meet, but do not mix, except for the market place. The outcome of the 2004 census, in which 12.5 percent of the population self-identified as mixed and another 6.6 percent refused to name an ethnic category, is the clearest refutation of this view. Suriname proudly presents itself as a harmonious nation, but this does not mean, however, that ethnicity is no longer a force to be reckoned with.

Major interrelated changes in the economy, social structure, and politics, had a great effect on gender, class, and ethnicity. The various economic

downturns and the rising inflation rate in the late twentieth century realigned the existing social structure. New mercantile elites emerged, while the vast decline in real wages since the late 1970s unsettled the middle and lower classes. Around the turn of the century, at least 60 percent of the population was living below the poverty line, up from 21 percent in the late 1960s. Poverty was particularly widespread among female-headed households. People from the interior have been hit hardest by this socioeconomic crisis (Terborg 2002: 273). The steady increase in income inequality made that in 2011 it was the highest in the region.

Education has traditionally been the engine of socioeconomic emancipation, but this is no longer true for women. Despite the fact that they participate more than men in secondary and tertiary education, there is no corresponding increase in female labor force participation. Even in economically better times, the gender difference in employment continues. Additionally, there is a feminization of the public sector, which offers more job security but often low salaries. Women's legal position has formally been equated with that of men, but when comparing women and men with similar educational backgrounds, women still rank lower in the class hierarchy (Wekker 2001: 175).

The economic crises have hit all ethnic groups, also because there are fewer specific ethnic occupational niches, and it has affected intra-ethnic equality, particularly among Hindustanis because the income gap between the new urban trading elite and smallholders in the districts has grown most conspicuously. Migrants are traditionally located at the lowest spot of the social ladder. In the early twentieth century it were the incoming Javanese who faced the greatest socioeconomic obstacles, presently migrants from within the country face similar hurdles. The socioeconomic development of the indigenous and Maroon peoples is obstructed by their limited access to education and other services. Recently urbanized Maroons have to contend with socioeconomic and cultural discrimination, and are often living in squatted or dilapidated housing.

A key word in this chapter is hybridity: the combination of autocratic and democratic practices in many aspects of state and society. I argue that early-twenty-first-century Suriname is a hybrid country with strong autocratic tendencies not only in politics, but also in the culture of the workplace, schools, and the family. However, the country's integration in the Caribbean and South American region and the changing demographic and socioeconomic structure, seem to predict that the "old ways" are truly becoming old.

Economic Developments

The exploitation of natural resources is the basis of Suriname's economy. In the course of the twentieth century the exploitation of bauxite supplanted agriculture as the most important sector. It attracted foreign investment,

generated foreign-exchange revenues, and financed the rapid increase in state expenditures after World War II. This high capital-intensive sector has created limited direct employment, but it spawned relatively high wages and progressive social legislation. On the macroeconomic level, the relative importance of the bauxite industry declined to about 15 percent of GDP at the end of the century. By that time, the public sector was the largest in terms of employment and income (Van Dijck 2001: 58). Bauxite's tax revenues are still crucial to state employment, providing jobs to thousands, especially in Paramaribo, and also in the districts. For example, around the turn of the century, more than 90 percent of the population of Coronie depended on the state for (low-paying) jobs or social security (NIKOS 2002: 3). However, the government will need to attract new investments to develop new mining sites in the east and the west of the country to replace the traditional mines that are close to being depleted.

More economically positive are the dynamics in two other mining sectors. In the last decade of the century both the exploitation of oil and gold became lucrative. After the first gold rush, as described in chapter 1, a new boom, sparked by increasing global prices for gold, began in eastern Suriname and around Lake Brokopondo in the late 1980s and 1990s. The Interior War forced Maroon men, who were now cut off from the coast and job opportunities, to increase their efforts at artisanal mining.¹ When the interior was safe again and world prices for gold soared, mining became increasingly profitable. There are two separate developments in this sector: the Canadian company Iamgold, exploiting the largest mine, Rosebel near Brokopondo,² is the principal large-scale miner, while Brazilian *garimpeiros* (gold miners) and Maroons dominate spontaneous small-scale exploitation. Official data on the sector's size and revenues are not available due to the small-scale, poorly controlled operations in the interior, the lack of transparency on government-issued concessions—even a map with concessions is not in the public domain—and the lack of company year reports or other financial data.³ Journalist Jeroen Trommelen (2013: 159–175) combined a number of fiscal and financial data to arrive at an “educated guess” of the main players in the gold sector. The two rivals in the Interior War head the list: the top-three consisted of Ronnie Brunswijk, Desi and Dino Bouterse, and Henk Naarendorp; father and son Bouterse's interest in the industry is not officially registered.⁴ Trommelen (2013) reports that small-scale mining produced more gold than Iamgold in the period 2004–2010.⁵ Economist Pitou van Dijck (2001: 60) estimates that around 2000 value added in the gold sector exceeded “the combined contributions of the bauxite and oil sectors to GDP.” Since 2008, gold accounts for more than half of Suriname's exports.

It is unclear how many people are involved in mining, but a reliable estimate is that 20,000 Brazilians and 10,000 Maroons are engaged in small-scale mining (De Theije & Heemskerk 2009: 8). The Brazilians brought advanced hydraulic mining techniques and small-scale mining

management, while the local inhabitants supplied geographical knowledge about the rivers and potentially rich sources. Many local miners quickly caught on to the modern and professional ways of the Brazilians, often hiring Brazilians as foremen for their operations. As in earlier mining operations, for example in the bauxite industry in Moengo, ethnic groups have their own particular niche.⁶

To expand the gold sector and to increase government revenues and control, licenses have been issued to North American companies. This development has evoked strong reactions in Maroon communities who protest the encroachment on their territorial rights.⁷ The Surinamese government has not been very effective at controlling the sector; the outflow of gold is beyond government control (Wongsowikromo 2011; Trommelen 2013). Two legislative initiatives backed up by army or police have not yielded the expected results. "Operation Clean Sweep" (2008), set out to register small-scale mining activities and to restore law and order in the interior, failed due to the lack of operational and administrative capacity. In 2011, the goal of the Gold Sector Planning Commission was to regulate the mining sector, but the commission met with resistance by local inhabitants who feared that their historical land rights would be nullified.⁸ Finally, both large- and small-scale gold mining create severe ecological damage. Erosion, deforestation, and pollution threaten both land and the waterways. Mining effects biodiversity, while the water in many of the rivers, crucial to Amerindians and Maroons living in the interior, is contaminated by mercury. As a consequence, the water is undrinkable and fish is no longer fit for human consumption.

Large-scale logging is another acute environmental danger. Suriname's forest covers almost 95 percent of its total land area. No matter which parties are in power, rent seeking through the granting of concessions to multinational companies from Indonesia, Malaysia, China and so forth, is a lucrative business. In early 1993 some 3 to 5 million ha of logging concessions were granted to Asian companies, equivalent to 25 to 40 percent of Suriname's land area. Timber production has increased from 247,377 m³ to 366,000 m³ between 2010 and 2011. The monitoring of timber production is haphazard at best.⁹ Greenheart, a Chinese company, is since its arrival in 2007 one of the largest investors in the timber industry. In 2011, the multinational owned concession and harvesting rights to 312,000 hectares of tropical forest "with plans to expand the current footprint in the near future . . . Greenheart's business strategy is to process all logs harvested into lumber for sale to China and other markets around the world as price and demand permit . . . Greenheart is building new processing facilities capable of processing up to 350,000 cubic meters of lumber into up to 140,000 cubic meters of timber by the 4th quarter of 2011."¹⁰

Exploitation of the oil deposits in the coastal zone by the state oil company (Staatsolie) started in 1982. In the 1990s, the production of crude oil increased from 500,000 barrels to more than 4 million, while in 2011 production was close to 6 million.¹¹ The contribution of Staatsolie to

the national economy is growing fast, on account of both onshore and offshore exploitation, but is still relatively small. The sector is well organized and efficient. In contrast to other mineral resources, oil also has psychological value as it is seen as an instrument of self-reliance.

Bauxite, gold, and oil accounted for 95 percent of export revenues in 2012.¹² In the first decade of the twenty-first century, the economy showed an average annual growth rate of more than 4 percent, better than in many other countries in the region, mainly on account of the high world market prices of gold and oil.¹³ The value of other resources such as diamonds, copper, and iron ore is unknown, but may also attract foreign investments. Exploitation of these resources, however, would require substantial infrastructural upgrades. All these sectors make that Suriname is a rent-seeking state, based on the access to certain markets including fishery-based, gold, and timber concessions. Thus, not only production but also concessions generate income. The state asserts that “all land ownership, including the natural resources, vests in the State” and the state thus enjoys the rents of activities by outsiders on the basis of concessions.¹⁴ The clientelistic nature of Surinamese politics encourages rent seeking. Other sources of income include remittances from overseas relatives, development assistance, and legal and illegal trade, including drugs.¹⁵

Both the mining and the agricultural sector are dependent on imported factors of production and intermediate inputs. This has caused the deep integration of the economy in the international market, making Suriname vulnerable to price fluctuations beyond its control. The most promising chances for diversification are in the agricultural sector (rice) as world food prices increase because of growing demand. The production of rice in Suriname that started with the colonization by former indentured laborers, seems on the rebound after years of decline. In 2012, milled rice production was 145,000 tons compared to 103,000 tons in 2000.¹⁶ Most of the production is still concentrated in the western district of Nickerie.

Social Developments

At the end of the century, overall employment trends were closely related to macroeconomic developments and therefore volatile and uncertain. Economic recession and high inflation, triggered by declining bauxite exports, reduced flows of foreign aid, and deficit government spending, had negative effects. The available data indicate that following the socioeconomic crises during the military period, the 1990s were another lost decade. In general, in the period 1978–1993 the urban labor force of Greater Paramaribo increased faster than the population, yet the capacity of the official economy to absorb this labor decreased.¹⁷ This problem reached a high during the 1993–1994 crisis, when employment fell by more than 5 percent within one year. The largest decline was registered in construction, mining, and trade (Menke 1998: 148). This

economic crisis hit wage earners as salaries did not keep up with the rate of inflation (394 percent in 1994). In 1993, the purchasing power of wage earners was halved when compared to 1990, and less than one-third of the buying power in 1980. Average incomes had declined steadily since 1978 (Buddingh' 2012: 376–377, 412–413). In comparison to countries in the region, Suriname lost ground in the period 1975–2000.

Employment levels went up again in 1995–1997, when the economy recovered due to rising export revenues, a resumption of aid, and stricter monetary control. However, female and youth unemployment increased.¹⁸ Overall, official unemployment figures declined in the 1990s in absolute and relative terms to 12 percent in the years 1993–1997. This may be explained by lower labor market participation as a result of emigration, remittances, and a reluctance to accept “official” jobs. This discouraged-worker effect is a result of the strong fluctuations in real wages in the 1990s.

The trend toward the informalization of (male) employment is in keeping with developments in the region. In 2008, slightly more than one-fifth of GDP was attributed to the informal sector (Terborg 2011: 41). While men were more likely to leave in order to work as self-employed, women tended to stay in the public sector. Sociologist Jack Menke (1998: 137–152) points at a feminization of the public sector, as the share of female civil servants increased from 45 percent in 1978 to 58 percent in 1993. The majority of women worked as teachers, cleaners, nurses, cooks, and assistants in day care centers (Kromhout 1995: 44).

Since the late 1980s, women have participated more than males at the secondary or tertiary level of education.¹⁹ However, there was no corresponding increase in female labor force participation (Kromhout 1995: 42–46; Terborg 2011: 26). The highest level of female unemployment was among Hindustanis, partly out of fear that a working wife would be interpreted as the man's failure to provide for his family. More generally, sociologist Mayke Kromhout (1995: 40) points at a “breaking down of the normative sexual division of the tasks within households.” In 1994, she conducted a study among Creole, Hindustani, and Javanese women in a low-income neighborhood in Paramaribo. She concludes that the composition of households had become “multiple generational” as a result of the socioeconomic crisis. These extended households saved on housing and other expenses and thus could generate larger household incomes. Kromhout argues, however, that women's financial contributions to the household budget did not increase their bargaining power.

De Bruijne and Schalkwijk in 1992 analyzed 32 types of occupations together representing 95 percent of all occupations to determine whether a specific ethnic group dominated a certain employment sector. They concluded that 21 of them could be qualified as occupations with a more or less even ethnic distribution, including all higher-ranking professions, such as entrepreneurs, executives, and higher administrative and technical cadres, but also most blue-collar jobs.²⁰ In five occupations, mainly the semigovernmental sector, Afro-Surinamese (Creoles, people of mixed

ethnicity, and Maroons) were clearly overrepresented: these jobs ranged from skilled labor (teaching and nursing) to unskilled labor (cleaning and catering). They found a strong Asian dominance in the commercial sector: particularly Hindustanis, Javanese, and Chinese worked as shopkeepers, traders, and drivers. Hindustanis held the most unskilled agricultural jobs (De Bruijne & Schalkwijk 2005: 255).

In the 1990s, real household incomes declined and poverty and inequality were on the rise. The incidence of extreme poverty increased significantly in households with no access to foreign income, mainly because of the inflation rate. The incidence of poverty in rural areas, especially in the interior, was believed to be higher (Vos, De Jong, & Dijkstra 2001: 205–211). With the decline of real income for the majority of the population and the large gains made by a minority, often in foreign trade, the income distribution became more skewed in Greater Paramaribo, but even more so in the country as a whole.²¹ Data on poverty are not very reliable, but the government estimated that in 1999–2000 60 to 65 percent of the population in Greater Paramaribo was living below the poverty line, this was up from 21 percent in 1968–1969. In the district of Nickerie the percentage was almost 70 percent in 1999–2000.²² A survey by Menke in 1998 among 400 households in Greater Paramaribo shows that 80 percent of households without remittances from family and friends abroad lived in poverty (Menke 1998).

The World Bank reports that access to basic needs, such as housing, safe water, and education improved among most groups in Greater Paramaribo since 1980. Enrollment at elementary school is almost universal, but the quality of education and the high drop-out rate explain that less than half of the population aged 12–19 years is enrolled in secondary education. Schools are inefficient and suffer from lack of qualified teachers and shortages of instruction materials, furniture, and supplies. The system is not preparing pupils for the digital age.²³ Although there are few data available concerning the areas outside of Paramaribo, it is obvious that the Interior War severely damaged or even destroyed existing utilities, and health and educational infrastructures in the interior. In a survey conducted along the Upper Suriname River and in the east of the country in 2000, 80 percent “of the surveyed population had only primary education or no formal education at all . . . women comprised nearly 75 per cent of the group of respondents that received no education at all” (Terborg 2002: 272; also Terborg 2011: 27).

Suriname’s social welfare system (including old-age pensions, general child allowance, income supplements for the poor, and health care coverage) is more extensive than in most neighboring countries, which is partly the result of the Dutch influence and Dutch financial assistance. It is, however, “a complicated system with many different benefits, allocated according to different criteria. This creates administrative problems, but may also give way to political abuse” (Dijkstra, De Jong, & Vos, 2001: 240).

The socioeconomic state of the country at the turn of the century was characterized by increased social inequalities—in terms of access to land and housing, safe and affordable utilities, education, and health care—informalization of the economy, the importance of trade and services rather than production, and the idea of a “lost generation.” Some data, including the general unemployment rate, improved after 2001 when the economy recovered. However, two trends from the 1990s continued: the gender difference in employment and the relatively high percentage of youth unemployment. A new problem was the high unemployment rate among people with only elementary education. The largest employment sectors were the government (17.9 percent), commerce (16 percent), construction (9 percent), agriculture, fishery, and forestry (8 percent), and industry (7 percent).²⁴ The unequal distribution of income noted in the last quarter of the twentieth century remained a major problem in the new century: according to an IMF report published in 2011, Suriname’s Gini coefficient scored highest among 23 listed regional countries at 61.6. This coefficient was up from 52.9 in 1999.²⁵

Demographic Changes

In the last decade of the twentieth century, the population increased again from 401,924 in 1990 to 434,516 in 2000 and 481,146 in 2003 (De Bruijne 2001: 27; ABS 2003: 8). Since the last census in 2004, the population increase has continued. Between 1900 and 2000 the population increased sixfold from 72,144 to 434,516. The census bureau concludes that in the period 1980–2003 the population increased with 35.4 percent, with a yearly average of 1.3 percent (ABS 2003: 8). This low growth rate is to be explained by outmigration and a low birth rate. The greatest population increase (more than 40 percent) between 1980 and 2003 took place in the districts of Paramaribo and Wanica, while Marowijne noted a decrease of more than 10 percent.²⁶ Suriname is a country with a large young population: in 2004, 48.3 percent was under 25.

In chapter 7, the demographic changes in ethnicity in the capital according to the seventh population and housing census from 2004 have been elaborated, for the country as a whole 27.4 percent of the population self-identified as Hindustani, 17.7 percent as Creole, 14.7 percent as Maroon, 14.6 percent as Javanese, 12.5 percent as mixed, 6.5 percent as other, and there were no data on 6.6 percent.²⁷ The mixed group is a new category, and it is likely that particularly Creoles categorized themselves as mixed (ABS 2006a: 29). The Javanese are no longer the third-largest group, as they have been overtaken by Maroons.

Christianity is the religion of 40.7 percent of the population, followed by Hinduism (19.9 percent) and Islam (13.5 percent). Slightly more than 10 percent indicated “other or none,” while 15.7 percent did not answer the question.

The interior of the country continued to experience great demographic changes. The war caused migration to French Guiana and back, to the Netherlands, and to Paramaribo. As detailed in chapter 7, in the city, the Maroons form the largest group of newcomers. Maroons occupy the lowest strata in society, also because of their lack of formal education. They are physically marginalized in low-income and “bad” neighborhoods, while young Maroon males are often stigmatized as armed and dangerous criminals.²⁸ In other words, urban Maroons have limited economic prospects and form a new underclass.

The population growth is mainly the result of immigration after years of outmigration. Haitians, Chinese, and Brazilians constitute the largest groups entering the country, thus adding to the population mix.²⁹ Guyanese are strictly spoken not part of this new group of immigrants as they have been migrating to Suriname since the 1960s. The migration of Guyanese coincided with the mass emigration from Suriname to the Netherlands in the pre-independence period. Official figures are lacking but in the period 1979–1981 it is estimated that circa 8,000 Guyanese had settled in Suriname, the majority were women.³⁰ At that time most Guyanese lived in Paramaribo and the adjoining districts (45.8 percent), while Nickerie was the single district with the largest Guyanese population (29 percent). The economy in this border district depended on Guyanese workers; this was especially true for rice cultivation (Singelenberg 1983: 5–33). The Guyanese generally worked in agriculture and fishery. In 1985, the operation *Schoon Schip* (Clean Sweep) supposedly deported all illegal foreigners, but the distinction between legal and illegal immigrants was often lost. Many Guyanese were forced back to their place of origin.³¹ In 2004, only approximately 5 percent (1,790 individuals) of Nickerie’s population were officially categorized as Guyanese (ABS 2006c: 27).

In contrast to the “old” migrants, it is much easier for “new” immigrants to keep up relations with their place of origin. Internet and other telecommunication facilities make it easier to keep in touch. Many migrants invest more in ties back home than in personal relations in Suriname. According to anthropologists Marjo de Theije and Ellen Bal (2010: 67), the “new” immigrants, in this case Brazilians, do not form a community anymore but a “category” or network, “to emphasise the relatively feeble and instrumental character of the ties they maintain with one another.” The estimates of the number of Brazilians living in Suriname vary between 8,000 and 40,000. The registration of migrant miners remains poor and, therefore, their number is unverifiable. The consensus is that in 2004 between 15,000 and 20,000 Brazilians resided in Suriname, the majority in the interior. The census takers state that 23,000 Brazilians is a maximum. According to José Cardoso Neto, president of the Cooperation of Garimpeiros in Suriname (COGASUR) there were approximately 13,000 Brazilians (90 to 95 percent men) in Suriname at the time of the census. Most of these men came to Suriname without any family members. According to Cardoso Neto they would stay for two months on average.

He also stated that “a sizeable number of Brazilian women have married a Surinamese man, thus making them Surinamese nationals” (ABS 2006a: 26–27). Next to *garimpeiros*, mining attracts shop-, bar-, and brothelown-ers, cooks, sex workers, and operators of gold buying houses.

The “new” Chinese immigrants may be divided into two categories: traders and shopkeepers, often taken over existing supermarkets, and (construction) workers who are employed by Chinese companies. As in for example Africa, Chinese businesses use workers from China for infra-structural projects, like the building of roads. According to the census takers, “the number of residents with Chinese nationality has been controversial, but much less so than the Brazilians. It may be that ethnicity (8,775 Chinese), which is a ‘respectable’ number, and nationality (3,654 Chinese), which is considered too low, are confused.”³²

Political Developments

The first postmilitary administration focused on diplomatic and legal issues. The New Front administration headed by President Ronald Venetiaan (1992–1996) tackled the military problem, concluded peace between the National Army and the Jungle Commando, restored relations with the Netherlands, implemented a short-lived structural adjustment program (1994–1995), stabilized inflation and the exchange rate, and presented a balanced budget.³³ However, the cabinet was internally divided on how to restructure the economy; particularly the Creole NPS and the Hindustani VHP differed on taxation and government spending. Once more, group concerns proved stronger than the national interest. The administration was not successful in mitigating the effects of the adjustment program, particularly the growing unemployment rate hurt the administration. Consequently, the government lost six seats in the 1996 election: for the first time since 1948 the three traditional ethnic parties did not gain an absolute majority. The Front parties focused their campaign on Bouterse, now the NDP chairman, but what worked in 1987 did no longer pay off less than a decade later.

Following political chicanery, showing old political opportunism and the strength of new informal elites, the leader of Bouterse’s NDP, Jules Wijdenbosch, became president in 1996.³⁴ These new elites, still mercantile in character, came to the fore in the 1980s. Civilian and (former) military millionaires, who earned their riches in import and export trade, currency trade, drugs and arms, and later in gold and timber, gained power. During economic lean times they used their connections and financial assets to acquire (semi-)state companies.

The Wijdenbosch administration soon plunged the country in another diplomatic and economic crisis. Without much ado, the president’s party, NDP, claimed major political and economic positions. Many regarded Wijdenbosch as Bouterse’s puppet preparing the way for the latter’s

election in 2001. The Hague refused to accept its old nemesis in any leading political role. Rumors about the involvement of the army brass in drug trafficking had been floating around since the mid-1980s. More than a decade later the Dutch public prosecutor declared to have solid evidence that Bouterse himself was involved in drug running. The day after an international summons for the arrest of Bouterse was issued, he was appointed as advisor to the government to provide him with a diplomatic cover. Again, the diplomatic relation between the two countries took a blow (for more on Surinamese–Dutch relations see below). Suriname was in danger of becoming an international pariah. Bouterse used the NDP to further his own interests, causing a power struggle within the party. In this political melee Wijdenbosch gained the upper hand and dismissed Bouterse as his advisor, thus opening up the road for prosecution by the Netherlands. In July 1999, Bouterse was sentenced *in absentia* to 11 years imprisonment. There was much speculation on whether this sentence would end his career.

Economically, NDP policies completely wiped out any recovery that had taken place in the early 1990s. An IMF report published in 1999 bluntly stated that the Wijdenbosch government was incapable of running the country.³⁵ Another downturn in international alumina prices in combination with expansionary economic policies accelerated inflation and undermined the currency value (Buddingh' 2012: 407–411). Internal opposition, united in the Gestructureerd Samenwerkingsverband (Structured Cooperative Association) questioned the democratic credentials of the administration by pointing at the informal, unelected but influential, forces that dictated government policy. Not the well-being and development of society but personal interests came first. The Association concluded that the administration's policies "had led to the destruction of the production infrastructure, impoverishment of the population, moral and ethical decay, corruption, abuse of power, and the destruction of political and social institutions" (Ramsoedh 2001: 106). In May 1999, the trade unions and other political and social groups organized the largest demonstration in the country's history; 50,000 to 75,000 people marched in Paramaribo, protesting the rising cost of living.³⁶ Surprisingly, given earlier successes, this time the unions did not manage to remove the government. According to Hans Ramsoedh (2001: 107) this was the result "of the political culture and political structures that had taken shape since the 1980s, and especially after 1996. Wealthy informal forces from various ethnic segments did all they could to keep the government in the saddle to secure their interests." Wijdenbosch partially ignored the vote of no confidence; he agreed to early elections in 2000, but he thus paralyzed the parliament and country.³⁷

Early elections in May 2000 weakened the NDP; as a result Venetiaan and the New Front governed the country in the first decade of the new century.³⁸ The new administration tried to stabilize the financial and economic situation and in 2004 introduced a new currency, the

Surinamese dollar. It earned Venetiaan a second term in 2005,³⁹ yet despite these macroeconomic successes, the administration did not make much progress in other fields, including the alleviation of poverty, housing construction, the reorganization of the civil service, curtailment of corruption, and improvements in the quality of education.⁴⁰ Internecine struggles paralyzed the administration. Venetiaan's incorruptibility was not enough to offset the problem of his aloof style of governance. It made it fairly easy for Bouterse, the main candidate of the oppositional alliance, the Mega Combination (including NDP, PALU, KTPI, and NS [Nieuw Suriname, New Suriname]), to mobilize discontented voters.

However, in the elections of May 2010, with a high turnout of 75 percent, the Mega Combination achieved a plurality, but not a majority. In August, Bouterse became president after some intricate political dealings with his earlier foes but new allies: former Front minister Paul Somohardjo—the leader of the Javanese party *Pertjajah Luhur*, part of the *Volksalliantie voor Vooruitgang* (VVV, People's Alliance for Progress)—and Ronnie Brunswijk, the chairman of ABOP (Algemene Bevrijdings- en Ontwikkelingspartij, General Liberation and Development Party).⁴¹ Brunswijk is now a wealthy businessman on account of his involvement in, *inter alia*, the gold and timber industries, who self-finances his campaign as well as social projects for his voters. In 2010, his yellow Hummer was adorned with the text “King of Marowijne” (Evers & Van Maele 2012: 103). The three strongmen profited from the backroom deal; Bouterse rewarded Brunswijk with three government ministers, including the vice-presidency, while Somohardjo also got three ministers. After more than two decades Bouterse finally is president. He presents himself as a hands-on manager, much in contrast to Venetiaan's detached approach. Yet in many other respects, things stay the same; clientelism and patronage remain common.

With the election of Bouterse, diplomatic relations with the Netherlands are frozen, even though CARICOM and the United States announced they would cooperate with the democratically elected president. More problematic is the fact that Bouterse is a divisive person, as the older generations remember his role in the military government and he does little to mitigate these negative feelings. For instance, on February 25, 2011 (the newly minted Day of Liberation and Renewal) he awarded the Gold Star of the Revolution to his fellow rebels in 1980.⁴²

Despite the fact that the New Front coalition was in charge in the first decade of the twenty-first century, election results in the postmilitary period seem to indicate that traditional ethnic politics are losing their pull, particularly among younger voters. In 2010, the former powerhouse NPS only won 4 seats, down from 8 in 2005. The VHP did better with 8 seats in 2010. Part of this loss is to be explained by demographic changes. It may also be a reflection of changes in the economic balance of power. The new economic elites are often part of the NDP or in the case of the Hindustanis, the VHP. The established Creole party NPS is the main

victim of this realignment. In addition, the NPS is affected by the decline of the “old” middle class, suffering from the crises in the 1980s and 1990s. Not a conventional politician like Venetiaan but Bouterse, the self-made millionaire, is the idol of many in the Creole electorate.⁴³ The NDP deftly positions itself as an antielite party. Less money, from bauxite revenues or Treaty funds, was available to the parties to distribute among potential voters, whereas rich individuals, including Brunswijk, Bouterse, or Hindustani businessman / politician Dilip Sardjoe, use private money to lure voters or to gain influence in strategically important government departments.⁴⁴

Another factor that may play a role in the decline of the traditional strongholds is that these parties have held on to the proven leaders who had been active for decades and who showed little inclination to make room for fresh faces.⁴⁵ For example, Ronald Venetiaan, a three-term president (1991–1996; 2000–2010), has been a government minister since the 1970s and after Bouterse took over the presidency in 2010, remained the leader of his party until 2012, despite the election loss. Significantly, in 2011 the Hindustani VHP for the first time in its history managed to elect a new party leader by going against the directives of the old autocratic guard. It is notable that Bouterse, born in 1945, and a national figure since 1980, is frequently hailed by his voters as a “young” politician. Bouterse, however, dominates his party just like his political rivals and while a master at conducting mass meetings, using common language, he does not leave much room for his supporters nor has he designated a successor. It should be added that the NDP, unlike most other parties, spends money and goods on voters also in nonelection times.

Politics and the State in the Twenty-First Century

Suriname’s postwar politics look like an alphabet soup of new and traditional parties that form changing coalitions. Electoral alliances are of vital importance in gaining political influence in a country consisting of minorities, but the different parties still sing their own song. Fraternization between parties as practiced by NPS, VHP, and KTPI before 1980 has changed into a consociationalism within electoral combinations (Blanksma 2006: 163). Clientelism, whether ethnic or socioeconomic in character, remains the driving force in politics; it is a system that grants many people access to politicians and the offices of state.⁴⁶ The *raison d’être* of patron-client relations is the belief that a powerful “godfather” can accomplish more for the individual than the rather abstract and slow state machinery, even though in Suriname “*lanti*” (the state) is traditionally seen as a benevolent uncle as expressed in the saying “*winti wai, lanti pai*” (while the wind blows, the state pays). Relatives, former school mates, acquaintances, co-ethnics, and church members are more reliable as they are already part of a social network based on mutual obligations and trust. Suriname is

a classic network state. Therefore, the state should be seen “in relation to the broader social context in which it is embedded” (Van Klinken & Barker 2009: 5). The state is more than officials, and politicians, alone. The embeddedness of the state is much wider as civil networks are also part of the state. This does not mean that every person belongs because networks are a mechanism to include and exclude.

On the ground, much of contemporary life is dominated by Bouterse, but even before he assumed this presidency he was one of the most influential persons in the country. At present, Suriname is a parliamentary democracy with a strong president and weak institutions, including the council of ministers and parliament. The ministers often decide on administrative issues, such as the issuing of licenses or the appointment of officials rather than setting policy. According to Menke (2001: 229), the National Assembly as representative or law making body is often ignored by the executive branch. In his speech commemorating the 145th anniversary of parliament Bouterse declared that “the current parliament lacks competence” (Evers & Van Maele 2012: 362). Loyalty rather than competence is a highly praised quality in the representatives and ministers. The parties that are not in power are excluded from formulating policies and are by definition in opposition to any substantial proposal. As one prominent politician expressed it, “Suriname is a dictatorship of the current majority. The rest can stay at home . . . You have no voice . . . Opposition is not about ideas, it is a power struggle.”⁴⁷ The traditionally partisan press, many media outlets are owned by politicians or political parties, with its frequent no-holds-barred approach further reinforces this bisection.⁴⁸ Preexisting institutional conditions favor the rise of strongman practices. A major issue is party weakness. Since the founding of the first political parties in the 1940s, these organizations have suffered from related problems including personalism, fragmentation, ethnic clientelism, secrecy, bully-boy tactics, top-down politics and limited consultation of the rank and file, and overextended tenure of the leadership.

The electoral victory of the Front-parties in 2000 and 2005 may have turned out to be a last hurrah for traditional ethnic parties as voters flock to other parties. To be sure, this is not necessarily a sign of weakening ethnic voting or a turning away from autocratic party leaders. Even Bouterse’s acclaimed panethnic NDP carefully mixes candidates of different ethnic backgrounds, thus enabling voters to choose a candidate on the basis of ethnic preference.⁴⁹ Moreover, new ethnic political parties, particularly among Maroons, have appeared on the scene in the last decades. Their demographic growth and increasing self-awareness account for the strong electoral performance of Maroon parties promoting the emancipation of the own group. The inhabitants of the interior were the late arrivals in the political arena, as they were enfranchised only in 1963, and thus have more catching up to do.

In the end, Bouterse’s election to the presidency was contingent on the support of two mono-ethnic political combinations representing Maroon

and Javanese interests, who used this opportunity to accelerate their emancipation. However, given the first census results of the twenty-first century, showing a remarkable growth of the “mixed” and “unknown” groups, ethnic voting is likely to become less prominent in the years to come.

Generally, Surinamese politics lack ideological content and the majority of parties have not presented comprehensive national strategies. The dominance of authoritarian leaders, expecting obedience from the supporters, make that the state has become a vehicle for particularist interests competing for scarce resources, rather than the common good. Party democracy and transparency are lacking as well; the party leaders tend to stifle internal criticism, leading to more fragmentation when disappointed members start their own movement. As said, rejuvenation is a phenomenon that has bypassed most party leaderships, creating continuity but also stagnation. In addition, gender has not played a significant role in policy-making. The role of women in political parties remains haphazard. The number of female parliamentarians increased from 3 in 1991, 8 in 1996, 9 in 2000, and 13 in 2005, but in 2010, only 6 out of the total of 51 seats were taken by women.⁵⁰ In 1996, parliament for the first time elected a female chairperson. However, historian Mildred Caprino (1999–2000: 75–76) concludes that these female politicians barely touch upon women’s issues or promote the emancipation of women.⁵¹ In 2012, prominent female politicians from the NPS and the VHP called for specific government actions to improve the economic and political position of women.⁵² In contrast, as noted by for example historian Rosemary Brana-Shute (1993) in the last decades of the twentieth century, women continue to play an important role in the “ground game” of political campaigns; women, especially in the NPS and the NDP, are often portrayed as more serious and more diligent than men.⁵³

It should be noted that Suriname is not all that unique in these respects. In a small state such as Suriname the political and economic decision-making process is in the hands of a limited number of people. In the words of the Trinidadian political scientist Selwyn Ryan (2001: 97): “there is a tendency towards role diffuseness rather than role specificity.” It is difficult to keep a neutral stance in a society in which interpersonal and interethnic relations are predominant and group rivalry often paralyzes basic institutions. The state is a site of struggle among these competing groups. The impact of policies on a specific group is often more important than the national interest. Loyalty trumps communal interests. In addition, there is danger to personalize conflicting views and interests, and validity or efficiency are less important than personal prestige and interests.

With the state as the largest employer, it is of utmost importance for parties (and their voters) to control the state. The fact that newly elected governments are not inclusive and bring in their own supporters to manage ministries and other state agencies, who in turn appoint other party

loyalists has at least two societal drawbacks. The first is that ministries are seen as personal and ethnic fiefs distributing, for example, housing, land, licenses, and jobs to party members. Some departments, including Social Affairs and Housing, Trade and Industry, or Agriculture and Fishery, are traditionally the domain of a specific ethnic group and are consequently known as “Creole,” “Hindustani,” or “Javanese” ministries, respectively.⁵⁴ This type of spoils system is a fecund ground for corruption.⁵⁵

The second problem is that ousted civil servants are not active, but remain on the state’s payroll in a society where resources are scarce. With the limited pool of highly educated individuals, this waste of human capital is detrimental to societal development. Administrative systems underperform or even collapse because demand is high but trained personnel are in short supply. The lack of qualified trained and independent individuals also prevents the setting up of an accountability and control system to check the existing system (see also Ryan 2001). It also leaves room for forces outside the government to set policy.

Individuals without political mandates or responsibility heavily influence state policies, while politicians ignore parliament, thus paralyzing the democratic system and making the system even less transparent. That begs the question of what kind of state Suriname has become in the early twenty-first century. In the first half of the twentieth century, the authoritarian colonial state continued to strengthen its position. In the second half of the century universal suffrage and a parliamentary system were introduced, while the state became the country’s largest employer.

The combination of authoritarian and democratic features has led to the creation of a mixed or hybrid political system in the late twentieth century. Political scientists Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold (2011: 1) in their analysis of contemporary Venezuela give this definition: “Hybrid regimes are political systems in which the mechanism for determining access to state offices combines both democratic and autocratic practices. In hybrid regimes, freedom exists and the opposition is allowed to compete in elections, but the system of checks and balances becomes inoperative.” They identify the following characteristics for such regimes: “Government negotiations with opposition forces are rare; die-hard loyalists of the government are placed at top-level positions in state offices, such as the courts, thereby undermining the system of checks and balances; the state actively seeks to undermine the autonomy of civic institutions; the law is invoked mostly to penalize opponents but seldom to sanction the government; the incumbent changes and circumvents the constitution; the electoral field is uneven, with the ruling party making use of sinecures that are systematically denied to the opposition.”

Given that Bouterse “adores” Venezuela’s late President Hugo Chávez, the obvious question is whether a hybrid regime according to this definition is extant in Suriname, especially under the Bouterse presidency.⁵⁶ As to the first point, the cooperation between government and opposition is indeed virtually nonexistent, yet as noted earlier this is not a feature that

is particular to NDP administrations. Regarding the two following issues, Suriname has always had a tradition to name supporters of the incumbent government in top-level positions. More specific to the NDP administrations is the creation of parallel institutions that undermine the system of checks and balances. The Wijdenbosch administration (1996–2000) created the so-called presidential task forces that undermined departments (and government ministers) as well as parliament, while former military strongmen served as personal advisors, head of the intelligence agency, or ambassador (Buddingh' 2012: 389–394; Evers & Van Maele 2012: 245–247, 356). Bouterse has taken this one step further. He too has named his former (military) comrades to influential positions in, for example, the presidential secretariat. Another example is the Investment Development Corporation of Suriname, a small group that is directly responsible to the president and that negotiates directly with foreign investors on the basis of resource concessions. It is expected that the corporation will play a key role in facilitating and financing economic activity in the interior, including the construction of (rail) roads. This group operates without an official budget or parliamentary control (Van Dijk 2011: 9). A second case of a parallel institution that is beyond the usual control mechanisms is the Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) that is directly responsible to the president. The minister of Justice claims to have no detailed knowledge about this group consisting of police, military, and intelligence personnel. The CTU operates independently from the police force's antiterrorism team. Its tasks include the protection of the president, assistance of the police in the fight against crime, and the safeguarding of "general national security in case of political destabilization" (Buddingh' 2012: 455; also Evers & Van Maele 2012: 287–290). The unit is headed by Bouterse's son Dino, who has been jailed for illegal arms and drug dealing.⁵⁷ Lack of transparency and accountability has always been an issue, but the problem seems to amplify during NDP administrations.

The fourth issue mentioned by Corrales and Penfold, the selective invocation of the law, certainly is a problem in Suriname. The events surrounding the passing of the so-called amnesty law in 2012 are a telling indication of how a powerful executive may use the law to further its own interests.⁵⁸ To the surprise of many, on March 19, 2012 the government introduced a law to extend the 1992 Surinamese law that provides immunity for some 20 offences committed "in the context of defense of the state" between January 1, 1985 and August 19, 1992 to the period April 1, 1980–December 31, 1984.⁵⁹ This extension thus includes December 8, 1982, the date of the executions in Fort Zeelandia. The government claimed that the extension of the law would ensure "the promotion of national unity and the further undisturbed development of the Republic of Suriname" (Schrijver 2012: 341). To the contrary, the new law provoked strong reactions in the international community and in Suriname itself.⁶⁰ According to Amnesty International, "This proposed law contravenes international law, which states that amnesties

cannot be applied to those responsible for gross human rights violations including extrajudicial executions.”⁶¹ Demonstrations in Paramaribo, led by family members of the victims of the December murders, attracted thousands. Smaller protests were organized in Willemstad (Curaçao) and Amsterdam. In contrast, Bouterse’s supporters lauded the president for his strong policies and considered the December murders as a thing of the past. After three days of debate, the law was passed with 28 votes in favor, and 12 against.⁶² On April 5, the law was signed by Vice President Robert Ameeralli, as Bouterse was traveling abroad. In May the trial was suspended indefinitely. At the time of writing, April 2013, the promised Truth and Reconciliation Commission had not yet been installed.

The opposition labeled the law as a political move, and Bouterse’s former foe but new ally Brunswijk did not deny this.⁶³ During a “reconciliation rally” in May, Brunswijk, Bouterse, and Somohardjo embraced each other, as an “example” of true reconciliation. Bouterse minced no words, denouncing “feints by individuals who continually speak loudly in this country. It is criminal, while the country is on the right path, it is criminal to destabilize matters in this way. They are enemies of the people.”⁶⁴ The tone and rhetoric echoed the period of the military regime. Bouterse openly excluded the opposition, by calling them “criminal,” and leading to further polarization between the president’s supporters and detractors (see also Corrales & Penfold 2011: 14). The exclusion of critical members of the media from press conferences reinforces this tendency.⁶⁵

Bouterse may have introduced laws to his own advantage, but so far he has not changed the constitution. The mixed presidential system leaves room for maneuvering: some presidents (e.g. Venetiaan) elect to be parliamentary presidents, while others, including Bouterse, opt for a more executive role. The presidency allows great power as the head of state is also the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, president of the Council of Ministers, who are responsible to the president not the parliament, and chair of the State Council, an advisory organ to the Council of Ministers, with a mandate to advise on general policy, laws in concept, and governmental decrees (Menke & Pérez 2012: 17).

The last characteristic of a hybrid regime, the unevenness of the electoral field, does not seem to apply to Suriname. Political fragmentation, however, plays in the hands of a strong leader. In Suriname, more than 20 parties contested the elections in 2010. In combination with the often shaky electoral combinations that are now part and parcel of the political landscape, it deals a strong hand to an executive president.

In the case of Venezuela, the transformation into hybrid regime was first and foremost

an outcome of available “political opportunities,” chiefly the presence of economic resources at the disposal of the state, together with institutions of representation that were weak to begin with and were further weakened by deliberate state policies . . . In the presence

of stronger political parties and institutions of accountability, the political impact from an economic windfall would have been different. The movement toward a hybrid regime also resulted from the deployment of state strategies, by which we mean the incumbent's deliberate use of polarization, political "clientelism," impunity from punishment for corruption, and job discrimination. (Corrales & Penfold 2011: 15)

Bouterse does not enjoy Venezuela's oil richness, but he can use economic resources available through official and unofficial institutions, such as the Investment Development Corporation, for his own political goals. Access to rents is an important objective in power struggles (Corrales & Penfold 2011: 74; Koopman 2011: 80–94). The other elements mentioned, including weak institutions of accountability, polarization, clientelism, and preferential treatment, apply to Suriname. Discretionary spending, political clientelism, a weak system of checks and balances, problems of transparency, and lack of political, institutional, and administrative competency all advance the power of the executive. On the basis of the six characteristics mentioned by Corrales and Penfold, Suriname is not a "full" hybrid regime yet, but it comes very close. It should be noted, however, that the Bouterse administration is not an aberration but rather an extension of traditional strongman and patronage politics in Suriname.

External Relations

At the end of the century, and 25 years after its constitutional independence, Suriname's frame of reference still was the Netherlands, not the neighbors in the Caribbean or South America. Dutch remained the official language and was used in education, the civil service, the press, literature, and even more than before in daily conversations. According to the 2004 census in 46.6 percent of the households Dutch was the first language, followed by Sarnami (15.8 percent).⁶⁶ The data also revealed that 80 percent of the households are bilingual. The choice of language is determined by the level of education, socioeconomic status, and ethnic background.⁶⁷ The large migrant community in the Netherlands, 350,000 people of Surinamese descent in the first decade of the century, strengthened this connection even more. Remittances, so crucial in the 1980s and 1990s, and circular migration make that the transnational ties between Surinamese in patria and those overseas remained strong. With new and cheaper means of communication the Netherlands is closer than ever before.⁶⁸ To the Netherlands, Suriname stays important as well. It is the only other country in the world where Dutch is the only official language and its embassy in Paramaribo is among the five largest the country maintains.

Yet, relations have never been easy between the two nations. Money was often at the heart of the problem. After the return to democracy

the plans for a new intensive relationship between Paramaribo and The Hague soon lost their luster as the issue of development cooperation and the Dutch insistence on structural adjustment programs soured relations between the two governments.⁶⁹ Next to fiscal soundness, the Dutch main interest was political stability in the postmilitary period. Dutch efforts went as far as proposing a commonwealth. A less intrusive cooperation and friendship plan (Raamverdrag or Frame Treaty) was signed in 1992; as it referred directly to the 1975 Aid Treaty and its funding, it only exacerbated earlier problems of aid dependency. The same disagreements regarding planning and control of spending resurfaced, leading The Hague to again reduce the flow of money in 1993. Thus, Suriname's efforts to curb the influence of the army and to restore peace in the interior were not rewarded by the former metropolis, even though political stability had been very high on the Dutch agenda. In tune with the times, The Hague suggested that Suriname should seek assistance from the IMF and World Bank; not surprisingly, Paramaribo immediately rejected this proposal to internationalize the bilateral donor relation (Schalkwijk 1994: 125–129). In response, the Netherlands unilaterally decided to switch to sector-related aid, thus ignoring Suriname's proposals and strategies. However, as a result of this policy change, more Dutch development money flowed to Suriname (Schalkwijk 1994: 207–346; Janssen 2011: 245–293). Summing up, the economic and financial relations with the Netherlands after independence continued to be complex. Between 1975 and 2000 it seems that more energy has been spent on bickering and stopping and resuming aid than on actual projects. Emotion, paternalism, pedantry, rancor, and resentment poisoned the official relation between the two countries.

Around the turn of the century, The Hague wanted to evaluate the effectiveness of development assistance to Suriname. The idea was to learn from past mistakes with an eye to the future. A Surinamese–Dutch team released a critical interim report, underscoring the different perspectives on both sides of the ocean.⁷⁰ Paramaribo rejected the report, but in the Netherlands the main architect of the 1975 development treaty, Jan Pronk, while defending the breaking of the constitutional ties between Suriname and the Netherlands and the policy of development assistance, admitted that Suriname's aid dependency was an unforeseen consequence (Pronk 2004: 60). To be sure, former minister Pronk was not the only one to (re)analyze the aid relationship with Suriname and its lack of tangible results; often the fingers pointed to the Netherlands.⁷¹ Among Surinamese politicians, however, this soul searching did not take place, probably because the development ties were more crucial to the Surinamese than to the Dutch. Moreover, in contrast to The Hague, in Paramaribo a change of guard had not yet taken place; individuals who had been involved in the independence process were still in charge. Nevertheless, with the changing winds in The Hague and the certainty that the Treaty Funds would be dwindling in the near future, Paramaribo pragmatically set out a new

course of regional integration to profit from international economic and political alliances in a globalizing world.

In 1995, Suriname became the first non-Anglophone member of CARICOM (Caribbean Community).⁷² After independence Suriname increasingly participated in CARICOM organs, and became an observer in 1982. CARICOM itself hesitated to fully admit non-Commonwealth and Dutch-speaking Suriname that was regarded as the odd country out in the region. The military dictatorship formed a second obstacle.⁷³ In 1991, the Venetiaan administration reiterated its goal of more regional and even global integration, also through active participation in CARICOM.

