Néstor García Canclini

IMAGINED GLOBALIZATION



Translated and with an Introduction by GEORGE YUDICE

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

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Néstor García Canclini

IMAGINED GLOBALIZATION

Translated and with an Introduction by GEORGE YÚDICE

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TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

George Yúdice

What hasn't been written or said about globalization? In mid-October 2011 a title keyword search in the Library of Congress online catalogue generated 5,514 entries; a search in the Worldwide Political Science abstracts produced 16,801, Proquest Sociological abstracts gave 20,492, and a Summon search at the University of Miami Richter Library produced 271,962 entries in book, article, and other formats. In such a forest of resources, why single out this book?

A first answer is that if you want to know about and understand Latin America's place in what Hannerz (1989) called the global ecumene,[1] García Canclini is the best starting point; no one, as far as I know, has dwelled on the impact of globalization on the relations between Latin America, Europe, and the United States or among Latin American countries in such a consistent manner. His insights extend to regional thinking in general, that is, to the integration

1. The totality of the inhabited world characterized by "persistent cultural interaction and exchange" (Hannerz 1989: 66).

strategies (European Union, U.S.-led free trade agreements, particularly with Latin America, and Mercosur or the Common Market of the South) that were the hoped-for remedies for the threats to regional hegemonies (Germany, the United States, and Brazil) in a rapidly globalizing world that rearranged production, labor, distribution, and markets. Second, he is a committed Latin Americanist, arguing less about the various tendencies of globalization than about charting flexible strategies to advance through this conceptual thicket toward greater effectiveness for a region that has fallen behind. (But some of whose countries—in particular Brazil and Argentina—have charted new directions independent of global hegemonic institutions, as García Canclini acknowledges in the epilogue, written twelve years after the publication of the original Spanish-language book in 1999.) Third, these strategies require constructing a methodological framework "capable of organizing the divergent perspectives and imaginaries of globalization" (38) in order to discern how local and regionally networked actors, including those excluded from both national and globalized economic, political, and communications enterprises, can intervene symbolically and politically to open new public spheres of influence, and thereupon invent new forms of governance. Constructing such a framework entails interdisciplinary inquiry, which is one of García Canclini's fortes. Fourth, García Canclini places intermediation—the ability to make arrangements throughout the chain of local, national, regional, and global instances—at the center of policymaking and sociopolitical action (177). Fifth, and most important, all of the above require attention to interculturality and its imaginaries: interculturality because globalization processes throw together people with different sociocultural backgrounds, and imaginaries because they constitute a major resource in how different people approach each other and interact. Finally (although I could go on mentioning other reasons for reading this book), García Canclini offers a poetics of the imaginaries of globalization by focusing on narrative and metaphor as constitutive of the ways in which people seek to deal with contingency, especially in a globalizing era in which formations that once created a measure of security—in particular nation-states and supranational formations and their social welfare institutions (e.g., the European Union)—erode and in the process unleash uncertainty.

Globalization and Hybridization

This translator's introduction can be understood as a reader's guide, not only to this book but to its place in García Canclini's oeuvre. As in any other writer's work, there are themes that are returned to, not like *idées fixes* but like

variations of a fugue, reworked in connection with changing contexts and circumstances. Before García Canclini began to write about globalization he was already writing about the transformations of imaginaries, particularly of artists, writers, and artisans, in the context of capitalist modernization. This is evident in his award-winning *Transforming Modernity: Popular Culture in Mexico* ([1982] 1993), which deals with how artisans reconvert their traditional practices under capitalism according to a dual process of being acted upon and simultaneously creating something new that does not repudiate the past. García Canclini expands his scope to include art, cultural industries, the media, consumer culture, heritage and national identity, folklore, crafts, popular cultures, museums, urban life, and the disciplines that study them in his other award-winning book *Hybrid Cultures: Strategies for Entering and Leaving Modernity* ([1989] 1995). In "Hybrid Cultures in Globalized Times," the introduction to the 2005 reprint of the book in English, originally written for the second Spanish-language edition in 2001 (two years after *Imagined Globalization* was first published), García Canclini (2005: xxxv) states that although he did not use the concept of globalization in that book, the processes he examined belonged to the "culmination of modern conflicts and tendencies," which is how Giddens and Beck understood globalization.

It is important to point out that by hybridization García Canclini (2005: xxxi) does not refer to *mestizaje*, the cultural melting pot that produced, under nationalizing policies, a normative notion of identity, one of whose artistic elaborations is the magical realist aesthetic that also became a product that fanned the exoticizing desires in the countries of the North. In response to a critique by the Peruvian intellectual Antonio Cornejo Polar, García Canclini embraced the identification of hybridization with nondialectical heterogeneity, which entails not fusion or integration but speaking from many places at once (xxx), thus buttressing the insight that identity has multiple sources and framings and that it is ideology that fixes that multiplicity for strategic purposes. The challenge to a normalizing mestizaje that García Canclini charts in his work is contemporaneous with the rise of social and ethnic movements that led to the recognition that Latin American societies are pluricultural and multiethnic, which by the late 1980s and early 1990s was institutionalized in constitutional reform throughout the region. His focus is less on the particular mobilizations than on the processes of hybridization that can be assisted by national and regional policies to