In Suriname, reactions to the admission to CARICOM were mixed.⁷⁴ The trade unions and entrepreneurs argued that the country was not ready for this step and that the consequences of the membership had not been thoroughly evaluated or communicated. The business community, in particular, expected more negative than positive effects, because of the increasing competition from other CARICOM nations.⁷⁵ Foreign Minister Subhas Mungra (1991–1996) countered by stating that the inefficient business community neglected to see that economic liberalization was necessary for international donors, including the IMF and the Netherlands, to support Suriname. Others pointed at the CARICOM membership as a further step in the decolonization process, showing that Suriname could thrive without the former metropolis (Banks 2011: 19–20). In the first half of 1999 President Wijdenbosch chaired CARICOM, which seems to symbolize Suriname's gradual integration into the Caribbean region at the turn of the century.⁷⁶ The hope was that CARICOM participation would improve Suriname's competitiveness (Banks 2011: 18–19). A 2009 report on the competitiveness of CARICOM countries by the Inter-American Development Bank states that because of its resource exports, Suriname's macroeconomic environment has stabilized. Yet, the report also notes that Suriname "performs poorly" in the financial, goods and services, and labor markets. Administrative barriers restrict trade, foreign investment, and thus foreign competition. The report calls for the liberalization of the labor markets.⁷⁷

The fact that Suriname is not part of the Commonwealth, however, continues to set it apart and Suriname's efforts in the integration process are limited (De Bruijne 2004: 26). It should also be noted that CARICOM's integration efforts have been haphazard so far, thus limiting its impact. In the end, the main importance of CARICOM is not its market, which is modest, but rather in the special links between CARICOM and the European Union, through the development cooperation between the European Union and the ACP (Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States). Above all, CARICOM membership was the first substantial step of Suriname on the regional stage.

In the twenty-first century bilateral relations with the Netherlands have become less prominent as the Treaty funds were depleted and The Hague no longer considers Suriname a "donor country." The presidency of Bouterse, convicted *in absentia* in the Netherlands on drug trafficking

charges, made that official relations between The Hague and Paramaribo have cooled even more. However, cooperation at other levels, for instance NGO's, local governments, and the private sector, has intensified in the last decades.⁷⁸ The closure of the financial relationship with the Netherlands is a positive development as it provides new opportunities, and challenges.

With The Hague in the margins, relations with other countries are intensified. Particularly Guyana, French Guiana (part of the EU euro zone)⁷⁹, Brazil, China, and Venezuela, and to a lesser degree Colombia and Cuba have become of greater interest to Paramaribo (Janssen 2011: 289–291). The role of Chavez's Venezuela is remarkable. "Via its aid and business deals [including the provision of oil and oil products on preferential payment terms to state-run enterprises of Caribbean nations via the oil alliance PetroCaribe] Venezuela has exported a particular form of corruption. Billed as investment in social services, it in fact consisted largely of unaccountable financing for political campaigns, unelected social movements, business deals, and political patronage by state officials" (Corrales & Penfold 2011: 109). Suriname's share in PetroCaribe is fourth in the Caribbean, after Cuba, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica. Corrales and Penfold estimate that total Venezuelan aid to Suriname in 2006 was between US\$ 102.2 and 306.6 million.⁸⁰ PetroCaribe assistance can give Venezuela tremendous leverage in Caribbean nations.

Menke and Pérez (2012: 19) state that this change in foreign policy away from The Hague is linked to the transfer of political power: "Historically, the traditional elites of the three major political parties (the NPS, VHP, and KTPI) have had an inward-looking political leadership. Generally, they had no significant links with anticolonial and regional integration movements elsewhere in the world." The Hague indeed dominated foreign relations in the first three decades after independence, which certainly induced inertia, but these authors seem to overstate their point. The CARICOM membership shows that regional integration was on the agenda in the late 1980s. This opened up new horizons, and energized the economy and society in general. In addition, the international playing field has changed. Two countries now at the center of Paramaribo's foreign network have experienced seismic changes: BRIC countries China and Brazil have become world powers.

In addition, relations with Guyana and French Guiana are less complicated now that border disputes are on the backburner. Dating back to the nineteenth century, there are challenges regarding the eastern and western borders. Particularly the so-called Tigri or New River Triangle in the west has been an area of tension. It covers some 15,600 square kilometers and is mineral rich. When in 1969 Guyana expelled Surinamese military from Tigri, war seemed to be imminent. The zone was demilitarized two years later and since then the question is more or less dormant (Janssen 2011: 34–36). "This area is internationally widely regarded as belonging to Guyana, but Suriname sees it as occupied territory." Guyana refers to the Roman legal principle of *uti possidetis juris* (as you possess under law), while

Suriname adheres to the adagio “Whoever maps it, owns it” (Domingo 2011: 3). The official Surinamese map thus includes the Triangle. This map is part of the national iconography and has implications for relationships with the neighboring countries, Guyana in particular. A more recent dispute revolved around the coastal waters at the Corantijn River, where oil companies have identified major oil fields. A United Nations tribunal in 2007 granted 65 percent of the disputed area to Guyana and 35 percent to Suriname (Domingo 2011: 4). In the east, Suriname has a river / border dispute with France involving the Marowijne River; the question is whether the Marowini or the Litani is the source of the river, again natural resources in the ground are the main bone of contention. Another worry on this border is illegal migration and trade.

As elsewhere in the region, China is a new player. China sees Suriname not only as a resource-rich country but also as one of its international allies supporting the country’s one-China policy; a policy that Suriname has endorsed for decades. However, although China is a major financial donor, it is not interested in internal politics. Most important for Suriname, China has become an important economic partner, especially in the building and upgrading of infrastructure: the construction or improving of roads in the coastal area and in the interior, and the plan to build a railway and a road linking a deep sea port near Paramaribo to Santarem or Manaus, making Paramaribo a conduit for goods from northeastern Brazil.⁸¹ This is linked to the so-called Tapajai hydroenergy project that would include the construction of roads and power plants south of Lake Brokopondo. A (rail)road through the interior, and thus through traditional indigenous and Maroon territories, would facilitate the export of Brazilian products to international markets, making Suriname a transit country and it would also further open up the interior for mining, logging, or other economic activities. All these plans are part of the South American integration project, IIRSA or Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America. In addition, the country is a link in the East-West connecting Venezuela, the three Guianas, and Brazil.⁸²

The improvement of infrastructural links with all its neighbors, including the construction of bridges connecting Suriname with Guyana and French Guiana are efforts to break Suriname’s geographical isolation. Similarly, Suriname’s inclusion in CARICOM and Unasur points at institutional integration, even though the impact of these memberships is modest thus far. Unasur (Unión de Naciones Suramericanas) is an intergovernmental 12-member union of South American nations integrating two existing customs unions, Mercosur and the Andean Community of Nations, and modeled on the European Union. Unasur was founded in 2008 and Suriname’s membership was ratified in 2010. Finally, Suriname is a “special guest” of ALBA (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América, Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) and expects to become a full member soon. These memberships show that Suriname (and Guyana) sees itself not only as a Caribbean country, but a South American one as well.

In Conclusion

Suriname's isolation, noted as a problem by Governor Kielstra in the first half of the century, has been partly lifted in a literal and a figurative sense. Technological changes (including air transport and later telephone and Internet) have expedited and expanded communications within the country and with the outside world, even though the Netherlands continued to form a large part of this world, mainly because of transnationalism. In the twenty-first century Suriname has constructed bridges across two of the country's many rivers, and plans to build more, something the Dutch despite their history in water engineering never seriously considered to undertake, to facilitate the traffic of persons and goods between the capital and the outlying districts and to relieve the population pressure in Paramaribo. Diplomatic and economic bridges with the surrounding countries would ease Suriname's external isolation and integration with the Caribbean and South American region. In this sense, Suriname's foreign policy is pragmatic as the country is continuously in search of money, particularly donors in Brazil and also China are in demand, to sustain the relatively high standard of living.

This regional integration speeds up the decolonization process as it surely weakens Dutch influence, yet the Dutch presence is not yet changing into a discontinuity. Even though the political influence of The Hague is waning, also because of the depletion of Treaty funds, other connections remain strong, if only because of the large Surinamese community in the Netherlands.⁸³ After independence, Dutch has remained the official language. In addition, Dutch (and Flemish) television programs, including the Dutch national news, can be seen on a daily basis in Suriname. The position of the Dutch language has even been strengthened in a formal sense, with the inclusion of Suriname in the (inter)governmental *Nederlandse Taalunie* (Dutch Language Union) in 2004 and at the practical level with Dutch as the language most spoken in Surinamese households.

The position of Dutch as the language of government, education, and the majority of households is likely to remain unchanged despite the influx of new immigrants from China and Brazil, in particular. Often the children of these migrants go to school in Suriname, where Dutch is the language of instruction, thus the increasing multi-ethnicity might strengthen rather than undermine the position of one common language that in the end is not the language of any specific group. However, Portuguese in particular is heard more in both the interior and the city, thus adding to Suriname's multilinguality. Next to English, it is likely that Portuguese will increasingly be the language of international contacts in diplomacy, business, higher education, and cultural exchanges.

With the influx of (temporary) migrants from neighboring countries and China Suriname has become an immigration country again, just as it was at the turn of the previous century. Throughout the twentieth century the country has experienced major demographic changes through

immigration of tens of thousands of Asian workers and the outmigration of more than 100,000 people (more than one-quarter of the population) between 1970 and 1980. The Asian plantation workers who arrived after the abolition of slavery were supposedly temporary migrants, but the great majority remained in Suriname. In contrast, the majority of current migrants from, for example, Brazil and China, but also from other Caribbean countries, will probably not settle permanently and use the money earned in Suriname as a stepping stone for setting up businesses in the country of origin or for migration to other countries in the region, including the United States of America. Current technology—Internet, cell phones, and air travel—enables today's migrants to keep in contact with relatives and relations back home, thus making it less imperative to become part of Surinamese society.

As in every immigrant society, discussions about inclusion of migrants, for example regarding education, housing, social services, and political participation remain thorny as it involves public money as well as culture and language. This discussion not only centers on foreign migrants but also on new urban citizens, the great majority is Maroons who arrived as a result of the Interior War. Just as Javanese and Hindustanis had to fight discrimination, now Maroons face similar obstacles. The fact that the Maroons and Amerindians are the last groups to arrive in the city, explains their precarious socioeconomic position; traditionally, education is the determinant factor in social mobility (De Bruijne & Schalkwijk 2005: 259–260).

In the end, diversity is a source of social and cultural tension, but also very much a source of pride as Suriname likes to portray itself as a United Nations in miniature, pointing at its peaceful and harmonious relations. The country's ethnic diversity is part and parcel of official representations, including the national calendar. Every group has its specific holiday to celebrate its culture and history.⁸⁴ In contradiction with Furnivall's expectations, independence, or rather the withdrawal of the colonizing power, did not result in ethnic conflict. Menke (2011) uses the concept of nation creation to describe this sociocultural development. He points at mutual solidarity, respect, and harmony between the different ethnic groups and their cultures. He underlines that this is a bottom-up, fairly "natural" evolution undermining the top-down strategy by the state aiming at uniformity. As chapter 2 has shown, the role of the state, even in colonial times, has been more nuanced. Moreover, as this study has argued, the dichotomy between society and state is not as clear as Menke presents. Finally, given Suriname's recent regional and global integration, the question is what positive or negative effects these processes have and will have on nation creation.

Politically, Suriname has experienced democratic and authoritarian regimes since its independence in 1975. The military regime was the most authoritarian in nature. As in the 1930s, popular protests led to fierce state repression. But even during democratic administrations, authoritarianism

was close to the surface due to the personal, clientelist, and authoritarian nature of the numerous political parties. Party members had and have exceedingly limited influence on policy. Politics in this small macho society often boils down to one-upmanship. This quality makes the political arena an inhospitable place for many. Moreover, political platforms are not national but group oriented, trying to seek (economic) benefits, in the form of permits, land, jobs, or services, for the own group. This not only complicates decision-making, but also strengthens the personalistic and authoritarian character of Suriname politics. Ironically, these tendencies are also frequently visible in institutions such as trade unions and churches. The most pregnant example may be the case of self-ordained Pentecostalist Bishop Steve Meye who as a spiritual advisor is on President Bouterse's payroll at a monthly rate of €1,400. During the controversy surrounding the amnesty law in May 2012, Meye, echoing Bouterse's words (see p. 205), labeled all people not willing to participate in a national reconciliation rally as "state enemies" who "needed to be identified."⁸⁵

The transition from large-scale agriculture to resource-based economics took place during World War II, although in previous decades the promises of natural riches, gold and balata, had drawn thousands toward the interior. In the postwar period, the country's economic development was and continues to be based on the exploitation of natural resources, stimulated by direct foreign investment, as well as income transfers from abroad including substantial development aid and remittances.

General studies on twentieth-century Suriname tend to overlook the great social changes that took place in the nonurban areas. Plantations disappeared, and the exploitation of natural resources took flight in a rather fitful way, with very unequal social consequences. Gold was prospected in the early decades of the century and again at the end. Some made fortunes, also in the transport sector, but for the majority of the pork knockers the benefits were meager. The search for gold, the numerous expeditions looking for natural resources, and the construction of the Lawa railroad intensified the contacts between Paramaribo and the inhabitants of the interior. Foreign bauxite companies were the first to fully exploit the country's natural resources.

In the autonomy period, the administration mixed romanticism about natural riches with business acumen to further open up the interior, with far-reaching consequences. Bauxite was the main economic pillar in the second half of the century, but the quest for hydroelectricity flooded 27 villages and displaced more than 6,000 Maroons. Maroon communities and part of the Amerindian population were further dislodged as a result of the Interior War. This war led to dislocation, violence, trauma, and the uprooting of existing social and legal structures. At the same time, the introduction of new technologies, the outboard motor in the 1950s or public and later cell phones and satellite dishes in the 1990s (mainly picking up Brazilian shows) integrated the Maroons and to a lesser extent Amerindians more than previously into coastal and international society

and enabled city dwellers to remain in contact with their relatives and friends in the interior. Networks thus shifted and expanded. Maroons have more structural contact with Paramaribo and other coastal places than Amerindians from the interior. Whereas Maroon villages are accessible by road and river straight from Paramaribo (or Albina), Amerindian villages in the interior are not. Consequently, Wayana and Trio have “structurally less contact with Paramaribo and more contact among themselves” (Carlin & Van Goethem 2009: 17).

In the second gold rush, the environmental hazards of gold prospecting, particularly the use of mercury, are obvious. Large-scale logging is a further threat to the environment and biodiversity. However, the gold sector has become the economic linchpin in eastern Suriname and provides work for thousands, often lowly educated men and women. Gold also generates work for transporters, shopkeepers, cooks, sex workers, and so forth. The influx of immigrants is changing the traditional ethnic and social balance in the interior. The social cohesion already weakened by the war, when guerrilla leader Brunswijk upstaged the traditional Maroon leadership and migration emptied villages in the interior, is thus threatened even more (Van Wetering & Thoden van Velzen 2013: 323–332).

The increasing economic activities, including the renewed, often large-scale exploitation of gold and timber, and the absence of legal authority made land rights a pressing issue around the turn of the century. Almost paradoxically, the Interior War contributed to the emancipation and self-esteem of the inhabitants of the interior: the call for their right to self-determination—including territorial rights—has become appreciably clearer in the years since the war. The Amerindian and Maroon fight for land rights would gain international recognition in the twenty-first century, even though the state up till the present has ignored the judgments of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Different interest groups, with different legal systems are contesting their right to exploit the resources. The construction of (rail) roads through the interior will only add fuel to the flames. This struggle is likely to intensify in the years to come as it is Suriname’s priority to deepen the exploitation of its natural resources by attracting foreign investors and by improving the state’s institutional capability to generate rents and taxes.

Other government issues related to the interior are the porous boundaries and the lack of border security. It shows that state power in Suriname is spatial and erratic. The available institutional resources are limited: an army of 2,500 troops and a police force of 1,500 are too small to control the vast interior and to give the state grip on immigration and economic activities. Amerindians and Maroons freely cross the border, particularly to French Guiana, where social security arrangements are superior to those in Suriname.⁸⁶ A trend that started in the 1940s became much more pronounced as a consequence of the Interior War and continues to this day. Again, there is not much difference here as the (colonial) state never managed to meaningfully establish its authority in the

interior. A twenty-first-century trend is the privatization of security, thus undermining the state monopoly on violence and leading to the proliferation of arms. In fact, the state does no longer project the image of a uniform, encompassing entity. In Africa, anthropologist James Ferguson (2005: 378) sees the emergence of resource-rich enclaves which are privately governed and secured. "What is noteworthy is the extent to which this economic investment has been concentrated in secured enclaves, often with little or no economic benefit to the wider society. There are significant differences in the ways that such enclaves are secured, and the ways they are governed (or not) by the states that have nominal jurisdiction over them." Transnational companies are not discouraged to invest in mineral extraction by weak states.⁸⁷ In the Surinamese context mining and logging sites in the near future may form virtually autonomous islands in the jungle, with little government oversight, governed by international and national companies, and policed by own their security forces.

Thus, the interior is the place of natural resources and economic growth as well as of potential conflict because of land rights and (illegal) immigration. This is an intensification of earlier tensions, so not much news is under the sun except that the newcomers are from BRIC countries, and one is a powerful neighbor. Thus far, the state has not yet developed any solid plans to deal with the complexities of the interior.

Suriname's challenge as the smallest state in South America is that with limited institutional capacity it has to deal with large countries such as Brazil and China. It is there that the country seeks new investors. The question is whether rent-seeking, resource-rich Suriname is willing to learn to literally and figuratively speak the language of the new dominant countries. Integration in the region, South America and the Caribbean, offers new opportunities, but old and new, partly interrelated, domestic issues also might spill over to the region. These include insecure borders and illegal migration, unresolved border issues linked to feelings of geographical inferiority, and conflicts of interests regarding natural resources, including oil.

The country presents itself to the world as a model for coexistence, yet in a culture of tolerance it is vital to note that a culture of intolerance lies just below the surface. The coexistence of peoples with different national, cultural, and religious backgrounds is a source of cultural enrichment, but it can simultaneously be a source of profound social tensions. In the twentieth century, Suriname has managed to keep these tensions to a minimum, a feat that is also attributable to the dominant ethnic political leaders; their cooperation was successful as in times of economic prosperity it facilitated the socioeconomic and cultural emancipation of the own group. Sociologist Marten Schalkwijk (in Lotens 2000: 44) points at the "permanent tension between emancipation processes and the type of leadership. During the emancipation process the main consideration is to advance the group and less attention is paid to democratic principles . . . In these group processes the leaders have great leeway and can be very authoritarian."

Whereas in 1948 Van Lier, following Furnivall, considered pluralism an obstacle to development, Menke (2011: 212–216) argues that Suriname has shown that a multicultural society based on respect and harmony can flourish. Chapter 7 on Paramaribo shows that in the twentieth century the country's only city did not have clear ethnic demarcations, although social life may have been more restricted to the own ethnic group. Culture and religion are domains where respect for each other's traditions and holidays has been obvious in the postwar era after decades of struggle by all groups to gain recognition for non-Dutch cultures and non-Christian religions. In contrast, in politics ethnicity continued to be a decisive force. This is also a function of the personalistic, autocratic, and clientelistic character of Surinamese politics. It is enlightened self-interest to vote for a candidate who promises economic or social perks to the individual or the group. This clientelism may be undermined by the recent blossoming of civil society, often against the wishes and interests of politicians (Buddingh' 2012: 481). (International) NGOs increasingly provide social services that used to be the preserve of the state, and thus of politicians. Moreover, many NGOs lure competent civil servants with higher salaries and better working conditions (see also Ferguson 2005: 379).

The first census of the new century points at a growing willingness to self-identify as "mixed." That is not to say that Suriname is beyond ethnicity; rather it is rooted in, but not restricted by ethnicity. Multiethnicity increasingly becomes a source of pride rather than of divisiveness and thus the basis for the further development of the nation.

Class differences that were so pronounced in colonial times lost their sharpest edges, but new commercial elites, of various ethnic backgrounds, dominate society. The economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s reshuffled the existing socioeconomic structure, greatly affecting the size and composition of the middle and lower classes. Differences in income are very obvious in the city and the districts and income inequality is increasing, thus creating a new potential source of tension. These income differences are also apparent within ethnic groups; among the Hindustanis these contrasts in income are most striking. Related to these socioeconomic trends is the widening gender gap: despite the fact that since the 1980s more women than men participate in secondary education, there is no corresponding increase in women's participation in the labor force. Official socioeconomic data point at a gender difference in employment, while poverty is especially widespread among female-headed households. This unequal position of women is a region-wide phenomenon.

Ethnic, class, and gender positions have shifted in the course of the century, but all three phenomena have remained essential mechanisms in structuring Surinamese society. In postcolonial Suriname socioeconomic position rather than ethnicity determines one's place in society. Or phrased differently, "class position is no longer as strongly correlated with belonging to a particular ethnic group or having light skin colour" (Wekker 2001: 174). Moreover, the backgrounds of the new elites show

that since the last decades of the previous century, socioeconomic class is not necessarily linked anymore with descent and legitimacy, occupation, educational and cultural background, and individual comportment. Financial assets are the main determining factor in the socioeconomic pyramid. Access to education has been the main factor in socioeconomic emancipation, although in the case of women that is less so. In the years since independence, income inequality has grown appreciably. The state to a certain degree mitigates the effects of poverty through social programs, but the increases in the cost of living make that the economic existence of the majority of Surinamese is precarious. For the nation to thrive, socioeconomic policies should be a national concern, rather than the fiefdom of certain groups. Only then can the increasing socioeconomic differences be effectively tackled.

Summing up, since 1900 ethnicity remains a guiding principle in the country's social organization, but socioeconomic position has become the determining factor in the social hierarchy. Ethnicity and class are not as intertwined anymore, as education serves as a vehicle for emancipation. However, despite legal and educational gains, the gender gap remains as women on their own merits have not been able to gain access to the upper echelon of society.

This study has shown how authoritarianism permeated life in Suriname in many aspects: the state, politics, business—but this is also true at the individual level, including schools and families. Sociologist Maureen Silos (2001; 2004) has coined the term *commandodemocratie* (democracy of orders). She too points at the existing hybridity, not only in politics but at all levels of society. Despite the façade of Western modernity and democracy, the importance of networks and a “plantation mentality” still permeates Suriname. This shows in the division between superiors and subordinates that leaves no room for discussion, consultation, and self-reflection. Not technical competency but patronage paves the road to the top. In other words, authority is often not earned. Rigid dictation rather than dialogue sets the tone (see Sennett 2012: 172–173). “Leaders in such organizations immediately start barking orders” (Silos 2004: 31). This type of organization not only leads to “enormous frustration, passive resistance, and apathy” but also to inefficiency, lack of innovation and initiative, and a limited commitment to the organization or institution (Silos 2004: 31).⁸⁸ Silos's observation is seconded by a 2009 report by the Inter-American Development Bank, pointedly stating that “meritocracy has not taken root in the country's business culture, resulting in a loss of efficiency of employees. Measures to cut down on widespread nepotism and favoritism when deciding on management positions (ranked 111th in the world) and to foster female participation in the labor force (103rd) could significantly improve the availability of skilled and motivated talent to business.”⁸⁹

In the same vein, in spite of the official liberal economic ideology, the state has a “disproportionate” sway in economic affairs, and “systematically

frustrates attempts by citizens to organize their self-reliance and economic independence” (Silos 2004: 28). It should be noted that in the interior the case is different as the state has limited grip on developments there. However, in line with the authoritarianism sketched by Silos is that the state does not consult the traditional inhabitants when granting economic concessions. According to Silos (2001: 241), the “democracy of orders” leads to a lack of self-confidence, feelings of inferiority, and an aversion to risk taking. It also leads to a resistance to outsiders, including remigrants returning to Suriname (Silos 2004: 35). She points at the conformist manner in which children are raised in the schools and within their own families, as well as the fact that the great majority of the elite is male in order to explain the basis of this authoritarian culture (Silos 2001: 241). As in the rest of the Caribbean, parents define their role essentially as providers of basic needs and security and as strict disciplinarians.⁹⁰ Child-rearing traditions enforce obedience and mannerliness.⁹¹ The active participation of children in decision-making is perceived as a “threat to adults, parents in particular, but also other authority figures such as teachers” (Barrow 2002: xxviii). These habits as well as traditional didactic teaching styles stun “curiosity, creativity and problem-solving skills” (Brown 2002: 120–121).

In the view of Silos, Suriname still suffers from an old fashioned master-subaltern mentality. What she does not mention in her knife-edged analysis is that Suriname’s population also has counteracted this dominant culture of authoritarianism. Contract laborers fighting the conditions at the plantations, street protests in the 1930s and 1990s, and labor strikes throughout the century are expressions of socioeconomic or political discontent. In addition, Dutch and later upper-class Creole cultural dominance was undermined first by universal suffrage and then by the sociocultural emancipation of the different ethnic and social groups who demanded equal recognition of their cultures and religions. Ironically, this emancipation was achieved mainly through the authoritarian politics of their ethnic leaders. Finally, since the 1990s civic organizations, especially in the field of human rights, have achieved international successes in their struggle for justice or the protection of a culturally determined way of life.

It is likely that the hybridity in society, in general, and in the political system, in particular, will continue to characterize Suriname for years to come. However, looking at developments in the first decade of the twenty-first century, the country’s increasing integration in the Caribbean and South America will undoubtedly lead to new opportunities, insights, as well as challenges. Suriname no longer is an isolated country but has opened up to a world far beyond the former colonizer. Reasons for guarded optimism.

NOTES

Introduction

1. In Suriname, ethnic groups are commonly known as *bevolkingsgroepen* (population groups). Population groups do not necessarily overlap with ethnic or racial groups as both Creoles and Maroons are of (predominantly) African descent. In this case ancestry determines the category, as Maroons are defined as descendants of people who fled enslavement at the plantations.

The Maroon populations consists of Ndyuka (or Okanisi), Sa(r)amaka, Matawai, Aluku (or Boni), Kw(i)inti, and Pa(ra)maka. Maroons are also known as *boslandcreolen* (Bushland Creoles) a term introduced in the 1960s and still in use as an official (and popular) term. Prior to the 1960s Maroons were called *bosnegers* (Bush Negroes), a term still used in Maroon languages (*businengre*).

The Amerindians are divided into Arawaks (or Lokono), Caribs (Kari'na), Trio, Wayana, Akuriyo, Sikiyana, Tunayana (Katwena), and Mawayana.

In Suriname, the British Indian population is often referred to as "Hindustanis," after Hindustan. The term "East Indian" is not used as it may lead to confusion with the term "Javanese" who originally are from the Netherlands East Indies. I will interchangeably use the terms British Indians and Hindustanis until 1927, when Hindustanis born in Suriname became Dutch subjects.

2. Interview by Anouk de Koning, Saramacca, April 5, 2007.
3. Jeroen Trommelen, "De onmacht van een ambassadeur," www.volkskrant.nl (accessed March 23, 2010). Original July 18, 1998, adapted January 16, 2009. One of Van Mierlo's predecessors, Chris van der Klaauw (1977–1981), compared the Dutch influence in Suriname in 1980 with that of a "super power" (Kagie 2012: 144).
4. See De Koning 2011a: 267–279 on the importance of locality.
5. Anthropologists and sociologists, including Reddock (1994) and Yelvington (1995) on Trinidad; Williams (1991), Trotz (2003), and Garner (2008a and b) on Guyana; and Wekker (2004) on Suriname, have earlier stressed that gender, class, and ethnicity work in concert.
6. Pluralism is linked to the Dutch concept of "*verzuiiling*" or pillarization. Originally this term describes the politico-denominational segregation of Dutch society; several "pillars" (*zuilen*), according to different Christian denominations or political ideologies, vertically divided society. These pillars all had their own institutions, including political parties and trade unions, newspapers and broadcasting organizations, banks, educational institutions, hospitals, and (sports) clubs.
7. A reprint was published in 1974. For recent scholarly assessments of M. G. Smith's work see the collection of essays edited by Meeks (2011).
8. A number of political scientists including Lijphart (1977), Hoppe (1976), and Dew (1978) base their work on Van Lier's theories. Lijphart's theory of consociational democracy is based on a plural society with several elites, each of which is too small to rule alone (see chapter 4).
9. According to Robotham (2011: 66), "plural society was an example of a 'conflict' theory *par excellence*."

10. For more on De Kom and *Wij slaven van Suriname*, see chapter 3.
11. See, for example, Verschuuren (1994); Dalhuisen, Hassankhan, & Steegh (2007); Buddingh' (2000; 2012). Most of the extant literature on twentieth-century Suriname is thematic in nature or covering a specific population group.
12. Yelvington 1995: 24. With "involuntary" he means that in emic terms ethnicity is considered fixed and unchangeable, even though the use of one's ethnic identity is flexible according to the circumstances. Mintz (1996: 41) explains the difference between race relations and ethnic relations. "Race relations have to do with perceptions of others which are based on physical differences; these differences are thought of as diagnostic features of membership in groups, called 'races'." Race is a cultural construct believed to have a biological basis. In Suriname, Trinidad, and Guyana the term is used to identify people of common biological descent.
13. See Brereton (2007) for Trinidad & Tobago; Meel (1998b) and De Koning (2011a: 260) for Suriname.
14. Hoefte 1998: 4; 49. The same type of stereotyping occurred in Trinidad and British Guiana, see, for example, Brereton 1974; 1979; and Williams 1991 respectively.
15. On the role of Javanese migrant women in the construction of ethnicity in Suriname and the Netherlands see Kopijn 1998.
16. See Carlin (2001) for an inventory and typology of these languages. The 19 languages: Dutch, Sranan Tongo, Sarnami, Surinamese-Javanese, Surinamese-Chinese or Hakka / Kejia, Paramakan, Aluku or Boni, Ndyuka or Aucan, Kwinti, Saramakan, Matawai, Kari'na or Carib, Wayana, Trio, Akuriyo, Sik'iyana, Tunayana, Arawak or Lokono, and Mawayana. It should be noted that four of the Amerindian languages are spoken by ten persons or less. The twentieth century saw the death of two Amerindian languages (Warau and Wayariloele or Triometesen) as well as the Ndyuka / Trio pidgin (Carlin 2001: 230).
17. In Suriname a local variety of Dutch has developed, Surinamese-Dutch, which differs from the standard language in morphology and syntax. This variety, however, is not officially recognized (Wekker & Wekker 1990; Carlin 2001: 222).
 Damsteegt (1988: 98–104) emphasizes that the immigrant *koiné* Sarnami is a grammatical mixture of several Indian languages and is not identical to any Indian language. Its further development in Suriname led to the creation of new grammatical forms, which cannot be found in any Indian language. In addition, the lingua franca of the Hindustanis adopted loan words from Sranan Tongo. In Suriname, Hindi became the prestige language for Hindus and Urdu for Muslims. The development and use of Sarnami is unique in the Caribbean: In British Guiana and Trinidad, Indian migrants soon dropped their Indic languages. For possible explanations see chapter 2.
 Surinamese-Javanese resembles Javanese in phonology, morphology, and syntax, but has adopted many loanwords from Sranan Tongo and (Surinamese) Dutch (Vruggink 1985: 55–59). The politeness style in Javanese, important in defining social relations, has been reduced in Surinamese-Javanese.
18. Tjon Sie Fat (2010: 87) comments that the recent immigration from China had made the linguistic situation within the Chinese community "unusually complex." Carlin (2001: 228) thinks it is possible that Mandarin rather than Kejia will become the main language.
19. The Hindus in Suriname are either Samaji's or Sanatani's. The relative division between Samaji's and Sanatani's is approximately 20:80. The reform movement Arya Samaj (Association of the Respected Ones) presented the opportunity for upward social mobility; in 1929 pandits formed the Sanatan Dharm (Eternal Law). Each had their own network and following and set up their own social and educational institutions. In the 1920s and 1930s a split in the Muslim community took place between "reformists" and 'traditionalists.' The first group emphasized the importance of official doctrine and prayed toward Mecca. The latter were called "West worshippers" as they prayed, as in Java, toward the West. They still performed pre-Islamic rituals. This division has had a profound influence on the religious and sociopolitical organization of the Javanese (Jap-A-Joe, Sjak Shie, & Vernooij 2001: 204–207; Bakker 2009: 8–10; Hoefte forthcoming).
20. Priests and missionaries "recruited" talented children for their denominational schools; not all children or families converted to attend such schools, as testified by Soehirman Patmo who in the mid-1950s left the Javanese village of Bakkie in Commewijne to go to a Catholic school

- in Paramaribo, but his family did not become Catholic (Djasmadi, Hoefte, & Mingoen 2010: 91).
21. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, January 23, 2007.
 22. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, January 20, 2007.
 23. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, February 1, 2007.
 24. For more on the NDP see chapter 8.
 25. In the earliest censuses “Negro” and “Colored” were separate categories, but since 1972 these have been lumped together as “Creole.” See De Koning (2011a: 261–262) on the role of official statistics in solidifying and naturalizing ethnic categories; also Menke 2011: 210–211.
 26. ABS 1972: 4. The text is vague on what group would question ethnic counting, but nationalists are a possibility.
 27. Van Lier (1971: 263) has a different view as “people belonging to totally different classes mixed with each other on a completely equal footing.” In his view, there was no development of “class determined behaviour and class pride.”
 28. Bourdieu 1986. Economic capital or productive property can be used to produce goods or services; social capital includes (network) relations and social position; cultural capital revolves around life style, educational background, and linguistic styles; symbolic capital is the use of symbols to legitimate the possession of varying degrees of social, economic, and cultural capital. Mating strategies can be important to add to the diverse forms of capital.
 29. Van Lier 1971: 265. He adds that they identified themselves so fully with the metropolis that criticism of their policies or personal insults were viewed as attacks on the Kingdom of the Netherlands, thus offending their national pride. This attitude was compounded by the coterie-like atmosphere in a small, colony populated by a variety of “foreigners.”
 30. For a history of Jews in the color system, see Vink 2010: 130–146. In 1893, 14 Chinese men belonged to the small electorate, based on tax registers, of less than 450 men, in 1897 this number had increased to 73 (Gobardhan–Rambocus 2008: 72), for more on the election system, see chapter 1.
 31. Wekker (2001: 182) points at “the disproportionate number of unmarried, upper-middle-class Jewish, Creole, and Chinese women in the first half of the century” and links this to the cult of pure womanhood.
 32. Van Lier 1971: 258. After 1910 mulattoes joined the ranks of the lawyers, until that time a Jewish monopoly. “Around 1940 there was not a single Jewish practitioner [*praktizijn*, not university-trained lawyer] practicing in Surinam, while there was only one Jew fulfilling an important function within the judiciary.”
 33. Nationaal Archief, The Hague, Collection Rollin Couquerque (RC) 2.12.142 nr 26, letter Hubert van Asch van Wijk, March 22, 1916. The writer details the network of the Da Costa family: the family’s patriarch is the president of the Court of Justice, while his son and a number of in-laws are the cantonal judge in Paramaribo, a public notary, the government attorney, a district commissioner, and the director of the post office. Later this writer claimed that the “Jewish clique” ruined the life of his children: “who shall liberate us from this concentration camp?” (RC nr 13, letter Hubert van Asch van Wijk, July 4, 1916).
 34. Yelvington 1999: 192; Secharan (1997: 232) writes that in British Guiana the rise of this middle class was “a painful process often eliciting ambivalence in its community of origin, and resentment in the broader host society.” Several members of this new rural and urban middle class thanked their ascendancy to “unscrupulous behavior” and unsavory practices.
 35. Gender refers to socially constructed, culturally conceptualized, and institutionalized differences between women and men.
 36. In this cult of domesticity, the man had complete authority. According to Dutch law, until 1956 married women were legally incompetent, meaning that married women needed their husband’s signature for each business transaction. Women employed by the state were automatically dismissed on their wedding day, as a woman was considered first and foremost a mother of her children. In Suriname this law regulating women’s legal capacity was changed in the 1980s (see chapter 6).
 37. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, December 19, 2006.
 38. See Hoefte 1998: 108–111 for a discussion of the situation in Suriname in comparison to British Guiana and Trinidad. Trotz & Peake (2000: 197) point out that the colonial state in British Guiana depicted violence against women as outcome of the lack of respectability

- and order in indentured family life, caused by the abject and flagrant sexual behavior of the British Indian women. This line of reasoning “enabled the colonial state to impose a version of morality that erased its own capability in the reduction of violence against Indian women.”
39. Trotz & Peake (2000: 210) state that this ideal notion of the Indian woman was represented “in contrast to her unruly, domineering and immoral Black counterpart.”
 40. Seecharan (1997: 248–250) notes that in British Guiana emerging rural and urban agricultural and retail businesses set up by Indians needed the often silent contributions of women to succeed.
 41. In Suriname the war is known as the “*binnenland(se) oorlog*,” referring to the *binnenland*, that is the interior of the country. Authors writing in English often refer to the armed conflict as “civil war” (in Dutch *burgeroorlog*). I prefer to use the term Interior War, as that is the closest translation of *binnenlandse oorlog*.
 42. According to Sally Price (1998: 238–239), among Maroons the polygynous marriage system, men having more wives, “strongly favors men.”
 43. A similar gender division of labor exists among the Kalintha (or Carib) and Lokono (or Arawak) Amerindians, but near the end of the century women complained that they could not get their men to clear plots for them because of absenteeism. Pressures from the wider society on the communities in the forestry belt force men to integrate into the cash-based economies, undermining women’s control of the land. Women without a plot are dependent on men (her husband or other male relatives) (Kambel 1999: 169–170, 174; see also Molendijk & Boven 1995: 63–64). Kambel (1999: 170) suggests that “changing gender ideology played a role as well: some men considered it unnecessary for their wives to work as independent food producers preferring them to stay at home and assume domestic tasks.” In short, according to this author, there are different developments leading to the further marginalization of Amerindian women in the coastal area. In the interior, the economic role of Trio men and women is still traditional with men hunting and fishing, and women harvesting vegetables from their plots (Carlin & Van Goethem 2009: 20).
 44. Sally Price, email March 19, 2010. She adds that “part of the change has to do with increasing specialization by men. When a man stops carving wooden utensils for his wives and starts selling the meat he gets by hunting (rather than distributing it to women in his village), the whole system of men providing for women gets thrown off track. It’s not that sharing among kin has completely disappeared, only that there’s competition from marketing opportunities.”
 45. In 2010, at least 9 percent of the 246 *kabiten* in the interior is female (Amoksi 2011: 34).
 46. Sally Price, email March 19, 2010.
 47. The Surinamese term for mistress is “*buitenvrouw*” (outside woman). Wekker (2001: 176, 193) observes that the sexual prerogatives that elite and upper-class men allowed themselves in the early decades of the century have been appropriated by men of different ethnic groups and of different classes.
 48. On political activities of working-class urban Creole women see Brana-Shute 1993 and Wekker 1997.
 49. Wekker 2001: 176. Wekker has published extensively on sexuality among Creoles and more particularly on the *mati* work “in which Creole [working-class] women openly engage in sexual relationships with men and with women, either simultaneously or consecutively ... it involves mutual obligations between two female partners in nurturing, social, sexual, and economic spheres.” According to her, comparably open behavior within a middle-class environment is “unthinkable” (Wekker 1997: 336, 338).
 50. McClaurin (1996: 120) in her study of women in Belize, argues that “it is within the boundaries of the institutional and ideological dimensions of gender that the dynamics of power and subordination among Belizean men and women are very often set up and executed through physical and mental abuse.”
 51. The social history and settlement of Surinamese migrant communities in Europe and the Americas is beyond the scope of this study.
 52. The interviews by De Koning and Verrest are anonymous, but identified by place and date of interview. All interviews are deposited in a database at KITLV / Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies in Leiden, the Netherlands. The interviews of the Surinamese-Javanese heritage project are available through the website www.javanenin-diaspora.nl.

1 Setting the Scene: The Culture of Late Colonial Capitalism 1900–1940

1. *Onze West* January 3, 1900.
2. For a cultural history see Van Kempen 2003: 395–634.
3. According to Klinkers (1997: 123) it is unclear whether most of the former enslaved left with their families or not. Klinkers (2007) describes resistance by former enslaved against their former owners and state supervision.
4. Already in 1869, 46 British Indians immigrated by way of British Guiana (*Koloniaal Verslag* 1869). For a history of this migration see De Klerk 1953; Hoefte 1998; Bhagwanbali 2006.
5. The migrants from the Netherlands East Indies were called “Javanese” from the start, even though small minorities from Madura, Sumatra, and Borneo also came to Suriname. For a history of Javanese migration see Ismael 1949; Hoefte 1998.
6. In these population counts by the colonial government, the Creole category included smaller ethnic groups such as Chinese and Europeans.
7. Jap-A-Joe, Sjak Shie, & Vernooij 2001: 201; Van Traa 1946: 37. According to Van Lier (1971: 221) approximately 5 percent of the Hindustanis and 2 percent of the Javanese had converted to Christianity by 1945.
8. Suriname was divided into districts: the number varied throughout the century. In the early decades there were six: Nickerie, Coronie, Saramacca, Suriname, Commewijne, and Marowijne. These administrative units did not have financial or political autonomy. Paramaribo did not and does not have a city government or a mayor (see also chapter 7).
9. Flu (1884–1945) was a medical doctor who was employed at the Military Hospital in Paramaribo. In 1911, he moved to the Netherlands East Indies and in 1921 he was appointed to full professor in tropical hygiene at the University of Leiden. He was the first Surinamese professor in history. In 1938 the same university named him rector magnificus.
10. Almost 40 years later, in 1950, Dr R. D. G. Ph. Simons in an official government report on public health in Suriname criticized the bad conditions of the sandy roads. “Every car causes a cloud of dust, making it normal to see people walking or biking with a handkerchief before their mouths” (National Archives [NA], The Hague 2.18.10 no 713). The number of cars in Paramaribo was limited, however.
11. According to a 1910 government report, 17 percent of the houses in “Negro-yards” were considered unsuitable for habitation, while more than half of the inspected yards had insufficient water supply and waste deposit (see De Bruijne 1976b: 214–215). Political activist Anton de Kom (1934: 143) also describes the miserable state of dwellings and roads in the poor parts of Paramaribo. For more on De Kom see chapter 3.
12. Efforts to build a water supply system at first came to naught, despite heavy lobbying by scientists and hygienists headed by Flu. It was not a technical but a financial and economic issue whether a water supply system would be built.
13. NA 2.18.10 no 713.
14. De Koning (2009a: 8), see also pp. 5–6. See Moore & Johnson 2011 on yard life in colonial Jamaica and Chamberlain (2010: 82) who notes that in Barbados, where child care was considered a village responsibility, “reciprocity, giving and sharing, were core, moral values.”
15. Donner 1993: 22. He states that these inhabitants lived alongside each other, not with each other (p. 43). De Koning (2009a: 19) notes that Donner’s stories actually picture a more complex situation: “ethnic diversity is lived with a matter-of-factness that portrays a deep sense of conviviality and familiarity with others.” The subtitle of Donner’s book, “memories of a lousy youth,” explains his agenda to take the edge of nostalgic stories about a harmonious, peaceful, multicultural Suriname.
16. Lebanese were also called Syrians. They migrated to Suriname voluntarily and were particularly active in the textile trade (De Bruijne 2006).
17. Roos 1912: 155–159. Other popular jobs included shop assistants (468, of whom 459 men), field and railroad laborers (467, of whom 429 men), balata bleeders (459, all men), shopkeepers (291, of whom 279 men), market- and fisher women (286, all women), tailors (245, all men), teachers (223, of whom 131 women), gold prospectors (192, all men), shoemakers (251, all men), black smiths (221, all men), carriers (213, all men), office clerks (175, of whom 165 men), civil servants (163, all men), seamstresses (152, all women), police (120, all men),

- painters (119, all men), merchants (117, of whom 113 men), fishermen (116, all men), seamen (119, all men), and nurses (101, of whom 53 men). A publication on women in Suriname (Surinaamsche Sub-Comitee 1912) from the same year gives higher figures regarding female labor participation. For example, it includes 50 to 60 women working in industrial plants, while the labor report lists only four men and no women as industrial workers. Interestingly, the report listed 19 pharmacists, all men, while the Sub-Comitee emphasized that there were 2 female pharmacists, one even owned her own pharmacy (pp. 53, 58–78). Given the official status of the government report, I have decided to use those data.
18. In the 1920s, oil refineries were established on these islands. From 1925 to 1930 2,002 people left for Curaçao, while 568 migrants returned to Suriname (Van Lier 1971: 249). See also chapter 3.
 19. The Koninklijke West-Indische Maildienst (KWIM, Royal West Indian Mail Service, since 1927 KNSM, Koninklijke Nederlandse Stoomboot Maatschappij / Royal Netherlands Steamboat Company) docked in Suriname once every two weeks, and after World War I once every month. The voyage from Amsterdam to Suriname took 18 days in the early twentieth century. From Suriname the KWIM ships sailed via Trinidad, Venezuela, Curaçao, New York, Suriname, Le Havre, back to Amsterdam (Staal 1927: 88). In the very first years of the century, British ships anchored in Paramaribo on the voyage between London and the British Caribbean colonies.
 20. According to Van Traa (1946: 173) the annual number of steamships leaving for Amsterdam varied between 14 and 29 in the years 1900–1937. The number of ships sailing to New York reached over 150 in 1937.
 21. The first KLM flight to Suriname was in December 1934, when an airplane landed near Paramaribo, five days after leaving Amsterdam. Thousands of people waving Dutch flags greeted the plane (“De eerste vlucht” 1977: 22–25).
 22. Albina counted a few hundred inhabitants, but was important in the gold and balata industries. Albina was in fact “twinned” with St Laurent on the other side of the Marowijne River in French Guiana.
 23. Personal communication, Paramaribo, November 2006.
 24. In 1901, Suriname counted 180 plantations larger than 10 hectares (ha). In 1932, 72 plantations with an acreage of over 10 ha were in production, and of those 24 were left in 1950.
 25. For production and export figures of coffee, cacao, and sugar in the years 1900–1939 see Van Dijck 2001: 52–53. On cacao see Van Traa 1946: 60–64; Van Lier 1971: 229–230, 244–245; Heilbron 1982: 195–199. On coffee see Van Traa 1946: 65–75, on bananas Van Putten 1988: 32–44. Van Traa 1946: 87–100 has written on citrus, rubber, cotton, and sisal cultivation.
 26. Since the abolition of slavery this average had almost doubled, while the total acreage under cultivation had tripled. Calculated from Heilbron 1982: 133.
 27. Production of cacao was relatively easy and did not require massive investments. Between the abolition of slavery and 1900 export increased almost eightfold. The peak in production and export was reached in 1894. Ten years later production was only one-fifth of that year. The definitive slide set in after 1923 and five years later the cacao sector was almost completely liquidated (Van Traa 1946: 60–64; Heilbron 1982: 195–199; Van Lier 1971: 229–230, 244–245).
 28. Heilbron 1982: 222–229. Van Lier (1971: 224–226, 236) emphasizes that not many Creoles were involved in agricultural production for the urban market. It was mainly Dutch farmers (*Burus*) and later Hindustanis who supplied Paramaribo with food. The Hindustanis undercut the prices asked by the *Burus*, who abandoned agriculture for livestock farming.
 29. Van Lier 1971: 248. The situation in Suriname differed from, for example, Jamaica where the wives of smallholders sold the products on the market.
 30. Based on accounts by missionaries, Klinkers (1997: 167–168) emphasizes, however, that marriage was rather uncommon in both Upper-Para and Coronic. The future governor Kielstra argued that the state’s failure to develop stable Creole communities after the abolition of slavery was one of the reasons for Suriname’s lack of economic development (see also chapter 2).
 31. Corn production grew with 68 percent and bananas with 53 percent (Heilbron & Willemsen 1976: 9; also Van Lier 1971: 237).
 32. According to Van Dijck (2001: 51) between 1914 and 1919, small-scale productions units increased from 9,900 to 13,000, the acreage from 12,000 to 19,000 ha, and the number

of producers and dependents grew from nearly 30,000 to almost 38,000 (compared to approximately 19,000 in 1900).

33. For details regarding land distribution, ownership, rent, and other conditions see Quintus Bosz 1954: 338–367; Staal 1927: 54–56; Van Traa 1946: 104–106; Heilbron 1982: 208–216. Most former enslaved did not own but rented the land they cultivated.
34. Josiah (2005: 1) undermines the notion of El Dorado by calling the gold and diamond industries in British Guiana “killing fields.” The main cause of death was drowning, but diseases, exhaustion, malnutrition, and accidents killed more than hundred men per year in the 1890s, see Josiah 2011: 60–65.
35. Thoden van Velzen & Van Wetering 1988: 21–22. In Suriname in the 1880s, yearly average production was 670 kilograms and this average rose to 813 in the next decade. In the first decade of the twentieth century the average reached 950 kilograms and 826 in the 1920s. In French Guiana gold production reached a yearly average of 3,900 kilograms in the period 1900–1914.
36. For production and export values in British Guiana, see Josiah 2011: 42–45.
37. The lack of adequate maps could make the granting of concessions and the exploitation of fields contentious issues. Some of these concessions could be as large as 500,000 ha (Heilbron & Willemsen 1980b: 28). The lack of serious exploration made that actual results dashed the high hopes.

Now that a number of new economic sectors gained ground, it became imperative to have accurate maps and explore where precious raw materials were located. In the years 1900–1911, seven scientific explorations took place to the Coppename, Saramacca, Lawa, Corantijn, Suriname, and Tapanahoni Rivers, and the Tumuk Humak Mountains, yielding much new topographical information, on the course of rivers in particular, that was of scholarly but also of economic and administrative interest (Bruijning & Voorhoeve 1972: 193–194; Van Traa 1946: 194–195). The commercial expeditions by engineers and surveyors were focused on the discovery of gold and other minerals. In the 1920s two more mountain expeditions followed, also with a view of the possibility to generate energy through water power.

In the period 1935–1938, a number of expeditions took place in the frontier area between Suriname and Brazil to settle a dispute on the exact boundaries. The (possible) discovery of precious minerals and later oil were at the root of border disputes with France, Brazil, and Great Britain (later Guyana). The conflicts with France were partially solved in 1891 and 1915, with Brazil in the 1930s, while the two disputed with Guyana were not solved in the twentieth century (see chapter 8). The first survey using an air plane was made in 1939. Aerial surveying became an important element of economic development after World War II.

38. Heilbron & Willemsen 1980a: 84. This figure represents the total number of contracts, not the number of laborers, as individuals could close a maximum of three contracts per year. In French Guiana, the gold rush at the upper Mana River attracted between 10,000 and 12,000 gold diggers in 1907 alone (Thoden van Velzen & Van Wetering 1988: 22), while in 1899–1899 British Guiana counted more than 27,000 gold miners (Josiah 2011: 43). British Indian and later Javanese (time-expired) indentured laborers were excluded from the gold industry (Heilbron 1982: 87; see also note 46).
39. Through an agency, a group of 63 laborers from Montserrat was recruited in 1901, but these men never reached Suriname as they alighted in British Guiana, claiming they were contracted to work in British not Dutch Guiana (Polak 1908: 203–205).
40. In 1901, one company suggested to introduce personal logbooks registering the laborer's name, personal characteristics, labor history, days worked, sick days, and suitability to curb these practices. Despite the administration's approval, the plan came to naught as only two companies participated; the others recognized the advantages but, according to contemporary expert J. A. Polak (1908: 198), complained about the administrative workload, adding this “characterizes the bizarre situation here.”
41. In one case, laborers were offered a higher wage to pull equipment. A number of them refused and left the placer. The company sued them, but lost the case when the cantonal judge acquitted the men. The attorney general appealed the decision: the court of justice in Paramaribo then sentenced the men to eight days hard labor (Polak 1908: 181).

42. Originally, a private company was going to build the railroad, yet when it turned out that the company could not raise the necessary capital, the government in The Hague agreed to finance the project, ignoring the warnings from the *Koloniale Staten* see Polak 1908: 114–132, 137–139, 208–223, 227–242; Heilbron & Willemsen 1980b: 30–35; Van Putten 1990; Van Traa 1946: 137–140. Van Traa (1946: 139) estimates the construction cost at 9 million guilders, Heilbron & Willemsen at 12 million. Staal (1927: 93) sketches the longer-term financial consequences of this project for Suriname and the Netherlands.
43. Balata's characteristics are different from rubber as it is less flexible and therefore cannot be used for the making of tires etc. The exploitation of balata was less sustainable than rubber harvesting as the balata tree can only be tapped again after the earlier incisions are "healed" which means that the trees have to recover for a couple of years. The Hevea used for rubber can be tapped at much shorter intervals (for Hevea and the leaf blight epidemic in 1915 see Grandin 2009: 31–32, 299–318). The Suriname administration prohibited to log the trees or to cut them deeper than half their circumference. It turned out to be impossible to control the activities of the bleeders (Van Traa 1946: 128–130; Oliveira 1977: 9, 42–50).
44. See Oudschans Dentz, Plasschaert, & Sack (1909: 48–51) for the exact regulation.
45. For model labor contracts see Oudschans Dentz 1911: XXII–XXVI.
46. Art. 24 prohibited to "employ British Indian immigrants or other British Indian laborers, brought in by the colonial administration in *Suriname*" [emphasis in the original] (Oudschans Dentz, Plasschaert, & Sack 1909: 78). This left the door open to British Indians from British colonies. The Javanese are not mentioned as the law was drawn up before their first arrival.
47. For details on the organization of production see Oliveira 1977: 20–24, 28–33, 38–39. She writes that the St Lucians often took their wives along to the forest, so that the women could cook and they would save money on accommodation in the city (Oliveira 1977: 32). See also De Kom (1934: 144–147, 184–186) who critically describes labor conditions in the balata industry.
48. Oudschans Dentz, Plasschaert, & Sack (1909: 54) state that in Nickerie in the period 1890–1891, 110,000 guilders were paid in wages, of which 30,000 guilders in food, tools etc., 40,000 guilders were paid in Demerara, and 40,000 in Nickerie, part of which was also spent outside Suriname. According to these authors, in Suriname only shop keepers selling alcohol made money of the bleeders. According to Singelenberg (1983: 23) ties between Nickerie and British Guiana remained closer than with Paramaribo for decades. According to this author, as late as 1957 the British pound was the preferred currency in the most western district of Suriname.
49. See for this episode in Suriname's colonial history Thoden van Velzen 2003. According to him, the strike is a taboo subject among Maroons, because of the humiliation of one of their leaders by the colonial government and the long lasting dissent between certain Maroon clans (pp. 47–48). See also Scholtens 1994: 68–85.
50. Anonymous missionary in 1901 quoted in Neumann 1967: 103.
51. Almost all timber estates had ceased to exist after the abolition of slavery.
52. Forestry management was weak, yet plans to strengthen it were not very successful. This would remain a problem throughout the century.
53. The same regulations regarding foreign companies that applied to the gold and balata industries also were in effect for the exploitation of bauxite; a company had to be registered in Suriname or the Netherlands.
54. Van Traa 1946: 204–205. Van Traa believed at the time that British policies saved the sugar industry, but in reality it only postponed its inevitable decline. A minor point that Van Traa makes concerns population density. He thinks that the larger population of British Guiana (337,039) and the higher population density, 1.5 persons per square kilometer compared to Suriname's 1 person per square kilometer, gave the British colony an economic advantage.
55. Before 1900 there were less than 500 eligible voters, in 1921 966, between 1921 and 1937 the average was 1,180, and in 1940 the number rose to 2,121. Not every eligible voter actually voted; for example, in 1902, 200 out of total of 703 voters did not show up at the polls (Goslinga 1990: 657).
56. An Administrative Council (*Raad van Bestuur*), formed by the governor himself, the attorney-general, a vice-chairman, and three members, advised the governor, but the latter was at liberty to whether to follow up on these suggestions (Meel 1999: 21). For a detailed description

- of the political-administrative and financial system see the account by former governor Staal (1927: 28–35, 156–168).
57. There existed no parties or programs, and elected members were chosen on the basis of their personality and the coverage in newspapers. So-called electors' associations (*kiesverenigingen*) could endorse a candidate by advertizing in the papers. The appointed members were to protect the interests of the freedpeople, as they did not have the right to vote, against the planters, who at first tended to be overrepresented in the *Staten*.
 58. Van Lier 1971: 222. Women had the right to stand as a candidate but not to vote.
 59. On Pavel Vaclac Killinger (1876–1936) see Ramsoedh 2003: 191–196; Van Lier 1971: 359–360; Klinkers 2011: 59–61. Ramsoedh also pays attention to the image of Killinger among contemporaries and in current historiography.
 60. This pacifist free state should stimulate the economy and provide basic social services such as clean drinking water.
 61. Ramsoedh (2003: 197–198) portrays the six men, who were all part of the lower middle class. For the betrayal see Ramsoedh 2003: 199 and 201.

2 The Growing Role of the State in Late Colonial Society

1. During state supervision the more than 33,000 former enslaved were to perform mandatory contract work for an employer of their own choice under supervision of the state.
2. Creole laborers continued to be a small but important part of the plantation work force as they often performed skilled and better-paying jobs.
3. The NHM was founded in 1824 at the instigation of King Willem I, to promote trade, shipping, shipbuilding, fishing and agriculture, and manufacturing. Soon, the NHM was part banker, part planter. It founded the Surinaamsche Bank in 1865 and in the 1880s became the largest sugar producer, and employer, in the colony.
4. The district commissioners and the judges thus replaced the planters as disciplinary forces. The commissioner was directly responsible to the governor. On the growing influence of the commissioners see also Heilbron 1982: 218.
5. The state had to pay full costs connected with disability, desertion, and death.
6. For a study of Kielstra and his policies see Ramsoedh 1990. Contemporary Dutch journalist and government official J. van de Walle (1975: 27) gives a lively description of Suriname's colonial officials and their rigid routines in the early 1940s. He remarks that Kielstra made a militaristic rather than a professional impression.
7. It is unclear whether Kielstra was familiar with Furnivall's theory, see Hoefte 2011.
8. Kielstra 1925b: 55. For other, similar, publications on Suriname following his visit in 1925 see Kielstra 1925a; 1925c; 1927; and 1929.
9. Kielstra 1925b: 71. It is not exactly clear to which group Kielstra referred to with the term "Surinamese"; presumably he meant Creoles.
10. On Rutgers's tenure in Suriname see chapter 3.
11. See Ramsoedh 1990: 110–119 for a history of Kielstra's "village policy." The institution of new village municipalities caused a rift between the governor and the *Staten*. Kielstra promulgated the ordinance without the *Staten's* approval. Dutch parliament censured the governor's actions. See also Mulder 1990. Derveld (1982: 59–60) describes how the already existing Javanese community of Tamanredjo, in the Commewijne district, became an official village (*dorpsgemeente*) with an elected *lurah* (village leader) and five elected council members; for the legal implications see Quintus Bosz 1954: 255–256. Van de Walle (1975: 16) pointedly remarks that Kielstra considered Suriname an "outer area" (*buitengewest*) of the Dutch East Indies.
12. Kielstra (1929: 344) believed that the Hindustani group had the best economic understanding; he counted on the "less economically developed groups," especially the Javanese, to become peasants.
13. De Waal Malefijt (1963: 35–36). She also notes that the Javanese sacred and traditional relationship to the land was missing in Suriname.
14. On the formation of associations see McNeill & Chimmam Lal 1915:183–184, app. 22; Ramdin 1989; Hoefte 1998: 179–180.

15. The SIV made Sital Persad a *Mahatma* in a ceremony attended by Governor Staal (1916–1920), the director of the Surinaamsche Bank, and three district-commissioners. Sital Persad was baptized by the Moravians, and when he died in 1923 he was buried in a Christian cemetery according to the rights of the Arya Samaj, an Indian reformist sect that reached Suriname by way of British Guiana in 1912 (see Hoefte 1998: 180, 245).
16. A rival union was founded in 1911: *Vrijheid en Recht* or *Ikhtiyar aur Hakh* (Freedom and Justice) by the enemies of the powerful Sital Persad. The goal of the union was to promote “the protection, brotherhood, and integration of Hindustani immigrants in Suriname.” Despite official fears, the topics discussed could not be considered inflammatory. However, a weak financial basis as well as organizational problems and scandals made *Ikhtiyar aur Hakh* virtually ineffective (Hoefte 1998: 179–180).
17. Hoefte 1998: 179–180. For Chinese migrant associations see Tjon Sie Fat 2009: 284–293.
18. The introduction of compulsory education, in Dutch, in 1876 was an important aspect of assimilation attempts in the nineteenth century. This law applied to British Indian children two years later. In 1867 there were six public schools and a larger number of religious schools run by the Moravian (*Herrnhutter*) and Roman Catholic churches. The language of instruction in the former schools was Sranan, in the Catholic schools Dutch. The language of instruction continued to be an issue for decades, as this chapter will show. The number of students was low, however, therefore the governor and the *Staten* introduced compulsory education (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 119–135).
19. Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 250–265; Hoefte 1998: 174–176. The financial cut backs had their origin in the Netherlands. The so-called school funding controversy (*schoolstrijd*) there had major financial consequences for Suriname. In 1917 public and religious education were given the same rights. In practice this meant that the state had to pay for both forms of education, leading to large increases in expenses. In Suriname this took effect in 1929 (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 230–231). Approximately one-seventh of total expenditures were spent on education (Van Traa 1946: 32).
20. Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 212, 238–243; Van Stipriaan 1998: 74–76; Van Traa 1946: 26; Van Gilst 2009: 4. Staal (1927: 116) writes that in Paramaribo in the 1920s, 85 percent of the registered boys and girls did go to school regularly (Gobardhan-Rambocus (2001: 132, 135) provides similar figures). In the districts, these percentages were 72 percent for boys and 76 percent for girls. The main reasons for not attending school were the poor infrastructure, the lack of shoes and clothing, and the parents’ lack of interest in education. At that time, approximately 10 percent of Hindustani schoolchildren received some form of secondary education (in Paramaribo) (Van Lier 1971: 221). The Javanese would catch up in the second half of the century. Maroons and Amerindians had been beyond colonial control for such a long time, that “they were effectively excluded from any kind of policy” (Van Stipriaan 1998: 70). Gobardhan-Rambocus dismisses the notion that education in the interior used to be good; until 1948 the schools were only store houses of children. “The brothers and missionaries at that time selected the best students and offered them secondary education. The efforts by the missionaries and brothers gave the most intelligent children a push. But that didn’t apply to all others” (quoted in De Vries 2005: 107).
21. One of the best-known examples of how education itself was a career was a teacher of the highest possible qualifications, C. R. Biswamitre (1897–1980). He was born in Nickerie and had advanced through the Catholic school system. He was in all likelihood the first Hindustani to receive his further education in the Netherlands and he was the first Hindustani to be elected to the *Staten* on account of Catholic votes. He was socially and politically active until well after World War II, promoting the interests of the Hindustani population.
22. Kielstra 1927: 190. More leftist politicians also doubted the value of an extensive education as it would lead to the depopulation of the districts, see Hoefte 2007: 97. In 1939, the administration founded two *desa* schools, to be paid by the community itself, where education was given in Javanese and was limited to reading, writing, and simple arithmetic (Ramsoedh 1990: 118; Van Gilst 2009: 4).
23. Meel (1999: 28) points out that a more hidden argument was that what the common-law unions, a frequent living arrangement among Creoles in particular, did not get the same legal status as the Asian marriages.
24. Immigrants who were already married on arrival obtained immediate registration at the office of the agent general. Most of the registered marriages between immigrants were

recorded on arrival and not many legal weddings among immigrants took place in Suriname. Interethnic marriages were a rarity, averaging about two a year in the period 1892–1917, with a high of five in 1909.

These marriage laws survived Suriname's independence and were only changed in the twenty-first century.

25. These pillars did not completely overlap. Approximately one-fifth of the British Indians was Muslim. In Suriname Indian and Javanese usually are divided into East (to where Mecca was) and West (like in Java) worshippers. The British Indians adhered to the Hanafitish shari'ah. Their literature and ritual language was based on Urdu, not Arabic. The Javanese Muslims, on the other hand, adhered to the Shafitit shari'ah.
26. Few people with experience in the East Indies actually moved to Suriname, as salaries were considerably lower in the Caribbean. Dutchmen who came escaped the unemployment crises at home (Klinkers 2011: 144). Probably more important than the actual arrival of new civil servants was the message that local people were inferior and had to make way for Europeans (see, for example, De Kom 1934: 151).
27. Peter Cool was not only the director of the colonial hospital but also in charge of the Medical Inspection Services, thus making him the administrative and the executive head of the medical field. Cool was forced to resign after an official inquiry, NA, 2.10.18 Kabinet Geheim, nr 82; see also Egger 2008: 108–109.
28. See chapter 3 for more on this unrest and subsequent repression. Among Hindustanis the governor was more popular: when Kielstra was forced to leave in 1944, a part of the Hindustani population wanted to erect a statue for him; this plan was not executed, however.
29. One of Kielstra's predecessors, Governor A. J. A. A. van Heemstra (1921–1928) "displayed a remarkable degree of preparedness to appoint Surinamers to responsible functions" (Van Lier 1971: 326).
30. "The complete apparatus: a governor and his secretariat, *Staten*, departments and independent central administrations, twelve district commissioners, a Court of Justice, cantonal judges, 90 public and private schools is not in accordance with a population of approximately 125,000 people, nor with the financial capacity of colonial society" (Kielstra 1925a: 559). Ramsোধ (1990: 22) notes that in 1918 the costs of the colonial bureaucracy, including police, amounted to 70 percent of official expenditures, in 1933 this percentage had been reduced to 52 percent. See the next chapter for more information on the police force.

3 Discontent, Protest, and Repression in the 1930s

1. No new intelligence services were created; spying was a police task (Klinkers 2011: 117–120).
2. Klinkers 2011: 111–115. To compensate for the cutbacks in the police force during the economic crisis a civil guard was erected in Paramaribo (120 men), Coronie (20), and Nickerie (20). Its task was to maintain law and order, with "force if need be." According to Klinkers (2011: 113) the importance of this guard turned out to be negligible.
3. See Hoeft 2007 and 2008 for short biographies of Grace Schneiders–Howard (1869–1968). In 1938 she was the first woman to be elected to the *Staten*.
4. In the Netherlands East Indies, exports fell by two-thirds in the period 1929–1932. As in Suriname, civil servants' salaries, military and educational expenses, and other services were drastically cut in the East as well (Kossmann 1978: 669–670).
5. According to Ramsোধ (1990: 20) civil servants lost 4 to 10 percent of their salaries and 6–9 percent of their pensions.
6. Scholtens 1986: 52. On a total number of 13,000 Creole men between 15 and 65 years the unemployment rate was approximately 30 percent (Ramsোধ 1990: 30).
7. Data on purchasing power are not available, but indicative are the number of tax returns that decreased from 9,009 in 1928 to 6,015 in 1933. Taxable income declined from 13 million to 9 million guilders (Ramsোধ 1990: 25).
8. The churches noted the increasing poverty, prostitution, requests for financial assistance, and free medical care, see statements in e.g., De Kom 1934: 198–199 and Ramsোধ 1990: 27–28.

9. Annual report of the Evangelische Broedergemeente cited in *De Banier van Waarheid en Recht* July 27, 1932.
10. National Archives (NA), Collection Rollin Couquerque (RC) 2.12.142 nr 21, letter of March 9, 1930; see also letter of March 2, 1930.
11. The estimates on the number of people attending vary from 200 (Scholtens 1986: 55; Brautigam 1999: 4) to 5,000 (Wijntuin 1998: 22). The latter figure seems quite high.
12. On Doedel (1905–1980) see Scholtens 1986; 1987; Wijntuin 1998; Brautigam 1999. There is no evidence of any personal relation between Urbina and Doedel (Wijntuin 1998: 18). Of the other leaders less is known, with the exception of Marinus Lepelblad, another migrant to Curaçao who in 1930 was fired by the oil company CPIM, see Scholtens 1986: 56–59.
13. Scholtens 1986: 56; also Wijntuin 1998: 19; Brautigam 1999: 4. The Communist Party was not interested in Suriname, and focused its attention on the Netherlands East Indies. This changed in 1930 when Anton de Kom became more active (Blekendaal 2010: 72–74).
14. Scholtens 1986: 27–28; Tjoa 1995: 28. Not much is known about this politically active union. According to Scholtens, a market woman named Moejsje Temmes was its founder.
15. According to Wijntuin (1998: 36), the great majority of the arrested were people who held jobs. For descriptions of this riot and its aftermath see Van Lier 1971: 363–367; De Kom 1934: 198–199; Hira 1983: 279–296; Scholtens 1986: 54–67, 117–133.
16. Recent publications on Anton de Kom (1898–1945) include a biography by Boots & Woortman (2009) and an article placing De Kom in a Surinamese nationalist and Caribbean context by Meel (2009). Another English-language publication is Kinshasa (2002).
17. Boot & Woortman 2009: 113. Meel (2009: 259) is not sure about De Kom's denial, also made in a note in his book *Wij slaven van Suriname* (1934: 232, n. 82), "it is safe to assume that his message partly served image-building purposes." According to Meel (2009: 265) there is no hard evidence supporting the idea that the Communist Party Holland directed De Kom's return to Suriname. Scholtens (1986: 81) states that De Kom certainly was a fellow traveler, but that he was not a theoretician grounded in historical materialism. Van Lier (1971: 370) argues that *Wij slaven* proved that De Kom "had been completely won over to communist ideas."
18. De Kom's wife Nel Borsboom was Dutch and their children were born in the Netherlands.
19. NA, RC 2.21.142 inv nr 22 letter February 12, 1933.
20. A term used by the Colonial Minister in a missive to warn Governor Rutgers about De Kom's arrival (quoted in Boots & Woortman 2009: 105; Scholtens 1986: 75).
21. De Kom 1934: 214. According to him (p. 211), the notebooks had mysteriously disappeared after a police search of his house.
22. According to De Kom (1934: 210) some days more than 1,500 people came to see him, some of whom "had traveled seven to eight days."
23. Meel (2009: 263) points out that in Surinamese-Javanese history, at last three leading politicians, Iding Soemita, Willy Soemita, and Paul Somohardjo, assumed the role of messiah with promises to lead their population group out of misery and even back to Java.
24. According to the District Commissioner of Commewijne, De Kom had promised the Javanese 350 guilders and a return to Java within four months. In his journal of February 1933 he recorded strikes at plantations Domburg and Jagtlust, which he blamed on De Kom (NA, 2.10.18 Kabinet Geheim (KG), nr 53).
As Meel (2009: 263) states, there is not enough factual testimony to decide whether De Kom indeed collected money or not. De Kom (1934: 214) himself blamed establishment newspapers, such as *De West* en *De Surinamer*, and the Catholic clergy for negative stories about him.
25. On the De Kom affair see Van Lier 1971: 369–375; De Kom 1934: 207–222; Hira 1983: 296–321; Scholtens 1986: 74–90, 137–154; Boots & Woortman 2009: 103–133; Meel 2009: 262–264. This case had limited resonance in the Netherlands, as the metropolis was focused on another colonial tragedy in the East: a mutiny on the war ship *De Zeven Provinciën* that had started on February 4 was ended by the (controversial) bombing of the ship on the tenth. Twenty-three lives were lost.
26. NA, RC 2.21.142 inv nr 22 letter March 18, 1933.
27. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, January 16, 2007.
28. Klinkers 2011: 116. The *Staten* rejected the proposal to prohibit the import of subversive publications from the Netherlands.

29. NA, 2.10.18 KG nr 59, Governor to Attorney-General, no date. On Kruisland see Van Kempen 2003: 433–435.
30. See also Klinkers 2011: 118. The key person in this relation between the police and Heinrich Liesdek, chairman and key figure of the Surinaamsche Democratische Arbeiders Partij (SDAP, Surinamese Democratic Labor Party) in 1933, seems to have been Schneiders-Howard, who was also active in the party. A letter from the attorney-general to the governor seems to confirm this. Given Schneiders-Howard's relationship with some state authorities, such as the attorney-general, it is likely that she indeed "recruited" him to serve as informant. According to the chief of police, Liesdek "is stupid and lacks tact; he is reaching too high and parrots what prominent leaders say without understanding it . . . Because of his instability I consider him dangerous" (NA, 2.10.18 KG nr 57, Commissioner of Police November 29, 1933).
31. The condition of Doedel and the background of his institutionalization remain unclear. In Suriname he was forgotten until the 1970s when several politicians attempted to rehabilitate him. The publication by Emile Wijntuin (1998) is one such attempt. Wijntuin sees Doedel as more important to Suriname's history than De Kom, by arguing that the riots in 1931 constituted a true popular revolution (pp. 33–34). The historical importance of Doedel vs De Kom is a minor topic in the historiography of Suriname. For example, Hira thinks that Doedel is of less importance than De Kom, while Ramssoedh thinks that De Kom is overvalued (Brautigam 1999: 23–26; also Scholtens 1986: 94–98). Brautigam (1999: 11–29) published a number of interviews that were conducted for a television documentary on Doedel that was aired in the Netherlands in 1999. In January 2013, a bust of Doedel was unveiled in Paramaribo; one of the initiators was Wijntuin (*Starnieuws* January 5, 2013, accessed January 11, 2013).
- The other prominent labor leader Theo de Sanders remained active throughout World War II, but then disappeared from view. He died in 1976 forgotten and unremembered.
32. Scholtens 1986: 79. Some 500 Hindustanis gathered at a meeting of Bharat Uday on February 12. They voiced a number of complaints regarding return premiums, taxes, infrastructure, medical treatment, education, and existing legal and religious obstacles. The consensus was that the Hindustanis had come to town on the seventh with good intentions, instead they were brutally treated by the police (Scholtens 1986: 90). For more on Bharat Uday, see chapter 2.
33. NA, 2.10. 18 KG nr 56. Copy of report by inspector of police MacDonald. The PII combined politics and religion. Its goal was to "legally unite the Indonesian Muslims in Suriname and to look after their religious and social interests" (Hoefte 1998: 183).
34. During World War II, De Kom joined the communist resistance. In 1944 the Nazis arrested and deported him to Germany. He died in concentration camp Sandbostel in 1945.
35. De Kom 1934: 171. According to Boots & Woortman (2009: 29), De Kom was part of the middle class, but they provide little proof to substantiate their claim.
36. Meel (2009: 257) argues that De Kom "underexposed and presumably also underestimated these differences, being too greatly absorbed by his endeavor to counterbalance the divide-and-rule strategies of the colonial government." Oostindie (1990: 6) thinks that De Kom attempted "to write away" the ethnic divisions.
37. According to Meel (2009: 259) "Apart from De Kom's inclination to focus on practical action rather than on . . . theoretical debate this apparent lack of ideological elaboration is to a great extent due to the stance of the Dutch authorities." De Kom adopted a low profile in Holland and there is a possibility that *Wij slaven* had been subject to censorship. Given that the original version of the text has been lost it is hard to determine its history of writing and publication (Boots & Woortman 2009: 82–98, 136–192; Oostindie 1986: 71–73; Scholtens 1986: 161–162).
38. On the "second life" of De Kom, see Boots & Woortman 2009: 317–461.
39. Hira was the first to extensively challenge Van Lier's pluralism approach. His re-evaluation of De Kom was part of a larger effort to privilege class and resistance rather than ethnicity in the history of Suriname. On this historiographical debate see Oostindie 1990: 16–18; Hassankhan 2012: 17–19.
40. *De Banier van Waarheid en Recht* July 21, 1931; this paper recorded many instances of socio-economic hardship in the 1930s.
41. *De Banier van Waarheid en Recht* August 27; September 7, 1932.

42. NA, RC 2.21.142. inv nr 20, letter March 15, 1929, inv nr 21, letters March 2, 1930; May 11, 1930. Schneiders-Howard did not stand alone, as Rutgers became deeply unpopular in Suriname. His governorship in Suriname broke his career; his lack of executive ability was cited as the main reason why he did not become governor-general of the Netherlands East Indies in 1936 (Ramsoedh 1990: 41).
43. Scholtens 1986: 137. The chief of police and the attorney-general differed on the threat of meetings and organizations. According to the police chief there were no threats against the state, leading to a conflict with the attorney-general (NA, 2.10.18 KG nr 57).
44. See, for example, the speeches by *Staten* member Putscher, made in the Netherlands in July 1933, who blamed the administrative organization and the poor choice of civil servants, lack of initiative and organizational talent, and administrative incompetency for the existing discontent in Suriname (p. 4). Many considered the civil servants to be second rate, bypassing native men.
45. The 741st division of the Universal Negro Improvement Association was founded in Suriname in 1924 by the Rijts brothers, but this did not lead to a back-to-Africa movement in the Dutch colony (Van Stipriaan 2004: 283). On the political importance of Garveyism in the Caribbean see Bolland 2001: 167–199; James 1998; Post 1978: 163–321. On the antagonism between the Surinamese-born communist Otto Huiswoud and Garvey see Post 1978: 2–5. Huiswoud, a resident of the United States, believed in international communism, while Garvey concentrated his efforts on the progress of black and colored people in the Caribbean and the United States.
On Ethiopianism see Charles Reavis Price (2003) who analyzes this movement and its critique on racial and social inequalities. He focuses on Jamaica where Ethiopianism grew its deepest roots.
46. See also De Kom (1934: 199), who states that Doedel's speeches were "friendly, full of confidence in the powers that be."
47. For examples of Doedel's writings and speeches see Scholtens 1987; Wijntuin 1998.
48. Already before the Moyne Commission toured the Caribbean, piecemeal reforms were implemented; however, these reform policies reinforced rather than stopped the discontent (Bolland 2001: 126–144).
49. Bolland 2001: 3, also 356–357; also Post 1978: 238 and Bolles 1996: 50 who contend that the protests did not lead to profound social transformations. Lauria-Perrecelli (2005: 17) reaches a similar conclusion on how new political parties coopted parts of the labor movement and thus managed to neutralize the most radical sectors in Puerto Rico while "cementing their rule through patronage."
50. In Jamaica, for example, the two emerging political parties PNP (People's National Party) and JLP (Jamaica Labour Party) soon developed into "middle-class-led labor-based bodies" and three of the country's postindependence prime ministers, Norman Manley, Alexander Bustamante, and Hugh Shearer, started their political career as trade union leaders, while in Trinidad the connection between the unrest of the 1930s and the political organizing of the middle class is less clear, but still visible (Ledgister 1998: 182). In these two-way alliances, the politicized lower classes are actively courted as the "middle class cannot presume an automatic deference," (p. 167) while in Suriname the masses are presumed to follow the political elites, as will be discussed in further detail in the following chapters.
51. The middle class basically equated modernization with Westernization, rejecting the traditional, Creole folk culture of the lower classes. Schulte Nordholt (2009: 107) points out that in the Netherlands East Indies the middle class was not as interested in nationalism as in modernity. For the British Caribbean see Rush (2011: 2), who writes that many middle-class Caribbean people considered themselves "members of a modernizing, progressive society."
52. For the importance of language as a socio-economic marker, see Bolland 2001: 173–177; Rush 2011: 70–71; Moore & Johnson 2011: 82–96.
53. *Staten* member Putscher (1933: 6) speaks of an "excited and angry mob, including so many primitive elements." Van Lier (1971: 376), a middle-class colored, argues that "malnutrition on the whole makes for mental instability among" the masses, leading in turn to violence.
54. Scholtens (1986: 79–80) assumes that De Kom is the author.
55. For example, Schneiders-Howard regularly corresponded with several Dutch MPs from different parties.

The social-democrat Van Kol traveled in the Caribbean and published two articles in the *West-Indische Gids* in 1919.

56. Ramsoedh 1990: 7. Until August 1939 governments in the Netherlands were all conservative or liberal in character, and thus espoused *laissez-faire* policies.
57. J. A. A. van Doorn as cited in Schulte Nordholt 2009: 106.
58. Albert Helman is one of the many pseudonyms of Lou Lichtveld (1903–1996). He was born in Paramaribo in an upper-middle-class family of mixed origin and received his education in the Netherlands. Helman's novel was an inspiration to De Kom (1934), who quoted Helman in epigraphs in his own book, see pp. 15 and 143.
59. The possible sale of Suriname was discussed in the Dutch periodical *Het Koloniaal Weekblad* for an entire year. Some in the Dutch Caribbean favored such a deal as they expected that the United States would bring more progress and prosperity than the Dutch. Oddly enough, the issue was barely touched upon in the Surinamese press (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2008: 79).
60. The US presence during World War II gave a considerable impulse to this longing for modernity.
61. Oostindie (2006: 31–37) discusses the gratitude to King Willem III (1849–1890) in Suriname for abolishing slavery, which was later extended to his successors Wilhelmina (1898–1948) and Juliana (1948–1980). Until well after World War II, commemorations of emancipation emphasized the link between abolition and gratitude to the king. As Oostindie (p. 38) points out, there is no sign whatsoever that the king was ever interested in slavery or the slave trade.
62. Just before independence, the statue was moved to a less conspicuous place. The square was renamed: Oranjeplein (after the House of Orange) became Onafhankelijkheidsplein (Independence Square).
63. Quoted in Van Verre 1980: 15. For similar observations in the British Caribbean see Rush (2011) who describes how a growing number of white-collar people through schools, churches, and other social institutions “increasingly participated actively in the shaping and transmission of a Caribbean Britishness” (Rush 2011: 9).

4 Resetting the Scene: Developments 1940–1975

1. For a general history of the war in Suriname see Van der Horst 2004 and Jones & Captain 2010.
2. Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 306, 310; Pengel 2006: 37. See also interviews with Esselien Bakrude-Bolwerk, Friede Norine Ferrol-Mac-Intosh, and Pauline Hermelijn in Rijssen (2012).
3. Kielstra and Colonial Minister Welter feared that Suriname would lose its sovereignty. With the Japanese occupation of the Netherlands East Indies in January 1942, the Netherlands Antilles and Suriname remained the only territories under Dutch rule. See Jones & Captain (2010: 49–52) for the US military presence in Suriname. According to Humberto García-Muñiz many of the troops stationed in Suriname were Puerto Rican (email June 21, 2007). This was the case since the fall of 1943 when Puerto Ricans replaced white Americans. One man (born in 1933) tells: “In the American army there were many Puerto Ricans, from Puerto Rico” (interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, April 6, 2007), another man tells that “the girls were crazy about those Puerto Ricans” (interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, April 12, 2007). In the British Caribbean all bases “were manned by Puerto Rican soldiers” by the end of 1943 (García-Muñiz & Campo 2009: 446).
4. Scholtens 1991: 17; Van der Horst 2004: 25–26. In 1942, the Americans transformed Zanderij Airport into the largest and most modern military airport in South America.
5. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo March 19, 2007; also Van der Horst 2004: 30–32.
6. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, March 22, 2007.
7. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, November 29, 2006. See also the chapter in Van der Horst (2004: 37–52) subtitled “We have celebrated the war.” A veteran, Wilfred Teixeira, counters these sentiments: “It is said that we in Suriname celebrated the war. Nothing could be further from the truth” (Rijssen 2012: 107).

8. Scholtens (1991: 22) and Jones & Captain (2010: 252–256) differ on the exact number. For interviews with Surinamese World War II veterans see Rijssen 2012. The return of the veterans caused a political shock when in 1947 Simon Sanches was arrested for plotting a coup. Frustrated by the lack of employment and recognition, Sanches and his group planned to storm the governor's palace and the police headquarters; a statue of Anton de Kom was to replace that of Queen Wilhelmina. Sanches was not only dissatisfied with Dutch colonial rule, but also with the emancipation of the Asian populations. In 1948 Sanches was sentenced to a short term in jail, and then shipped off to the Netherlands, as the authorities feared that his ideas would continue to stir unrest, particularly among the Creole population. On the cold reception of the veterans see the interviews with Andre Ludwig Neiden, Anton Semmoh, and Franklin Octaaf Soeral in Rijssen 2012.
9. In 1941, the United States and Great Britain called for self-determination in all colonial societies. However, Suriname remained isolated within the region; for example, there is little evidence that political ideas or the names of prominent politicians from other Caribbean nations aiming for autonomy were of import in Suriname (see Van de Walle 1975: 116).
10. Compare to Rush 2011: 119–131 for similar sentiments in the Anglophone Caribbean. To some the promise of autonomy was an important motive to join the military actions in the Netherlands East Indies in 1944.
11. For the Bos Verschuur case see Breeveld (2004); Marshall (2003: 48–55); Ramssoedh (2007); Jansen van Galen (2000: 57–62). Breeveld in particular sees Bos Verschuur as the forerunner of independence.
12. During the years 1959–1969 the area for large-scale agriculture was expanded by 5,500 hectares, while the area cultivated by smallholders declined by 4,500 hectares (Van Dijk 2001: 63).
13. Calculated from Buijning & Voorhoeve 1972: 363, tables 6 and 7.
14. Van Dijk 2001: 63. The graphic on that page shows the increase in real GDP during the period 1953–1968. During the Brokopondo push real gross national product (GNP) increased by 14 percent and per capita GNP by 11 percent (p. 64). This strong upward trend, however, caused inflation and increased wage levels.
15. According to Surinamese law, “the state owns all the land and natural resources and only those who can show titles that derive from the state, may claim ownership rights. Since indigenous peoples and maroons do not possess such titles, they may only claim certain ‘entitlements’ that are subject to the general interest” (Kambel 2007: 69), see also chapter 8.
16. The roads were mainly built for economic purposes. Most important were roads to the airport Zanderij (1940s), the road to the dam at Afobaka (1960s), and the East–West link between Albina and Nickerie (1960s). Suriname was some 15 years behind British Guiana; there the first airstrips were constructed in the 1930s, and by 1948 the neighboring colony counted 26 airstrips. Air transportation was considered “vital in opening up the interior” (Josiah 2011: 82).
17. The official name was in English because of the (financial) involvement of the United Nations in this project. Its most visible promoter was engineer and politician Frank Essed, who proclaimed that Operatie Sprinkhaan was intended to “mobilize our own things” (“*mobilisatie van het eigene*”). As elsewhere in the Caribbean, economic development was thus intertwined with political nationalism.
18. One of the results of Operation Grasshopper was the discovery of bauxite in the Bakhuis Mountains. This initiated the West Suriname Project (see at the end of this chapter). The seven air strips were located near Tafelberg, Kaysergebergte, and the rivers Sipaliwini, Kabalebo, Oelemari, Palumeu, and Coeroenie (Sanches 2012: 31).
19. Van Stipriaan (2011: 37–38) outlines that an outboard motor in the interior was equal in status to a car in Paramaribo. Traveling time to the city was reduced by days when motors became available.
20. See Hoop (1991) for an account of the preparations for and social, economic, and political consequences of this forced migration. He concludes that the Saramakans were not involved in the decision-making process and were faced with a fait accompli (p. 65). See also Price (2011: 29–40) for the devastating effect of the dam on Saramaka culture, that flooded approximately 50 percent of Saramaka territory. “From the perspective of Saramakas, the Afobaka project was a direct assault on their property rights and sovereignty” (Price 2011: 45). With Lake Brokopondo a large part of the railroad, including the stations Kabel and

- Dam, that was built in the first decades of the century disappeared under water (Wicherts & Veltkamp 2012: 35).
21. Hoop (1991: 71–72) argues the same by pointing out that government policies to keep the Maroons in the interior accomplished the opposite.
 22. The first Maroon parties, founded in the 1950s, were not very successful.
 23. In the early 1960s there was a counterreaction in the form of a prophet cult (Boven 2006: 109–110). For a history of missionary activities among the Trio in the western interior see Mans (2012: 140–145). The Door-to-Life missionaries made their first contact with the Trio in 1960.
 24. Boven 2006: 290. She notes that in contrast to Suriname, the French emphasized and subsidized the “preservation of traditions.” The ant or wasp trials are rites of passage for boys.
 25. For example, the village of Kawemhakan (also called Lawa by the Wayana) grew from 40 to 400 inhabitants in the mid-1980s (Boven 2011: 15).
 26. In 1973 the VHP changed its name to Vooruitrevende Hervormings Partij (Progressive Reform Party), still abbreviated as VHP. For studies of pre-independence Suriname politics see Dew 1978 or Marshall (2003: 57–62, 133–143). On political developments and its consequences in the Javanese community see Derveld 1982; Suparlan 1995; and Hoefte, forthcoming.
 27. Sedoc-Dahlberg (1990: 175) identified three weaknesses in the political structure in the pre-1980 period: the electoral system, the “authoritarian nature” of the parties and the “strong position of political brokers,” and the “paternalistic administration . . . that served as a main instrument for patronage politics.”
 28. After the war the government became the largest employer, financed by bauxite revenues and Dutch transfers. Ramsoedh (2001: 92) regards the political parties as “the colonisers of the state” as they use the state to favor their own supporters. In 1953 the state employed 12 percent of the working population (6,500 persons), this increased to 26 percent (26,000) in 1968 (Ramsoedh 2001: 96). In previous decades, lighter-skinned Creoles held clerical jobs, but with the ascendance of the NPS in particular, darker-skinned Creoles obtained, often poorly-paid, white-collar positions, including in the police and armed services (see also Buschkens 1974: 149).
 29. Dew observes the same phenomenon in Guyana with Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham and in Trinidad with Eric Williams. “*Apanjaht* politics is generally condemned for pandering to the meanest suspicions and biases of the group vis-à-vis its ethnic and cultural rivals. It feeds a ‘we-versus-they’ set of group identifications that is counterproductive to national identity and national development. Yet it can also be said that *apanjathism* rests on positive foundations. At the time in which it made its entrance to the Caribbean in the 1940s and 1950s, it served not only as a means of political mobilization but also as a source of social liberation” (Dew 1988: 130). Supporters of the East-Indian People’s Progressive Party in British Guiana first used the term *apanjaht* in 1957 (Ledgister 1998: 176, n.142). For a more recent analysis of *apanjaht* in Suriname see Menke 2011: 202–209.
 30. There exists little information on the role of women in the Surinamese union movement; but it is not unlikely that the situation was similar to the Anglophone Caribbean, where executive positions in the “extremely hierarchical” unions remained the domain of men and women in the organization were marginalized and unrecognized (Bolles 1996: 19–20, 54; also Chamberlain 2010: 15). In the 1980s unions in the British Caribbean were, despite their democratic structures and procedures, still dominated by men and women were still considered inferior (Bolles 1996: 216); there is no evidence to believe that the situation in Suriname was different.
 31. The Republic of Indonesia unilaterally declared its independence on August 17, 1945. Four years later, on December 27, 1949, the Netherlands officially acknowledged Indonesia’s sovereignty.
 32. The first RTC resulted in appreciably more autonomy for the colonies; that was the maximum outcome as the Netherlands still was hoping for a “grand” union including Indonesia (Meel 1999: 31–41; also Oostindie & Klinkers 2003: 76–83). The RTC results were outlined in the *Statenregeling* (State Regulation) of 1948 and reconfirmed in the *Interimregeling* (Interim Regulation) of 1950.
 33. See for example Meel 1999: 54–74; Oostindie & Klinkers 2003: 84–96. The right of secession proved too big an obstacle during the RTC of 1952.

34. Until 1955, Indonesia was also part of Sticusa. On Sticusa and its influence see Helman & De Roo (1988), esp. pp. 48–65; Gordijn (1970); Meel (1999: 229–238); Reeser (2012: 90–95, 143–149); Gobardhan-Rambocus (2001: 392–412).
35. The executive consisted of the governor and the council of ministers, a body that was accountable to the *Staten*.
36. According to Breeveld (2006: 70), the 1955 elections were a turning point in the country's electoral history as ethnicity for the first time played such a dominant role in politics.
37. The term was coined by Lachmon; Pengel preferred terms as “assimilation;” “integration;” or “broad-based” politics (*brede-basis-politiek*). Lachmon aimed at the harmonious coexistence of the different population groups, while Pengel took a far more assimilationist approach (Breeveld 2006: 74–76).
38. On Pengel (1916–1970) see his biography by Breeveld (2000); for Lachmon (1916–2001) see his political biography by Azimullah (1986) and his political memoirs (Khemradj 2002). Lachmon was the founder of the VHP in 1949 and remained its chairman until his death in 2001.
39. The third populist leader, next to Pengel and Lachmon, was the Javanese Iding Soemita. He still lacks a proper biography, but Choenni's pamphlet (2009) provides basic information on Soemita.
40. On the history of Emancipation Day and its changes in name and significance see Van Stipriaan 1994.
41. On this (cultural) nationalism see, *inter alia*, Meel 1997; Meel 1999: 175–223; Van Kempen 2003: 653–685 and 743–929; Marshall 2003; Jansen van Galen 2000; Breeveld 2004. Compared to the Anglophone Caribbean, this movement started about a decade later. For more on cultural nationalism, see later in this chapter.
42. The RTC of 1961 would be the last one before Suriname's independence. Meel (1998a) presents a reconstruction of this RTC. He concludes that the actual lack of equality between the three partners frustrated the Surinamese delegation and these feelings would inform relations between the two countries throughout rest of the twentieth century.
43. Ramsোধ 2001: 97. In January 1963, Actiegroep joined forces with other opponents of fraternization politics in Actiefrent; this combination gained six seats in the March 1963 elections for the 36-member *Staten* (Dew 1978: 129–131).
44. Contemporary politicians point out that Pengel demanded clerical jobs for his supporters, while Lachmon was more interested in concessions or land for his voters (Breeveld 2006: 78).
45. Breeveld 2006: 83; Ramsোধ 2001: 98. Sennett (2012: 128) points out that top-down politics often results in “socially fragile” coalitions as only cooperation based on “solidarity built from the ground up strives for cohesion among people who differ.” See also Ledgister (1998: 10) who questions whether “a political order founded on the mutual accommodation of segmental elites is really democratic; in a consociational system the role of the people seems limited to ratifying with their votes the decisions made privately by their leaders, it being assumed that they are bound to their leaders by religious, ethnic, or racial ties.”
46. For a brief analysis of the work of Hoppe (and Dew) and the influence Lijphart, who introduced the concept of consociational democracy, had on their work see Gowricharn 2006: 230–232. Lijphart developed this concept in his first major work, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (1968), and further developed his thesis in *Democracy in Plural Societies* (1977).
47. On the strikes and their significance, see Campbell 1987: 80–83. Campbell (p. 110) lists more than 300 strikes between 1949 and 1985; there were only five years without strikes. The years 1971, 1982, and 1984 counted the most strikes with 49, 53, and 51 strikes respectively. For a police perspective on the unrest in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the role of the union of police officers, see Klinkers 2011: 225–234.
48. The number of unions grew steadily from 33 in 1960 to 57 in 1974, the membership from 8,247 in 1960 to more than 24,000 in 1974. After 1977 the number of unions increased even further to 192 in 1985 (Campbell 1987: 60, 270; 69).
49. According to an informant of Klinkers (2011: 232), police officer H. B. Peneux, “It was a downright war.” See also the note below.
50. Campbell 1999: 78–81. He lists seven steps in the reaction to strikes by public servants: refusal to pay salaries; refusal to negotiate; disciplinary actions (including fines and reprimands); use of police force; a ban on meetings; arrest of strike leaders; censorship. Union

leader Rudie Kross is quoted in Budike (1982: 64) about the “fear for the blunt display of power, the raids, the house searches by armed policemen.” The police killing of the leader of a group of Maroons, Abaisa, broke the strike and ended the protests; the police quickly arrested a number of union leaders. Thereafter, unions and administration soon reached a deal. In the elections on November, Prime Minister Jules Sedney (1969–1973) was defeated and succeeded by Henck Arron.

51. In June 1970 Pengel passed away.
52. For an analysis in English of these negotiations see Oostindie & Klinkers 2003: 102–116.
53. Extrapolations from the data collected in 1980 show Creoles accounted for approximately 31.5 percent, Hindustanis 38 percent, Javanese 15.7 percent, Maroons 9 percent, and Amerindians 1.5 percent (ABS 1992: 21; in this table the total number of Hindustani is incorrect as 11,893 should read 118,936). See Menke 2011: 210–211 for an analysis of how the concept of cultural plurality served as the framework for the construction of official statistics in the twentieth century; also De Koning 2011a: 261–262.
54. Oostindie 1986 studies the history of migration to the Netherlands from the seventeenth century to 1954.
55. Interview by Lisa Djasmadi with Wim Soekarman Kromoredjo in Djasmadi, Hoeft, & Mingoen 2010: 65. See also the interview at the website [www. Javanenindiaspora.nl](http://www.Javanenindiaspora.nl). Kromoredjo arrived in the Netherlands in 1987.
56. Data by Van Amersfoort (1974: 144) show the increase in the number of Hindustani migrants: in 1968 an estimated 10 percent of the migrants were Hindustani and in 1971 this had increased to 30 percent.
57. The recruitment of nurses started in the 1950s; it is estimated that between 1955 and 1970 a few thousand Surinamese nurses left for the Netherlands; Cottaar (2003: 109) estimates that more than 200 Surinamese nurses worked in the Netherlands in the late 1950s. Budike (1982: 51) presents data for departures of Creoles and Hindustanis for the period 1964–1970, but not for later years. During this period a total of 7,684 Creole men, 7,899 Creole women, 2,547 Hindustani men, and 2,014 Hindustani women migrated.
58. A few hundred Surinamese found work in West Germany (Budike 1982: 39).
59. Interview by Kemi Tosendjojo with Rudy Moekiat Samiran in Djasmadi, Hoeft, & Mingoen 2010: 114 and [www. Javanenindiaspora.nl](http://www.Javanenindiaspora.nl). Samiran was 23 when he left in 1979.
60. Tensions within the Ndyuka community manifested itself in antiwitchcraft movements in the 1970s, see Thoden van Velzen & Van Wetering 1988; Van Wetering & Thoden van Velzen 2013.
61. According to Bovenkerk (1983: 173) in 1980, 90 percent of the migrants were Dutch citizens, the rest held a Surinamese passport; the number of illegal immigrants from Suriname was unknown.
62. In the period 1976–1980 a total of 15,707 people re-migrated: 8,092 men and 7,615 women (Budike 1982: 103).
63. Bovenkerk 1983: 171. Budike (1982: 47) writes that developments projects were locally known as “quick to Holland projects” (*snel naar Holland projecten*) as workers saved to depart for the Netherlands as soon as they could. This emigration also further encouraged internal migration, as workers, especially women, moved from districts like Coronie to seek employment elsewhere (NIKOS 2002: 47).
64. The term seems to have been coined in 1977 by *The Economist* to describe the decline of the manufacturing sector in the Netherlands after the discovery of a large natural gas field in 1959.
65. Van Dijck (2001: 65) thinks that between 1975 and 1995 per capita income in all likelihood was negative. He quotes the World Bank: “GDP in constant local currency was essentially the same in 1996 as 20 years before, and thus 15 per cent lower per capita. The real value of GDP in constant US dollars fell much more, by about two-thirds.”

5 Bauxite Mining in Moengo: Remnants of the Past and Signs of Modernity

1. This chapter is based on research by Anouk de Koning; besides less-known secondary sources she used oral history interviews, census analyses, and archival information to gain

- an insight in the social history of the bauxite industry. On the basis of this research she has published articles on Moengo's social history (De Koning 2011c) and on labor policies in the Surinamese bauxite industry (De Koning 2011b).
2. SBM would be renamed Suralco in 1957.
 3. Buddingh' (2000: 269) elaborates on the international (economic) issues that played a role. According to him, the Dutch government in fact was able to protect its interests in the oil fields of Sumatra (Netherlands East Indies) in exchange for the American exploitation of bauxite in Suriname.
Efforts by Governor G. J. Staal (1916–1920) to stop the first attempt at American monopolization by having a Dutch company exploit bauxite deposits on the government domain Rorac were aborted by colonial Minister A. W. F. Idenburg (1918–1919), a former governor of Suriname, who refused to release the necessary funds. On ordinances and bauxite rights see Lamur 1985.
 4. On contacts between Moengo and Paramaribo in the 1970s, see Hesselink 1974: 109–113.
 5. The Mackenzie and Wismar-Christianburg communities were joined in the new town of Linden, named after Prime Minister Linden Burnham, in the 1960s. On bauxite towns in Guyana see Josiah 2011: 96–108.
 6. The DC had moved from Albina to Moengo in 1932. In 1945 this official moved back to Albina and since then a district secretary resided in Moengo (Lie A Kwie & Esajas 1996: 132).
 7. In 1919 there were 474 inhabitants including 298 Dutch (of whom four were female; this group included Creoles), 43 Javanese (27 men and 16 women), 57 “Foreign whites” (probably including French deportees and Dutch), 54 “Foreign blacks” (53 men and one woman, maybe British Guianese), and 22 Americans (Oudschans Dentz 1921: 491). In 1919, the process of Dutchification had not yet started. In 1926 the number of inhabitants was close to 2,400 (Lie A Kwie & Esajas 1996: 54).
 8. Oudschans Dentz 1921: 486–496. Compare this to the triumphal words of business writer Frederick Upham Adams regarding United Fruit Company that carved an empire in the “wilderness,” including “places of amusement, well-kept streets, electric lights, and most of the accessories of civilization” (quoted in Grandin 2009: 15). For more on company towns past and present across the globe see Borges & Torres 2012.
 9. See Van der Klooster & Bakker (2009: 56–58) for an architectural history of Moengo. The original town plan was designed by engineers Buchanan, Apell, and Pommeren in 1919.
 10. Oudschans Dentz 1921: 486–488, 499. Van der Klooster & Bakker (2009: 56) note that at first the workers lived on ships and later in pina huts.
 11. *De Banier van Waarheid en Recht* June 7, 1932.
 12. Van Dijck (2001: 56) presents a graph of export production figures in the years 1938–1953.
 13. Lie A Kwie & Esajas 1996: 82. At that time, Paranam was located in the district of Suriname and later became part of the district of Para. The economy of the large and populous district of Suriname was not as heavily dominated by mining as Marowijne.
 14. Van Dijck (2001: 57) states that in the postwar period until independence, the bauxite sector generated between 30 and 33 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), “more than agriculture, cattle husbandry and fishery which contributed only between 10 and 15 percent to GDP during most years in this period.”
 15. “All together, the contribution of the integrated sector to overall export earnings fluctuated between 70 and 80 per cent of the value of merchandise exports from the beginning of World War II until the end of the century” (Van Dijck 2001: 58).
 16. The dam was financed by Suralco, the new name of SBM, which for legal reasons was based in the United States. After 75 years the dam and the power station would be transferred free of cost to the Surinamese state. Suralco would construct the plant and smelter and would use 90 percent of the energy produced, the remaining 10 percent would be at the disposal of the state. The state would take care of the transmigration of more than 5,000 Maroons who lived in the area of the future lake (Lie A Kwie & Esajas 1996: 165–168; Buddingh' 2000: 306; Meel 1999: 271–281). On the transmigration of Saramaka Maroons see chapter 4.
 17. Van Dijck (2001: 63–64) states that during the Brokopondo push GNP increased by 14 percent and per capita GNP by 11 percent, causing inflation and general wage increases.

18. Half of the members were born in the Netherlands, while the rest originated from Suriname, Indonesia, the United States, and Belgium. On the ethnic division of labor in Moengo / Wonoredjo see Hesselink 1974: 67–69.
19. Fluctuations in demand and thus in the labor force were first noticeable among the Creoles and a few years later among the Javanese. The Creole population in Marowijne almost doubled between 1936 and 1937, going from 1,500 to 2,900, while the Javanese population grew from 308 in 1939 to 1,627 in 1942. Given Moengo's dominant position in Marowijne, almost the entire population growth of the district can be ascribed to Moengo (De Koning 2011c: 226).
 In 1950, 48 percent of the inhabitants of Moengo / Wonoredjo were categorized as Creole and 42 percent as Javanese. Corrected data in the 1964 census indicate that the composition of the population had remained largely stable, even though the number of inhabitants had doubled. In 1970 the share of Javanese and Creole was equal at 37 percent (De Koning 2011c: 226–227). De Koning notices that the 1964 census shows an unexplained drop in the absolute number and relative share of the Javanese population in Moengo / Wonoredjo. She argues that this is most likely due to a mistaken placement in the enumeration district Albina. The results of the 1971 census seem to confirm this mistake.
20. In the period 1940–1950 the Javanese population in Suriname increased by 11 percent, while the Javanese population in Marowijne grew by 79 percent, thus illustrating the Javanese move to Moengo / Wonoredjo. For more detailed data see De Koning 2011c: 226–227.
21. The wage of one guilder at Mariënborg is almost certainly too low. De Koning (2011c: 229) believes that the differences in wages between Mariënborg and Moengo were not as large as indicated in the interview, but that Moengo's wages nevertheless were often five times as high. This specific way of explaining the move from the plantation to the mine and its better wages is part of a standard repertoire employed by Javanese of that generation (D. Ferrier, personal communication with De Koning, Leiden, November 21, 2007).
22. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, January 6, 2007.
23. Interview Girman Kromodikoro by Slamet Njoredjo & Ronald Sanroddi (edited by Slamet Njoredjo & Harriët Mingoën) [2010], www.javanenindiaspora.nl.
24. Mining also offered work to 18 percent of the employed Amerindian men, this figure is partly explained by the limited number of Amerindians considered part of the employed labor force. In 1964, Amerindian men made up only 2 percent of those employed in the mining sector (Census 1964 in De Koning 2011c: 227).
25. Interview by Lisa Djasmadi with Ngaisah Klar-Mohamad, Leiden July 16, 2010 (Javanese in diaspora project, www.javanenindiaspora.nl). See De Koning (2011c: 233) for more examples of low-paid, often informal, service work, like sewing, ironing, and cleaning.
26. In contrast to Moengo, mining sites at Paranam and Onverdacht also employed a significant number of Hindustanis (22 percent of the work force) (De Koning 2010: 21).
27. In 1970, 21 percent of the middle group and only 6 percent of the workers was a member of either the more elitist Dutch Reformed Church or the Lutheran Church. The other belonged to the Moravian or Catholic Churches. Among the middle group the incidence of common-law unions was significantly lower than among the workers: 6 percent versus 42 percent. Hesselink (1974: 73) points out that this difference may be partially explained by the age difference between the groups. The middle group was on average older, leading to more stability. Moreover, socially it may have been more desirable to be married when one was part of the monthly-paid employees. Informants of De Koning (2011c: 233–234) confirm that the company preferred married (and thus likely to be less transient) men and facilitated their married life in terms of housing.
28. De Koning 2011b: 32. See Borges & Torres (2012: 2) for company towns as “contested terrains of negotiations and confrontations between capital and labor.”
29. De Koning 2011b: 37–39. It is unclear whether the government tried to influence wage levels in the private sector. There were persistent rumors to that effect, but the administration denied any such interference (De Koning 2011b: 37). For the company's version of the conflicts see Lie A Kwie & Esajas 1996: 99–100.
30. A Dutch colonial official estimated that in the war years up till 1943, the cost of living increased by 80 percent (Campbell 1987: 106).
31. Radio address by J. Postma, January 18, 1942, quoted in De Koning 2011b: 38.
32. Letter dated January 28, 1942 quoted in De Koning 2011b: 39.

33. The highest grade of organization (87 percent) was among the gas, water, and electricity employees (Campbell 1987: 62).
34. This was also the case in, for example, Guyana (Quamina 1987). It seems that union members in Suriname were less politicized than in Guyana, where the mines were nationalized in the 1970s.
35. Campbell (1987: 110) gives a list of strikes between 1949 and 1985. On the three strikes of 1966, 1969, and 1973 see Campbell 1987: 78–93.
36. In the late twentieth century, the bauxite sector generated approximately 15 percent of GDP, down from 30 percent in the pre-independence period (Van Dijck 2001: 57–58).
37. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, March 19, 2007.
38. Interview by Djasradi with Ngaisah Klar-Mohamad, Leiden, July, 16, 2010 (Javanese in diaspora project, www.javanenindiaspora.nl).
39. Hesselink (1974: 83–86) notes the importance of the “friendly societies,” “courts” or “lodges” such as the “Ancient Order of the Foresters” and the “Independent United Order of Mechanics.” In Moengo, about half of the male Creoles over 25 years were a member of one of the orders.
40. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, November 29, 2006.
41. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, March 28, 2007. According to this informant, “The staff club at Mariënborg was comparable to the officers’ club here in Paramaribo at the time. It was very modern, more beautiful than the one in Paramaribo. I liked that. I thought it was terrific . . . I was treated with great respect.”
42. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, January 16, 2007.
43. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, March 28, 2007.
44. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, January 16, 2007. See Borges & Torres (2012: 20) on nostalgia and idealized memory of life in company towns.
45. See also chapter 6. The official name of the Jungle Commando was Nationaal Surinaams Bevrijdingsleger (National Surinamese Liberation Army). Its leader Ronnie Brunswijk is from Moengotapoe.
46. De Vries 2005: 27–28. According to her, people blame the government in Paramaribo and former guerrilla leader Brunswijk for this lack of action.
47. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, January 6, 2007.
48. Girvan 1975: 28. He has written extensively on the political economy of race and class in mineral-export economies. In a review of Caribbean dependency theories of the 1970s, Green (2001: 62) notes that “the thrust of Girvan’s thesis . . . is expressed in the radical political terms of the 1960s and 1970s, which might be considered somewhat undernuded today. However, it remains a classic statement of the way in which imperial capitalism articulates class systems . . . that are ‘necessarily’ mediated through racial-national divisions and identities.”
49. The SML was founded in 1949 as a research project by the agricultural University of Wageningen in the Netherlands for the mechanized cultivation of rice. The Surinamese village of Wageningen was known for its labor and social provisions. For a planning and architectural history see Van der Klooster & Bakker 2009: 70–72.
50. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, April 3, 2007.

6 Economic Collapse, Social Dislocation, and the Military Regime

1. In 1984, 51 strikes involving close to 12,000 workers paralyzed the country (Campbell 1987: 110).
2. Given the tense situation, there is speculation that Hindori crossed the aisle to prevent an outbreak of violence. In the end, independence was unanimously accepted by parliament (three members were absent).
3. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, April 6, 2007. For more on this negative example of Guyana and how this has been used in Surinamese political discourse see Jaffe 2011.

4. As announced in 1975, in 1980 Dutch immigration policies would change, making it more difficult for Surinamese to immigrate as a visa would be required; it became harder but not impossible to enter the Netherlands as another 93,000 Surinamese immigrated in the period 1980–1996 (CBB 1997: 71).
5. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, April 6, 2007.
6. The money was to be spent within 10 to 15 years on the basis of a multi-annual development plan (MOP, *Meerjarig ontwikkelingsplan*). The main goals were to improve the country's economic viability, employment, and standard of living, and to regionally redistribute economic activity and prosperity. A quarter of the funds were allocated to infrastructural projects, a quarter to socio-educational programs, and half to directly productive projects.
7. Both governments had to agree on the actual spending of the funds. For a detailed analysis see Kruijt & Maks (2001) and De Groot (2004) whose book has the telling title "Three billion reproaches."
8. Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 23. They state that in 1974 there was an overcapacity of 10,000 civil servants.
9. The reasons for establishing an army were border disputes with Guyana and French Guiana. A Dutch military mission, as part of the embassy, would be stationed in Paramaribo. This mission was to assist with organizing the new army (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 24–26; Meel 1993: 129–130). Prime Minister Arron, however, wanted to turn the army into a force that would help in executing economic projects, such as road construction.
10. Most of the military were trained in Europe, and returned to Suriname out of patriotism and a sense of responsibility. Importantly, the returnees received a supplement, paid by the Netherlands, to their regular Surinamese salary.
11. See Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 28; one of the NCOs, Chas Mijnaals, in an interview with Tjan A Way ("Medaille om revolutie hoeft niet" in *Parbode* 6 [62] 2011: 25–26). Earlier Mijnaals had labeled Elstak as a "de-Surinamized Surinamer" (Dew 1994: 40). Bouterse called him "a big joke." For other, equally negative, assessments see Kagie 2012: 63–65, 94–95. Other experts outside the army also doubted Elstak's leadership qualities (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 26; Kagie 2012: 63–65). At issue were his organizational and communicative skills, as well as his ad-hoc system of promotions.
12. Lotens 2004: 20. Hoogbergen & Kruijt (2005: 29) conclude that this "not very popular, operetta-esque commander of a rudimentary army, hastily cobbled together in the months before independence, did not inspire much confidence among his subordinates."
13. On political and socioeconomic developments prior to the takeover see Boom 1982: 7–43 or Dew 1994: 15–35. Dew (1994: 15) is actually surprised "that Suriname was not plunged into civil war in 1975–1976."
14. A survey showed that only one-fourth of the skilled workers who were trained in the period 1957–1977 were still in Suriname. (Stichting Planbureau Suriname 1978: 6–14).
15. Peter Meel, personal communication November 25, 2012; information is based on Meel's forthcoming biography of Henck Arron. The union's name was Bomika (Bond Militair Kader, Union of Military Staff). For details see Boom 1982: 45–112; Fernandes Mendes 1983; Campbell 1999: 81–83; see also Ledgister (1998: 163) who interviewed Arron and concluded that he was the only person he had talked to who did not think the refusal to recognize the union provoked the coup.
16. Ramon Abrahams, Laurens Neede, and Badrissein Sital. At this time future army leader Desi Bouterse was not very interested anymore in the founding of a union, calling it "bull shit" (Boom 1982: 51).
17. It is unclear whether the police was ordered to shoot or not. Boom (1982: 61) writes that Police Chief Jimmy Walker yelled, "I had ordered you to shoot? Why didn't you shoot?" Meel, on the basis of several interviews, however doubts that this order was ever given (personal communication November 25, 2012).
18. It seems that three separate groups were plotting a coup, see e.g., Kagie 2012: 167. On the preparations of the actual coup see Bouterse in Slagveer (1980: 21–38). His account belies the idea that the 16 did not want to take power at all ("We wanted a union, but now we got the whole country"). The 16 included Paulus Bhagwandas, Desi Bouterse, Benny Brondenstein, Steven Dendoe, Roy Esajas, Ernst Geffery, Arthy Gorré, John (Hardjo) Hardjoprajitno, Wilfred Hawker, Roy Horb, Ewoud Leeftland, Guno Mahadew, John Nelom, Ruben

- Rozendaal, Roy Tolud, and Marcel Zeeuw. (For portraits of these men see Slagveer 1980: 80–105.) All were between 23 and 37 years of age, and most were of lower- or working-class background.
19. The Dutch embassy in Paramaribo was abreast of the situation and Colonel Valk, the military attaché, was a mentor of Bouterse c.s. Valk, who died in November 2012, has always denied his involvement, yet after the coup, he was transferred to NATO headquarters in Brussels (*de Volkskrant*, December 3, 2012). A number of (Dutch) inquiries in the 1980s stated that Valk or the seven-men military mission were not associated with the coup. De Groot (2004: 169–171) argues that Valk encouraged the sergeants, but that the influence of the Dutch government was unclear as it did not monitor Valk's movements very closely. See also Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 33–34; Verhey & Van Westerloo 1983: 30–37, 60–62, 123–165. Mijns minimizes Valk's role (*Parbode* 6 [62] 2011: 25). There are, of course, ideological reasons to do so, because Dutch assistance would imply that the coup and subsequent revolution were partly Dutch in origin. Perhaps telling is that in 2011 the Dutch government decided to seal the archival records on the Dutch military mission in Paramaribo until 2060.
 20. See Slagveer 1980: 21–73; Boom 1982: 113–138 for accounts. Journalist Slagveer (1980: 7), who hailed the revolution as the “peak of the people's resistance against social-economic injustice” published a long interview with Bouterse. The book by the Dutch journalist Boom includes transcripts from live interviews and radio reports aired the day of the coup. Six people were killed on the first day of the coup d'état. The military also took control of the border towns of Nieuw Nickerie and Albina. Arron went into hiding; through mediation of the Catholic bishop of Suriname he reported to the military within days.
 21. Abrahams, Bouterse, Horb, Stanley Joeman, Chas Mijns, Neede, Badrissein Sital, and Michiel van Rey. According to Mijns, Bouterse, Horb, Sital, Neede and himself were the main players preparing the coup (*Parbode* 6 [62] 2011: 25). In his early account of the coup, Bouterse praises Horb for his organizational talent (Slagveer 1980: 66, 68).
 22. The coup leaders became senior officers of the armed forces.
 23. Quoted in Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 45; General Secretariat of the Organization of American States 1983: 13–14. This report gives a useful overview of the main political developments from 1980 to 1983. Prime Minister Chin A Sen announced an overhaul of the existing political-administrative, educational, social, and economic systems.
In 2011, months after Bouterse was elected president, February 25 became a national holiday: Day of Liberation and Renewal. The opposition called it Day of National Mourning and Reflection. On February 25, 2011, Bouterse merited the nine surviving insurgents with the Golden Star of the Revolution (*NRC Handelsblad* February 25, 2011).
 24. Decree C11 of April 16, 1981 detailed the right of women and men, and recognized the full legal capacity of married women in particular. In 1982 *A Statute of Basic Rights and Duties of the People of Suriname* was adopted and later included in the 1987 constitution. According to Wekker (2001: 193–194, n.5), the military regime proclaimed these rights to mobilize women's support for the revolution.
 25. The new cabinet members had to have clean slates and no connections to pre-1980 politics. Van Rey was minister of Army and Police, while Neede became deputy minister of Police. A source of support was prominent legal expert C. D. Ooft—one of the authors of the constitutions of 1975 and 1987—who stated that the coup was part of a “natural urge to establish a country's own identity as a nation that no longer wants to be dependent on the former mother country” and such a tendency was common in countries that became independent in the postwar period (Ooft 1980: 18).
 26. Civil servants had a dubious reputation, appearing at their desk at seven in the morning and leaving soon afterward, often to go to another job. Now they had to report on time for work and for a short period immediately after the coup inspections were held to catch absentee employees. Work attendance peeked, and it turned out that there were too few desks to accommodate all those present. Physical beatings of suspected (young) criminals undermined the popular support for the military, however.
 27. Chin A Sen's urgency program focused on education, socioeconomic improvements, and political order. The money for the urgency program was taken from other projects (De Groot 2004: 186–187).
 28. Haakmat was a civil servant in Amsterdam before he returned to Suriname in 1980 to become the personal advisor of Chin A Sen. In August 1980 he became vice prime minister

and minister of Justice, Army and Police, and Foreign Affairs. On Haakmat see Verhey & Van Westerloo 1983: 16–29.

29. The two parties that shaped policies at this point were the *Revolutionaire Volkspartij* (RVP, Revolutionary People's Party) and the *Progressieve Arbeiders en Landbouwers Unie* (PALU, Progressive Laborers and Farmers Union). In the words of Meel (1993: 133–134), "They both relied on a small and devoted group of followers, used an academic and radical vocabulary, and appealed particularly to the younger generation, the very group to which the rebellious NCOs belonged." Anticolonialism now set the tone in the construction of a sovereign socialist state.
30. Van Rey in Verhey & Van Westerloo 1983: 28, 14; Kagie 2012: 184.
31. Hoogbergen & Kruijt (2005: 47–48). Haakmat and Van Rey were interviewed days after the December murders of 1982, Chin A Sen in 1986. For a more detailed description in English of political developments in the period 1980–1982 see Dew 1994: 52–84 or Meel 1993: 133–140.
32. In 1987 Chin & Buddingh' even published an analysis of Suriname in the "Marxist regime Series" by Pinter Publishers.

The revolution was supported by journalists organized in VPM (Vereniging van Progressieve Mediawerkers, Organization of Progressive Media Workers). VPM relied on information provided by Prensa Latina and Inter Press Service and closely followed developments in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Grenada (see interview with Chandra van Binnendijk in Lotens 2004: 38–53; Ramcharan 2008). Popular newspapers such as *De West*, *De Ware Tijd*, and *De Vrije Stem* were occasionally closed for violating censorship guidelines. A dissenting voice was *de Weekkrant Suriname*, set up in the Netherlands.
33. According to Bouterse c.s., Sital had conspired with Fidel Castro to make Suriname's political system comparable to Nicaragua and Cuba (Haakmat 1987: 98; Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 50). Another connection is discussed by Rupert Roopnaraine (2012: 64–65), a co-leader of the Guyanese Working People's Alliance (WPA) with Walter Rodney, who states that relations between the WPA and Surinamese "activists" were initiated by Rodney when he was forced to travel via Suriname (and Amsterdam) to the independence celebrations in Zimbabwe in 1980. Joeman, Mijns, and Sital were freed again in March 1981, well before they had served their time in jail. Sital and Mijns attended the Rodney Memorial Rally in Georgetown on June 12, 1981. Roopnaraine later had sporadic contacts with RVP leaders.
34. Chin A Sen became increasingly unhappy as, according to Haakmat, he felt like a "handyman" with little to do (quoted in Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 51).
35. Laurens Neede's comments (in 2004) were crystal clear: Haakmat basically ruled the country; he was very smart, but also "incredibly untrustworthy" (quoted in Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 55).
36. Haakmat became director of the so-called Kabalebo project, an attempt to develop the economy of Western Suriname, which the military had closed down earlier. During this time, Haakmat developed strong relations with union leader Cyrill Daal and lawyer Eddy Hoost, the former minister. Bouterse later accused Haakmat of organizing an extra-parliamentary opposition. According to Bouterse, Daal was a CIA informant (quoted in Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 55). After an attempt on his life, Haakmat fled to the Netherlands in late 1982.
37. It seems that Cheddi Jagan and Fidel Castro, but especially Grenada's Maurice Bishop had influence on Bouterse. The latter two had received Bouterse as a "revolutionary brother." See Oltmans 1984: 40, 60–61, 91; Haakmat 1987: 172–173, 203; Janssen 2011: 110–122.
38. See, for example, personal accounts by journalists Noraly Beyer (2010) and Rudie Kagie (2012).
39. The final straw was a difference of opinion on promised elections in October 1982 within the administration (Haakmat 1987: 141–148). The Military Authority decided that the government had lost its authority to rule.
40. Rambocus held a personal grudge against Bouterse after he had been excluded from the group of 16, but he also had plans to restore democracy, which gained him popular support. An accomplice, Baal Oemrawsingh, fled to the Saramacca district; a few days later he was found dead. The fact that Hindustanis had participated in the coup pointed to the involvement of rich Hindustani businessmen, at least according to the regime and its supporters (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 64–65; Haakmat 1987: 150–152).

41. Especially the RVP tried to put its platform into practice by standardizing public enterprises, the press, and the university.
42. The three lawyers were John Baboeram, Eddy Hoost, and Harold Riedewald. They managed to alter the charge from “conspiracy to overthrow the lawful government” to “conspiracy to overthrow the current government.” For this success they would pay with their lives. According to Boerboom & Oranje (1992: 39) the defiant mood in the country emboldened the lawyers during the trial.
43. Before these manifestations took place, Bouterse and Daal had a confrontation. A wild cat strike among air controllers had almost prevented Bishop from landing in Suriname. Bouterse took the strike as a personal affront and threatened to lock up Daal. When Daal not much later received an official invitation for a reception with Bishop his undiplomatic, negative answer was broadcast live. Daal was arrested, Bishop could land, but massive protest forced Bouterse to release Daal shortly thereafter. Bouterse announced that Daal “had presented us with a bill and we will pay him cash.” In December it became clear what Bouterse had in mind, for quotes Boerboom & Oranje 1992, p. 47 and Haakmat 1987: 174; see also Janssen 2011: 66–67; Roopnaraine 2012: 66–67.
44. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, April 3, 2007.
45. In contrast, Bishop called for confrontational politics: “The Surinamese revolution is too friendly. Reactionary forces are too strong. You have to eliminate those who are not with you, otherwise they will eliminate you” (quoted in Dew 1994: 63).
46. Kenneth Gonçalves, also President of the Local Bar Association, was the founder; the three Rambocus-lawyers took part also.
47. Horb had not been present at earlier deliberations, but arrived at the Fort just before midnight. He claimed not to have known about the actions against the opposition. For an extensive journalistic report on the December murders see Boerboom & Oranje 1992, esp. pp. 53–83.
48. The Cuban ambassador to Suriname, Osvaldo Cárdenas, condemned the actions because, according to him, there were still non-violent alternatives to defend the revolution. He argued that the violence cost the military respect and support in the country and abroad (Cárdenas 1988: 46). The day after he exclaimed “that man [Bouterse] is a goddamned butcher” (quoted in Boerboom & Oranje 1992: 95).
Guyanese WPA representative Roopnaraine (2012: 68) states that the killings “sent shock waves around the Caribbean and beyond.” “Shaken though it was by the inhumanity and bloodshed of December, on the third anniversary of the revolution, the WPA issues a statement maintaining its faith in the ideals of February 25, 1980” (Roopnaraine 2012: 68–69). The minutes of the Political Bureau meeting (of Grenada) of December 22, 1982 state “The situation there [Suriname] was described as ‘dread’ with clear evidence of the involvement of the Dutch, British, Canadian and American [sic]; inability to work with the masses was also noted” (*Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection* 1984: Document 86, p. 3, item 2.7). Roopnaraine (2012: 69) points at “the widespread disaffection among the people and the excesses and isolation of the Surinamese revolutionaries.”
49. Arrested were Gonçalves, the three Rambocus lawyers Baboeram, Hoost, and Riedewald, journalist Bram Behr (also founder of the Communist Party Suriname), University Dean Gerard Leckie, Suchrim Oemrawsingh (director of the accounting office), Rambocus and Sergeant Jiwansing Sheombar, business man Robby Sohansingh, Daal and his fellow union leader Fred Derby, André Kamperveen, the owner of Radio ABC, and journalists Frank Wijngaarde, Lesley Rahman, and Jozef Slagveer. The latter had been a defendant of the revolution, but later turned against Bouterse and his men (see for a personal recollection Van Westerloo 2010: 58). As a group they were “the perfect representation of Suriname’s elite” (Boerboom & Oranje 1992: 8). For a more detailed list of the victims and their wounds and injuries see General Secretariat of the Organization of American States 1983: 29–30.
50. According to the official reading, they were shot while trying to escape from custody. Only in 2007 Bouterse claimed political responsibility for the deaths, appealing for amnesty, but declared that he was not present in person at the Fort at the time of the killings. Other witnesses, including Bhagwandas, claimed otherwise. Bouterse stated that Bhagwandas was primarily responsible for what happened at the Fort; Bhagwandas died in 1996 (see Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 77–81). See also Boerboom & Oranje 1992. In 1983 the OAS published a critical report on the human rights situation in Suriname and called for the prosecution of the “high government officials” who participated in the torture and executions (General

Secretariat of the Organization of American States 1983: 33–34). While the trial about the December murders was ongoing Bouterse was elected president in August 2010. For more on the trial and the amnesty law see chapter 8.

51. According to the General Secretariat of the OAS (1983: 33), “the December massacre . . . has utterly silenced those sectors of the population opposed to continuation of a non-democratic government with power centralized in the hands of Lieutenant Colonel Bouterse, and has in general created an environment marked by intense fear . . . Effective organizations of the legal profession no longer exist in Suriname.”
52. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, April 6, 2007.
53. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, January 3, 2007. For a similar argument, see Marie Levens, later minister of Foreign Affairs, in Lotens (2000: 173): “I knew exactly who associated with the military, because Suriname is so tiny. I studied with most of them in Amsterdam. Every Surinamese intellectual above forty has lived together, often even in the same student building.”
54. Interview with Ruth Wijdenbosch by Iwan Brave, “Ik ben een hele Volksvrouw” *Parbode* 7 (81) 2013: 20.
55. For a detailed statement by Bouterse in English see General Secretariat of the Organization of American States 1983: 31–32. Van Mulier (1990: 89–96) claims but does not prove that The Hague started its interventions in 1981 after Paramaribo had stopped the West Suriname Project. Both the Dutch and the Americans, with the help of Haakmat, supposedly infiltrated Surinamese trade unions and organized the Rambocus-coup as well as the civil protest in late 1982. US and Dutch authorities openly acknowledged plans to intervene after the December murders. However, before the murders, in the fall of 1982, covert actions specialist of the US National Security Council, Oliver North, discussed a “roll back strategy” in Central America and the Caribbean and identified Grenada and Suriname as “soft targets” (De Graaf & Wiebes 1998: 367). Both the CIA and Dutch intelligence services seem to have been taken by surprise by the December murders.
56. According to the official version Horb had hung himself with the string from his shorts. The cynical rumor was that Horb had hung himself while attempting to flee (Boerboom & Oranje 1992: 106–107); Conveniently, Horb now was named the primary organizer of the December murders. On Horb’s contacts with the US State Department see De Graaf & Wiebes 1998: 365–366; Verhey & Van Westerloo 1983: 63–74.
57. The unarmed militia’s were to defend the country against foreign attacks, but in reality guarded buildings. RVP-insider Edward Naarendorp states that the militias were based on the *comités de defensa Sandinista* in Nicaragua (quoted in Lotens 2004: 107). At that time the military counted 2,500 to 3,000 men and the police 1,300 to 1,400 (estimates by Neede quoted in Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 91).
58. Rumors about a joint US-Dutch invasion had been going around in Suriname for more than 25 years. In 2010 former Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers (1982–1994) revealed this plan in a newspaper interview (*de Volkskrant* November 20, 2010). The Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, Hans van den Broek (1982–1993), and his former colleague, the Minister of Defense, Wim van Eekelen (1986–1988), confirmed the plan made in late 1986. After 1986, US interest in Suriname waned.
 For more on other invasion plans see Verhey & Van Westerloo 1983: 75–122; De Graaf & Wiebes 1998: 367–372.
 De Graaf & Wiebes (1998: 369–370) cite two apparent Dutch attempts in 1986–1987 and 1991 to induce Bouterse to move permanently to Brazil.
59. It should be noted that the Cuban connection produced little material assistance, and was limited to training of soldiers, journalists, and some students; the country and its embassy in Suriname tried to ideologically influence events (Janssen 2011: 113–115). After the December murders there still was a connection with Grenada, as Surinamese observers visited Grenada in 1983 (*Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection* 1984: Document 92, p. 3).
 The assassination of Bishop also meant that Bouterse lost one of his closest foreign allies. The US invasion of Grenada on October 13, 1983 strengthened the rumors in Suriname about an imminent US intervention.
60. The strikers did not take to the streets, but instead stayed on company property, thus denying the military a reason to intervene (see chapter 5). The withdrawal of the military was considered a triumph.

61. The movement, also known as the “25 Februari Beweging,” (25 February Movement) was founded in November 1983. Stanvaste is Sranan Tongo for courageous, bold, fearless, daring. Some of the “original sixteen” formed its leadership, a number of civilians served as advisors. The movement never managed to garner broad public support. The plan was to develop political cells in each workplace in order to create national unity. In 1987 the movement was transformed into Nationale Democratische Partij (NDP, National Democratic Party). For an account of political developments during this period see Dew 1994: 91–118.
62. The Dutch embassy in Paramaribo remained open, and private relations between the Surinamese government and the Dutch diplomats were good. Minister of Foreign Affairs Henk Herrenberg was the exception to the rule by seeking confrontations with the Netherlands. Herrenberg’s hardline led to the removal of the Dutch chargé d’affaires in 1985 and a year later of the ambassador (Janssen 2011:198–199).
63. In the period 1980–1987 bauxite export revenues (including alumina and aluminum) declined sharply, and this trend continued in early 1990s (Van Dijck 2001: 65–66). At the same time, the number of state employees increased from 35,000 in 1981 to more than 40,000 in 1987, with a declining population. Not surprisingly, the army and police in particular experienced growth during this period (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 106).
64. Government expenditures remained high, causing the fiscal deficit to grow by 20 percent in each year in the period 1985–1988 (Van Dijck 2001: 16). Between 1982 and 1987 the GNP decreased with an average of 4 percent per year; the GNP per capita declined from US\$ 4,500 in 1981 to US\$ 3,000 in 1987 (Van Dijck 2001: 36). When the Treaty money flowed again and bauxite prices recovered in the late 1980s, the economy bounced back, only to crash again when bauxite prices fell once more in 1991. With spending increasing and revenues falling, the inflation rate jumped to 368 percent in 1994. A Structural Adjustment Program was never fully executed, see also chapter 8.
65. Interview by De Koning, Samacca, April 5, 2007. Parts of the following section on the economic downturn are based on fieldwork in Suriname by Verrest. In February and March 2009 she collected statistical data, technical and policy reports, and 15 in-depth interviews with individuals from diverse economic backgrounds, and between 20 and 35 years old at the start of the crisis. This group included school teachers, a police officer, an entrepreneur, senior government officials, university students, and a housewife. Given that hard data are scarce, Verrest’s results are more qualitative than quantitative.
66. Unemployment went up from 15 percent in 1980 to 30 percent in 1987, despite the prohibition to lay off employees. According to Menke (1998: 40), “The decline in the standard of living from the 1970s to the 1990s is so striking, that primarily macro level factors are assumed to determine the changes in the employment structure, rather than cultural and demographic developments. One of these factors could be the declining labor income and the sectoral differences.”
67. According to Schalkwijk & De Bruijne (1997: 24–25), per capita income in 1997 (US\$ 880) was at 43 percent of the income in 1980 (US\$ 2,028); school directors, for example, earned 860 Dutch guilders in 1981 compared to 56 guilders in 1994 and 455 guilders in 1997.
68. On the Byzantine system of exchange rates in the 1980s and 1990s see Danna 1997.
69. Interview by Verrest, Paramaribo, March 8, 2009.
70. Menke 1998: 129–173. Between 1978 and 1993 employment in the mining sector declined from 14.9 to 3.6 percent, while “community / personal services” doubled from 11.2 to 22.6 percent (p. 150). In this last sector, 47 percent were informal workers (p. 168).
71. Of Verrest’s informants none started a secondary job nor did anyone report substantial additional income from informal employment.
72. Many researchers have pointed out that migration does not necessarily leads to disintegration of the family, and that often it is a survival strategy that benefits the whole family, see for example Chamberlain 2010; Byron & Condon 2008.
73. De Bruijne & Schalkwijk (1994: 19–21) estimate that only one-third of all households actually received such support on a regular basis. Non-receiving households had no overseas family (25 percent) or seldom received goods (40 percent). Menke (1998: 176) underlines the importance of remittances in Greater Paramaribo: “If remittances are hypothetically excluded, 79.8 percent of all households are below the poverty line; if included it stands at 69.5 percent.” Menke estimates that 23.5 percent of urban households depended on overseas support.

74. This substitution stopped when “traditional” items were for sale again.
75. According to a policeman, home robberies increased significantly in these years (Verrest 2010: 13).
76. Debt holders (including those with mortgages), however saw their debts in local currency vanish after the devaluation of 1985.
77. In this scheme, based on 1992 figures, the elite (owning air conditioning, a car, television, washer, and refrigerator) comprise 6.5 percent of the population of Greater Paramaribo; the middle class (television, refrigerator, washer, car) 27.7 percent; the “popular” class (television, refrigerator, washer) 49.9 percent; the “under class” (with a television or refrigerator at best) 15.9 percent.
78. In 1986 the US Drug Enforcement Agency arrested Etienne Boerenveen, the second in command, for smuggling cocaine. He was sentenced to 12 years imprisonment. There is evidence that Bouterse was well aware of Boerenveen’s plans and attempts to set up a drugs network between Suriname and the United States (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 109–110; Janssen 2011: 169–170).
79. In contrast, wealthy Chinese, European, and mixed groups are a substantial part of their own group (Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997: 63).
80. Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997: 74 present the following data: for the middle classes access to drinking water increased from 80 percent in 1980 to 93 percent in 1992; for the popular class from 51 percent to 74 percent; for the underclass from 13 to 34 percent.
81. There exist a number of rumors about this “escape”: Brunswijk used a saw, or he paid his wardens, or the military authorities allowed him to leave, or he used magic. Brunswijk himself refers to his magic powers (De Vries 2005: 15; see also Thoden Van Velzen & Hoogbergen 2011: 240; Van Wetering & Thoden van Velzen 2013: 274–275). For a timeline on the Interior War see De Vries 2005: 157–165. The Ndyuka call themselves Okanasi, but given that internationally they are known as Ndyuka, I prefer to use this name.
82. According to Meel (1991: 315) from the mid-1980s till the 1990s, the army, 6,000 troops, was the Suriname’s second-largest largest employer after the civil service.
83. The reasons for this conflict are unclear. Mijnals blames fellow insurgent Bhagwandas for provoking Brunswijk (*Parbode* 6 [62] 2011: 25–26). Brunswijk himself says that his initial support for the revolution waned, when Bouterse and his men turned into dictators. He too blames Bhagwandas, who fired Brunswijk in March 1984. According to Brunswijk, Bhagwandas told him to go thieving now that he had lost his income (De Vries 2005: 14–15).
84. Brunswijk even played soccer against a team including a government minister (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 115).
85. For an informative article on Brunswijk and the (Dutch) press see De Vries 2011.
86. Haakmat (1987: 212–213) claims that it was Brunswijk who initiated the contact.
87. Bouterse apparently was aware of this possibility and arrested the Dutch journalists, who were released again when it became clear that Brunswijk was not getting asylum in the Netherlands (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 120).
88. Again, it is unclear what really happened: Haakmat claimed to have had 7 million Dutch guilders to support the Surinamese resistance, while it seems that Brunswijk received only 17,000 guilders (Van Westerloo quoted in Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 120). Whatever happened to the 7 million is a mystery.
89. The majority of the captives were Maroons, who joined the Jungle Commando. The Commando’s sported *noms de guerre* such as “commandant Reagan” and “Castro” (see Van Wetering & Thoden van Velzen 2013: 291).
90. Initially France / French Guiana quietly supported the Jungle Commando, but stopped doing so after the return to civil government in Suriname in 1987 (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: esp.157–159).
91. Penta 2002: 9. For the stories of these mercenaries see Penta’s lively memoirs from 2002. According to him the two parties matched up as follows: armed forces 2,500 personnel and the Jungle Commando 250 personnel at the maximum and “40 fire extinguishers and 250 sticks” (p. 6). Brunswijk himself states that the maximum strength of his army was 1,200 men and the average size was 500; 50 troops formed the core of the guerrillas (De Vries 2005: 26).
92. See Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 121–131. The Jungle Commando occupied Moengo in November 1986, halting production there. Facing a total production stop, Bouterse went on the offensive and in weeks recaptured Moengo and Albina.

93. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, December 5, 2006.
94. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, December 18, 2006.
95. Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 131–135, 136–141. Penta was alternately annoyed and intrigued by “voodoo rituals” among the Maroon fighters (Penta 2002: 36–37, for a more scholarly explanation of these rituals Thoden van Velzen & Van Wetering 2004: 239–261; Van Wetering & Thoden van Velzen 2013: 292–310). The latter argue that the commando’s were urbanized before the war, speaking Sranan Tongo and marrying Creole wives, and only “discovered” their Maroon heritage after the first skirmishes.
96. See MacKay 2006: 11; De Vries 2005: 71–80; Price 2011: 83–103. MacKay gives voice to the victims and describes the long judicial road. His book includes seven eye-witness accounts, the expert witness by Thomas Polimé, a Dutch-educated Ndyuka anthropologist, and the verdict by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights from 2005. The military did not deny its involvement: “high ranking military officers declared that the massacre had been ordered by them and that military operations were not subject to investigation” (Judgment of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Case of Moiwana Village, Suriname Summary of the Operative Points). Following a fact-finding mission by Amos Wako in 1987, in 2002 the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights recommended, among others, “that Suriname investigate the massacre, prosecute those responsible and compensate the survivors and next of kin” (www.forestpeoples.org/topics/legal-human-rights/publication/2010/case-moiwana-village-v-suriname-inter-american-court; accessed November 30, 2012). Since Suriname failed to comply, the case was referred to the Court. Judge Cançado Trindade concluded that “the Moiwana murders were planned . . . and executed by the State; it was a crime by the State” (quoted in MacKay 2006: 22). Meanwhile “in 1989 the Civil Police attempted to carry out an investigation led by Police Inspector Herman E. Gooding, who was murdered on August 4, 1990, after meeting with the Deputy Commander of the Military Police, as documented in the report by the IACHR. His corpse was found next to the office of Commander-in-Chief Bouterse. Several soldiers were arrested by the Civil Police shortly after the Moiwana massacre, but were released after the police were besieged by 30 armed Military Policemen acting on the orders of Commander-in-Chief Bouterse” (www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/admissible/suriname11821.htm; accessed November 30, 2012). This case has not been solved yet.
97. Name and age of this witness are kept anonymous because of safety reasons.
98. Price 2002: 81–88. De Vries (2005: 61) thinks there were 4,000–6,000 refugees. Price (2002) estimates that in 2002 37,200 Surinamese Maroons were living in French Guiana and more than 9,000 in the Netherlands. The majority is illegal and lives in the coastal area of St Laurent, Kourou, and the capital of Cayenne. Children born on French territory automatically qualify for French citizenship. In the border town of St Laurent, Sranan Tongo became the main language.
99. On the role of the war on the redemocratization process see Volker (1998: 160, 166–167) who argues that the Jungle Commando greatly contributed to this development. On the contrary, Marten Schalkwijk points out that the redemocratization process started before the war (quoted in Lotens 2004: 95).
100. On Derby as trade union leader and politician see Marshall 2010.
101. Later those 10 seats were taken and the division then was Front 40, NDP 3, PALU 4, and the Javanese Pendawa Lima 4. As a result of the elections, the Dutch branch of the resistance folded in early 1988 and called upon Brunswijk to stop the guerrilla (Hoogbergen & Kruijt 2005: 201–202).
102. See, for example, the warning by Haakmat in *NRC Handelsblad*, December 1, 1987, who concluded that Bouterse’s role was not over yet.
103. In addition, aid would henceforth be calculated in goods and services.
104. For *Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname* see http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_15_ing.pdf (accessed March 28, 2013); Price 2011. In 1993, the IACHR set reparations at US\$ 453,102.
105. Previous attempts to establish peace had come to naught. After Kourou other attempts (1989–1990) failed as well.
106. On the background and actions of the approximately 300 Tucayanas and the views of its spokesman Mato see De Vries 2005: 133–142; also Buddingh’ 2012: 360–392; 2010: 79; Dew 1994: 171–173, 176–178. Tucuyana leader Thomas Sabajo rejected offers to organize a

- national referendum on the Kourou Accord with the argument that it would be “a conscious attempt to set the majority against an oppressed minority” (quoted in Dew 1994: 172). By 2000, the Tucayanas seemed to have vanished into thin air. According to De Vries, the Tucayanas were instrumental in getting Indigenous rights to lands and resources on the national political agenda.
107. In December a flight with Bouterse and Shankar was in transit in Amsterdam. Dutch police isolated Bouterse from the press and Surinamese living in the Netherlands, thus deterring Bouterse from making a speech. Bouterse not only blamed Dutch authorities, but Shankar as well, because the president had not come to his defense.
 108. Price (2011: 63) states that “according to many observers, its main effect was to carve up the country into two major zones for the drug trade, with . . . Brunswijk getting the eastern part of the country and . . . Bouterse the rest.”
 109. French Guiana pressured the refugees to return, also with financial incentives. It is estimated that more than 1,000 Maroons did not go back and were later given legal status (De Vries 2005: 163).
 110. The National Army has not released its casualty rate; according to informants, the Jungle Commando lost 24 to 60 men. Defense minister Ronald Assen estimates that in total 450 people died as a result of the war (De Vries 2005: 52).
 111. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, September 19, 2006. Other informants (interviews by De Koning, Paramaribo, December 13, 2006 and Verrest, Paramaribo, February 9, 2009) expressed similar sentiments emphasizing that one had to be careful to whom one talked.
 112. Interview by Verrest, Paramaribo, February 26, 2009. It should be noted that this informant lived close to the Memre Boekoe barracks and her experiences may not match those of other citizens, who lived further away from the barracks.
 113. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, April 6, 2007. See also, interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, March 23, 2007, in which her informant almost literally says the same.
 114. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, January 18, 2007.
 115. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, March 23, 2007.
 116. Interview by Verrest, Paramaribo, March 1, 2009.
 117. Interview by Brave, *Parbode* 7 (81) 2013: 19–20.
 118. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, January 3, 2007.
 119. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, March 22, 2007.
 120. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, February 1, 2007; for similar sentiments interview by Verrest, Paramaribo, February 26, 2009.
 121. As a high government officials mentions in her interview with Verrest, Paramaribo, March 3, 2009, “We held meetings at our home. What is most important to us? And toilet paper was number one for all of us. We thought it a bit dehumanizing. You can’t imagine what it is like, to have no soap and toilet paper.”
 122. See for example interviews by Verrest, Paramaribo, February 1, 2009, March 3, 2009 and De Koning, Saramacca, April 5, 2007.
 123. Interview by Verrest, Paramaribo, March 6, 2008. Access to social houses was restricted to government supporters, thus in that respect not much had changed.
 124. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, January 18, 2007.
 125. See for example, interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, January 18, 2007. See also the publications by Bouterse biographers and supporters Van Mulier 1990 and Oltmans 1984.
 126. See Van Mulier 1990. His publication, with the subtitle “Decolonization and national leadership” aims to counter the “misinformation and counterpropaganda” by foreign authors by presenting a Surinamese point of view.
 127. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, March 1, 2009.
 128. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, December 13, 2006.
 129. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, April 6, 2007.
 130. In this interview (De Koning, Paramaribo, March 1, 2009) the informant compares life in Nickerie in 1985 with that in Paramaribo in 1989; he tells that living in the districts was much easier and cheaper.
 131. Interview by De Koning, Paramaribo, November 18, 2006.
 132. After his election in 2010, Wekker (2010) refers to the “big man” syndrome: the successful (read rich) son, who has the means to help the poor.

133. Meel (1991: 314–317) emphasizes that Bouterse's main achievements were military in character: the coup itself, the crushing of the Rambocus-coup, the defeat of the opposition in November–December 1982, the fight against the Jungle Commando, and the telephone coup of 1990.
134. On May 1, 1980 Prime Minister Chin A Sen proposed major socioeconomic, cultural, and political-administrative transformations (see note 23). Only in the latter domain limited changes, including women's rights, were officially implemented. The 1987 constitution incorporated basic human rights and introduced a mixed presidential-parliamentarian system, encouraging more direct political participation through local councils. For a discussion of this constitution in an international perspective, see Fernandes Mendes 1989: 211–261.

7 The Development of Paramaribo in the Second Half of the Century

1. This chapter is based on a variety of sources and data. In early 2008 Hebe Verrest held in-depth interviews with professionals and experts in the field of Paramaribo's urban development and change. A survey of 395 households in eight communities (Geyersvljht, Ma Retraite 1 and 2, Krepi, Munderbuiten, Van Dijk 1 and Van Brussel, Land van Dijk, Flora, and Nieuwweergevondenweg) conducted in the same period, together with survey data collected in 1980, 1992, and 2001 by Aart Schalkwijk and Ad de Bruijne and, *inter alia*, the basis for Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997, provide insights in the city's housing, settlement and mobility, and community structures. Census data were derived from publications of the 1950, 1964, 1971, 1980, and 2005 population polls are used to illustrate developments. In addition, analyses of census data of 2004 at *ressort* level were provided by Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek. Finally, a random sample of 1,100 records of the original 1950 census was taken and developed into an SPSS data file which allowed in-depth analysis, prepared by Tim van Gilst. For English-language introductions to twentieth-century Paramaribo see De Bruijne 2001 or De Bruijne & Schalkwijk 2005. We want to thank Ad de Bruijne for sharing his data and his much appreciated advise.
2. ABS 2005: 37–40. Nieuw Nickerie houses approximately half of the population of the district of Nickerie. Albina on the border with French Guiana was one of the larger towns in the beginning of the century, yet it suffered from the Interior War and only counted 4,000 inhabitants at the end of the century. The population in the districts has not increased in the last decades of the twentieth century (De Bruijne 2001: 34).
3. Paramaribo does not have a municipal council or a mayor as the local government is divided into districts. Paramaribo is part of the district of Paramaribo. It is bordered by the districts of Wanica to the south and west, Commewijne to the east, and the mouth of the Suriname River to the north. Paramaribo is divided into twelve *ressorts*. *Ressorts* are administrative units that are larger than neighborhoods. There is no decentralization beyond the *ressort* level.
4. The city counted 37,000 inhabitants in 1920; 49,674 in 1932 (De Bruijne 2001: 32); and 71,496 in 1950 (Volkstelling).
5. ABS 1965 and CBB 1997. According to the census of 1980 the population in the district of Paramaribo was 68,005. This appears to be an underestimation (ABS 1996b).
6. ABS 2006b:24. The area called Paramaribo has changed several times as a result of changes in district boundaries in 1966 and 1985. In 1985 Suriname's districts were redesigned. The district of Suriname was dissolved: parts were added to districts such as Para, Saramacca, and Paramaribo. Wanica was a new creation.
7. ABS 2003: 14. All other districts are below 10 inhabitants per km².
8. Greater Paramaribo (183 km²) includes the population of Wanica (since 1985) or (before 1985) the district of Suriname.
9. ABS 1972: 3; 2003: 13; 2006b: 24. Such expansions, often on former plantations, can be private developments or government projects.
10. Mulo stood for *meer uitgebreid lager onderwijs* (more extensive elementary education) and ulo for *uitgebreid lager onderwijs* (extensive elementary education),

11. Both were training schools to prepare professionals for work in the fields of health care (including dentistry and pharmacy) and law; academic research was not part of the curricula. For a history of tertiary education in Suriname, see the commemorative volumes by Oostburg (1995) and Werners (1995) on occasion of the 25th anniversary of the university. Following the December murders in 1982, Law School Dean Gerard Leckie was one of the victims, the university was closed until October 1983. In that year the university's name was changed to Anton de Kom Universiteit van Suriname.
12. The university, with its motto "*populo serviens*," aimed to train professionals and academics. In the first quarter century of its existence, a total of 734 students, 450 men and 284 women, graduated from the university, while 17 PhDs were granted. The highest number of graduates (155 men and 50 women) received a medical training (Oostburg 1995: 11–65).
13. Interview by Kemi Tosendojo with Rudy Moekiat Samiran in Djasmadi, Hoefte, & Mingoen 2010: 113 and at www.Javanenindiaspora.nl. Many informants in this project told about their move to the city and the fact that in the city they had to wear shoes for the first time.
14. The Colonial Library and Reading Room were established in 1856–1857 by two physicians and served as a library for secondary and tertiary students; it closed in 1957.
15. In the 1950s movies were more popular in the districts than in the city. At that time, 77 percent of the movies were US made, 11 percent Indian, and 12 percent other (Gobardhan-Rambocus 2001: 396).
16. De Bruijne 2001: 35–36. According to the census of 1964, the other major urban employment sectors were trade and commerce, industry, mining, and public utilities respectively. In 2000, another 10 percent of the labor force was employed by state-owned enterprises such as Staatsolie (the national oil company).
17. Temminck Groll et al 1973; Van der Klooster & Bakker 2009: 88. In June 2002 the center of Paramaribo was included in UNESCO's world heritage list.
18. In the twentieth century, the name of the square changed several times, reflecting Suriname's history. In 1900 it was Oranjeplein or Gouvernementsplein, in 1975 Onafhankelijkheidsplein (Independence Square) in 1980 Plein van de Revolutie (Revolution Square) and since 1987 Onafhankelijkheidsplein again.
19. The Ma Retraite Cultuurmaatschappij NV was the owner of these plantations and subdivided 1,150 ha in total. For an architectural history of twentieth-century residential buildings in Paramaribo see Van der Klooster & Bakker 2009: 107–113.
20. Interview by Verrest with informant familiar with NV Ma Retraite Cultuurmaatschappij, Paramaribo, February 22, 2008.
21. Interview by Verrest, Paramaribo, January 14, 2008; De Bruijne 1976a.
22. Interviews by Verrest with residents in Abrouaweg, Paramaribo, April 2003.
23. Den Hengst-Kleijn 1973. These housing projects provided an example of a public-private partnership as the state asked the Bruynzeel Company to provide timber in order to increase its sales in Suriname.
24. Maks & De Bruijne 2008. Republiek van Suriname, nationaal werkgelegenheidsrapport, p. 17 mentions a need for 40,000 houses in 2004, <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=2256172> (accessed October 22, 2012).
25. The possibility of obtaining housing through the employer existed since 1906, when the company of Kersten & Co started to "enable its employees to obtain ownership of a house and a yard." The first houses in this plan were ready in 1908 (Van der Klooster & Bakker 2009: 121).
26. Interview by Verrest, Paramaribo, March 6, 2008.
27. Interview by Verrest, Paramaribo, February 22, 2008.
28. This informant recalls that the cost for land in Paramaribo North was fl 1.50 per m² plus the cost for clearing the parcel (interview by Verrest, Paramaribo, February 22, 2008). De Bruijne (1976a), however, mentions fl 7–8 per m² in 1966. In projects by the Cultuurmaatschappij Ma Retraite people could pay in cash or provide a down payment of 10 percent and pay the rest within 60 months (with 7.5 percent interest); interview by Verrest, Paramaribo, February 22, 2008.
29. Paramaribo's squatter settlements dwarf in size compared to *favelas* in Brazil, for example.
30. According to the World Bank, 20,500 foreign tourists visited Suriname in 2010, twice the number of visitors in 2008, <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/suriname/international-tourism-number-of-arrivals-wb-data.html> (accessed August 5, 2012).

31. Maroons / Bush Negroes were not always counted as separate categories.
32. A resident's ethnicity was classified according to four main categories with multiple sub-categories: not black colored-not mixed (Amerindian, Chinese, Hindustani, Javanese, European); not black colored-mixed (one generation / multiple generation); black colored-not mixed (Negro and Bush Negro); black-colored-mixed (one-two-three generations).
33. Welvaartsfonds 1954: tables 12–15. In Wijk H and Buitenvijk 1 it was 53 percent; in Wijk D and Buitenvijk 2 over 80 percent was Afro-Surinamese. For Hindustanis the lowest percentage was 7 in Wijk D and the highest 34 in Wijk G.
34. Interview by Verrest, Paramaribo, April 2003.
35. Cf. De Bruijne 1976b; Goodenough 1976; Clarke & Howard 2008; De Koning 2011a; Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997; ABS 2006b: 106.
36. Among Creoles it was 77 percent, Hindustanis 28 percent, and Javanese 40 percent. Dutch is mainly spoken by those with a higher education (Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997: 88), see also chapter 8.
37. Buschkens (1974: 162–163) concluded that in the 1960s the standard of living among the majority of lower-class Creoles was low, but that there was no evidence of starvation or “complete pauperization.” Since he conducted his research among Creoles only, he has not recorded observations regarding other population groups.
38. In the period 1954 (=100) and 1968 prices increased to 144 whereas the mean income increased from Sf 23 per week to Sf 407.15 per month. In the period 1968 (=100) to 2000 the price index exploded to Sf 234,062 for food and Sf 225,959 overall. The mean income in that period grew to Sf 327,056 (ABS 2002).
39. Welvaartsfonds Suriname 1956b: 31.
40. Van der Klooster & Bakker 2009: 122. In 1939 out of a total of 11,863 buildings 6,018 counted one room and 3,461 two rooms. See also Buschkens 1974: 138–140. In his sample of 518 lower-class Creole households in Paramaribo in the 1960s, 32 percent had indoor sanitation and bathroom facilities, while approximately 90 percent had electricity, and 23 percent gas; the rest of the households relied on kerosene, charcoal, or butane for cooking (pp. 141–142).
41. The remainder subleased (2.5 percent) or had a house “in use” (9.5 percent), (Welvaartsfonds 1956b: 57).
42. A survey among close to 500 households in the same ten neighborhoods in 1980, 1992, and 2001 shows developments within these ten areas. The neighborhoods are Ondrobon, Elisabethshof, Clevia, Peu et Content, Van Dijk Project, Janki, Flora A, Koewarasan, Welgedacht C, and Ramgoelam. The 1992 and 2001 survey differentiated between ownership and family ownership whereas the 1980 census subsumed the category family-owned under ownership.
43. Because of very small numbers the in the sample, the homeownership percentages of Amerindians have been excluded.
44. VOJ stands for *Voortgezet Onderwijs op Juniorenniveau* (secondary education at junior level); this type of education replaced ulo and mulo schools.
45. See for example the 2004 census and the ranking by Schalkwijk & De Bruijne 1997. According to Carlin & Van Goethem (2009: 15) of the 18,037 Amerindians counted in the 2004 census, 5,353 or 29 percent now live in the capital.
46. *De Ware Tijd* (January 17, 2011) reported an average homicide rate of 4 per 100,000 inhabitants for the period 2008–2010; compare to Jamaica with 53 per 100,000. The number of robberies in Suriname per 100,000 people increased from 107 to 386 between 2004 and 2006 (UNDP 2012: 23). After this spike, the number of armed robberies declined again, but the fear of crime is high (see Evers & Van Maele 2012: 297).
47. UNDP 2012: 10, 69, 89. The UNDP Citizen Security Survey 2010 was carried out in seven countries: Suriname, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, St Lucia, and Trinidad & Tobago. It indicates that in Suriname the perception of the street gang problem is below the Caribbean average, with 10 percent of respondents identifying it as a problem (Caribbean average 12.5 percent) and almost 31 percent stating that it is a big problem in the neighborhood, if gangs are present (Caribbean averages at more than 32 percent) (pp. 68–69). Street gangs are considered different from organized crime groups. About the structure of organized crime groups in Suriname, and Guyana, little is known, “but it is believed to be comprised of loosely organized networks that support the drug and gun

trade” (pp. 72–73; also pp. 76–77). Almost 9 percent of Surinamese respondents state that they had experiences with neighborhood gang violence (below the average of more than 12 percent). In Suriname, as in Barbados and Guyana, people who live in neighborhoods with gangs are more than twice as likely to have been the victims of property crimes (pp. 74–76). In general, neighborhoods where gangs are active exhibit less community cohesion than neighborhoods that do not have gangs (p. 79).

48. Marten Schalkwijk agrees and states that certain, unnamed, political parties deliberately promote the immigration of Chinese to break the power of Hindustani shopkeepers (*Parbode* April 2012: 10). See also Ellis 2012.

8 Leaving the Scene: A New Century

1. Gold also contributed to the financing of the Jungle Commando’s war effort.
2. Iamgold acquired Rosebel in 2006; the concession covers 170 square kilometers (Van Dijck 2011: 4). The Canadian company Cambior, taken over by Iamgold in 2006, started large-scale gold mining in Brokopondo in 2004 (Buddingh’ 2012: 462, 459; Kambel & MacKay 1999: 105).
3. De Theije & Heemskerk (2009: 21) conclude that “a so-called ‘mining law’ developed that was based on customary land claims, formal land titles, practical considerations, and practical experience brought by the Brazilians. This common law has adapted to local circumstances in multiple ways and is accepted by the miners, concessionaries, and even the Suriname government, even though it functions entirely outside of the national legal system.”
4. For more on these businessmen cum politicians see further in this chapter.
5. It should be noted that the Surinamese production also includes gold mined in French Guiana. Because of environmental laws it is almost impossible for the local Guianese population to obtain licenses; illegally mined gold is often sold in Suriname. According to Trommelen (2013: 176–178), in 2011 the Surinamese state received only 12 percent of total revenues in the gold sector (taxes, royalty’s, concession rights). Iamgold paid more than \$164 million out of the total \$180 million of state revenues from gold (more than 90 percent), while this company’s production was 12,000 kg out of a total of 31,000 kg nationwide (less than 40 percent).
6. De Theije & Heemskerk 2009: 13–18. They give the example of the Benzdorp region where 90 percent of the population is Brazilian nationals. “Several Javanese and Hindustani young men work as operators of excavating machines and bulldozers, Ndyuka Maroons dominate the fuel commerce, and a recently arrived Chinese man brought the supermarket in the mining village. The owners of the gold operations are Brazilians and Aluku Maroons, while the workers in the pits and on the mountains are mostly Brazilians and Ndyuka, often in mixed teams” (p. 18). The authors also comment on the “incredible adaptability of the Maroon culture” (p. 19), a phenomenon described earlier by Thoden van Velzen & Van Wetering (1998; 2004).
7. See note 14 for more information on territorial rights. Wongsowikromo (2011) describes the conflict between Maroons, Iamgold, and the government in the village of Nieuw Koffiekamp, located in an Iamgold concession. In January 2009 young pork knockers faced the Surinamese army and the national police who defended the Canadian concession. See also Price 2011: 228.
8. Menke & Pérez 2012: 24. An additional problem is that the regulation seems to re-enliven the political feud between two protagonists in the sector: Bouterse and Brunswijk (*Parbode* 6 [70] 2011: 16).
9. Price 2011: 106–112; Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP), Suriname, Final Draft 23 February 2013, Forest Carbon Partnership Facility, The United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries, pp. 9, 45–46 (email Rudi van Kantén, April 5, 2013).
10. http://www.greenheartgroup.com/en_op_ko01.html (accessed August 30, 2012). The company praises its “sustainable management practices.” According to R. Evan Ellis (2012: 91), Greenheart is controlled by Sinolumber, that has “progressively bought up the rights held by other firms in Suriname. Nonetheless it is not clear whether the action is an attempt

- to lock-up Surinamese timber resources, a way to get Chinese capital out of the PRC, or a Ponzi scheme by Sinolumber to lure investors with a superficially large but difficult to exploit overseas resource base.”
11. Van Dijk 2001: 60; http://www.staatsolie.com/pdf/annual_report_2011.pdf (accessed October 22, 2012), p. 12. In the late 1990s the refinery produced largely for the domestic market thus foreign-exchange earnings were limited; in 2011 production was more than 2.5 million barrels.
 12. Central Bank of Suriname, Suriname Country Profile: Economic and Financial Data. <http://www.cbvs.sr> (accessed May 30, 2013).
 13. Nationaal werkgelegenheidsrapport, p. 11; Menke & Pérez 2012: 21. The size of the informal economy makes it difficult to calculate exact economic or fiscal data.
 14. Price 2011: 213. In 2008 the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) ruled that in the case of large-scale developments or investment projects the state should obtain the “free, prior, and informed consent” of the Amerindian and Maroons inhabitants and that their right to property can only be restricted “under very specific, exceptional circumstances” (Price 2011: 215, 216). Price (2011: 217–218) concludes that according to this ruling “Suriname must rewrite its laws, including the Constitution if necessary, both to recognize indigenous and Maroon groups as legal personalities and to permit such groups to own and effectively control property communally.” So far, the state, however, defies the IACHR in not recognizing the indigenous and tribal rights of Amerindians and Maroons, see Price (2011: 223–227) and also the earlier work by Kambel & MacKay 1999; Kambel 2007. Kambel & MacKay (1999: 116) conclude that Amerindians and Maroons have no voice in the decision-making about resource exploitation and concessions are routinely issued without notifying affected communities. In the words of Saramaka human rights activist Stanley Rensch, “When Amerindians and Maroons are involved, colonial principles are still valid”; the “name of the new colonizer is Paramaribo” (interview with Rensch in Lotens 2000, pp. 97 and 99).
 15. In 2009 the World Customs Organization noted the growing significance of Suriname and Brazil in the transshipment of cocaine to Europe, http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/WDR2011/World_Drug_Report_2011_ebook.pdf, p.109 (accessed August 15, 2012). Remarkable is the growth of the casino sector in Paramaribo since 2000; it is possible that some of these establishments are instrumental in money laundering. On narcotics in Suriname, see Griffith 2011: 22–27, 41–43. This author does not “envisage the creation of a narco-state in Suriname” (p. 26). Another instance of illegal trade is human trafficking, particularly sex trafficking and forced labor, including child labor (<http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/210741.pdf>, pp. 345–346).
 16. <http://www.indexmundi.com/agriculture/?country=sr&commodity=milled-rice&graph=production> (accessed April 28, 2013).
 17. In the 1990s the bauxite sector employed only 3.2 percent of the labor force (ABS 1996a).
 18. Vos, De Jong, & Dijkstra 2001: 192–200. In the period 1993–1997 nearly 30 percent of the economically active youngsters were unemployed; it seems likely that many young people found work in the informal or underground sectors.
 19. “Of the overall 5 percent students that reach the tertiary level, more than two third are women” (Terborg 2011: 26).
 20. Ethnically mixed persons and Europeans were mainly employed as upper-level professionals, whereas most Maroons, and to a lesser degree Amerindians, worked as blue-collar and unskilled laborers. Javanese were relatively overrepresented in some blue-collar jobs.
 21. Vos, De Jong, & Dijkstra 2001: 211–214. Education is an important factor in explaining income inequality.
 22. Nationaal werkgelegenheidsrapport, p. 6; ABS 2001: 10. These government publications quote different figures: the first report cites 60 percent, the second 65 percent below the poverty line. There is no uniform definition of poverty in Suriname. The estimated poverty incidence may be too high due to the underreporting of incomes.
 23. Union leader Wilco Valies in Lotens (2000: 133); Dijkstra, De Jong, & Vos 2001: 223–226; Vierstraete 2012; Buddingh’ 2012: 414–41, 467–468; Nationaal werkgelegenheidsrapport, p. 16; <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=2256172>, pp. 2–3 states that Suriname lags behind its (CARICOM) peers in technological readiness (accessed October 22, 2012).

24. Nationaal werkgelegenheidsrapport, pp. 19–22.
25. The Gini coefficient is a 100-point index that measures income inequality; a Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality. *Jamaica Gleaner* October 9, 2011 <http://jamaica-gleaner.com/gleaner/20111009/business/business8.html> (accessed October 25, 2012); <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?> (accessed October 25, 2012). Earlier data for Suriname are not available.
26. Nationaal werkgelegenheidsrapport, p. 18; ABS 2003: 13–14.
27. The censuses reflect changing social and political ideas about race / ethnicity; particularly the term Creole could mean different things at different times. It always included the Afro-Surinamese population (“Negroes”), up until 1963 it could also include Maroons (or “Bush Negroes”), and, until the latest census, individuals classified by the census takers as “mixed.” Thus a one-on-one comparison of census data from 1911 to the present is not self-evident.
28. Jaffe & Sanderse 2010: 1565; Terborg 2002: 273–275. For changes in Maroon socio-economic culture in Paramaribo see Aviankoi & Apapoe 2009; Amoksi 2011.
29. The literature on Haitians in Suriname is limited. It seems that the first Haitians migrated to Suriname in the 1970s. In 1985, their number was estimated at 4,500 (Accord 1986: 30), but this is not supported by other sources. Haitians constitute one of the largest immigrant groups in French Guiana (numbering 15,000 in 2006). According to Laëthier (2010: 85), “Crossings through neighboring Suriname are organized and this network progressively ensures the majority of entries into Guianese territory.” See also Lony (2010: 192) who cites a Haitian housekeeper in Cayenne: “It was impossible to get a visa for Cayenne. It’s difficult to get into a *département* of France. The tourist visa for Suriname is easier. Everyone does it that way. You go to Suriname and then you cross by night to Cayenne.” It is likely that not all Haitians entering Suriname on their way to French Guiana actually make it that far and stay in Suriname.
30. The 1980 census counted 5,830 Guyanese, a number that was almost certainly too low; at the high end the estimate was 40,000 (Stichting Wetenschappelijke Informatie 1985: 3). The great majority was of East Indian descent (Singelenberg 1983: 54–55).
31. It is assumed that the illegal group was larger than the legal group (Stichting Wetenschappelijke Informatie 1985: 8). See also Romein 1985: 44–45; both publications underline that the operation in fact was aimed at deporting all Guyanese on account of the crime rate and unemployment in Suriname.
32. ABS 2006a: 27. Ellis (2012) points at the importance of the relationship between the Chinese ethnic community in Suriname and mainland Chinese companies. The number of Chinese immigrants is hard to estimate as many entered the country using a tourist visa. In 2011, the Chinese ambassador in Suriname stated that 40,000 ethnic Chinese were living in Suriname (Buddingh’ 2012: 424). According to Tjon Sie Fat (2010: 186–187), the number of PRC nationals officially entering Suriname spiked in 1991 when 7,587 Chinese (more than 11 percent of all registered immigrants) entered the country. The figures dropped again in the second half of the 1990s to an average of approximately 1,100 per year. In 2004 this number had nearly doubled again to 2,041 PRC nationals. The vast majority comes from China’s coastal provinces.
33. The New Front—now including NPS, VHP, KTPI, and SPA (Surinaamse Partij van de Arbeid, Surinamese Labor Party)—won 30 seats in the 1991 elections, down from 40 in 1987. On the first Venetiaan administration see Buddingh’ 2012: 366–378. The government stripped the army’s political function, leading to Bouterse’s resignation. This in turn created resentment among certain officers against the minister of Defense. According to Buddingh’ (2012: 370), the main agitators “were exactly those individuals who had made the army into their private economic domain, which often was built on serious abuse of power or criminal activities.” In May 1993 a new commander, Arty Gorré, was installed; his main task was the transformation of the army.
34. Buddingh’ 2012: 385–388. Opportunism and chicanery were extant in the other camp as well. Venetiaan’s Front won 24 seats (or 42 percent of the vote, down from 54 percent), while the NDP combination went from 12 to 16 seats. The powerful VHP business elite split the party, thus sinking the candidacy of Front presidential candidate Venetiaan. The Front split even further when KTPI politician Willy Soemita played kingmaker for Wijdenbosch in exchange for five government departments (this Javanese party held only five parliamentary seats).

35. Reported by Dutch radio station Zorg en Hoop, June 26, 1999, <http://www.nps.nl/nps/radio/zorgenhoop/nieuws/99/0626.html> (accessed December 27, 2012).
36. Egger (2006: 159) points at ethnic rivalries within the union movement in the late 1980s and 1990s. Referring to a statement by the federation of trade unions Ravaksur in 1997, he concludes that the federation acknowledged these problems, but was unable to act upon them exactly because of the existing ethnic divisions. For a description of the unions during the Wijdenbosch presidency, see Egger 2006: 160–166; he shows that the role and strategy of the unions did not gain universal support as some pundits argued that the labor movement threatened economic profits. The fact that unions are organized by company or government department also make that the federations are less effective than their size suggests. In 2000, an average of 30 percent of employees was organized, with peaks of 75 percent in the educational sector (Lotens 2000: 124; 128).
37. The fact that the constitution was unclear regarding the division of power between president and parliament led to even greater political uncertainty.
38. Buddingh' 2012: 416–418. The coalition headed by Venetiaan won 33 seats, while the Millenium Combination featuring the NDP won only 10. Nieuw Front now included the Javanese party Pertjajah Luhur rather than the KТПI.
39. In 2005 Venetiaan won the presidency from Bouterse with the help of Brunswijk, who thus gained considerable political leverage. The common goal was to prevent a Bouterse presidency. Like Bouterse, Brunswijk was convicted *in absentia* on drugs trafficking charges in the Netherlands in 1999. For more on the politician Brunswijk see p. 199.
40. In the period 2002–2002 Suriname spent 13 percent of its GDP on its civil service, compared to an average 5 percent in neighboring countries (Buddingh' 2012: 460).
41. Buddingh' 2012: 432–447; Evers & Van Maele 2012: 150–212. Evers and Van Maele (2012: 27) describe how Bouterse ridiculed both Somohardjo and Brunswijk in the 2010 campaign. Ramsoedh in his response during the Rudolf van Lier Lezing, Leiden, February 10, 2012, pointed at the unpredictability of political leaders, who lack any coherent plans, and are only interested in power and the entitlements political influence brings. Bouterse announced his candidacy only after the parliamentary elections.
 ABOP is part of the Maroon alliance A-Combinatie, which also includes BEP (Broederschap en Eenheid in de Politiek, Fraternity and Unity in Politics) and the junior party Seeka. The A-Combinatie with 4.7 percent of the vote won seven seats and got three cabinet ministers. Mega Combination held 23 seats, New Front, now without Pertjajah Luhur or any other Javanese party, 14. NPS again lost voters and hit an all-time low, even in previous strongholds like the mainly Creole district of Coronie.
42. Five of the original group had passed away by then. All decorated ex-military men are suspects in the December murders, see note 58.
43. Rumors abound on Bouterse's fortune, but there is no official confirmation on his (sources of) wealth. Buddingh' (2012: 386) points at the strength of Bouterse's NDP in lower-class Paramaribo neighborhoods. Wekker (2010: 169–173) identifies Bouterse as a *wakaman-koni* (a trickster), who holds out the promise that he will help the poor and proves that street smarts trump education. Jaffe (2011: 192–193) shows how Bouterse represents an anti-establishment, *wakaman* lifestyle that ties into popular culture. Bouterse received 16.7 percent of the vote in Paramaribo (compared to 11.2 percent for Venetiaan) (Evers & Van Maele 2012: 145–146).
44. Buddingh' (2012: 380–383) describes how Dilip Sardjoe, who made his money in the trade of currencies and licenses in the 1980s, virtually took over the department of Trade and Industry. He was also treasurer of VHP. Buddingh' also points at the close economic and monetary ties between Sardjoe and Bouterse. See also Evers & Van Maele 2012: 97.
45. The number of young candidates for parliament is also limited. In the words of then president Venetiaan during the 2010 campaign: "If young people get power, they will become power hungry [*machtsdronken*]," quoted in Evers & Van Maele 2012: 94.
46. As Van Klinken & Barker (2009: 6) observe of state and society in present-day Indonesia: "Clientelism was supposed to be destructive of the political fabric, yet here [in North Sumatra] it seemed to promise access to the new democracy."
47. The late NDP politician Ernie Brunings (1944–2007) quoted in Evers & Van Maele 2012: 75–76.

48. For example Dilip Sardjoe owns the only English-language newspaper *Times of Suriname* as well as a TV and a radio station. For other examples see Evers & Van Maele 2012: 69; 102. In 2013 Reporters without borders judged press freedom in Suriname at the same level as in the United States (Suriname was thirty-first on the index of 179 countries; Jamaica thirteenth, Trinidad and Tobago forty-fourth, Guyana sixty-ninth), <http://en.rsf.org/press-freedom-index-2013.1054.html> (accessed January 31, 2013).
49. Jaffe 2011: 192 states that “the NDP owes much to its popularity to the fact that that it is the only significant pan-ethnic, or rather, trans-ethnic party.” However, Blanksma (2006), who attended and analyzed 22 campaign meetings in 2005, concludes that not ethnicity but the difference between “old” politics versus the oppositional combinations was the deciding factor in the electoral campaign. Ethnicity was still important, but now served as a demarcation between partners within an electoral combination. This was especially true in the Nieuw Front; parties in NF were the most autonomous and adhered to proportionality in the presentation of the different parties and ethnic groups. The electoral system, based on both regionalization and proportionality, forces parties to present candidates of different ethnic backgrounds or to form a coalition with other parties (Buddingh’ 2012: 478).
50. <http://www.dna.sr/parlement/leden/> (accessed December 2, 2012). Both the presiding officer and her first replacement are women. Suriname ranks 102nd out of 139 in a global comparison of female parliamentarians; Guyana ranks twenty-seventh, Trinidad & Tobago thirty-first, and Jamaica ninety-seventh, <http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm>.
- There were no female ministers in 1991, while the following cabinets counted a few women (two in 1996, 1998 and 2000 each); the incoming cabinet in 2010 included three female ministers.
51. This seems to be corroborated by the Global Gender Gap Index of the World Economic Forum. In 2007 Suriname was ranked fifty-sixth, and in 2012, 106 out of 135 countries; Guyana ranked forty-second in 2012, Trinidad forty-third, and Jamaica fifty-first. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GenderGap_Report_2012.pdf (accessed December 2, 2012). This index “is a framework for capturing the magnitude and scope of gender-based disparities and tracking their progress. The Index benchmarks national gender gaps on economic, political, education and health criteria.”
52. Ruth Wijdenbosch (NPS) and Sheilendra Girjasing (VHP) in *De Ware Tijd*, November 1, 2012.
53. Personal communication Peter Meel, October 31, 2012.
54. See Menke 2001: 204, Jaffe 2011: 190; Fernandes Mendes in Rudolf van Lier Lezing, Leiden, February 10, 2012. Apparently Bouterse is disappointed that in his administration the departments remain party fiefdoms (Evers & Van Maele 2012: 354).
55. Data on corruption from 2011 indicate that Suriname is an average Caribbean country. On the corruption perception index (182 countries) Suriname is included in the 100/111 group (Trinidad and Tobago 91, Guyana 134–142, Jamaica is not listed), see *LA Chispa* 26 (360) 2012, p. 6.
56. Evers & Van Maele 2012: 11. Bouterse’s office is adorned with a poster format portrait of the Venezuelan president (p. 232). Much to Bouterse’s chagrin, Chávez at the last minute decided not attend his inauguration; later in 2010 Chávez made a quick visit to Paramaribo. The latter stressed the importance of Suriname in the unification of South America and the close ties between the two countries (pp. 233, 291–293).
- The extant literature on hybrid regimes is vast; but given Bouterse’s admiration for Chávez, and their similar, military, backgrounds, I have chosen to compare Suriname’s political development to this key neighbor.
57. In an interview in 2012 with Caroline van Schubert, Dino Bouterse “brands” himself as a role model and speaks of his growing political interest, declaring that he would make a good successor to his father (“Ik was niet moeders liefste,” *Parbode* 7 [74] 2012: 16–20).
- After several brushes with the law Dino Bouterse (1972) in 2008 was convicted to an eight-year jail term; he served three years (Griffith 2011: 23).
- To complicate matters with the CTU even more, there exists an elite team called Faya Blo, consisting of police, military, and CTU members, that is responsible for tracking down and arresting the country’s “most wanted” criminals. The structure of command and responsibility is unclear (*Parbode* 7 [76] 2012: 33; 59).

58. On the trial against Bouterse and 24 other suspects regarding the December murders see Buddingh' 2012: 440–441, 444, 449, 483; Evers & Van Maele 2012: 373–382, 395–397, 407–409. The trial commenced in November 2007, and has faced repeated delays. Even though he is the main suspect, Bouterse has never appeared in court. On the day of Bouterse's inauguration as president, US ambassador John Nay stated that the rule of law and an independent judiciary were of utmost importance to the United States, an obvious reference to the December murder trial (Buddingh' 2012: 449).
59. Evers & Van Maele (2012: 382) state that insiders identify Bouterse's attorney Irvin Kanhai as the author of the law that apparently had been in the making for quite some time. They give a detailed account of the passing of the law (Evers & Van Maele 2012: 367–410).
60. See for example *NRC Handelsblad* April 6, 2012 on reactions in Brazil, the United States, and the Netherlands.
61. <http://www.amnesty.nl/nieuwsportal/pers/suriname-amnesty-law-threatens-presidents-trial-human-rights-violations> (accessed August 30, 2012). The law may also contravene the Surinamese constitution; the government has promised a review by a Supreme Court; this institution is not yet (March 2013) in existence but was one of Bouterse's election promises.
62. Somohardjo guided the law through parliament; his party was rewarded with an additional deputy minister (Evers & Van Maele 2012: 402).
63. *NRC Handelsblad* April 5, 2012.
64. <http://nos.nl/video/371863-bouterse-keihard-tegen-critici-amnestiewet.html> (accessed August 30, 2012).
65. Similar to Chávez, Bouterse has an ambivalent relationship with the press and the public as he balances between show and secrecy. Well-known Surinamese journalists as Rita Ramcharan and George Findlay observe a deterioration in the relationship between the president and the press by ignoring critical members of the press and the intimidation of some journalists (Ramcharan in *Starnieuws* May 3, 2011, August 12, 2011; Findlay in *de Volkskrant* August 15, 2011). Bouterse in no way matches Chávez's exhibitionism as used to be displayed in his weekly television shows.
66. Maroon languages were the first language in 15.2 percent of households, Sranan Tongo 9 percent, and Javanese 5.6 percent. The outcome surprised the census takers: "we had not expected such a large margin of victory for Dutch" (ABS 2006a: 29).
67. De Bruijne & Schalkwijk 1994: 6–16. Most written communication is in Dutch (p. 7). These authors estimate that in the 1990s approximately 75 percent of all international telephone calls were with the Netherlands.
68. This is true too for the connections with the countries of origin such as India and Indonesia, a topic beyond the scope of this study.
69. Relations between the Netherlands and Suriname in the postmilitary period are a frequent topic of analysis in both the media and scholarly publications in both countries. See for example Schalkwijk 1994: 121–346; Janssen 2011: 278–293; Van Dijck 2004; Buddingh' 2012: 371–378, 396–401.
70. See the two versions of the controversial report by Marion Maks (Director of the Ministry of Planning and Development in Suriname, PLOS) and Dirk Kruijt (professor of Development Studies at Utrecht University in the Netherlands) with the title "Een belaste relatie" (A loaded relationship). The team interviewed 60 resource persons in Suriname, but a lack of reliable macroeconomic data hampered the study. In the end, PLOS rejected the findings of the interim report, and refused to cooperate in the planned second phase of the enquiry. The Dutch continued the project and added materials from interviews with Dutch resource persons. According to the authors, the second report, that appeared two years later in the Netherlands, confirmed and highlighted the earlier findings (Kruijt & Maks 2001; 2003). President Venetiaan denounced the findings and promised an "appropriate, Surinamese report" (Kruijt 2006: 299). Thus far, no initiatives have been taken to set up such a study.
71. See for example Van Dijck 2004, a compilation of critical essays by Surinamese and Dutch scholars.
72. Suriname was not a beneficiary country of the Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Expansion Act (CBERA) or the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA).
73. See Lewis (2001) for an Anglophone Caribbean perspective on Suriname's inclusion in CARICOM and the country's foreign policy in general.
74. Then Prime Minister Jules Sedney (1969–1973) remembers the resistance to his presence at the signing of Suriname's liaison status in Trinidad in 1973; he blames it on the fear of

- marginalization of the Hindustani VHP, that took the minority status of East Indians in Trinidad and Guyana as a negative example (interview Sedney in Lotens 2000: 31–32).
75. Suriname indeed was flooded with products from other member states, compelling Surinamese companies to become more competitive and service oriented. Trade with CARICOM nations has increased (bauxite counted for more than 70 percent; other trade products include oil, fish, and timber), but the balance in the early twenty-first century remained negative for Suriname. In 2000, CARICOM imports amounted to US\$ 103 million and exports to CARICOM members to US\$ 28 million. Between 1996 and 2006 only 11.5 percent of Surinamese products were traded with CARICOM nations (Banks 2011: 20–22).
 76. In 2005 CARICOM unanimously backed the election of Surinamese diplomat Albert Ramdin as Vice-General Secretary of the Organization of American States (Janssen 2011: 286).
 77. <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=2256172>, p. 2 (accessed July 6, 2012).
 78. See for example, economic, cultural, and educational relations between Surinamese and Dutch institutions. In 2010 the number of Dutch trainees, mainly in schools and hospitals, in Suriname was estimated to be between 1,000 and 2,000 (up from 30 in 1995) (Annemarie Slotboom, Reisverslag naar aanleiding van de reisbeurs voor de roman “Stagiaires in Suriname.” Verantwoording aan Nederlands Letterenfonds, B20120500432, accessed June 11, 2012).
 79. In October 2011, Suriname opened an embassy in Paris. Paramaribo considers France a neighboring country and a stepping stone to markets in Europe and North Africa. According to Ambassador Harvey Naarendorp, “We have more common interests with the French [than with the Dutch]” as France is a “power center in the European Union.” <http://www.rnw.nl/suriname/article/nieuwe-ambassade-parijs-economische-springplank?> (accessed June 11, 2012). To underline the embassy’s economic mission, the president of the Central Bank of Suriname, G. Hoefdraad, gave the opening presentation entitled “Suriname: An Investment Opportunity,” <http://www.cbvs.sr/presentatie-president-g-hoefdraad-bij-opening-surinaamse-ambassade-in-parijs/> (accessed June 11, 2012).
 80. Corrales & Penfold 2011: 132. The high value assumes that country accepts all possible oil and concessional loans available under the terms of the 2005 PetroCaribe agreement; the lower number assumes that countries will take up one-third of the allowed quota. According to these authors, Chávez’s Venezuela is “world champion of foreign aid” (p. 104). In comparison, average US assistance in the period 2005–2007 to Suriname amounted to US\$ 1.29 million—US aid to Suriname is low compared to Jamaica (US\$ 44.26 m.) or Guyana (US\$ 25.35 m.). “The comparison is staggering. Venezuelan aid to PetroCaribe nations far surpassed United States assistance, except US aid for Haiti” (Corrales & Penfold 2011: 132–133). See also Griffith (2011: 29–31) and Bulmer–Thomas (2012: 346–347) on PetroCaribe. According to Wikileaks, Chávez also donated money to Bouterse’s election campaign (Koopman 2011: 119). Evers & Van Maele (2012: 345) state that Venezuela, and China, “for years have financially supported a number of political parties.” They give no sources for this allegation.
 81. See, for example, the *New York Times* April 11, 2011, “With Aid and Migrants, China Expands Its Presence in a South American Nation.” Van Dijk (2011: 8) notes that Brazil seemed to prefer a connection between the north of the country and Georgetown. “That link is shorter and flatter, and crosses through the dynamic area of northern Brazil. Moreover, Brazil had only recently established the Tumac Humak nature reserve covering a substantial area south of the border with Suriname.”
 82. Suriname’s links to Guyana and French Guiana are of poor quality and need upgrades, see Van Dijk 2013. See Price (2011: 227–233) for a list of possible future large-scale economic or infrastructural developments that may threaten the rights and culture of indigenous and Maroon peoples.
 83. Money from the Treaty fund was only a trickle compared to the flow in previous decades; remittances from the Netherlands were four times larger. The Dutch government estimated that in 2004, individuals sent 100 million euros from the Netherlands to Suriname (Buddingh’ 2012: 461; 552).
 84. Many monuments in Paramaribo have the same function: for example, the statue of Kwakoe (1963) celebrates the abolition of slavery, while the statue of Baba and Mai (1994) represents the first arrival of Hindustani migrants in 1873, see Meel 1998b; De Koning 2011a.

85. Para 2012: 61. An English-speaking colleague of Meye, Tamara Bennett, said she envisioned the law's critics as "wicked ones which you should destroy." Meye is the leader of Gods Bazuin Ministeries (Gods' Trumpet), that has more than 50 churches in Suriname and several more in French Guiana, Grenada, and the Netherlands. The church is popular among lower-class Creoles and Javanese.
86. De Theije & Heemskerk 2009: 9. Richard Price (2002: 82) estimated that 7,400 Maroons were living in the interior of French Guiana and 29,800 in the coastal zone, compared to 52,740 in Suriname's interior. Many do low-paid work in and near the European space center in Kourou. Price (2011: 53) notes that Maroons have been crossing the border back and forth for more than 150 years. "Yet despite their mobility, and their penchant for long-term stays in French Guiana, they remain strongly grounded in their forest domain" in Suriname.
87. Van Klinken & Barker (2009: 12) point out that "It is true that inadequate personnel and budgets . . . make it less likely that the state's disciplinary powers will be invoked. But the terms 'softness' and 'failure' suggest that the only thing stopping an effective state is lack of resources. In fact the system is kept permanently incapacitated because so many people profit from its incapacity. Illegal activities bind state officials to each other and to nonstate actors. They extend the struggle for domination into the marketplace and they bind state actors to elements in society."
88. Anthropologist Maggie Schmeitz also points at lack of initiative due to the hierarchy at the workplace, and she too blames this on a plantation mentality. "Everything in this country is seen in relation to power" (interview Schmeitz in Lotens 2000, p. 58). See also Terborg's comments on hierarchy in today's society in Suriname. She mentions unequal relations at all social levels. She too relates this to slavery, colonialism, and clientelism. She does, however, notice changes in social relations, but also that it may still take time to fully "decolonize" relations in political parties, government, schools, families, etcetera (Interview Terborg by Diederik Samwel in *VPRO Gids* 38, September 17–23, 2011, pp. 19–21).
89. <http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=2256172>, p. 2 (accessed August 28, 2012).
90. Barrow 2002: xxviii; see also Matthies et al (2008: 422–425); Ramkissoon et al (2008: 96–97); Samms-Vaughan (2008: 191–194) for the consequences of authoritarianism, physical punishment, and harsh discipline on the development of Caribbean children.
91. "Manners are seen as essential tools for facing authority of all kinds, especially when you perceive yourself as having little such authority" (Brown 2002: 121). See also the research report "No naki mi" (Don't hit me) by the Suriname Pedagogical Institute (Surinaams Pedagogisch Instituut, SPI). In 1998, 70 percent of the teachers in 106 elementary schools in Paramaribo believed it necessary to hit pupils to keep them in line. Research leader, and later minister of Foreign Affairs, Marie Levens concluded that elementary schools are unsafe for children because of frequent physical punishments and that this situation does not differ much from earlier times, when the parents of the current pupils went to school. She speaks of the "trans-generational relay of impotence," *De Ware Tijd* 27 maart 1999, p. 5; see also interview Levens in Lotens 2000: 169–170.

B I B L I O G R A P H Y

- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (1965). *Surinaamse volkstelling 1964: Distrikt Paramaribo (exclusief beperkte telling)*. Paramaribo: Author.
- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (1972). *Voorlopig resultaat vierde algemene volkstelling (The Fourth General Population Census, A Preliminary Report)*. Paramaribo: Author.
- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (1978). *Vierde algemene volkstelling 1971/1972 (Geheel Suriname)*. Paramaribo: Author.
- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (1992). *Vijfde algemene volks- en woningtelling 1980 (definitieve resultaten)*. Paramaribo: Author.
- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (1996a). *Statistical Yearbook of the Republic of Suriname*. Paramaribo: Author.
- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (1996b). *Vijfde algemene volks- en woningtelling 1980. (Supplement)*. Paramaribo: Author.
- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (2001). *Poverty Lines and Poverty in Suriname*. Paramaribo: Author.
- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (2002). *Consumer Price Indexes and Inflation in Suriname since 1954 (An Account)*. Paramaribo: Author.
- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (2003). *Suriname Census 2003: Voorlopig verslag (Suriname Population Census 2003: Preliminary Report)*. Paramaribo: Author.
- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (2005). *Suriname Census 2004: Volume I: Sociale en demografische karakteristieken*. Paramaribo: Author.
- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (2006a). *Report on the Census 2004 Coverage and Evaluation-Suriname*. Paramaribo: Author.
- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (2006b). *Suriname Census 2004: Districtsresultaten Volume I: Paramaribo*. Paramaribo: Author.
- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (2006c). *Suriname Census 2004: Districtsresultaten Volume III: Nickerie*. Paramaribo: Author.
- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (2006d). *Zevende algemene volks- en woningtelling in Suriname. Landelijke resultaten Volume IV: Huishoudens, gezinnen en woonverblijven*. Paramaribo: Author.
- ABS (Algemeen Bureau voor de Statistiek). (2009). *Household Budget Survey 2007/2008. Volume III Final Results per Stratum*. Paramaribo: Author.
- Accord, Irma. (1986). "Guyanese en Haitiaanse arbeidsmigranten in Suriname." *AWIC Nieuwsbrief* 3 (2): 27–35.
- Adhin, J. H. (1969). "Ontstaan en ontwikkeling van de z.g. Aziatische huwelijkswetgeving." In *Een eeuw Surinaamse codificatie: Gedenkboek (1869–1mei–1969)*. Paramaribo: Surinaamse Juristen-Vereniging.
- Amersfoort, Johannes Marinus Maria van. (1974). *Immigratie en minderheidsvorming: Een analyse van de Nederlandse situatie 1945–1973*. Alphen a/d Rijn: Samson.
- Amoksi, Martine. (2011). "Het nieuwe zelfbeeld van de Marronvrouw anno 2011: De traditiegetrouwe tegenover de geïntegreerde en de ontwortelde vrouw." *His/herTori: Tijdschrift voor Surinaamse geschiedenis en cultuur* 2: 28–38.

- Aviankoi, Erna. (2003). "De Marronvrouw: Breekijzer voor sociaal-economische ontwikkeling." *Siboga* 13 (2): 7–11.
- Aviankoi, Erna & Ine Apapoe. (2009). "Leven in de stad: Marrons in transitie." In Alex van Stipriaan & Thomas Polimé (Eds.), *Kunst van overleven: Marroncultuur uit Suriname*, pp. 156–161. Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.
- Azimullah, Evert. (1986). *Jagemath Lachmon: Een politieke biografie*. Paramaribo: Author.
- Bakker, Freek. (2009). "The Never-Ending Struggle of the Surinamese East Indians." Paper presented at the conference "Multiculturalism, Religion and Legal Status in the Dutch Colonial World, c. 1600–c. 1960." Instituut voor Nederlandse Geschiedenis, The Hague, January 21–23.
- Banks, Helga. (2011). "Integratie van Suriname in de CARICOM in historisch perspectief, 1973–2008: Een moeizaam maar positief proces." *His/herTori: Tijdschrift voor Surinaamse geschiedenis en cultuur* 2: 17–27.
- Barrow, Christine. (2002). "Introduction: Children's Rights and the Caribbean Experience." In Christine Barrow (Ed.), *Children's Rights: Caribbean Realities*, pp. xiii–xxxv. Kingston: Ian Randle.
- Best, Lloyd & Kari Polanyi Levitt. (2009). *Essays on the Theory of Plantation Economy: A Historical and Institutional Approach to Caribbean Economic Development*. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press.
- Beyer, Noraly. (2010). "Van staatsgreep naar ingreep naar revolutie." In John Leerdam & Noraly Beyer (Eds.), *Suriname en ik: Persoonlijke verhalen van bekende Surinamers over hun vaderland*, pp. 17–22. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff.
- Bhagwanbali, Rajinder. (1996). *Contracten voor Suriname: Arbeidsmigratie vanuit Brits-Indië onder het indentured-labourstelsel 1873–1916*. The Hague: Amrit.
- Blanksma, Anne. (2006). "Etniciteit en nationalisme tijdens de Surinaamse verkiezingscampagne in mei 2005." *Oso* 25 (1): 149–165.
- Blekendaal, Martijn. (2010). "Hatta en De Kom: Een gekleurd front." *Historisch Nieuwsblad* 5: 68–75.
- Blufpand, Yves. (2006). "Paramaribo op orde: Structuurvisie Groot-Paramaribo 2020." MSc. thesis, Delft University of Technology.
- Boerboom, Harmen & Joost Oranje. (1992). *De 8-december moorden: Slagschaduw over Suriname*. The Hague: BZZTôH.
- Bolland, O. Nigel. (2001). *The Politics of Labour in the British Caribbean: The Social Origins of Authoritarianism and Democracy in the Labour Movement*. Kingston: Ian Randle / Oxford: James Currey / Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener.
- Bolles, A. Lynn. (1996). *We Paid Our Dues: Women Trade Union Leaders of the Caribbean*. Washington DC: Howard University Press.
- Boom, Henk. (1982). *Staatsgreep in Suriname; De opstand van de sergeanten op de voet gevolgd*. Utrecht: Veen.
- Boots, Alice & Rob Woortman. (2009). *Anton de Kom: Biografie 1898–1945/1945–2009*. Amsterdam: Contact.
- Borges, Marcelo J. & Susana B. Torres. (2012). "Company Towns: Concepts, Historiography, and Approaches." In Marcelo J. Borges & Susana B. Torres (Eds.), *Company Towns: Labor, Space, and Power Relations across Time and Continents*, pp. 1–40. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Borges, Marcelo J. & Susana B. Torres (Eds.). (2012). *Company Towns: Labor, Space, and Power Relations across Time and Continents*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bosma, Ulbe. (2009). *Terug uit de koloniën: Zestig jaar postkoloniale migranten en hun organisaties*. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. (1986). "The Forms of Capital." In John G. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, pp. 241–258. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. [Orig. 1983.]
- Boven, Karin. (2006). *Overleven in een grensgebied: Veranderingsprocessen bij de Wayana in Suriname en Frans-Guyana*. Amsterdam: Rozenberg / IBS.
- Boven, Karin. (2011). "Overleven in de Wayanajungle: Wie niet sterk is moet slim zijn!" *Oso* 38 (1): 12–27.

- Bovenkerk, Frank. (1983). "De vlucht: Migratie in de jaren zeventig." In Glenn Willemsen (Ed.), *Suriname: De schele onafhankelijkheid*, pp. 152–181. Amsterdam: Synopsis.
- Brana-Shute, Rosemary. (1993). "Neighbourhood Networks & National Politics among Working-class Afro-Surinamese Women." In Janet Momsen (Ed.), *Women & Change in the Caribbean: A Pan-Caribbean Perspective*, pp. 132–149. Kingston: Ian Randle / Bloomington: Indiana University Press / London: James Currey.
- Brautigam, Ellen. (1999). *Louis Doedel: Een vergeten Surinaams vakbondsleider*. Hilversum: RVU.
- Breeveld, Hans. (2000). *Jopie Pengel 1916–1970: Leven en werk van een Surinaamse politicus*. Schoorl: Conserve.
- Breeveld, Hans. (2004). *Baas in eigen huis: Wim Bos Verschuur, heraut van Surinames onafhankelijkheid 1904–1985*. Paramaribo: Djinipi.
- Breeveld, Hans. (2006). Verbroederingspolitiek in Suriname, onvoltooid verleden tijd." In Edwin K. Marshall (Ed.), *Engagement en distantie: Wetenschap in vele facetten*, pp. 67–84. Amsterdam: NiNsee.
- Breton, Bridget. (1974). "The Foundations of Prejudice: Indians and Africans in 19th Century Trinidad." *Caribbean Issues 1* (1): 15–28.
- Breton, Bridget. (1979). *Race Relations in Colonial Trinidad, 1870–1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Breton, Bridget. (1999). "Family Strategies, Gender and the Shift to Wage Labour in the British Caribbean." In Bridget Breton & Kevin A. Yelvington (Eds.), *The Colonial Caribbean in Transition: Essays on Postemancipation Social and Cultural History*, pp. 77–107. Kingston: The Press University of the West Indies / Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Breton, Bridget. (2007). "Contesting the Past: Narratives of Trinidad & Tobago History." *New West Indian Guide 81*: 169–197.
- Breunissen, Klaas. (2001). *"Ik heb Suriname altijd lief gehad": Het leven van de Javaan Salikin Hardjo*. Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij.
- Brown, Janet. (2002). "Parental Resistance to Child Rights in Jamaica." In Christine Barrow (Ed.), *Children's Rights: Caribbean Realities*, pp. 113–131. Kingston: Ian Randle.
- Bruijne, Ad de. (2001). "A City and a Nation: Demographic Trends and Socioeconomic Development in Urbanising Suriname." In Rosemarijn Hoeft & Peter Meel (Eds.) *Twentieth-Century Suriname: Continuities and Discontinuities in a New World Society*, pp. 23–47. Kingston: Ian Randle / Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Bruijne, Ad de. (2004). *Suriname: Neem toekomst binnen de smalle marges*. [Paramaribo]: Vereniging Surinaams Bedrijfsleven.
- Bruijne, G. A. de. (1976a). *Bijdragen tot de sociale geografie van de ontwikkelingslanden*. Bussum: Romen.
- Bruijne, G. A. de. (1976b). *Paramaribo, stadsgeografische studies van een ontwikkelingsland*. Bussum: Romen.
- Bruijne, G. A. de. (2006). *Libanezen in Suriname: Van Beharre naar Paramaribo, 1880–2006*. Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij.
- Bruijne, Ad de & Aart Schalkwijk. (1994). *Kondreman en P'tata: Nederland als referentiekader voor Surinamers*. Paramaribo: Leo Victor.
- Bruijne, Ad de & Aart Schalkwijk. (2005). "The Position and Residential Patterns of Ethnic Groups in Paramaribo's Development in the Twentieth Century." *New West Indian Guide 79*: 239–271.
- Bruijne, Ad de & Aart Schalkwijk. (2008). "Ethnic Residential Patterns in Paramaribo: Spatial Segregation or Blending?" In Rivke Jaffe (Ed.), *The Caribbean City*, pp. 162–188. Kingston: Ian Randle / Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Brujning, C. F. A. & J. Voorhoeve. (1972). *Encyclopedie van Suriname*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Buddingh', Hans. (2000). *Geschiedenis van Suriname*. Utrecht: Het Spectrum. [Orig. 1995.]
- Buddingh', Hans. (2010). "Een uitgelezen plek voor nieuwsgierige reporters." In John Leerdam & Noraly Beyer (Eds.), *Suriname en ik: Persoonlijke verhalen van bekende Surinamers over hun vaderland*, pp. 76–80. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff.
- Buddingh', Hans. (2012). *Geschiedenis van Suriname*. Utrecht: Het Spectrum. [Orig. 1995.]
- Budike, Fred. (1982). *Surinamers naar Nederland: De migratie van 1687–1982*. Amsterdam: Instituut Voortgezet Agogisch Beroeps onderwijs.

- Bulmer-Thomas, Victor. (2012). *The Economic History of the Caribbean Since the Napoleonic Wars*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bureau Sociale Rechrzorg. (1988). *Tevreden huurders en verhuurders*. Paramaribo: Ministerie van Justitie.
- Buschkens, Willem F. L. (1974). *The Family System of the Paramaribo Creoles*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Byron, Margareth & Stéphanie Condon. (2008). *Migration in Comparative Perspective: Caribbean Communities in Britain and France*. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Campbell, E. E. (1987). *Vakbeweging en arbeidsverhoudingen in Suriname*. PhD. Dissertation Katholieke Universiteit Brabant.
- Campbell, Eddy. (1999). "De vakbeweging en het proces van machtsdeling in Suriname 1975–1996." *Oso* 18 (1): 77–88.
- Caprino, Mildred. (1999–2000). "Vrouwen in de marge van de nationale politiekvoering: Politieke ambitie is meer dan een oppervlakte gevecht." *SWI Forum* 16 (2) / 17 (1): 68–76.
- Cárdenas Junquera, Osvaldo O. (1988). *De revolutie van sergeanten: Getuigenis van mijn werk als resident-ambassadeur van Cuba*. Nijmegen: Studiecentrum voor Vredesvraagstukken Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen.
- Carlin, Eithne B. (2001). "Of Riches and Rhetoric: Language in Suriname." In Rosemarijn Hoeffte & Peter Meel (Eds.), *Twentieth-Century Suriname: Continuities and Discontinuities in a New World Society*, pp. 220–243. Kingston: Ian Randle / Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Carlin, Eithne B. & Diederik van Goethem. (2009). *In the Shadow of the Tiger: The Amerindians of Suriname*. Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.
- CBB (Centraal Bureau voor Burgerzaken). (1997). *Demographic Data of Suriname All-In; Demografische gegevens van Suriname integraal*. Paramaribo: Author.
- Chamberlain, Mary. (2010). *Empire and Nation-Building in the Caribbean: Barbados, 1937–66*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Chin, Henk E. & Hans Buddingh'. (1987). *Surinam: Politics, Economics and Society*. London: Pinter.
- Choenni, Chan E. S. (2009). *Bapak Iding Soemita (1908–2001): De innemende leider van de Javanen in Suriname*. Haarlem: BOX Press.
- Clarke, Colin & David Howard. (2008). "Class, Unemployment and Housing Problems in Kingston, Jamaica since Independence." In Rivke Jaffe (Ed.), *The Caribbean City*, pp. 123–161. Kingston and Miami: Ian Randle / Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Comins, D. W. D. (1892). *Note on Emigration from the East Indies to Surinam or Dutch Guiana*. Calcutta: n.p.
- Corrales, Javier & Michael Penfold. (2011). *Dragon in the Tropics: Hugo Chávez and the Political Economy of Revolution in Venezuela*. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Cottaar, Annemarie. (2003). *Zusters uit Suriname: Naoorlogse belevenissen in de Nederlandse verpleging*. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff.
- Dalhuisen, Leo, Maurits Hassankhan, & Frans Steegh (Eds.). (2007). *Geschiedenis van Suriname*. Zutphen: Walburg Pers.
- Damsteegt, Theo. (1988). "Sarnami: A Living Language." In Richard K. Barz & Jeff Siegel (Eds.), *Language Transplanted: The Development of Overseas Hindi*, pp. 95–120. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz.
- Danns, Donna. (1997). "The Evolution of the Financial Sector in Suriname (1970–1996)." In Laurence Clarke & Donna Dadds (Eds.), *The Financial Evolution of the Caribbean Community (1970–1996)*, pp. 355–406. St. Augustine: Caribbean Centre for Monetary Studies, University of the West Indies, Trinidad.
- Dasgupta, Susmita, Benoit Laplante, Craig Meisner, David Wheeler, & Jianping Yan. (2007). *The Impact of Sea Level Rise on Developing Countries: A Comparative Analysis*. Washington DC: World Bank.
- "De eerste vlucht naar Suriname." (1977). *Suralco Magazine* 9 (1): 22–25.
- Derveld, F. E. R. (1982). *Politieke mobilisatie en integratie van de Javanen in Suriname*. Groningen: Bouma's Boekhandel.
- Dew, Edward. (1978). *The Difficult Flowering of Surinam: Ethnicity and Politics in a Plural Society*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

- Dew, Edward. (1988). "Apanjaht and Revolution in Caribbean Politics: The Case of Suriname." In Scott B. MacDonald, Harold M. Sandstrom, & Paul B. Goodwin, Jr. (Eds.), *The Caribbean After Grenada: Revolution, Conflict, and Democracy*, pp. 127–137. New York, NY: Praeger.
- Dew, Edward. (1994). *The Trouble in Suriname, 1975–1993*. Westport, CT: Praeger.
- Dijck, Pitou van. (2001). "Continuity and Change in a Small Open Economy: External Dependency and Policy Inconsistencies." In Rosemarijn Hoefte & Peter Meel (Eds.), *Twentieth-Century Suriname: Continuities and Discontinuities in a New World Society*, pp. 48–70. Kingston: Ian Randle / Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Dijck, Pitou van (Ed.). (2004). *De toekomst van de relatie Nederland-Suriname*. Amsterdam: Rozenberg.
- Dijck, Pitou van. (2011). "Suriname's Economic Variables in the Context of Strategic Culture." Paper presented at "Suriname Strategic Culture Workshop," Florida International University, Miami, November 3.
- Dijck, Pitou van. (2013). *The Impact of the IIRSA Road Infrastructure Programme on Amazonia*. London: Routledge.
- Dijkstra, Geske, Niek de Jong, & Rob Vos. (2001). "Social Policies." In Pitou van Dijck (Ed.), *Suriname: The Economy: Prospects for Sustainable Development*, pp. 221–245. Kingston: Ian Randle.
- Djasmadi, Lisa, Rosemarijn Hoefte, & Hariëtte Mingoen. (2010). *Migratie en cultureel erfgoed: Verhalen van Javanen in Suriname, Indonesië en Nederland*. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2010.
- Domingo, Vernon. (2011). "Suriname: Geographic Elements of Strategic Culture." Paper presented at "Suriname Strategic Culture Workshop," Florida International University, Miami, November 3.
- Donner, Don Walther. (1993). *Swietie Sranang kan me nog meer vertellen: Herinneringen aan een rot jeugd*. Rotterdam: Laetitia Boeken.
- [Drimmelen, C. van]. (1916). *Vrije immigratie: Lezing gehouden door de Agent-Generaal, Vereeniging voor den Grooten Landbouw in Suriname, op 24 oktober 1916 te Paramaribo*. Paramaribo: Oliviera.
- Egger, Jerome. (2006). "Toenemende invloed, grote verdeeldheid: De vakbeweging in Suriname, 1975–2005." In Eric Jagdew et al. (Eds.), *Een Liber Amicorum voor André Loor*, pp. 152–173. Paramaribo: Instituut Opleiding Leraren.
- Egger, Jerome. (2008). "De pers als partijdige observator: Van nieuwe Staatsregeling tot Koninkrijksstatuut, 1937–1975." In Archie Sumter & Angelie Sens (Eds.), *K'ranti!: De Surinaamse pers 1774–2008*, pp. 89–138. Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.
- Ekker, M. H. (1953). *Budgetonderzoek gehouden in Suriname in februari-maart 1952: Nota no 1 "De kosten van levensonderhoud"*. Paramaribo: Stichting Planbureau Suriname.
- Ellis, R. Evan. (2012). "Suriname and the Chinese: Timber, Migration, and Less-Told Stories of Globalization." *SAIS Review* 31 (2): 85–97.
- Evers, Ivo & Pieter Van Maele. (2012). *Bouterse aan de macht*. Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij.
- Ferguson, James. (2005). "Seeing Like an Oil Company: Space, Security, and Global Capital in Neoliberal Africa." *American Anthropologist* 107 (3): 377–382.
- Fernandes Mendes, H. K. (1983). "De staatsgreep in Suriname." *Nederlands Juristenblad* 58: 145–151.
- Fernandes Mendes, H. K. (1989). *Onafhankelijkheid en parlementair stelsel in Suriname: Hooflijnen van een nieuw en democratisch staatsbestel*. Zwolle: Tjeenk Willink.
- Flu, P. C. (1922–1923). "Sanitaire verhoudingen in Suriname." *De West-Indische Gids* 4 (5): 577–596.
- Flu, P. C. (1928). *Verslag van een studiereis naar Suriname (Nederlandsch Guyana) Sept. 1927–Dec. 1927, en beschouwingen dienaangaande*. Utrecht: Kemink.
- Furnivall, J. S. (1948). *Colonial Policy and Practice*. London: At the University Press.
- García-Muñiz, Humberto & Rebeca Campo. (2009). "French and American Imperial Accommodation in the Caribbean during World War II: The Experience of Guyane and the Subaltern Roles of Puerto Rico." In Alfred W. McCoy & Francisco A. Scarano (Eds.), *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State*, pp. 441–451. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Garner, Steve. (2008a). *Guyana 1838–1985: Ethnicity, Class & Gender*. Kingston: Ian Randle.

- Garner, Steve. (2008b). "The Role of the State in the Development of Ethnicity, Class, and Gender in Guyana: An Overview." Paper presented at the KITLV workshop Cultural Dynamics, Leiden September, 26–27, 2008.
- General Secretariat of the Organization of American States. (1983). *Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Suriname*. Washington DC: Organization of American States.
- Gilst, Tim van. (2009). "Onderscheid als onderwijsbeleid: De invloed van het Surinaamse onderwijs op de bevolking van Paramaribo in 1950." Paper, KITLV Leiden.
- Girvan, Norman. (1975). *Aspects of the Political Economy of Race in the Caribbean and in the Americas*. Mona, Kingston: Institute of Social and Economic Research, University of the West Indies, Jamaica.
- Gobardhan-Rambocus, Lila. (2001). *Onderwijs als sleutel tot maatschappelijke vooruitgang: Een taal- en onderwijsgeschiedenis van Suriname, 1651–1975*. Zutphen: Walburg Pers.
- Gobardhan-Rambocus, Lila. (2008). "Spiegel van een verdeelde samenleving: De pers in jaren van sociale onrust, 1863–1937." In Archie Sumter & Angelie Sens (Eds.), *K'ranti!: De Surinaamse pers 1774–2008*, pp. 55–88. Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.
- Goodenough, Suzanne S. (1976). *Race, Status and Residence, Port of Spain, Trinidad: A Study of Social and Residential Differentiation and Change*. PhD Dissertation, University of the West Indies.
- Gordijn, W. [1970]. *Culturele kroniek '48–'68*. Amsterdam: Sticusa.
- Goslinga, C. Ch. (1990). *The Dutch in the Caribbean and in Surinam 1791/5–1942*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
- Gowricharn, Ruben. (2006). "Ethnicity and Political Stability in Plural Societies." In Ruben Gowricharn (Ed.), *Caribbean Transnationalism: Migration, Pluralization, and Social Cohesion*, pp. 223–239. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Graaf, Bob de & Cees Wiebes. (1998). *Villa Maarheeze: De geschiedenis van de inlichtingendienst buitenland*. The Hague: Sdu Uitgevers.
- Grandin, Greg. (2009). *Fordlandia: The Rise and Fall of Henry Ford's Forgotten Jungle City*. New York, NY: Picador.
- Green, Cecilia. (2001). "Caribbean Dependency Theory of the 1970s: A Historical-Materialist-Feminist Revision." In Brian Meeks & Folke Lindahl (Eds.), *New Caribbean Thought: A Reader*, pp. 40–72. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press.
- Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection, Released by the Department of State and the Department of Defense*. (1984). Washington DC: Department of State, Department of Defense.
- Griffith, Ivelaw L. (2011). "The Re-Emergence of Suriname's Désiré (Desi) Bouterse: Political Acumen and Geopolitical Anxiety." Paper Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, Applied Research Center, Florida International University, Miami.
- Groot, René de. (2004). *Drie miljard verwijten: Nederland en Suriname 1974–1982*. Amsterdam: Boom.
- Haakmat, André. (1987). *De revolutie uitgegleden: Politieke herinneringen*. Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Jan Mets.
- Haraksingh, Kusha. (1981). "Control and Resistance Among Overseas Indian Workers: A Study of Labour on the Sugar Plantations of Trinidad, 1875–1917." *Journal of Caribbean History* 14: 1–17.
- Hassankhan, Maurits. (2012). "Het nationale geschiedenis-symposium van 1985 en de dekolonisatie van de geschiedschrijving in Suriname." *His/herTori: Tijdschrift voor Surinaamse geschiedenis en cultuur* 3: 15–27.
- Heilbron, Waldo. [1982]. *Kleine boeren in de schaduw van de plantage: De politieke economie van de n-slavernijperiode in Suriname*. S.l.: s.n.
- Heilbron, Waldo & Glenn Willemsen. (1976). *Klasse en economische werkelijkheid: Suriname vanaf de Eerste Wereldoorlog tot aan de crisis van de dertiger jaren*. Paramaribo: Fakulteit der Sociaal-Economische Wetenschappen, Universiteit van Suriname.
- Heilbron, Waldo & Glenn Willemsen. (1980a). "Goud en balata-exploitatie in Suriname: Nieuwe productiesektoren en nieuwe vormen van afhankelijkheid na 1873." *Caraïbisch Forum* 1 (1): 66–84.
- Heilbron, Waldo & Glenn Willemsen. (1980b). "Goud en balata-exploitatie in Suriname: Nieuwe productiesektoren en nieuwe vormen van afhankelijkheid na 1873—deel II." *Caraïbisch Forum* 1 (2): 87–101.

- Helman, Albert. (1976). *Zuid-zuid-west*. Amsterdam: Querido. [Orig. 1926.]
- Helman, Albert & Jos de Roo. (1988). *Groot geld tegen klein geld: De voorgeschiedenis van Sticusa*. Amsterdam: Sticusa.
- Hengst-Kleijn, C. A. M. den. (1973). *Onderzoek van drie projecten van de stichting volkshuisvesting Suriname: Tammenga, Peu et Content en Marowijne*. Paramaribo: Ministerie van Arbeid en Volkshuisvesting.
- Herskovits, Melville & Frances S. Herskovits. (1934). *Rebel Destiny: Among the Bush Negroes of Dutch Guiana*. New York, NY: Whittlesey House.
- Hesseling, G. (1974). *De maatschappijstad Moengo en haar omgeving*. Amsterdam: Geografisch en Planologisch Instituut van de Vrije Universiteit.
- Hira, Sandew. (1983). *Van Priary tot en met De Kom: De geschiedenis van het verzet in Suriname, 1630–1940*. Rotterdam: Futile. [Orig. 1982.]
- Hiss, Philip Hanson. (1943). *Netherlands America: The Dutch Territories in the West*. New York, NY: Duell, Sloan and Pearce.
- Hoefte, Rosemarijn. (1998). *In Place of Slavery: A Social History of British Indian and Javanese Laborers in Suriname*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Hoefte, Rosemarijn. (2007). "The Lonely Pioneer: Suriname's First Female Politician and Social Activist, Grace Schneiders-Howard." *Wadabagei: A Journal of the Caribbean and its Diasporas* 10 (3): 84–103.
- Hoefte, Rosemarijn. (2008). "Grace Schneiders-Howard: De social-activiste." In Rosemarijn Hoefte, Peter Meel, & Hans Renders (Eds.), *Tropenlevens: De [post]koloniale biografie*, pp. 17–33. Amsterdam: Boom / Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij.
- Hoefte, Rosemarijn. (2011). "Learning, Loving and Living in Early Twentieth-Century Suriname: The Movement of People and Ideas from East to West." *Journal of Caribbean History* 45 (2): 190–211.
- Hoefte, Rosemarijn. (forthcoming). "Locating Mecca: Religious and Political Discord in the Javanese Community in Pre-Independence Suriname." In Aisha Khan (Ed.), *Islam and the Atlantic World: Toward New Paradigms and Prospects*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Hoogbergen, Wim & Dirk Kruijt. (2005). *De oorlog van de sergeanten: Surinaamse militairen in de politiek*. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
- Hoop, Carlo. (1991). *Verdronken land, verdwenen dorpen: De transmigratie van Saramaccaners in Suriname 1958–1964*. Alkmaar: Uitgeverij Bewustzijn.
- Hoppe, R. (1976). "Het politieke systeem van Suriname: Elite-kartel democratie." *Acta Politica* 11 (2):145–177.
- Horst, Liesbeth van der. (2004). *Wereldoorlog in de West: Suriname, de Nederlandse Antillen en Aruba 1940–1945*. Hilversum: Verloren.
- Ismael, Joseph. (1949). *De immigratie van Indonesiërs in Suriname*. Leiden: Luctor et Emergo.
- Jaffe, Rivke. (2011). "Hegemonic Dissolution in Suriname? Recent Challenges to Pluralist Politics." In Brian Meeks (Ed.), *M. G. Smith: Social Theory and Anthropology in the Caribbean and Beyond*, pp. 185–195. Kingston: Ian Randle.
- Jaffe, Rivke, Ad de Bruijne, & Aart Schalkwijk. (2008). "The Caribbean City: An Introduction." In Rivke Jaffe (Ed.), *The Caribbean City*, pp. 1–23. Kingston: Ian Randle / Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Jaffe, Rivke & Jolien Sanderse. (2010). "Surinamese Maroons as Reggae Artistes: Music, Marginality and Urban Space." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33 (9): 1561–1579.
- James, Winston. (1998). *Holding Aloft the Banner of Ethiopia: Caribbean Radicalism in Early Twentieth-Century America*. London: Verso.
- Jansen van Galen, John. (2000). *Hetenachtsdroom: Suriname, erfenis van de slavernij*. Amsterdam: Contact.
- Jansen van Galen, John. (2005). *Laatste gouverneur, eerste president: De eeuw van Johan Ferrier, Surinamer*. Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij.
- Janssen, Roger. (2011). *In Search of a Path: An Analysis of the Foreign Policy of Suriname from 1975 to 1991*. Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Jap-A-Joe, Harold, Peter Sjak Shie, & Joop Vernooij. (2001). "The Quest for Respect: Religion and Emancipation in Twentieth-Century Suriname." In Rosemarijn Hoefte & Peter Meel (Eds.),

- Twentieth-Century Suriname: Continuities and Discontinuities in a New World Society*, pp. 198–219. Kingston: Ian Randle / Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Jones, Guno & Esther Captain. (2010). “De Tweede Wereldoorlog en de verschoven staatkundige verhoudingen met de Oost en de West.” In Esther Captain & Guno Jones (Eds.), *Oorlogserfgoed overzee: De erfenis van de Tweede Wereldoorlog in Aruba, Curaçao, Indonesië en Suriname*, pp. 36–64. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
- Josiah, Barbara P. (2005). “Migration and Mortality in the Development of Guyana’s Gold and Diamond Industries, 1890–1956.” Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Association of Caribbean Historians, Cartagena, Colombia.
- Josiah, Barbara P. (2011). *Migration, Mining, and the African Diaspora: Guyana in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kagie, Rudie. (2012). *Bikkel: Het verhaal van de eerste politieke moord van het Bouterse-regime*. Amsterdam: Bert Bakker.
- Kambel, Ellen-Rose. (1999). “Are Indigenous Rights for Women Too? Gender Equality and Indigenous Rights in the Americas: The Case of Surinam.” In Titia Loenen & Peter R. Rodrigues (Eds.), *Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives*, pp. 167–179. The Hague: Kluwer Law International.
- Kambel, Ellen-Rose. (2007). “Land, Development, and Indigenous Rights in Suriname: The Role of International Human Rights Law.” In Jean Besson & Janet Momsen (Eds.), *Caribbean Land and Development Revisited*, pp. 69–80. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kambel, Ellen-Rose & Fergus MacKay. (1999). *The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and Maroons in Suriname*. Copenhagen: International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs.
- Kempen, Michiel van. (2003). *Een geschiedenis van de Surinaamse literatuur*. 2 vols. Breda: De Geus.
- Khemradj, Roy. (2002). *Jagernath Lachmon: Een politiek testament*. Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.
- Kielstra J. C. (1908). *Proeve eener inleiding tot de koloniale staathuishoudkunde*. Bandoeng: Kolff.
- Kielstra J. C. (1925a). “Economische mogelijkheden voor Suriname.” *Haagsch Maandblad* 4: 551–563.
- Kielstra J. C. (1925b). “Indisch Genootschap. Vergadering van 9 October 1925. Voordracht van prof. mr. J. C. Kielstra. De economische vooruitzichten in West-Indië.” *Verslagen der vergaderingen over de jaren 1921–1925*, pp. 52–71.
- Kielstra J. C. (1925c). *Wirtschaftliche und soziale Probleme in Niederländisch-Westindien*. Jena: Gustav Fischer.
- Kielstra J. C. (1927). “Nieuwe mogelijkheden voor Suriname.” *De Economist* 76: 181–196.
- Kielstra J. C. (1929). “Suriname’s economische vooruitzichten.” *De Economist* 78: 335–338.
- Kinshasa, Kwando M. (2002). “From Surinam to the Holocaust: Anton de Kom, a Political Migrant.” *Journal of Caribbean History* 36 (1): 33–68.
- Klerk, C. J. M. de. (1953). *De immigratie der Hindostanen in Suriname*. Amsterdam: Urbi et Orbi.
- Klinken, Gerry van & Joshua Barker. (2009). “Introduction: State and Society in Indonesia.” In Gerry van Klinken & Joshua Barker (Eds.), *State of Authority: The State and Society in Indonesia*, pp. 1–16. Ithaca: Southeast Asia Program Publications.
- Klinkers, Ellen. (1997). *Op hoop van vrijheid: Van slavensamenleving naar Creoolse gemeenschap in Suriname, 1830–1880*. Utrecht: CLACS / IBS.
- Klinkers, Ellen. (2007). “De strijd gaat door: Creools verzet na de afschaffing van de slavernij.” In Peter Meel & Hans Ramsoedh (Eds.), *Ik ben een haan met een kroon op mijn hoofd: Pacificatie en verzet in koloniaal en postkoloniaal Suriname: Opstellen voor Wim Hoogbergen*, pp. 133–151. Amsterdam: Bakker.
- Klinkers, Ellen. (2011). *De geschiedenis van de politie in Suriname, 1863–1975: Van koloniale tot nationale ordehandhaving*. Amsterdam: Boom / Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij.
- Klooster, Olga van der & Michiel Bakker. (2009). *Architectuur en bouwcultuur in Suriname*. Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.
- Kom, Anton de. (1934). *Wij slaven van Suriname*. Amsterdam: Contact.
- Koning, Anouk de. (2009a). “The Everyday of Class, Ethnicity and Gender in Mid-Century Paramaribo,” Paper, KITLV Leiden.
- Koning, Anouk de. (2009b). “Voorbij het multiculturele paradijs: Etniciteit en Suriname’s sociale geschiedenis.” *Oso* 28 (1): 12–27.

- Koning, Anouk de. (2010). "Shadows of the Plantation? Mining Enclaves in Suriname" Paper, KITLV, Leiden.
- Koning, Anouk de. (2011a). "Beyond Ethnicity: Writing Caribbean Histories through Social Spaces." *Latin American and Caribbean Ethnic Studies* 6 (3): 259–282.
- Koning, Anouk de. (2011b). "Moengo on Strike: The Politics of Labour in Suriname's Bauxite Industry." *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 91: 31–47.
- Koning, Anouk de. (2011c). "Shadows of the Plantation? A Social History of Suriname's Bauxite Town Moengo." *New West Indian Guide* 85: 215–246.
- Koopman, Edwin. (2011). *De oliëkoning: Hugo Chávez en de belofes van zijn Latijns-Amerikaanse revolutie*. Amsterdam: Podium.
- Kopijn, Yvette. (1998). "Constructions of Ethnicity in the Diaspora: The Case of Three Generations of Surinamese-Javanese Women in the Netherlands." In Mary Chamberlain (Ed.), *Caribbean Migration: Globalised Identities*, pp. 109–124. London: Routledge.
- Kossmann, E. H. (1978). *The Low Countries 1780–1940*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Kraan, W. (1928). "Een bezoek aan Moengo." Paramaribo: De West.
- Kromhout, Mayke. (1995). "Gender Relations and Household Management in the Changing Economy of Suriname." *Journal of Social Sciences / Tijdschrift voor Maatschappijwetenschappen* 2 (2): 40–52.
- Kromhout, Mayke Yolanda. (2000). *Gedeelde smart is halve smart: Hoe vrouwen in Paramaribo hun bestaan organiseren*. PhD Dissertation, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
- Kruijt, Dirk. (2006). "Assessment Adventures: The History of the Evaluation of the Dutch Surinamese Development Relations, 1975–2000." In Paul van Lindert, Ali de Jong, Gery Nijenhuis, & Guus van Westen, *Development Matters: Geographical Studies on Development Processes and Policies*, pp. 293–300. Utrecht: Faculty of Geosciences, Utrecht University.
- Kruijt, Dirk & Marion Maks. (2001). "Een belaste relatie: 25 jaar ontwikkelingsamenwerking Nederland–Suriname, 1975–2000: Interimrapport." The Hague: Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken (DWH) / Paramaribo: Ministerie van Planning en Ontwikkelingsamenwerking.
- Kruijt, Dirk & Marion Maks. (2003). "Een belaste relatie: 25 jaar ontwikkelingsamenwerking Nederland–Suriname, 1975–2000." s.l.: n.p.
- Laëthier, Maud. (2010). "Identifications and Kinships among Haitians in French Guiana: Observations on a Diaspora." In Philippe Zacaïr (Ed.), *Haiti and the Haitian Diaspora in the Wider Caribbean*, pp. 82–102. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Lalmahomed, Bea. (1992). *Hindostaanse vrouwen: De geschiedenis van zes generaties*. Utrecht: Jan van Arkel.
- Lamur, Carlo. (1985). *The American Takeover: Industrial Emergence and Alcoa's Expansion in Guyana and Suriname 1914–1921*. Dordrecht: Foris.
- Lamur, H. E. (1973). *The Demographic Evolution of Surinam 1920–1970*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Lauria-Perricelli, Antonio. (2005). "Puerto Rico in the 1930s." In Constance R. Sutton (Ed.), *Revisiting Caribbean Labour: Essays in Honour of O. Nigel Bolland*, pp. 1–18. Kingston: Ian Randle / New York, NY: Research Institute for the Study of Man.
- Ledgister, F. S. J. (1998). *Class Alliances and the Liberal Authoritarian State: The Roots of Post-Colonial Democracy in Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Surinam*. Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press.
- Lewis, Vaughan A. (2001). "Some Implications of Suriname's Regional Involvement in the Caribbean Community." In *Nationale ontwikkeling in regionale en internationale context*, pp. 187–202. Paramaribo: Anton de Kom Universiteit van Suriname.
- Lie A Kwie, Cor J. & Henk G. Esajas. (Eds.). (1996). *80 jaar bauxietindustrie in Suriname = 80 Years of Bauxite Industry on Suriname*. Paramaribo: Suralco L.L.C.
- Lier, R. A. J. van. (1949). *Samenleving in een grensgebied: Een sociaal-historische studie van de maatschappij in Suriname*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Lier, R. A. J. van. (1971). *Frontier Society: A Social Analysis of the History of Surinam*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Lijphart, Arend. (1977). *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

- Linnekamp, F., A. Koedam, & I. S. A. Baud. (2011). "Household Vulnerability to Climate Change: Examining Perceptions of Households of Flood Risks in Georgetown and Paramaribo." *Habitat International* 35 (3): 447–456.
- Lommerse, Hanneke. (2008). "Population Figures." In Gert Oostindie (Ed.), *Dutch Colonialism, Migration and Cultural Heritage*, pp. 315–342. Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Lony, Marc. (2010). "Picking and Unpicking Time: Contextualizing Haitian Immigration in French Guiana." In Philippe Zacaïr (Ed.), *Haiti and the Haitian Diaspora in the Wider Caribbean*, pp. 171–198. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- Lotens, Walter. (2000). *Gesprekken aan de Waterkant: Suriname 2000*. Mol: Libertas / Paramaribo: Fingos.
- Lotens, Walter. [2004]. *Om kijken naar een "revolutie": Surinaamse intellectuelen onder militairen*. [Paramaribo]: Lotens.
- MacKay, Fergus (Ed.). (2006). *Moiwana zoekt gerechtigheid: De strijd van een Marrondorp tegen de staat Suriname*. Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.
- Maks, Marion & Ad de Bruijne. (2008). *Bouwen aan een fundament: Een programma voor beleidsondersteunend onderzoek voor de sector huisvesting. Deel 1. Hoofdrapport*. Paramaribo: MaksConsultancy.
- Mans, Jimmy. (2012). *Amotopao Trails: A Recent Archaeology of Trio Movements*. Leiden: Sidestone Press.
- Marh , Usha. (2000). *Tapu sj n: Bedek je schande: Surinamers en incest*. Amsterdam: Van Gennep. [Orig. 1995.]
- Marshall, Edwin Kenneth. (2003). *Ontstaan en ontwikkeling van het Surinaams nationalisme: Natievorming als opgave*. Delft: Eburon.
- Marshall, Edwin. (2010). *De arbeiders zijn mij heilig: A pikin syatu anu disi e go te ini a saka fu Bustion fu teki a moni gi unu. Fred Derby: Vakbondsleider en politicus*. Amsterdam: Ninsee / The Hague: Amrit.
- Massiah, Joycelin. (1986). "Work in the Lives of Caribbean Women." *Social and Economic Studies* 35 (2): 177–239.
- Matthies, Brigitte K., Julie Meeks–Gardner, Avril Daley, & Claudette Crawford–Brown. (2008). "Issues of Violence in the Caribbean." In Frederick W. Hickling, Brigitte K. Matthies, Kai Morgan, & Roger C. Gibson (Eds.), *Perspectives in Caribbean Psychology*, pp. 393–464. Kingston: Caribbean Institute of Mental Health and Substance Abuse–CARIMENSA.
- McClaurin, Irma. (1996). *Women of Belize: Gender and Change in Central America*. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
- McGranahan, Gordon, Deborah Balk, & Bridget Anderson. (2007). "The Rising Tide: Assessing the Risks of Climate Change and Human Settlements in Low Elevation Coastal Zones." *Environment and Urbanization* 19 (1): 17–37.
- McNeill, James & Chimmam Lal. (1915). *Report on the Condition of Indian Immigrants in the Four British Colonies Trinidad, British Guiana or Demerara, Jamaica and Fiji, and in the Dutch Colony of Suriname*. London: His Majesty's Stationary Office 7744.
- Meeks, Brian (Ed.). (2011). *M. G. Smith: Social Theory and Anthropology in the Caribbean and Beyond*. Kingston: Ian Randle.
- Meel, Peter. (1990). "A Reluctant Embrace: Suriname's Idle Quest for Independence." In Gary Brana–Shute (Ed.), *Resistance and Rebellion in Suriname: Old and New*, pp. 259–289. Williamsburg, VA College of William and Mary.
- Meel, Peter. (1991). "Het mechanisme van de gekwetste trots: Surinaamse 'revolutie' in historisch perspectief." *Internationale Spectator* 45 (5): 312–319.
- Meel, Peter. (1993). "The March of Militarization in Suriname." In Anthony Payne & Paul Sutton (Eds.), *Modern Caribbean Politics*, pp. 125–146. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Meel, Peter. (1994). "Verbroederingspolitiek en nationalisme: Het dekolonisatievraagstuk in de Surinaamse politiek." *Bijdragen en Mededelingen betreffende de Geschiedenis der Nederlanden* 109: 638–659.
- Meel, Peter. (1997). *Op zoek naar Surinaamse normen: Nagelaten geschriften van Jan Voorhoeve (1950–1961)*. Utrecht: CLACS / IBS.
- Meel, Peter. (1998a). "De Ronde Tafel Conferentie van 1961: Nederland en Suriname in het spanningsveld van vrijheid, gelijkwaardigheid en gebondenheid." *Tijdschrift voor Geschiedenis* 111: 411–432.

- Meel, Peter. (1998b). "Towards a Typology of Suriname Nationalism." *New West Indian Guide* 72: 257–281.
- Meel, Peter. (1999). *Tussen autonomie en onafhankelijkheid: Nederlands-Surinaamse betrekkingen 1954–1961*. Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij.
- Meel, Peter. (2009). "Anton de Kom and the Formative Phase of Surinamese Decolonization." *New West Indian Guide* 83: 249–280.
- Menke, Jack. (1998). *Restructuring Urban Employment and Poverty: The Case of Suriname*. Paramaribo: SWI Press.
- Menke, Jack. (2001). "Staat, politiek en democratie in Suriname 1975–2000." In *Nationale ontwikkeling in regionale en internationale context*, pp. 203–232. Paramaribo: Anton de Kom Universiteit van Suriname.
- Menke, Jack. (2011). "Ethnicity between Nation-building and Nation-creation." In Brian Meeks (Ed.), *M. G. Smith: Social Theory and Anthropology in the Caribbean and Beyond*, pp. 196–220. Kingston: Ian Randle.
- Menke, Jack & Orlando J. Pérez. (2012). "Surinamese Strategic Culture." Miami: Florida International University, Applied Research Center/Latin American and Caribbean Center. [Finding Report; 24.]
- Mintz, Sidney. (1996). "Ethnic Difference, Plantation Sameness." In Gert Oostindie (Ed.), *Ethnicity in the Caribbean: Essays in Honor of Harry Hoetink*, pp. 39–52. London: Macmillan.
- Molendijk, Mathilde & Karin Boven. (1995). *Arowakse, Karaïbe en Wayana vrouwen in het Surinaamse binnenland: Een onderzoek naar hun dagelijkse activiteiten, rollen, posities, belangen en toekomstverwachtingen*. Paramaribo: Leo Victor / Amsterdam: Instituut voor Sociale Geografie, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
- Moore, Brian L. & Michele A. Johnson. (2011). *"They Do As They Please": The Jamaican Struggle for Cultural Freedom after Morant Bay*. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press.
- Mulder, Karen. (1990). "Het aantreden van Gouverneur Kielstra: Een breuk in de Surinaamse koloniale geschiedenis?" *SWI Forum voor Wetenschap en Cultuur* 7: 36–48.
- Mulier, Ludwig van (Ed.). (1990). *Desi Bouterse: Dekolonisatie en nationaal leiderschap*. Nijmegen: Masusa.
- Neumann, Peter. (1967). *Wirtschaft und materielle Kultur der Busch neger Surinames: Ein Beitrag zur Erforschung afrikanischer Probleme*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
- NIKOS. (2002). *Bevolkingsontwikkeling en gevolgen van migratie: Een onderzoek naar de invloed van migratie op de sociaal-ekonomische ontwikkeling van het distrikt Coronie*. [Paramaribo]: Author.
- Ockhorst, Annika. (2012). *Lachen, huilen en bevrijden: De weerspiegeling van de Surinaamse samenleving in het werk van het Doe-theater, 1970–1983*. Leiden: Brill.
- Oliveira, I. (1977). "Een geschiedenis van de balata-industrie in Suriname." *Scriptie MO-A Geschiedenis*, Paramaribo.
- Oltmans, Willem. (1984). *In gesprek met Desi Bouterse*. Amsterdam: Jan Mets.
- Ooft, C. D. (1980). *Surinaams Staatsrecht vóór en na de Omwenteling*. Paramaribo: Leo Victor.
- Oostburg, B. J. F. (1995). *25 jaar Universiteit van Suriname*. Paramaribo: Anton de Kom Universiteit van Suriname.
- Oostindie, Gert. (1986). "Kondreman in Bakrakondre: Surinamers in Nederland 1667–1954." In Gert Oostindie & Emy Maduro (Eds.), *In het land van de overheerser. II Antillianen en Surinamers in Nederland, 1634/1667–1954*. Dordrecht: Foris.
- Oostindie, Gert. (1990). "De onvoltooide dekolonisatie en de geschiedschrijving van Suriname." *Leidschrift* 6 (2): 5–26.
- Oostindie, Gert. (2000). *Paradijs overzee: De "Nederlandse" Caraïben en Nederland*. Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij. [Orig. 1997.]
- Oostindie, Gert. (2006). *De parels en de kroon: Het koningshuis en de koloniën*. Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij / Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij.
- Oostindie, Gert & Inge Klinkers. (2003). *Decolonising the Caribbean: Dutch Policies in a Comparative Perspective*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Oostindie, Gert & Alex van Stipriaan. (1995). "Slavery and Slave Cultures in a Hydraulic Society: Suriname." In Stephan Palmié (Ed.), *Slave Cultures and the Cultures of Slavery*, pp. 78–99. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press.
- Oudschans Dentz, Fred. (1911). *De balata-industrie in Suriname: Supplement*. Paramaribo: Oliviera.

- Oudschans Dentz, Fred. (1921). "De bauxietnijverheid en de stichting van een nieuwe stad in Suriname." *Nieuwe West-Indische Gids* 2: 481–508.
- Oudschans Dentz, Fred., E. K. Plasschaert, & J. Sack. (1909). *De balata-industrie in Suriname*. Paramaribo: Oliviera.
- Para, Theo. (2012). "De wijsheid van non-discriminatie." *Parbode* 7 (76): 61–63.
- Pengel, Pearl J. (2006). "Female Soldiers in Suriname 1942–1946." In Edwin K. Marshall (Ed.), *Engagement en distantie: Wetenschap in vele facetten*, pp. 33–42. Amsterdam: NiNsee.
- Penta, Karl. (2002). *A Mercenary's Tale*. London: John Blake Publishing.
- Polak, J. A. (1908). *Historisch overzicht van de goudindustrie in Suriname*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Pos, Hugo. (1995). *In triplo: autobiografie*. Amsterdam: In de Knipscheer.
- Post, Ken. (1978). *Arise Ye Starvelings: The Jamaican Labour Rebellion of 1938 and its Aftermath*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Potter, R. B. (1993). "Urbanization in the Caribbean and Trends of Global Convergence-Divergence." *The Geographical Journal* 159 (1): 1–21.
- Potter, R. B. (1998). "From Plantopolis to Mini-Metropolis in the Eastern Caribbean: Reflections on Urban Sustainability." In Duncan F. M. McGregor, David Barker, & Sally Lloyd Evans (Eds.), *Resource Sustainability and Caribbean Development*, pp. 51–68. Barbados: The Press University of the West Indies.
- Potter, R. B. (2000). *The Urban Caribbean in an Era of Global Change*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Price, Charles Reavis. (2003). "'Cleave to the Black': Expressions of Ethiopianism in Jamaica." *New West Indian Guide* 77: 31–64.
- Price, Richard. (2002). "Maroons in Suriname and Guyane: How Many and Where." *New West Indian Guide* 76: 81–88.
- Price, Richard. (2011). *Rainforest Warriors: Human Rights on Trial*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Price, Sally. (1998). "Sexism and the Construction of Reality: An Afro-American Example." In Arlene Torres & Norman E. Whitten, Jr (Eds.), *Blackness in Latin America and the Caribbean: Social Dynamics and Cultural Transformations. Volume II: Eastern South America and the Caribbean*, pp. 236–255. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. [Orig. 1983.]
- Pronk, Jan. (2004). "De autonomie van Suriname." In *De Tweede Vrede van Breda: Natievorming of Onafhankelijkheid. Zevende Multatuli Lezing, De Grote Kerk, Breda, vrijdag 1 november 2002*, pp. 38–65. Amsterdam: NCDO / Breda: Stichting Multatuli Lezing Nederland.
- Putscher, A. G. (1933). *Het bestuursbeleid en toestanden in Suriname: Lezing gehouden te Den Haag en Utrecht op 12 en 14 juli 1933 door den heer A. G. Putscher, Lid van de Koloniale Staten in Suriname*. S.l.: s.n.
- Putten, Adriaan van. (1988). "De bacovencultuur met gouvernementsteun in de jaren 1905–1910." *Oso* 7 (1): 31–46.
- Putten, Adriaan van. (1990). "De Lawa-spoorweg: Een voortijdige poging tot industrialisatie." *Oso* 9 (1): 57–64.
- Quamina, Odida T. (1987). *Mineworkers of Guyana: The Making of a Working Class*. London: Zed Books.
- Quintus Bosz, A. J. A. (1954). *Drie eeuwen grondpolitiek in Suriname: Een historische studie van de achtergrond en de ontwikkeling van de Surinaamse rechten op de grond*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
- Ramcharan, Nita. (2008). "Het donkerste tijdperk voor de persvrijheid: De media tijdens de militaire dictatuur, 1980–1987." In Archie Sumter & Angelie Sens (Eds.), *K'ranti! De Surinaamse pers 1774–2008*, pp. 173–190. Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.
- Ramdin, Albert R. (1989). "Het ontstaan van Hindostaanse organisaties in Suriname in de periode 1900–1940." *SWI Forum voor Wetenschap en Cultuur* 6 (2): 53–66.
- Ramkissoon, Marina et al. (2008). "Family Life in the Caribbean: Assessment and Counselling Models." In Frederick W. Hickling, Brigitte K. Matthies, Kai Morgan, & Roger C. Gibson (Eds.), *Perspectives in Caribbean Psychology*, pp. 93–112. Kingston: Caribbean Institute of Mental Health and Substance Abuse-CARIMENSA.
- Ramsoedh, Hans. (1990). *Suriname 1933–1944: Koloniale politiek en beleid onder gouverneur Kielstra*. Delft: Eburon.

- Ramsoedh, Hans. (2001). "Playing Politics: Ethnicity, Clientelism and the Struggle for Power." In Rosemarijn Hoefte & Peter Meel (Eds.), *Twentieth-Century Suriname: Continuities and Discontinuities in a New World Society*, pp. 91–110. Kingston: Ian Randle / Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Ramsoedh, Hans. (2003). "De revolutie die niet doorging." *Oso* 22 (2): 187–213.
- Ramsoedh, Hans. (2007). "Surinaamse sores versus Nederlandse mores: Politieke conflicten in de koloniale tijd." In Peter Meel & Hans Ramsoedh (Eds.), *Ik ben een haan met een kroon op mijn hoofd: Pacificatie en verzet in koloniaal en postkoloniaal Suriname: Opstellen voor Wim Hoogbergen*, pp. 160–190. Amsterdam: Bakker.
- Reddock, Rhoda. (1994). *Women, Labour and Struggle in 20th Century Trinidad and Tobago, 1898–1960*. PhD Dissertation, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
- Reeser, Pepijn. (2012). *Verzamelaars en volksoepvoeders: Surinaamse musea 1863–2012*. Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Rijssen, Jules. (2012). *Teken en zie de wereld: Oorlogsveteranen in Suriname*. Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.
- Robotham, Don. (2011). "Pluralism and Creolism, Africa and the Caribbean." In Brian Meeks (Ed.), *M. G. Smith: Social Theory and Anthropology in the Caribbean and Beyond*, pp. 62–91. Kingston: Ian Randle.
- Rodríguez Beruff, Jorge. (2009). "From Winship to Leahy: Crisis, War, and Transition in Puerto Rico." In Alfred W. McCoy & Francisco A. Scarano (Eds.), *Colonial Crucible: Empire in the Making of the Modern American State*, pp. 431–440. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Romein, Arie. (1985). "Guyanezen in Suriname." *SWI Forum* 2 (1): 44–51.
- Roopnaraine, Rupert. (2012). *The Sky's Wild Noise: Selected Essays*. Leeds: Peepal Tree.
- Roos, J. S. (1912). *Het ambacht in Suriname: Rapport van de commissie benoemd bij Gouvernements-resolutie van 13 januari 1910, no 13*. [Paramaribo]: Gouvernement van Suriname.
- Rush, Anne Spry. (2011). *Bonds of Empire: West Indians and Britishness from Victoria to Decolonization*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ryan, Selwyn. (2001). "Democratic Governance in the Anglophone Caribbean: The Independence Experience." In *Nationale ontwikkeling in regionale en internationale context*, pp. 96–119. Paramaribo: Anton de Kom Universiteit van Suriname.
- Samms-Vaughan, Maureen. (2008). "Developmental Psychology in Caribbean Infants and Preschoolers." In Frederick W. Hickling, Brigitte K. Matthies, Kai Morgan, & Roger C. Gibson (Eds.), *Perspectives in Caribbean Psychology*, pp. 163–203. Kingston: Caribbean Institute of Mental Health and Substance Abuse-CARIMENSA.
- Sanches, Peter. (2012). *Flying on Trusted Wings: Vijftig jaar Surinam Airways*. Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.
- Schalkwijk, Aart & Ad de Bruijne. (1997). *Van Mon Plaisir tot Ephraïmszegen: Welstand, etniciteit en woonpatronen in Paramaribo*. Paramaribo: Leo Victor.
- Schalkwijk, Marten. (1994). *Suriname, het steentje in de Nederlandse schoen: Van onafhankelijkheid tot Raamverdrag*. Paramaribo: Firgos Suriname.
- Schoch, C. F. (1924). "Onze twaalfde provincie in nood." *West-Indische Gids* 5 (1): 497–518.
- Scholten, Ben. (1986). *Opkomende arbeidersbeweging in Suriname: Doedel, Liesdek, De Sanders en de werklozenonrust 1931–1933*. Nijmegen: Masusa.
- Scholten, Ben. (1987). *Louis Doedel: Surinaams vakbondsleider van het eerste uur. Een bronnenpublicatie*. Paramaribo: Anton de Kom Universiteit.
- Scholten, Ben. (1991). *Suriname tijdens de Tweede Wereldoorlog*. Paramaribo: Anton de Kom Universiteit van Suriname. [Orig. 1985.]
- Scholten, Bernardus Petrus Canisius. (1994). *Bosnegers en overheid in Suriname: De ontwikkeling van de politieke verhouding 1651–1992*. Paramaribo: Afdeling Cultuurstudies / Minov.
- Schrijver, Nico. (2012). "Amnestiewet in Suriname: Komt de waarheid ooit nog boven water?" *Internationale Spectator* 66 (7/8): 341–342.
- Schulte Nordholt, Henk. (2009). "Onafhankelijkheid of moderniteit? Een geïllustreerde hypothese." In Marieke Bloembergen & Remco Raben (Eds.), *Het koloniale beschavingsoffensief: Wegen naar het nieuwe Indië, 1890–1950*, pp. 105–120. Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij.

- Sedoc-Dahlberg, Betty. (1990). "Struggle for Democracy in Suriname." In Betty Sedoc-Dahlberg (Ed.), *The Dutch Caribbean: Prospects for Democracy*, pp. 173–189. New York, NY: Gordon and Breach.
- Seecharan, Clem. (1997). "Tiger in the Stars": *The Anatomy of Indian Achievement in British Guiana 1919–29*. London: Macmillan.
- Segal, Daniel A. (1993). "'Race' and 'Colour' in Pre-Independence Trinidad and Tobago." In Kevin A. Yelvington (Ed.), *Trinidad Ethnicity*, pp. 81–115. London: Macmillan Caribbean.
- Sennett, Richard. (2012). *Together: The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Cooperation*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Shultz, George P. (1993). *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary of State*. New York, NY: Charles Scribner's Sons.
- Silos, Maureen, 2001. "Comments on 'Staat, politiek en democratie in Suriname 1975–2000' by Jack Menke." In *Nationale ontwikkeling in regionale en internationale context*, pp. 238–242. Paramaribo: Anton de Kom Universiteit van Suriname.
- Silos, Maureen. (2004). "Leiderschap in de organisatie van armoede in Suriname." In *De Tweede Vrede van Breda: Natievorming of Onafhankelijkheid. Zevende Multatuli Lezing, De Grote Kerk, Breda, vrijdag 1 november 2002*, pp. 22–36. Amsterdam: NCDO / Breda: Stichting Multatuli Lezing Nederland.
- Singelenberg, Richard. (1983). *Guyanese gastarbeid in Suriname*. Utrecht: Instituut voor Culturele Antropologie, Universiteit Utrecht.
- Singh, Simboonath. (2003). "Imagined Communities: Articulating a Return to the Mythical Homelands in the African and Indian Diaspora." In Holger Henke & Fred Reno (Eds.), *Modern Political Culture in the Caribbean*, pp. 212–236. Kingston: University of the West Indies Press.
- Slagveer, Jozef. (1980). *De nacht van de revolutie: De staatsgreep in Suriname op 25 februari 1980*. Paramaribo: C. Kersten.
- Smith, M. G. (1974). *The Plural Society in the British West Indies*. Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press. [Orig. 1965.]
- Snellen, Ernst. (1933). *De aanvoer van arbeiders voor den landbouw in Suriname*. PhD Dissertation Landbouw Hogeschool, Wageningen, the Netherlands.
- Staal, G. J. (1927). *Nederlands Guyana: Een kort begrip van Suriname*. Amsterdam: Groot Nederland. Stichting Planbureau Suriname. (1978). *Mankracht inventarisatie 1977*. Paramaribo: CESWO.
- Stichting Wetenschappelijke Informatie. (1985). *Het vraagstuk van de Guyanezen en andere vreemdelingen in Suriname: Memorandum*. Paramaribo: Author.
- Stipriaan, Alex van. (1998). "Between State and Society: Education in Suriname, 1850–1950." In Nico Randerad (Ed.), *Mediators between State and Society*, pp. 57–86. Hilversum: Verloren.
- Stipriaan, Alex van. (2004). "July 1, Emancipation Day in Suriname: A Contested 'Lieu de Mémoire', 1863–2003." *New West Indian Guide* 78: 269–304.
- Stipriaan, Alex van. (2009). "Van wie is het binnenland? Exploratie en exploitatie van het binnenland tot 1965." In Alex van Stipriaan & Thomas Polimé (Eds.), *Kunst van overleven: Marroncultuur uit Suriname*, pp. 114–127. Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.
- Stipriaan, Alex van. (2011). "Contact! Marrons en de transport- en communicatierevolutie in het Surinaamse binnenland." *Oso* 38 (1): 28–46.
- Struiken, Harald & Chris Healy. (2003). "Suriname: The Challenge of Formulating Land Policy." In Allan N. Williams (Ed.), *Land in the Caribbean: Issues of Policy, Administration and Management in the English-Speaking Caribbean*, pp. 315–343. Mount Horeb, WI: Terra Institute.
- Suparlan, Parsudi. (1995). *The Javanese in Suriname: Ethnicity in an Ethnically Plural Society*. Tempe: Arizona State University Program for Southeast Asian Studies.
- Surinaamsche Sub-Comitee. (1912). "De Vrouw 1813–1913." *De vrouw in Suriname*. [Amsterdam]: Author.
- Suriname-Syndicaat. (1920). *Rapport van de Studie-commissie van het Suriname-Syndicaat*. Rotterdam: s.l.
- Temminck Groll, C. L., A. Tjin a Djie, A. R. H. Hollestee, Johanna Krooshof, R. Rubenstein, & Thea M. Luykx. (1973). *De architectuur van Suriname 1667–1930*. Zutphen: Walburg Press.
- Terborg, Julia. (2002). "Social Change, Socialisation and Sexual Practice Among Maroon Children in Suriname." In Christine Barrow (Ed.), *Children's Rights: Caribbean Realities*, pp. 269–282. Kingston: Ian Randle.

- Terborg, Julia. (2011). *Adolescent Fertility and Poverty Suriname Report, 2011*. Paramaribo: UNFPA / Ministry of Youth and Sports / Project Teen Mothers in School.
- Theije, Marjo de. (2006). "Transnationalism in Surinam: Brazilian Migrants in Paramaribo." In Ruben Gowricharn (Ed.), *Caribbean Transnationalism: Migration, Pluralization, and Social Cohesion*, pp. 117–135. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Theije, Marjo de & Ellen Bal. (2010). "Flexible Migrants: Brazilian Gold Miners and Their Quest for Human Security in Surinam." In Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Ellen Bal, & Oscar Salemink (Eds.), *A World of Insecurity: Anthropological Perspectives on Human Security*, pp. 66–115. London: Pluto Press.
- Theije, Marjo de & Marieke Heemskerck. (2009). "Moving Frontiers in the Amazon: Brazilian Small-Scale Gold Miners." In *Revista Europea de Estudios Latinoamericanos y del Caribe 87*: 5–25.
- Thoden van Velzen, H. U. E. (2003). *Een koloniaal drama: De grote staking van de Marron vrachtwaaarders, 1921*. Amsterdam: Rozenberg / Utrecht: CLACS & IBS.
- Thoden van Velzen, H. U. E. & Wim Hoogbergen. (2011). *Een zwarte vrijstaat: De Okaanse samenleving in de achttiende eeuw*. Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Thoden van Velzen, H. U. E. & W. van Wetering. (1988). *The Great Father and the Danger: Religious Cults, Material Forces, and Collective Fantasies in the World of the Surinamese Maroons*. Dordrecht: Foris.
- Thoden van Velzen, H. U. E. & W. van Wetering. (2004). *In the Shadow of the Oracle: Religion as Politics in a Suriname Maroon Society*. Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press.
- Tjoa, Twie. (1995). "The Political Participation of Women in Suriname from a Herstorical Perspective." *Journal of Social Sciences / Tijdschrift voor Maatschappijwetenschappen 2* (2): 27–39.
- Tjon Sie Fat, Paul. (2007). "'Immigratie van Chinezen schijnt de laatste jaren toe te nemen': Het anti-Chinese discours in Suriname." *Oso 26* (1): 61–80.
- Tjon Sie Fat, Paul B. (2009). *Chinese New Migrants in Suriname: The Inevitability of Ethnic Performing*. Amsterdam: Vossiuspers.
- Tjon Sie Fat, Paul B. (2010). "Old Migrants, New Immigration and Anti-Chinese Discourse in Suriname." In Walton Look Lai & Tan Chee-Beng (Eds.), *The Chinese in Latin America and the Caribbean*, pp. 185–209. Leiden: Brill.
- Traa, A. van. (1946). *Suriname 1900–1940*. Deventer: W. van Hoeve.
- Trommelen, Jeroen. (2013). *Goutu: Klopjacht op het Surinaamse goud*. Schoorl: Conserve.
- Trotz, D. Alissa. (2003). "Behind the Banner of Culture? Gender, 'Race,' and the Family in Guyana." *New West Indian Guide 77*: 5–29.
- Trotz, D. Alissa & Linda Peake. (2000). "Work, Family, and Organising: An Overview of the Emergence of the Economic, Social and Political Roles of Women in British Guiana." *Social and Economic Studies 49* (4): 189–222.
- Trouillot, Michel-Rolph. (1992). "The Caribbean Region: An Open Frontier in Anthropological Theory." *Annual Review of Anthropology 21*: 19–42.
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). (2012). *Caribbean Human Development Report 2012: Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security*. New York, NY: Author.
- Verhey, Elma & Gerard van Westerloo. (1983). *Het legergroene Suriname*. Amsterdam: Weekbladpers.
- Verre, Tony van. (1980). *Tony van Verre ontmoet Albert Helman: Uit het leven van een dwarsliggende Indiaan*. Bussum: De Gooise Uitgeverij / Unieboek.
- Verrest, H. (1998). "Je diploma is je eerste man: Takenpakketten en sociale netwerken van dochters als bestaansverwervingsstrategieën van huishoudens in Paramaribo, Suriname." MA Thesis, Universiteit van Amsterdam.
- Verrest, H. (2007a). "Ik groot maar bemoei niet: Bestaansverwerving, huisgebonden economische activiteiten en sociale relaties in Nieuwweergevondenweg, Paramaribo." *Oso 26* (1): 100–122.
- Verrest, H. (2007b). *Home-based Economic Activities and Caribbean Urban Livelihoods: Vulnerability, Ambition and Impact in Paramaribo and Port of Spain*. Amsterdam: Vossiuspers.
- Verrest, H. (2009). "City Profile: Paramaribo." *Cities 27* (1): 50–60.
- Verrest, H. (2010). "Coping in Times of Crisis: Livelihoods in Suriname 1982–1994." Paper, KITLV Leiden

- Verrest, H. & J. Post. (2007). "Home-based Economic Activities, Livelihoods and Space in Paramaribo, Suriname." *International Development Planning Review* 29 (2): 161–184.
- Verschuuren, Stan. (1994). *Suriname: Geschiedenis in hoofdlijnen*. The Hague: Sdu Uitgeverij.
- Vierstraete, Pieter. (2012). "Surinaamse opleidingen beneden alle peil." *Parbode* 6 (70): 43–45.
- Vink, Wieke. (2010). *Creole Jews: Negotiating Community in Colonial Suriname*. Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Volker, Gerard. (1998). "De Surinaamse Burgeroorlog, 1986–1992." *Oso* 17 (2): 157–168.
- Vos, Rob, Niek de Jong, & Geske Dijkstra. (2001). "Employment, Poverty and Income Distribution." In Pitou van Dijck (Ed.), *Suriname: The Economy: Prospects for Sustainable Development*, pp. 189–219. Kingston: Ian Randle.
- Vries, Ellen de. (2005). *Suriname na de binnenlandse oorlog*. Amsterdam: KIT Publishers.
- Vries, Ellen de. (2011). "The making of Ronnie Brunswijk in Nederlandse media." *Oso* 30 (1): 73–89.
- Vrugink, Hein D. (1985). "Het Surinaams-Javaans: Een introductie." *Oso* 4 (1): 53–62.
- Waal Malefijt, Annemarie de. (1963). *The Javanese of Surinam: Segment of a Plural Society*. Assen: Van Gorcum.
- Walle, J. van de. (1975). *Een oog boven Paramaribo: Herinneringen*. Amsterdam: Querido.
- Wekker, Gloria. (1997). "One Finger Does Not Drink Okra Soup: Afro-Surinamese Women and Critical Agency." In M. Jacqui Alexander & Chandra Talpade Mohanty (Eds.), *Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures*, pp. 330–352. New York, NY: Routledge.
- Wekker, Gloria. (2001). "Of Mimic Men and Unruly Women: Family, Sexuality and Gender in Twentieth-Century Suriname." In Rosemarijn Hoefte & Peter Meel (Eds.) *Twentieth-Century Suriname: Continuities and Discontinuities in a New World Society*, pp. 174–197. Kingston: Ian Randle / Leiden: KITLV Press.
- Wekker, Gloria. (2004). "Sranan, Swit' Sranan: Populaire beeldvorming over etnische en gendergeïjkheid in Suriname." In Michiel van Kempen, Piet Verkruijse, & Adrienne Zuiderweg (Eds.), *Wandelaar onder de palmen: Opstellen over koloniale en postkoloniale literatuur: Opgedragen aan Bert Paasman*, pp. 539–550. Leiden: KITLV Uitgeverij.
- Wekker, Gloria. (2010). "Boutse for president: Een cultuurkritische interpretatie." In John Leerdam & Noraly Beyer (Eds.), *Suriname en ik: Persoonlijke verhalen van bekende Surinamers over hun vaderland*, pp. 169–173. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff.
- Wekker, Gloria & Herman Wekker. (1990). *Coming in from the Cold: Linguistic and Socio-cultural Aspects of the Translation of Black English Vernacular Literary Texts into Surinamese Dutch*. Leiden: Rijkuniversiteit Leiden, vakgroep Engels.
- Welvaartsfonds, Suriname. (1954). *Tweede algemeene Volkstelling Suriname 1950. De eigenlijke volkstelling. Vol. II, Serie A: Aantal, Landaard en Geslacht, Geographische Spreiding, Leeftijdsopbouw en Herkomst der getelde woonbevolking: Paramaribo*. Paramaribo: Author.
- Welvaartsfonds, Suriname. (1956a). *Tweede Algemeene Volkstelling Suriname 1950. De eigenlijke Volkstelling. Vol. X, Serie A: Aantal, Landaard en Geslacht, Geographische Spreiding, Leeftijdsopbouw en Herkomst der getelde woonbevolking: Geheel Suriname*. Paramaribo: Author.
- Welvaartsfonds, Suriname. (1956b). *Tweede Algemeene Volkstelling Suriname 1950. Het sociaal-economisch en cultureel onderzoek. Vol. XXIII, Serie E: Woning en Gezinstelling: Aantal, spreiding, soort en bezetting der woningen; Woningtelling*. Paramaribo: Author.
- Werners, S. (1995). *Gedenboek Universiteit van Suriname*. Paramaribo: Anton de Kom Universiteit van Suriname.
- Westerloo, Gerard van. (1983). "Suriname, acht jaar onafhankelijk: Een modeldekolonisatie met dodelijke afloop." In Glenn Willemsen (Ed.), *Suriname: De schele onafhankelijkheid*, pp. 218–237. Amsterdam: de Arbeiderspers.
- Westerloo, Gerard van. (2010). "Suriname, een vuilnisvat, ik houd van jou!" In John Leerdam & Noraly Beyer (Eds.), *Suriname en ik: Persoonlijke verhalen van bekende Surinamers over hun vaderland*, pp. 56–60. Amsterdam: Meulenhoff.
- Wetering, Wilhelmina van & H. U. E. Thoden van Velzen. (2013). *Een zwarte vrijstaat in Suriname: De Okaanse samenleving in de negentiende en twintigste eeuw*. Leiden: Brill.
- Wicherts, Eric & Jan Veltkamp. (2012). *Geschiedenis van de Landspoorweg*. [Paramaribo]: Veka Productions.

- Wijntuin, Emile. (1998). *Louis Doedel: Martelaar voor het Surinaamse volk*. [Paramaribo:] Author.
- Williams, Brackette. (1991). "Stains on My Name, War in My Veins": *Guyana and the Politics of Racial Struggle*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Wongsowikromo, Angretha. (2011). "Is alles goud dat glinstert? De Surinaamse goudmijnbouw beschouwd vanuit groen-criminologisch perspectief." *Oso* 30 (1): 63–72.
- Yelvington, Kevin. (1995). *Producing Power: Ethnicity, Gender, and Class in a Caribbean Workplace*. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
- Yelvington, Kevin. (1999). "The War in Ethiopia and Trinidad 1935–1936." In Bridget Brereton & Kevin A. Yelvington (Eds.), *The Colonial Caribbean in Transition: Essays on Postemancipation Social and Cultural History*, pp. 189–225. Kingston: The Press University of the West Indies / Gainesville: University Press of Florida.

INDEX

- Abaisa, 236–7n.50
- Abolition of slavery, 1, 8, 21, 22, 28–9,
34–5, 36, 51, 52, 54, 59, 67, 70,
87, 88, 89, 103, 163, 212, 233n.61,
236n.40, 259n.84
- Abrahams, Ramon, 241n.16, 242n.21
- Afobaka, 96, 234n.16, 234–5n.20, 238n.16
- Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of
States (ACP), 208
- Agriculture
- cacao, 21, 28, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 46,
224n.27
 - cattle, 37, 224n.28
 - coconuts, 37
 - coffee, 34, 36, 38, 46, 71
 - corn, 37
 - cotton, 36
 - fruits 35, 36, 38, 37, 39, 96,
general, 5, 17, 41, 45, 52, 74, 77, 84, 93,
95, 99, 163, 187, 189, 195, 196, 203
 - large-scale, 1, 3, 8, 24, 27, 30, 35, 36,
37, 41, 46, 52–3, 57, 58, 87, 95–6,
111, 120, 130, 131, 160, 187, 213,
226n.54, 227n.3, 240n.49
 - poultry, 37
 - rice, 9, 15, 17, 37, 38–9, 46, 96, 187,
192, 240n.49
 - sisal, 36
 - small-scale, 21, 24, 36–7, 38, 46, 56–60,
64, 67, 87, 95, 160, 224n.28, 234n.12
 - sugar, 16, 29, 34, 36, 38, 46, 47, 52–3,
54, 71, 114, 120, 121, 128, 131,
226n.54, 227n.3
 - vegetables 37, 38
- See also* Plantations
- Albina, 35, 42, 96, 129, 130, 142, 150,
156, 214, 224n.22, 234n.16, 238n.6,
239n.19, 242n.20, 247n.92, 250n.2
- Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos
de Nuestro America (ALBA), 210
- Alibux, Errol, 124, 142, 143
- Algeria, 140
- Ameerali, Robert, 205
- Amnesty International, 204–5
- Amnesty Law, 204–5, 213, 258n.59–62,
260n.85. *See also* December
murders
- Amsterdams Volksverzet (AVV), 149,
248n.101
- Antigua and Barbuda, 252–3n.46
- Apoera, 111
- Appell (architect), 238n.9
- Arron, Henck, 23, 106, 107, 135, 136,
137–8, 139, 152, 153, 236–7n.50,
241n.9, 241n.15, 242n.20
- Aruba, 34, 71. *See also* Netherlands
Antilles
- Asch van Wijk, Hubert van, 14, 221n.33
- Assen, Ronald, 249n.110
- Atjóni, 153
- Atlantic Charter, 94, 100
- Baboeram, Dew. *See* Hira, Sandew
- Baboeram, John, 244n.42, 244–5n.49–50
- Bal, Ellen, 3, 196
- Balata, 1, 3, 17, 21, 22, 27, 34, 35, 37,
38, 39, 40–3, 44, 46, 52, 67, 71, 82,
84, 88, 93–4, 114, 213, 223–4n.17,
224n.22, 226n.43, 226n.47
- Barbados, 1, 30, 110, 183, 223n.14,
252–3n.46
- Barker, Joshua, 256n.46, 260n.87
- Bauxite
- Alcoa, 45, 96, 113, 117, 124, 125
 - alumina, 96, 110, 118, 125, 198,
246n.63

- Bauxite—*Continued*
 aluminum, 45, 96, 110, 113, 118, 125, 198, 246n.63
 Billiton, 115, 117, 118, 123, 125
 discovery of, 45, 111, 113, 234n.18
 economic importance, 3, 15, 23, 24, 27, 34, 35, 45, 88, 91, 95, 96, 110–1, 112, 113, 114, 118, 130–1, 134, 135, 144, 152, 162, 187, 189–90, 192, 198, 200, 213, 235n.28, 238n.14, 240n.36, 246n.63
 labor, 23, 27, 45, 71, 73, 93, 94, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119–25, 129, 130, 131, 132, 143, 246n.70, 254n.17
 management, 116, 118–9, 124, 127–8
 production and export figures, 45, 46, 117–8, 259n.75
 SBM, 113, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 132
 Suralco, 118–9, 120, 121, 122, 124–5, 126, 127, 129, 132, 143, 153, 168, 238n.16
 social policies, 23, 114–6, 120, 122, 125–9, 131–2
See also Moengo; Onverdacht; Paranam
- Behr, Bram, 244–5n.49–50
 Belize, 222n.50
 Benjamins, H. D., 63
 Bennett, Tamara, 260n.85
 Benzdorp, 253n.6
 Best, Lloyd, 130
 Bhagwandas, Paul, 241–2n.18, 244–5n.50, 247n.83
 Bishop, Maurice, 141, 243n.37, 244n.43, 244n.45, 245n.59
 Biswamitre, C. R., 228n.21
 Boerenveen, Etienne, 247n.78
 Borders
 with Brazil, 214, 215, 225n.37, 259n.81
 with French Guiana, 92, 98, 142, 209, 210, 214, 215, 225n.37, 241n.9, 248n.98, 250n.2, 260n.86
 with Guyana/British Guiana, 196, 209, 214, 215, 225n.37, 241n.9
 Borsboom, Nel, 230n.18
 Bos Verschuur, Wim, 95, 234n.11
 Bosse, J. J., van, 53
 Bourdieu, Pierre, 12
 Bouterse, Desi
 army leader, 24, 129, 134, 137, 138, 139–44, 149, 151, 152–3, 154, 156–7, 241n.11, 241n.16, 241–2n.18, 242n.21, 242n.23, 243n.36, 243n.40, 244n.43, 244–5n.48–51, 245n.58–9, 247n.83, 247n.92, 248n.96, 249n.107, 250n.133, 255n.33
 businessman, 190, 198, 253n.8, 256n.43–4
 drugs, 198, 208, 247n.78, 249n.108, 256n.39
 politician, 11–12, 134, 197–202, 203–6, 208, 213, 242n.23, 244–5n.50, 256n.39, 256n.41, 256n.43, 257n.56, 258n.58, 258n.61, 258n.65, 259n.80
 Bouterse, Dino, 190, 204, 257n.57
 Boven, Karin, 97, 235n.24
 Bovenkerk, Frank, 109, 110
 Brana-Shute, Rosemary, 202
 Brazil, 43, 93, 98, 134, 143, 155, 209, 210, 211, 213, 215, 225n.37, 245n.58, 254n.15, 258n.60, 259n.81
 Brazilians, 3, 10, 13, 25, 163, 184, 187, 190–1, 196–7, 212, 253n.3, 253n.6
 Breda, Peace of, 1
 Breeveld, Hans, 234n.11, 236n.36
 Brereton, Bridget, 7, 9
 British Caribbean, 6, 10, 13, 14, 30, 41, 42, 53, 83, 84, 85, 224n.19, 232n.51, 233n.3, 233n.63, 234n.10, 235n.30, 236n.41, 258n.73. *See also* individual countries
 British Guiana, 8, 14, 17, 30, 35, 39, 41, 43, 47, 56, 62, 74, 110, 113, 115, 220n.14, 220n.17, 221n.34, 221–2n.38, 222n.40, 223n.4, 225n.34, 225n.36, 225n.38–9, 226n.48, 226n.54, 228n.15, 234n.16, 235n.29. *See also* Guyana
 Broek, Hans van den, 245n.8
 Brokopondo, Lake, 96–7, 118, 190, 210, 234–5n.20, 238n.16
 Brondenstein, Benny, 241–2n.18
 Brownsberg, 35
 Bruijne, Ad de, 147–8, 160, 166, 168, 174, 175–6, 178–80, 193–4, 246n.67, 246n.73, 247n.80, 250n.1
 Bruma, Eddy, 100, 103
 Brunings, Ernie, 256n.47
 Brunswijk, Ronnie
 businessman, 190, 199, 200, 253n.8
 drugs, 249n.8, 253n.8, 256n.39

- guerrilla leader, 134, 149–51, 153, 157
 politician, 199, 200, 205, 214, 256n.39,
 256n.41
- Buchanan (architect), 238n.9
- Buddingh', Hans, 97, 113, 238n.3,
 255n.33, 256n.43–44
- Burnham, Forbes, 235n.29, 238n.5
- Burus, 13, 224n.28
- Bustamente, Alexander, 232n.50
- Campbell, Eddy, 106, 138, 236n.47,
 236–7n.50
- Canada, 4, 190, 191, 244n.48, 253n.2,
 253n.7
- Caprino, Midred, 202
- Cárdenas, Osvaldo, 244n.48
- Cardoso Neto, José, 196–7
- Caribbean Community and Common
 Market (CARICOM), 26, 162,
 188, 199, 207–8, 209, 210, 254n.23,
 259n.75–6
- Carlin, Eithne, 10, 220n.18, 252n.44
- Castro, Fidel, 243n.33, 243n.37,
 247n.89
- Cayenne, 35, 248n.98, 255n.29
- Censorship, 66, 78, 79, 138, 140, 144,
 151, 205, 231n.37, 236–7n.50,
 243n.32, 257n.48
- Central Bank of Suriname, 259n.79
- Chávez, Hugo, 203, 209, 257n.56,
 258n.65, 259n.80
- Chin a Sen, Henk, 139–40, 141, 242n.23,
 242n.27, 242–3n.28, 243n.31,
 243n.34, 250n.134
- China, 4, 25, 170, 171, 184, 188, 191,
 197, 209, 210, 211, 215, 253–4n.10,
 255n.32, 259n.80
- Chinese, 2, 3, 13, 14, 25, 30, 33, 84,
 108, 109, 119, 121, 126, 130, 147,
 160, 163, 173–4, 184, 187, 196, 197,
 211–2, 220n.16, 220n.18, 221n.30–1,
 223n.6, 228n.17, 247n.79, 252n.32,
 253n.6, 253n.47, 255n.32
- Class
 consciousness, 75–6, 78, 80–1, 83,
 86, 124
 and contestation, 22, 55, 69–70, 74–6,
 81, 82, 83–4, 85, 218
 and culture, 10, 12, 13, 14, 23, 86,
 88–9, 94–5, 100–2, 105, 206, 218,
 233n.63, 239n.27
 and education, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 23,
 34, 48, 95, 98–9, 100–1, 111, 147,
 148, 155, 160, 176–7, 181, 196, 212,
 217, 233n.63
 emancipation, 23, 25, 66, 91–2, 93,
 94–5, 99, 100–1, 105, 112
 and ethnicity, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12–16, 18,
 19–20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 47–9, 69, 74–7,
 83, 85, 91–2, 94–5, 99, 102–3, 112,
 115, 116–7, 121–2, 147, 148, 156–7,
 160–1, 176–8, 188–9, 193, 196,
 206, 216–7, 218, 221n.32, 247n.79,
 260n.85
 and gender, 5, 7, 9, 12, 13, 14, 16–18,
 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 111, 115, 121, 132,
 135, 146, 147–8, 181, 188–9, 193,
 216, 218
 hierarchy, 2, 12, 13–15, 22, 23, 86, 102,
 114–5, 121–2, 124, 127–9, 130–2,
 146–7, 160, 180, 189, 195, 197, 198,
 216, 217, 221n.27, 247n.77
 and housing, 31–2, 160, 166–9, 173–5,
 179, 180, 182, 185, 247n.80
 and labor, 12, 13–15, 24, 49, 71, 120,
 127–9, 130, 135, 144–5, 148, 160,
 176–7, 181–2, 241–2n.18
 and migration, 13–14, 15, 23, 27–8,
 109, 136, 146, 148, 155, 241n.14
 and politics, 23, 47–9, 65, 66, 69, 74–7,
 82–3, 85, 86, 88–9, 91–2, 99, 101,
 197–8, 199–200, 244n.49
 and sexuality, 13, 222n.47, 222n.49
 social mobility, 12–13, 14, 15, 34,
 49, 59, 66, 94, 98–9, 100–1, 102–3,
 105, 111, 144–5, 146–8, 160, 165,
 176, 179–80, 181–2, 216–7,
 221n.34
- Climate change, 171
- Colijn, H., 58, 79
- Colombia, 134, 209
- Comins, D. W. D., 56
- Company towns, 4–5, 15, 21, 23,
 114–6, 121, 125–30, 131–2, 238n.8,
 239n.28, 240n.44
- Conçado Trindade, Antônio Augusto,
 248n.96
- Constitution, 3, 23, 24, 25, 47–8, 99, 100,
 103, 104–5, 106, 107, 140, 152, 154,
 187, 188, 203, 205, 207, 235n.32,
 242n.24, 242n.25, 250n.134,
 254n.14, 256n.37, 258n.61

- Contestation
 armed, 149–151, 153, 248n.101,
 248–9n.106
 cultural, 2, 7, 29, 103–4, 218
 general, 1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 25, 188, 217, 218
 political, 2, 22, 24, 28, 49–50, 59,
 69–77, 78–9, 81–6, 89, 91, 92, 95, 97,
 104–6, 135, 137–8, 140–3, 149, 150,
 153, 156, 157, 191, 198, 200, 201,
 205, 212, 215, 218, 223n.3, 231n.34,
 231n.39, 236–7n.50, 242n.20,
 244n.43, 245n.55, 247n.88, 253n.7,
 255n.33
 socioeconomic, 2, 22, 25, 28, 44, 55,
 69–77, 79, 81–4, 91, 92, 94, 105–6,
 122–3, 124, 137, 140–3, 153, 191,
 198, 212, 215, 218, 223n.3, 225n.41,
 236n.47, 236–7n.50, 239n.28, 253n.7
- Contract labor. *See* Indentured labor
- Cool, Peter, 229n.27
- Corrales, Javier, 203, 204, 205–6, 209
- Corruption, 105, 137, 138, 145, 153,
 155, 157, 169, 182, 198, 199, 203,
 206, 209
- Cottica (region), 150
- Cuba, 11, 139, 140, 143, 149, 157, 161,
 209, 243n.32–3, 244n.48, 245n.59
- Curaçao, 34, 35, 71, 72, 73, 83, 106, 123,
 205, 224n.18–19, 230n.12. *See also*
 Netherlands Antilles
- Da Costa family, 221n.33
- Daal, Cyrill, 141–2, 143, 157, 243n.36,
 244n.43, 244–5n.49–50
- December murders, 2, 24, 133, 134, 142–
 3, 144, 149, 152, 154, 156, 204–5,
 244n.43, 244n.47, 244–5n.50–51,
 245n.55–56, 245n.59, 250n.133,
 251n.11, 256n.42, 258n.58. *See also*
 Amnesty law
- Demography
 census, 12, 25, 29, 32–3, 107–8, 114,
 118, 120–1, 161, 166, 170, 172–3,
 174, 176–7, 179–81, 188, 195, 196–7,
 202, 206, 216, 221n.25, 239n.19,
 239n.24, 250n.1, 250n.5, 251n.16,
 252n.32, 252n.44, 255n.27, 255n.30,
 258n.66
 emigration, 2–3, 4, 23, 34, 107, 108–10,
 112, 135–6, 137, 142, 155, 166,
 167, 187, 195, 196, 211, 214, 215,
 237n.56–8, 237n.61, 241n.4, 241n.14
 immigration, 2–3, 8–10, 13, 22, 25,
 27–31, 32, 33, 40, 46, 49, 51–4, 55,
 57–8, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67, 71, 91,
 107, 108, 119, 163, 184, 187, 196–7,
 211–2, 214, 215, 225n.38
 population density, 163, 166, 226n.54,
 250n.7
 population growth, 24, 51, 56,
 107–8, 130, 162, 195, 201, 239n.20,
 250n.2
 return migration, 30, 43, 56–7, 61, 71,
 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 82, 83, 84, 110,
 129–30, 136, 137, 218, 224n.18,
 230n.24, 234n.8, 237n.62, 241n.10,
 242–3n.28, 249n.109
 rural-urban migration, 15, 16–17, 18,
 23, 24–5, 27, 28–9, 32–3, 37, 59,
 65, 96–7, 99, 105–6, 134, 151, 160,
 163–4, 165–6, 170, 172, 174, 179–8,
 185, 187–8, 189, 196, 212, 213, 214,
 237n.63, 260n.86
- Dendoe, Steven, 241–2n.18
- Derby, Fred, 142, 152, 244n.49
- Derveld, F. E. R., 227n.11
- Dew, Edward, 99–100, 219n.8, 235n.29,
 236n.46
- Dietrich, Marlene, 83
- Dijck, Pitou van, 110, 112, 118, 190,
 224–5n.32, 237n.65, 238n.14–15,
 238n.17, 259n.81
- Districts
 Brokopondo, 108, 168, 190, 210,
 253n.2
 Commewijne, 119, 120, 163, 220–1n.20,
 223n.8, 227n.11, 230n.24, 250n.3
 Coronie, 28, 35, 37–8, 190, 223n.8,
 224n.30, 229n.2, 237n.63, 256n.41
 general, 17, 162, 223n.8, 250n.6
 Marowijne, 35, 40, 113, 114, 118, 120,
 121, 129–30, 150, 195, 199, 223n.8,
 238n.13, 239n.19–20
 Nickerie, 35, 37, 38–9, 42, 46, 95, 111,
 131, 192, 194, 196, 223n.8, 226n.48,
 228n.21, 229n.2, 234n.16, 249n.130,
 250n.2
 Para, 28, 37, 159, 224n.30, 238n.13
 Saramacca, 37, 39, 40, 60, 87, 223n.8,
 225n.37, 243n.40, 250n.6

- Suriname, 40, 164, 223n.8, 238n.13, 250n.6, 250n.8
- Wanica, 159, 163, 164, 195, 250n.3, 250n.6, 250n.8
- Doedel, Louis, 72, 74, 75–6, 77, 78, 83, 86, 230n.12, 231n.31, 232n.46
- Domination**
- church, 1, 2, 5, 7, 10, 16, 25, 189, 213
 - family, 1, 5, 7, 13, 16, 17, 18, 21, 25, 51, 128, 189, 217, 218, 221n.36, 222n.50, 260n.90–1
 - gender, 17, 18, 20–1, 25, 218, 221–2n.38, 222n.50
 - military, 139, 140–1, 149, 151, 153, 154–5, 242n.26
 - politics, 1, 5, 7, 11–12, 18, 20, 25, 49, 105, 188, 189, 200, 201, 212–3, 215, 216, 218, 235n.27
 - school, 1, 5, 7, 51, 189, 217, 218, 260n.91
 - state, 1, 2, 5, 7, 8, 10, 20, 22, 24, 25, 28, 44–5, 49, 51, 52, 54–6, 58, 67, 69–70, 74, 75, 76–8, 82, 84, 85, 91, 94, 95, 106, 122–3, 124, 138, 139, 140, 142, 188, 189, 212, 217–8, 221n.36, 221–2n.38, 229n.2, 234n.8, 236–7n.50, 248n.96, 253n.7, 260n.87
 - workplace, 1, 5, 7, 25, 40, 42, 51, 54–5, 57, 58, 79, 114–5, 123, 131–2, 189, 217, 225n.41, 242n.26
- Donner, Don Walther, 223n.15
- Drimmelen, C. van, 62
- Drugs, 147, 192, 197, 198, 204, 208, 247n.78, 249n.108, 252–3n.46, 254n.15, 256n.39
- Education**
- general, 31, 84, 87, 89, 90, 98, 99, 103, 106, 114, 128, 129, 130, 131, 141, 146, 148, 154–5, 160, 162, 163, 165, 177, 194, 199, 228n.18–19, 229n.4, 229n.30, 231n.32, 241n.6, 242n.27, 257n.51, 259n.78
 - language of, 4, 10, 63, 64, 99, 103, 206, 211, 228n.18, 228n.22
 - primary education, 59, 61, 62, 63–5, 98–9, 116, 165, 167, 181, 194, 195, 228n.20, 228n.22, 260n.91
 - and religion, 10–11, 33, 63–4, 98, 103, 112, 116, 165, 167, 220–1n.19–20, 228n.19–21
 - secondary education, 98, 99, 103, 160, 164, 180, 189, 193, 194, 216, 228n.20
 - and social structure, 2, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 20, 23, 33–4, 48, 51, 59, 66, 92, 93, 98–9, 109, 110, 111, 118, 121, 122, 128, 148, 155, 160, 163, 164, 165, 175, 176, 177, 179–80, 181, 183, 184, 185, 189, 195, 196, 212, 216–8, 221n.28, 228n.20, 228n.22, 233n.63, 252n.36, 254n.21, 256n.43, 260n.91
 - teachers 14, 15, 17, 34, 48, 63, 64, 71, 73, 85, 90, 95, 98–9, 101, 106, 109, 111, 112, 123, 124, 128, 131, 141, 144, 146, 148, 164, 193, 194, 203, 218, 223–4n.7, 228n.21, 246n.65, 256n.36, 260n.91
 - tertiary education, 16, 141, 164–5, 180, 189, 193, 244n.41, 244n.49, 251n.11–12
 - vocational education, 164
- Eekelen, Wim van, 245n.58
- Egger, Jerome, 256n.36
- Electricity, 96, 116, 125, 126, 129, 143, 162, 167, 169, 170, 178, 179, 194, 195, 213, 252n.40
- Elstak, Yngwe, 137, 138, 241n.11
- Emanuel, S. D., 103
- Esajas, Roy, 241–2n.18
- Essed, Frank, 234n.17
- Ethnicity**
- assimilation, 45, 52, 61–5, 66, 101, 103–4, 228n.18, 236n.37
 - census, 12, 32–3, 107–8, 172–3, 174, 176–7, 179–81, 188, 195, 196–7, 202, 216, 221n.25, 239n.19, 239n.24, 255n.27, 255n.30
 - and class, 5, 6–7, 9, 10, 12–15, 23, 24, 25, 26, 69, 48–9, 74–5, 83, 85, 94–5, 99, 102–3, 112, 115, 116–7, 121, 147–8, 156–7, 160–1, 176–8, 179–81, 188–9, 193, 196, 206, 216–7, 218, 221n.34, 247n.79, 252n.32, 260n.85
 - and consciousness, 83, 94–5, 103–4
 - and contestation, 13, 22, 55, 59, 69–70, 72, 76–7, 78–9, 82, 84, 85, 149–51, 212, 218, 234n.8

- Ethnicity—*Continued*
- and culture, 7, 9–11, 14, 17, 18, 23, 30, 39, 58, 59, 60, 61–2, 64, 65–7, 69, 74–5, 84, 92, 94, 97–8, 99, 100–1, 102–4, 105, 112, 159, 168, 176, 189, 206, 212, 216, 218, 227n.13, 228n.23, 239n.27, 253n.6, 258n.66 259n.84. (*see also* Language; Religion)
 - diversity, 4, 6, 8, 22, 30, 33, 49–50, 52, 54, 58–9, 61, 64, 65–6, 67, 91–3, 156, 159, 173, 187, 188, 211–2, 216, 219n.1, 223n.6, 223n.15
 - and education, 23, 60, 61, 63–5, 98–9, 100–1, 103, 108–9, 165, 176, 179–81, 185, 189, 196, 228n.20, 228n.22
 - emancipation, 23, 25, 61, 65, 66, 91–2, 93, 94–5, 100–1, 102–5, 112, 156, 159, 176, 179–81, 185, 189, 196
 - and gender, 5, 6, 7, 9, 14, 16–19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 33–4, 37, 66, 115, 132, 177, 193, 188–9, 216, 221–2n.38–40, 222n.43–4, 237n.57, 242n.24
 - identity, 6, 7, 8, 62, 64, 94–5, 103
 - and labor, 5, 8, 9, 19, 33–4, 36, 37–9, 41, 46, 49, 60, 66, 71, 118–22, 126, 131, 176–7, 180, 184, 189, 190–1, 192, 193–4, 196–7, 222n.40, 224n.28, 225n.38, 226n.46, 227n.2, 229n.29, 235n.28, 238n.7, 239n.19, 239n.24, 239n.26, 253n.6, 254n.20
 - and migration, 8, 14, 18, 23, 27–31, 32, 33, 40, 46, 51–4, 57–8, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 67, 136, 146, 214, 237n.56–7
 - and nationalism, 13, 78–9, 94–5, 99, 101, 103–4, 106–7, 108–9, 196–7, 211–12
 - organization, 79, 61–2, 67, 196–7
 - and politics, 5, 8, 11–12, 14, 23, 24, 25, 48–9, 65, 66, 69, 74–7, 78, 91–2, 94–5, 97, 99–101, 102–3, 104–5, 106–7, 136, 152, 157, 199–203, 205, 216, 218, 228n.21, 229n.28, 235n.29, 257n.49, 258–9n.74
 - relations, 5–6, 7, 8, 11, 14, 23, 30, 49, 51, 61, 69, 74–6, 80, 84, 85, 94–5, 97, 99, 102–4, 114–5, 116, 121–2, 127, 128, 131, 132, 135–6, 150, 151, 153, 157, 158, 176, 184–5, 187–9, 211–2, 214, 215–6, 228–9n.23–4, 236n.37, 248–9n.106, 256n.36, 258–9n.74
 - and sexuality, 9, 13, 17, 221–2n.38, 222n.47, 222n.49
 - stereotyping, 2, 8–9, 13, 52, 54, 79, 121, 185, 221–2n.38–9, 227n.12
 - Europe, 2, 4, 7, 14, 34, 45, 47, 62, 70, 103, 104, 107, 113, 155, 162, 165, 241n.10, 254n.15, 259n.79, 260n.86
 - European Union (EU), 208, 209, 210, 259n.79
 - Europeans, 2, 4, 9, 33, 116, 119, 123, 147, 174, 176–7, 223n.6, 229n.26, 247n.79, 252n.32, 254n.20
 - Family relationships, 1, 2, 14, 16–19, 28, 29, 37–8, 88, 147–8, 174–5, 182, 189, 193, 196, 216, 221–2n.38, 222n.42–44
 - Ferrier, Johan, 95, 98, 101, 133, 136, 138, 140
 - Findlay, George, 258n.65
 - Fishery, 17, 19, 37, 156, 192, 195, 196, 222n.43, 223–4n.17, 227n.3, 238n.14, 259n.75
 - Flu, Paul Christiaan, 31, 223n.9, 223n.12
 - Foreign relations
 - border disputes, 209–10, 215, 225n.37
 - Caribbean integration, 25, 162, 188, 189, 199, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 218, 258–9n.72–6
 - general, 24, 100, 103, 134, 156, 188, 198, 209–10, 211, 212, 215
 - South American integration, 25, 188, 189, 209–10, 211, 212, 218
 - See also* individual countries/organizations
 - Forestry, 3, 37, 41, 44–5, 46, 52, 162, 187, 191, 192, 195, 197, 199, 214, 226n.52, 251n.23, 253–4n.10, 259n.75
 - Fort Zeelandia, 142, 149, 159, 166, 204, 244n.47, 244–5n.50
 - France, 209–10, 224n.19, 225n.37, 247n.90, 255n.29, 259n.79
 - French Caribbean, 53. *See also* individual countries
 - French Guiana
 - general, 92, 97, 98, 119, 142, 146, 149, 153, 209, 210, 224n.22, 241n.9,

- 247n.90, 250n.2, 255n.29, 259n.82, 260n.85
 gold mining, 39, 41, 43, 44, 225n.35, 225n.38, 253n.5
 Maroons in, 19, 43, 129, 134, 150, 151, 196, 214, 248n.98, 249n.109, 260n.86
 Furnivall, J. S., 5, 58, 212, 216, 227n.7
- Gandhi, Indira, 159
 Gandhi, Mahatma, 76
 Garner, Steve, 8
 Garvey, Marcus, 232n.45
 Geffery, Ernest, 241–2n.18
 Gender
 and class, 5, 7, 12, 14, 16, 20, 23, 24, 25, 26, 74, 93, 111, 115, 121, 132, 135, 146, 147–8, 181, 188–9, 193, 216–7, 218, 221–2n.38
 and contestation, 22, 74, 142
 and culture, 17, 93
 and education, 20, 165, 177, 193, 194, 216–17, 228n.20, 254n.19
 emancipation, 19, 20, 93, 139, 189, 217, 242n.24, 250n.134
 and ethnicity, 5, 7, 14, 16–19, 20, 23, 25, 26, 33–4, 37, 66, 93, 115, 132, 147, 177, 188–9, 193, 216–7, 221–2n.38–40, 222n.43–4, 237n.57
 ideology, 16, 17–18, 20, 93, 221n.31, 221n.36, 222n.43
 and labor, 16–19, 20, 24, 33–4, 37, 44, 66, 93, 94, 111, 119, 121, 132, 135, 148, 177, 193, 195, 189, 216, 222n.40, 222n.43, 223–4n.17, 224n.29, 226n.47, 237n.57, 239n.25
 and migration, 16, 17, 18, 20, 23, 27–9, 109, 148, 196, 197, 237n.57, 237n.63
 and politics, 20, 48, 73, 74, 139, 202, 227n.58, 229n.3, 235n.30, 242n.24, 250n.134, 257n.50
 relations, 16, 17, 18, 19–21, 23, 27–8, 132, 139, 218, 221n.36, 226n.47, 239n.27, 242n.24
 and sexuality, 9, 13, 17, 21, 221–2n.38, 222n.47, 222n.49–50
 stereotyping, 2, 9
 Georgetown, 35, 243n.33, 259n.81
 Germany / Germans, 4, 40, 92, 231n.34, 237n.58
- Ghana, 53
 Girjasing, Sheilendra, 257n.52
 Girvan, Norman, 130, 131, 240n.48
 Globalization, 4, 21, 159, 171–2, 187, 190, 208, 212
 Gobardhan–Rambocus, Lila, 35, 98–9, 228n.20
 Gold
 first gold rush, 1, 3, 17, 21, 22, 27, 28, 33, 34–5, 37, 38, 39–41, 42, 43–4, 45, 46, 52, 53, 67, 74, 77, 81–2, 84, 88, 96, 114, 213, 223–4 n.17, 224n.22, 225n.34–41, 226n.53
 second gold rush, 3, 162, 187, 190–1, 192, 197, 213, 214, 253n.1–3, 253n.5–7
- Gómez, Juan Vicente, 71
 Gonçalves, Kenneth, 244n.46, 244n.49
 Gooding, Herman, 248n.96
 Gorré, Arty, 241–2n.18, 255n.33
 Goslinga, C. Ch., 48
 Gowricharn, Ruben, 6
 Great Britain, 1, 47, 53, 55, 63, 84, 224n.19, 225n.37, 234n.9
 Green, Cecilia, 240n.48
 Grenada, 140, 141, 143, 243n.32, 245n.55, 245n.59, 260n.85
 Griffith, Ivelaw, 245n.15
 Guevara, Che, 157
 Guicherit, Henna, 130
 Guyana, 11, 26, 98, 105, 107, 108, 122, 136, 158, 209–10, 220n.12, 225n.37, 235n.29, 238n.5, 240n.34, 241n.9, 243n.33, 252–3n.46, 257n. 48, 257n.50–1, 257n.55, 258–9n.74, 259n.80–2. *See also* British Guiana
 Guyanese, 13, 108, 196, 255n.30–1
- Haakmat, André, 139–40, 141, 149, 150, 242n.28, 243n.34–6, 245n.55, 247n.86, 247n.88
 Haiti, 3, 108, 259n.80
 Haitians, 3, 13, 25, 108, 184, 187, 196, 255n.29
 Hardjoprajitno, John, 241–2n.18
 Havana, 161
 Hawker, Wilfred, 140, 142, 241–2n.18
 Health (care), 29, 32, 41, 55, 71, 76, 84–5, 87, 98, 114, 116, 123, 126, 128, 131, 141, 155, 162, 168, 177, 185, 194–5, 223n.9–10, 225n.34, 229n.27

- Heemskerk, Marieke, 253n.3, 253n.6
- Heemstra, A. J. A. A. baron van, 118, 229n.29
- Helman, Albert, 88, 90, 233n.58
- Helstone, S., 123
- Henry IV, king, 10
- Herrenberg, Henk, 246n.62
- Hesselink, G., 118, 120, 121–2, 124, 126, 127, 128, 132, 239n.27, 240n.39
- Hindorie, George, 135, 240n.2
- Hira, Sandew, 6, 81, 231n.31, 231n.39
- Hoefdraad, Gilmore, 259n.79
- Hoogbergen, Wim, 241n.12
- Hoost, Eddy, 137, 243n.36, 244n.42, 244–5n.49–50
- Hoppe, Rob, 105, 219n.8
- Horb, Roy, 139, 141, 142, 157, 241–2n.18, 242n.21, 244n.47, 245n.56
- Housing
 - construction material, 31–2, 44, 159, 166, 173, 178–9, 181
 - market, 15, 24, 161, 166–70, 181, 182–3
 - social housing, 156, 159, 163, 166–8, 169, 170, 174, 182
 - See also* Paramaribo
 - general, 31–2, 84, 100, 114, 116, 120, 123, 125, 128, 131–2, 146, 147, 148, 159–60, 161, 166–70, 173, 175, 178, 180–1, 182–3, 185, 189, 193, 194, 195, 199, 203, 212
- Huiswoud, Otto, 232n.45
- Idenburg, A. W. F., 238n.3
- IJzerman, A. W., 83
- Indentured labor, 1, 4, 6, 7, 9, 17, 22, 29–30, 51–8, 60, 62, 63, 80, 87, 116, 119, 221–2n.38, 225n.38
- Indonesia, 4, 26, 60, 61, 62–3, 75, 77, 78–9, 100, 101, 191, 235n.31–32, 236n.34, 239n.18, 256n.46, 258n.68. *See also* Netherlands East Indies
- Infrastructure. *See* Transport
- Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America (IIRSA), 210
- Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR), 153, 214, 248n.96, 254n.14
- Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), 208, 217
- Interior
 - contestation, 2, 25, 44, 97, 188, 191, 214, 215, 253n.7, 254n.14
 - cultural conditions, 5, 19–20, 23, 44, 45, 96–8, 130, 153, 154, 156, 188, 191, 211, 213–4, 222n.43–4, 234–5n.20, 235n.23–4, 259n.82
 - ecology, 188, 191, 214, 253n.5
 - economy, 2, 4, 5, 17, 23, 25, 27, 39–45, 91, 93, 96–8, 114, 119, 121, 162, 184, 188, 189–92, 196–7, 204, 210, 213–5, 218, 234n.16–8, 254n.14, 259n.82
 - education, 130, 155, 165, 194, 228n.20
 - migration from, 15, 24, 25, 96–7, 117, 109, 134, 151, 163, 170, 172, 179–80, 185, 187–8, 196, 212, 213, 214, 215, 252n.44, 260n.86
 - migration to, 40, 41–2, 45, 97–8, 116, 119–20, 162, 188, 196–7, 211, 213–4, 215, 260n.86
 - socioeconomic conditions, 5, 19, 23, 43–4, 96–8, 130, 153, 154, 162, 188, 189, 191, 194, 196–7, 213–4, 222n.43–4, 234n.19
 - state authority, 44–5, 162, 188, 191, 214–5, 217–8, 226n.49, 235n.21, 253n.7, 254n.14
 - territorial rights, 25, 97, 188, 191, 192, 214, 215, 234n.15, 253n.7, 254n.14
 - transmigration, 96–7, 108, 213, 234–5n.20
 - See also* Interior War
- Interior War, 19, 24, 125, 129–30, 133, 146, 149–51, 152, 154, 156, 163, 170, 190, 194, 212, 213, 214, 222n.41, 250n.2
- Jaffe, Rivke, 11, 256n.43, 257n.49
- Jagan, Cheddi, 235n.29, 243n.37
- Jamaica, 85, 110, 148, 161, 209, 223n.14, 224n.29, 232n.45, 232n.50, 252n.45–46, 257n.48, 257n.50–1, 257n.55, 259n.80
- Japan, 94, 233n.3
- Jews, 4, 12–14, 93
- Joeman, Stanley, 242n.21, 243n.33
- Josiah, Barbara, 225n.34
- Juliana, queen, 233n.61
- Jungle Commando. *See* Military

- Kambel, Ellen-Rose, 222n.43, 254n.14
 Kamperveen, André, 142, 244–5n.49–50
 Karr, Alphonse, 3
 Kawemhakan, 235n.25
 Kersten, C., 41, 251n.25
 Kielstra, J. C., 8, 22, 58–60, 65–7, 77–8, 79, 84, 85, 87, 91, 93, 94, 95, 123, 211, 224n.30, 227n.6, 227n.11–12, 229n.28, 229n.30, 233n.3
 Killinger, Frans Pavel, 49
 Kingston, 161
 Klaauw, Chris van der, 219n.3
 Klar-Mohamed, Ngaisah, 239n.25, 240n.38
 Klinken, Gerry van, 256n.46, 260n.87
 Klinkers, Ellen, 16, 28, 37–8, 223n.3, 224n.30, 229n.2
 Kol, H. van, 232–3n.55
Koloniale Staten. See Parliament
 Kom, Anton de
 ideology, 22, 69, 75–6, 80, 84, 86, 90, 230n.13, 230n.17, 231n.31, 231 n.34, 231n.36–7, 234n.8
 and Javanese, 77, 78–9, 82, 230n.24
 in Suriname, 69, 75–7, 82, 83, 230n.21–2, 230n.24
 Wij slaven, 6, 80–1, 90, 230n.17, 231n.37
 Koning, Anouk de, 23, 24–5, 113, 116, 120, 121, 122, 223n.15, 237–8n.1, 239n.19, 239n.21, 249n.109
 Kossman, Ernest, 70
 Kourou, 153, 248n.98, 248–9n.105–6, 260n.86
 Kraan, Willem, 116
 Kromhout, Mayke, 18, 148, 181, 193
 Kromodikoro, Girman, 239n.23
 Kromoredjo, Wim Soekarman, 237n.55
 Kross, Rudie, 236–7n.50
 Kruijt, Dirk, 241n.12, 258n.70
 Kruisland, J. C., 78
 Kwamalasamutu, 98
 Lachmon, Jaggernath, 102, 103, 104–5, 106, 136, 236n.37–8, 236n.44
 Laëthier, Maud, 255n.29
 Lalmahomed, Bea, 18
 Lamur, Carlo, 45
 Landrights. See Interior
 Language
 Amerindian languages, 98, 220n.16
 Chinese languages, 215, 220n.16, 220n.18
 Dutch, 4, 9, 14, 25, 55, 61, 63–4, 66, 74, 86, 88, 89, 92, 100–1, 104, 130, 176, 188, 206, 211, 220n.16–17, 228n.18, 258n.66
 English, 211
 general, 4, 5, 7, 9–10, 53, 61, 63, 64, 99, 165, 176, 206, 212, 215
 Hindi, 10, 63, 64, 220n.17
 Malay, 79
 Maroon languages, 44, 220n.16, 258n.66
 Ngoko, 101
 Portuguese, 10, 211, 215
 Sarnami, 9, 61–2, 206, 220n.16–17
 Sranan Tongo, 4, 9, 14, 29, 63, 74, 103, 104, 220n.16–17, 246n.61, 248n.95, 248n.98, 258n.66
 Surinamese–Dutch, 220n.17
 (Surinamese–)Javanese, 9, 10, 61–2, 101, 220n.16–17, 258n.66
 Urdu, 63, 220n.17, 229n.25
 Lauria-Perrecelli, Antonio, 232n.49
 Lebanese, 14, 33, 121, 223n.16
 Leckie, George, 244–5n.49–50, 251n.11
 Ledgister, F. S. J., 85, 236n.45, 241n.15
 Leeftland, Ewoud, 241–2n.18
 Lelydorp, 129, 159, 161
 Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI), 26
 Lepelblad, Marinus, 230n.12
 Levens, Marie, 245n.53, 260n.91
 Levitt Polanyi, Kari, 130
 Libya, 134, 140
 Lichtveld, Lou. See Helman, Albert
 Lie, R. A. J. van, 5, 6, 11, 13, 34, 36, 46, 47, 48, 49, 66, 80, 81, 87, 164, 188, 216, 219n.8, 221n.27, 221n.29, 221n.32, 223n.7, 230n.17, 231n.39, 232n.53, 256n.41, 257n.54
 Liesdek, Heinrich, 231n.30
 Lijphart, Arend, 219n.8, 236n.46
 Locality, 4–5, 8, 11, 15, 16, 18, 21, 23, 26, 37, 51, 60, 62, 64, 98–9, 115, 147, 156, 157, 164–5, 188, 214–5, 249n.130
 Lony, Marc, 255n.29
 Lubbers, Ruud, 245n.58

- MacKay, Fergus, 248n.96, 254n.14
- Madeirans. *See* Portuguese
- Mahadew, Guno, 241–2n.18
- Maks, Marion, 168, 169, 179, 258n.70
- Malaysia, 4, 5, 191
- Manley, Norman, 232n.50
- Manumission. *See* Abolition of slavery
- McClaurin, Irma, 222n.50
- Meel, Peter, 76, 80, 81, 102, 157, 228n.23, 230n.17, 230n.23–4, 231n.36–7, 236n.42, 241n.17, 243n.29, 247n.82, 250n.133
- Menke, Jack, 6, 145, 193, 194, 201, 209, 212, 216, 246n.66, 246n.73
- Mexico, 95
- Meye, Steve, 213, 260n.85
- Mierlo, Hans van, 4
- Migration. *See* Demography
- Mijnals, Chas, 241n.11, 242n.19, 242n.21, 243n.33, 247n.83
- Military
 - colonial period, 13, 55, 77, 78, 79, 92–3, 94, 106, 123, 229n.4
 - Interior War, 129, 134, 149–52, 154, 249n.110
 - Nationaal Surinaams Bevrijdingsleger, 24, 129, 134, 150–1, 152–3, 197, 247n.88–92, 248n.95, 248n.99, 249n.110, 250n.133, 253n.1
 - Netherlands army, 94, 137, 142, 143, 241n.9, 242n.19
 - post-regime, 15, 98, 133, 152–3, 191, 197–8, 204, 205, 207, 247n.82, 248n.96, 250n.133, 255n.33, 257n.57
 - pre-coup, 100, 107, 135, 136, 137–8, 209, 241n.9–12, 241n.15–16
 - regime, 2, 3, 11, 15, 21, 24, 106, 107, 112, 124–5, 133–4, 138–44, 154–7, 197, 199, 204, 205, 207, 208, 212, 241–2n.17–18, 242n.20–4, 242n.26, 243n.36, 243n.39–40, 244n.48, 245n.53, 245n.57, 245n.60, 246n.63, 247n.82–3, 248n.96, 250n.133, 256n.42
 - US army, 117, 123, 143, 233n.3–4
- Mintz, Sidney, 220n.12
- Miranda, J. de, 123
- Moengo, 5, 15, 21, 23, 35, 45, 113, 114–32, 149, 150, 153, 164, 165, 191, 247n.92
- Moengotapoe, 240n.45
- Moiwana, 151, 248n.96
- Montserrat, 30, 40, 225n.39
- Mook, H. J. van, 94
- Mountains, 111, 225n.37, 234n.18, 253n.6
- Moyne Commission, 84–5
- Mozambique, 140
- Naarendorp, Edward, 245n.57
- Naarendorp, Harvey, 259n.79
- Naarendorp, Henk, 190
- Napoleonic Wars, 1
- Nationalism, 5, 11, 54, 71, 75, 78–79, 81, 94, 102, 103–5, 112, 232n.51, 234n.17
- Nay, John, 258n.58
- Nederlandse Handel-Maatschappij (NHM), 53, 54, 227n.3
- Neede, Laurens, 241n.16, 242n.21, 242n.25, 243n.35
- Nelom, John, 241–2n.18
- Netherlands
 - autonomy period, 100–1, 105, 106–7, 236n.42
 - colonial relations, 1, 3, 7–8, 11, 12–14, 17–18, 21, 22, 23, 34–6, 41, 44, 47–9, 51–67, 69–70, 74, 75, 76–9, 80–3, 85–90, 94, 101, 113, 224n.19–21, 226n.42, 234n.8, 238n.3
 - culture, 4, 12–14, 16, 25, 61, 63–4, 66, 85–6, 88–90, 92, 94, 95, 98, 100–2, 103–4, 109, 188, 206, 211, 229n.26, 259n.78. (*see also* Language)
 - diplomatic relations, 3, 4, 25, 139, 144, 152–3, 154, 188, 197, 198, 199, 206–7, 208–9, 211, 241n.9, 242n.19, 246n.62, 249n.107
 - financial relations, 4, 24, 91, 95, 107, 110, 111, 112, 135, 136–7, 138–9, 144, 152, 153, 154, 155, 187, 192, 193, 194, 207, 208, 209, 211, 213, 241n.6, 246n.64, 258n.70
 - migration to, 4, 12–14, 15, 20, 23, 107, 108–10, 135–6, 137, 142, 146, 155, 163, 167, 228n.21, 237n.57, 237n.61
 - monarchy, 89–90, 95, 233n.61–2
 - nationals, 12–13, 15, 40, 66–7, 221n.29, 229n.26
 - opposition against military regime, 142–3, 149–51, 245n.55, 245n.58

- Surinamese in, 4, 14, 81, 107, 146, 150, 188, 206, 211
- Netherlands Antilles, 2, 15, 30, 41, 72, 89, 94, 100, 101, 107, 233n.3. *See also* Aruba; Curaçao
- Netherlands East Indies, 14, 22, 30, 34, 49, 53, 54, 58, 59, 61, 66, 67, 70, 77, 79, 82, 86, 87, 88–9, 94, 117, 219n.1, 223n.5, 223n.9, 227n.11, 229n.4, 229n.26, 230n.13, 230n.25, 232n.42, 232n.51, 233n.3, 230n.25, 232n.42, 234n.10, 238.n.3. *See also* Indonesia
- News media
- Newspapers, 27, 49, 63, 66, 72, 75, 83, 89, 117, 138, 140, 142, 150, 151, 165, 219n.6, 227n.57, 230n.24, 233n.59, 243n.32, 257n.48, 258n.65
- Radio, 101, 116, 123, 141, 142, 151, 165, 242n.20, 244n.49, 257n.48, 258n.65
- TV, 151, 257n.48, 258n.65
- Nicaragua, 139, 140, 243n.32–3, 245n.57
- Nieuw Koffiekamp, 253n.7
- Nieuw Nickerie, 31, 42, 161, 164, 165, 242n.20, 250n.2
- North, Oliver, 245n.55
- North Korea, 140
- Oemrawsingh, Baal, 243n.40
- Oemrawsingh, Suchrin, 244–5n.49–50
- Oil (mineral), 3, 71, 123, 162, 187, 190, 191–2, 206, 209–10, 215, 225n.37, 238n.3, 254n.11, 259n.75, 259n.80
- Onverdacht, 115, 117, 118, 239n.26
- Ooft, C.D., 242n.25
- Oostindie, Gert, 37, 231n.36, 233n.61
- Organization of American States (OAS), 244–5n.50–1
- Oudschans Dentz, F. 115–6, 126
- Pan-Africanism, 83, 232n.45
- Paramaribo
- administrative center, 11, 14, 31, 40, 42, 47–9, 55, 56, 66, 111, 161–2, 184, 213–4, 221n.33, 223n.8, 229n.2, 250n.3, 254n.14
- and class, 5, 13, 15–16, 20, 21, 24, 31–2, 33–4, 148, 160–1, 163, 166–9, 171, 173–9, 181–3, 185, 194, 247n.77, 256n.43
- and contestation, 22, 49, 72–7, 84, 138, 140, 141–2, 143, 149, 150, 156, 198, 205
- cultural center, 31, 90, 97, 101–2, 112, 160, 161–2, 165, 184, 259n.84
- economy, 24, 31, 33, 35, 37, 41, 42, 71, 96, 109–10, 111, 115, 116, 126, 129, 156, 162, 184, 190, 194, 210, 211, 213, 224n.28, 254n.15
- educational center, 31, 33, 64, 98–9, 103, 112, 160, 161–2, 163–5, 167, 179, 184, 194, 220–1n.21, 228n.20, 260n.91
- and ethnicity, 11, 15, 18, 20, 24, 31, 32–4, 67, 111, 160–1, 166, 169, 170, 172–8, 184–5, 194, 212, 216, 252n.32
- and gender, 18, 20, 28–9, 33–4, 148, 194
- housing, 24, 31–2, 115, 126, 155, 159–61, 163, 166–70, 173, 178–9, 180–1, 184, 223n.11
- infrastructure, 31, 32, 35, 41, 96, 159–61, 163, 166–70, 173, 178–9, 180–1, 184, 211, 223n.10–12, 224n.19–21
- labor, 1, 15, 18, 28–9, 33–4, 94, 97, 109, 119, 120, 145, 163, 165–6, 173, 175, 176–7, 180, 184–5, 190, 192, 251n.16
- migration to, 15–16, 18, 19, 23, 24, 27, 28–9, 32–3, 37, 93, 99, 109, 129, 134, 151, 160, 163–6, 169, 170, 172, 174, 178, 179–80, 184–5, 187–8, 189, 196, 212
- neighborhoods, 155, 163, 166–8, 170, 171, 174–6, 180, 181, 182–3, 250n.1, 252n.33, 252n.42, 256n.43
- politics, 152, 256n.43
- population size, 27, 28, 32–3, 109, 161, 162–4, 184, 192, 195, 211, 250n.4–5
- socioeconomic conditions, 15–16, 24, 31–2, 33, 111, 145, 147, 148, 156, 166, 167, 169, 170, 175, 177–9, 181–3, 185, 187–8, 189, 194, 216, 223n.10–11, 246n.73
- spatial patterns, 5, 15, 24, 31–2, 160–1, 166–72, 173–6, 180, 181–5
- and World War II, 92, 93
- Paranam, 45, 115, 117, 118, 123, 143, 238n.13, 239n.26

- Parliament
 colonial, 47–9, 65, 72, 77, 82, 86, 87, 88, 89, 93, 94, 99, 113, 135, 164, 227n.11, 228n.18, 228n.21, 229n.3, 229n.30, 230n.28, 232n.44, 232n.53, 236n.35, 236n.43
 Dutch, 1, 49, 52, 53, 55, 83, 86, 107, 227n.11
 Republic, 137, 140, 142, 144, 152, 153, 198, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 256n.37, 256n.45, 257n.50
 Patmo, Soehirman, 220–1n.20
 Peake, Linda, 221–2n.38–9
 Peneux, H. B., 236n.49
 Penfold, Michael, 203, 204, 205–6, 209
 Pengel, Johan Adolf, 97, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 124, 159, 236n.37, 236n.44, 237n.51
 Penta, Karl, 247n.91, 248n.95
 Persad, Sital, 62, 228n.15–16
 Phedra, 168
 Plantations, 1, 2, 4, 8, 9, 13, 14, 16–17, 20–2, 23, 27–31, 32, 34–5, 36–7, 38, 41, 46, 52, 54–7, 59, 60–1, 63, 67, 71, 76, 79, 81–2, 87–8, 96, 114, 119–20, 121, 126, 128, 130, 131, 166, 167, 211, 213, 218, 219n.1, 230n.24, 239n.21, 240n.41. *See also* Agriculture
 Pluralism, 5–6, 7, 8, 11, 64, 188, 216, 219n.6, 219n.8–9, 231n.39, 237n.53
 Polak, J. A., 41, 225n.40
 Police
 colonial and autonomy period, 8, 34, 40, 42, 49, 51, 55, 69, 72, 74, 76–8, 79, 82, 84, 85, 98, 127, 132, 223–4n.17, 229n.1–2, 229n.30, 230n.21, 231n.32, 232n.43, 234n.8, 235n.28, 236n.47, 236–7n.49–50
 independence, 8, 98, 137, 138, 141, 149, 155, 156, 168, 183, 191, 204, 214, 215, 241n.17, 242n.25, 245n.57, 246n.63, 248n.96, 253n.7, 257n.57
 Polimé, Thomas, 248n.96
 Political parties and coalitions
 A-Combinatie, 256n.41
 Actiefront, 236n.43
 Actiegroep, 104, 105, 236n.43
 Algemene Bevrijdings en Ontwikkelingspartij (ABOP), 199, 256n.41
 Broederschap en Eenheid in de Politiek (BEP), 256n.41
 Communistische Partij Holland (CPH), Netherlands, 72, 89, 230n.13, 230n.17
 Communistische Partij Suriname, 244n.49
 Fraternalization, 102–3, 104–5, 106, 236n.43
 Front voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling, 152, 248n.101
 Gestructureerd Samenwerkingsverband, 198
 Hindostaans-Javaanse Centrale Raad, 99
 Kaum Tani Persatuan Indonesia (KTPI), 99, 102, 152, 153, 199, 200, 209, 255n.33–4, 256n.38
 Mega Combinatie, 199, 256n.41
 Millenium Combinatie, 256n.38
 Moeslim Partij, 99
 Nationaal Democratische Partij (NDP), 12, 143, 152, 153, 197–8, 199, 200, 201, 202, 204, 246n.61, 248n.101, 255n.34, 256n.38, 256n.43, 256n.47, 257n.49
 Nationale Beweging Suriname (NBS), 103–4, 105
 Nationale Partij Suriname (NPS), 20, 97, 99, 102, 104, 106, 142, 152, 153, 197, 199–200, 202, 209, 235n.28, 255n.33–4, 256n.41, 257n.52
 Nieuw Front (voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling), 153, 197, 198–9, 201, 255n.33–4, 256n.38, 256n.41, 257n.49
 Nieuw Suriname (NS), 199
 Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), Indonesia, 79
 Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), Indonesia, 79
 Partij van de Arbeid (PvdA), Netherlands, 107
 Partij van de Nationalistische Republiek (PNR), 105, 106
 Pendawa Lima, 248n.101
 People's National Party (PNP), Jamaica, 232n.50
 People's Progressive Party (PPP), Guyana, 235n.29

- Pertjajah Luhur, 199, 256n.38, 256n.41, 258n.62
- Progressieve Arbeiders en Landbouwers Unie (PALU), 199, 243n.29, 248n.101
- Progressieve Surinaamse Volkspartij (PSV), 99, 102
- Revolutionaire Volkspartij (RVP), 139–40, 243n.29, 243n.33, 244n.41, 245n.57
- Seeka, 256n.41
- Sociaal-Democratische Arbeiders Partij (SDAP), Netherlands, 72
- Surinaamsche Democratische Arbeiders Partij (SDAP), 231n.30
- Surinaamse Partij van de Arbeid (SPA), 152, 153, 255n.33
- Vereenigde Hindostaanse Partij / Vooruitstrevende Hervormingspartij (VHP), 99, 102, 104–5, 107, 152, 153, 197, 199, 200, 202, 209, 235n.26, 236n.38, 255n.33–4, 256n.44, 257n.52, 258–9n.74
- Volksalliantie voor Vooruitgang (VVV), 199
- Working People's Alliance (WPA), Guyana, 243n.33, 244n.48
- Politics
- autonomy period, 91, 94, 100, 102–3, 104–7, 236n.42
 - colonial, 65, 42, 47–9, 86, 88–9, 94–5, 226–7n.55–7
 - elections, 3, 24, 48, 66, 102, 105, 106, 124, 136, 137, 152, 153, 155, 197–9, 200–1, 203, 205, 218, 221n.30, 226–7n.55–8, 228n.21, 229n.3, 236n.36, 243n.39, 257n.49, 259n.80
 - and ethnicity, 5, 8, 11–12, 14, 23, 24, 25, 48–9, 65, 66, 69, 74–7, 78, 91–2, 97, 99–101, 102–3, 104–5, 106–7, 136, 152, 157, 197, 199–203, 205, 216, 218, 228n.21, 235n.29, 257n.49
 - ideology, 11, 58–60, 65, 66, 75–8, 80–1, 83, 86, 89, 133–4, 139–43, 157, 202, 243n.29, 244n.41
 - independence, 103, 104–5, 106–7, 111, 112, 135–6, 236n.42
 - military regime, 133–4, 138–40, 142–4, 152–4, 156–7, 208
 - political culture, 12, 25, 48, 91–2, 99–100, 103, 138, 149, 152, 157, 169, 182, 188, 192, 197–206, 209, 213, 215, 216, 232n.49, 235n.27–8, 236n.44–5, 249n.123, 256n.41, 256n.46, 260n.88
 - post-military regime, 188, 197–200, 207
 - redemocratization, 133, 134, 141, 144, 152–4, 248n.99
- See also* Constitution; Parliament; Political parties and coalitions
- Pommeren (architect), 238n.9
- Port of Spain, 175
- Pos, Hugo, 92
- Postma, J., 122–3
- Power-Staphorst, Siegmien, 139
- Price, Richard, 97, 234–5n.20, 248n.98, 249n.108, 254n.14, 260n.86
- Price, Sally, 19–20, 222n.42, 222n.44
- Pronk, Jan, 207
- Puerto Rico, 232n.49, 233n.3
- Putscher, A. G., 89, 232n.44, 232n.53
- Raad voor de Bevrijding van Suriname, 150
- Radhakishun, P. S. R., 143
- Rahman, Lesley, 244–5n.49–50
- Rambocus, Surindre, 140–1, 157, 243n.40, 244n.46, 244–5n.49–50, 245n.55, 250n.133
- Ramcharan, Rita, 258n.65
- Ramdin, Albert, 259n.76
- Ramsোধ, Hans, 49, 87, 99–100, 102, 107, 198, 229n.5, 229n.30, 231n.31, 235n.28, 256n.41
- Religion
- Amerindian religions, 10
 - Christian religions 10–11, 14, 16, 19, 30, 33, 61, 63–4, 66, 71, 73, 86, 92, 93, 97–8, 99, 101, 116, 167, 175, 195, 220–1n.20, 223n.7, 228n.15, 228n.18–21, –230n.24, 235n.23, 239n.27, 242n.20, 260n.85
 - general, 5, 9, 10, 23, 25, 28, 83, 90, 93, 131, 151, 160, 165, 175, 183–4, 195, 216, 218
 - Hinduism, 10, 11, 30, 65, 103, 112, 195, 220n.17, 220n.19, 228n.15

- Religion—*Continued*
 Islam, 10, 11, 30, 63, 65, 78, 79, 99,
 103, 112, 195, 220n.17, 220n.19,
 229n.25, 231n.33
 Maroon religions, 10, 121
 Winti, 10, 29
 Remittances, 15, 109, 146, 148–9, 155,
 181, 182, 187, 192, 193, 194, 206,
 213, 246n.73, 259n.83
 Rensch, Stanley, 254n.14
 Rey, Michel van, 139, 242n.21, 242n.25
 Riedewald, Harold, 244n.42,
 244–5n.49–50
 Rijts, Johannes, 232n.45
 Rijts, Rudolf, 232n.45
 Rivers
 Coeroeni, 234n.18
 Coppename, 225n.37
 Corantijn, 111, 210, 225n.37
 Cottica, 45, 115
 general, 43, 115, 191, 214
 Inini (Fr. Guiana), 44
 Kabalebo, 234n.18
 Lawa, 41, 97, 98, 225n.37
 Litani, 210
 Mana (Fr. Guiana), 225n.38
 Marowijne, 40, 150, 210, 224n.22
 Marowini, 210
 Oelemari, 234n.18
 Palumeu, 234n.18
 Saramacca, 225n.37
 Sipaliwini, 234n.18
 Suriname, 31, 39, 40, 96, 117, 159, 162,
 163, 171, 194, 225n.37, 250n.3
 Robotham, Don, 219n.9
 Rodney, Walter, 243n.33
 Roopnaraine, Rupert, 243n.33, 244n.48
 Roos, J. S., 32
 Rozendaal, Ruben, 241–2n.18
 Rubber, 36, 226n.43. *See also* Balata
 Rush, Ann Spry, 232n.51, 233n.63
 Rutgers, A. A. L., 59, 72, 76, 77, 81–2,
 232n.42
 Ryan, Selwyn, 202
- Sabajo, Thomas, 248–9n.106
 Samiran, Rudy Moekiat, 237n.59,
 251n.13
 Sanches, Simon, 234n.8
 Sanders, Theo de, 74–6, 83, 231n.31
- Sardjoe, Dilip, 200, 256n.44, 257n.48
 Savornin Lohman, M. A. de, 63
 Schalkwijk, Aart, 147–8, 174, 175–6,
 178–80, 193–4, 246n.67, 246n.73,
 247n.80, 250n.1
 Schalkwijk, Marten, 215, 248n.99,
 253n.47
 Schmeitz, Maggie, 260n.88
 Schneiders–Howard, Grace, 69–70,
 71, 75, 77, 78, 79, 82, 83, 229n.3,
 231n.30, 232n.42, 232n.55
 Schoch, C. F., 88
 Scholtens, Ben, 73, 96–7, 230n.14,
 230n.17
 Schulte Nordholt, Henk, 88, 232n.51
 Sedney, Jules, 236–7n.50, 258–9n.74
 Sedoc–Dahlberg, Betty, 235n.27
 Seecharan, Clem, 221n.34, 222n.40
 Shankar, Ramsewak, 152–3, 157,
 249n.107
 Shearer, Hugh, 232n.50
 Sheombar, Jiwansing, 244–5n.49–50
 Shultz, George, 143
 Silos, Maureen, 217–8
 Simons, R. D. G. Ph., 32, 223n.10
 Singh, Lu(t)chman, 62
 Singh, Simboonath, 8
 Sital, Badrissein, 241n.16, 242n.21,
 243n.33
 Slagveer, Jozef, 142, 242n.20,
 244–5n.49–50
 Slavery, 1, 4, 6, 7, 17, 31, 54, 59, 67, 74,
 80–1, 175, 219n.1, 227n.1, 260n.88.
See also Abolition of slavery
 Smith, M. G., 6, 11, 219n.7
 Social organizations
 Associatie voor Democratie, 142
 Bharat Uday, 62, 64, 78, 79, 231n.32
 COGASUR, 196
 Comite Christelijke Kerken, 93
 friendly societies, 240n.39
 Perkoempoelan Islam Indonesia (PII),
 79, 231n.33
 Sarekat Islam, 62–3, 78
 Surinaams Werklozen Comité (SWC),
 72–3, 74, 84
 Surinaamsch Onderwijzers-
 Genootschap, 64
 Surinaamsche Algemeene Werkers
 Organisatie (SAWO), 74–5, 82, 84

- Surinaamsche Immigranten
 Vereeniging (SIV), 62, 228n.15
- Surinaamsche Sociaal-Democratische
 Vrouwenbond, 73
- Surinaamsche Volksbond (SVB), 74,
 82, 84
- Tjintoko Muljo, 62
- Unie Suriname, 94–5, 99, 101, 136
- Vereniging Herdenking Javaanse
 Immigratie (VHJI), 26
- Vrijheid en Recht, 228n.16
- Wie Eegie Sanie (WES), 103–4
See also Trade unions; Political parties
- Soemita, Iding, 230n.23, 236.n39
- Soemita, Willy, 230n.23, 255n.34
- Sohansingh, Robby, 244–5n.49–50
- Somohardjo, Paul, 136, 199, 205,
 230n.23, 256n.41, 258n.62
- South Africa(ns), 40, 62, 94
- South Korea, 143
- Soviet Union, 82, 140
- St. Laurent, 130, 224n.22, 248n.98
- St Lucia, 30, 42, 226n.47, 252–3n.46
- Staal, G. J., 57, 228n.15, 228n.20, 238n.3
- Stadwijk-Kappel, Nel, 139
- State supervision, 1, 16, 28, 30, 37, 52,
 223n.3, 227n.1
- Staten van Suriname see* Parliament
- Stichting Comité Herdenking Javaanse
 Immigratie (STICHJI), 26
- Sticusa, 101–2, 104
- Stipriaan, Alex van, 37, 234n.19
- Stolkertsijver, 150
- Sukarno, 63, 78
- Surinaamsche Bank, 39, 47, 88, 227n.3,
 228n.15
- Syrians. *See* Lebanese
- Tamanredjo, 227n.11
- Temmes, Moesje, 230n.14
- Teixeira, Wilfred, 233n.7
- Terborg, Julia, 260n.88
- Territorial rights *see* Interior
- Theije, Marjo de, 3, 196, 253n.3, 253n.6
- Thoden van Velzen, H. U. E., 44, 109–10
- Tjarda van Starckenborgh Stachouwer, A.
 W. L., 58
- Tjon Sie Fat, Paul, 220n.18, 255n.32
- Tolud, Roy, 241–2n.18
- Tourism, 170, 172
- Traa, A. van, 47
- Trade unions
 general, 2, 23, 69, 71, 73–4, 82, 83–4,
 86, 92, 100, 102, 105–6, 112,
 115, 123–4, 134, 137–8, 139, 141,
 143–4, 145, 153, 157, 198, 208, 213,
 232n.50, 235n.30, 236n.47–8, 236–
 7n.50, 240n.34, 241n.15–16, 241–
 2n.18, 243n.36, 244n.49, 245n.55,
 256n.36
- Bomika, 137–8, 241n.15–16
- Moederbond, 105–6, 141, 142
- Moengo Mijnwerkersbond, 123
- Ravaksur, 256n.36
- Surinaamse Bauxiet en Metaalwerkers
 Federatie, 123–4
- Surinaamse Mijnwerkersunie, 123
- Vereniging Progressieve Mediawerkers,
 243n.32
- See also* Social organizations
- Transport
 air, 35, 93, 95, 96, 98, 159, 211, 212,
 224n.21, 225n.37, 233n.4, 234n.16,
 234n.18
- ground, 31, 35, 41, 45, 46, 87, 93, 95,
 96, 98, 111, 115, 126, 129, 139,
 150, 154, 155–6, 159, 163–4, 171,
 180, 197, 204, 210, 211, 213–4,
 223n.10–11, 226n.42, 228n.20,
 234n.16, 234–5n.20, 241n.9
- water, 35, 38, 43–4, 56, 163, 210, 211,
 234n.19
- Trinidad and Tobago, 7, 9, 12, 14, 17, 26,
 35, 56, 62, 73, 83, 85, 105, 110, 148,
 161, 175, 220n.12, 220n.14, 220n.17,
 221–2n.38, 224n.19, 232n.50,
 235n.29, 252–3n.46, 257n.48,
 257n.50–1, 257n.55, 258–9n.74
- Trommelen, Jeroen, 190, 253n.5
- Trotz, D. Alissa, 8, 221–2n.38–9
- Trouillot, Michel-Rolph, 7
- Unión de Naciones Suramericanas
 (Unasur) 210
- United Nations (UN), 155, 209–10, 212,
 234n.17
- United States
 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
 142, 143, 243n.36, 245n.55
- diplomatic relations, 103, 199, 258n.58

- United States—*Continued*
 Drugs Enforcement Agency (DEA),
 247n.78
 economic interests, 4, 35, 40, 44–5,
 47, 87–8, 103, 113–9, 123–4, 125,
 162, 184, 191, 224n.19–20, 238n.3,
 238n.7, 238n.16, 239n.18
 emigration to, 3, 15, 129, 134, 142,
 155, 212, 232n.45
 general, 70, 129, 257n.48, 259n.80
 and military regime, 142, 143, 150,
 243n.36, 244n.48, 245n.55, 245n.58
 missionaries, 97–8
 selling colony to, 66, 88, 233n.59
 World War II, 23, 45, 47, 93–4, 96, 117,
 123, 233n.3–4, 233n.60, 234n.9
 Upham Adams, Frederick, 238n.8
 Urbina, Rafael, 71–2, 230n.12
- Valies, Wilco, 254n.23
 Valk, Hans, 138, 242n.19
 Venetiaan, Ronald, 197, 198–200,
 205, 208, 255n.33–4, 256n.38–9,
 256n.43, 256n.45, 258n.70
 Venezuela, 71, 143, 203, 205–6, 209, 210,
 224n.19, 257n.56, 259n.80
 Venturini, Danilo, 143
 Verrest, Hebe, 15–16, 24, 26, 145, 148,
 159, 246n.65
 Vries, Ellen de, 130, 240n.46, 248n.98,
 248–9n.106
- Wageningen (Nickerie), 15, 95–6, 131,
 156, 165
 Wageningen University (Netherlands),
 58, 240n.49
 Wako, Amos, 248n.96
 Walker, Jimmy, 241n.17
 Walle, J. van de, 227n.6, 227n.11
 Water
 draining and flooding, 31, 32, 37,
 116, 179
 management, 37, 38, 56, 170, 171
 pollution, 191
 power, 96, 210, 225n.37, 238n.16
 supply, 32, 85, 116, 123, 125, 126,
 127, 137, 148, 162, 169, 170, 178,
 179, 194, 195, 223n.11–12, 227n.60,
 247n.80
See also Transport
 Wekker, Gloria, 13, 20, 139, , 221n.31,
 222n.47, 222n.49, 242n.24,
 249n.132, 256n.43
 Welter, C. J. I. M.,
 58, 60, 233n.3
 Welvaartsfonds, 95
 West Suriname Project, 111–12, 136,
 234n.18, 243n.36, 245n.55
 Westerloo, Gerard van, 105, 136
 Westra, P., 62
 Wetering, Wilhelmina van, 44, 109–10
 Wijdenbosch, Jules, 163, 197–8, 204, 208,
 255n.34, 256n.36
 Wijdenbosch, Ruth, 142, 155, 257n.52
 Wijngaarde, Frank, 244–5n.49–50
 Wijntuin, Emile, 230n.15, 231n.31
 Wilhelmina, queen, 77, 89, 94, 95,
 233n.61, 234n.8
 Willem I, king, 227n.3
 Willem III, king, 233n.61
 Williams, Eric, 235n.29
 Wonoredjo, 114, 117, 119–20, 125, 126,
 239n.19–20. *See also* Moengo
 World Bank, 194, 207, 237n.65
 World War I, 34, 38–9, 45, 47, 83, 113
 World War II, 18, 22–3, 45–7, 91, 92–5,
 117, 122, 123, 213, 231n.34, 233n.60,
 234n.8
- Yelvington, Kevin, 7, 12, 220n.12
- Zaal, G., 123
 Zeelandia. *See* Fort Zeelandia
 Zeeuw, Marcel, 241–2n.18
 Zimbabwe, 243n.33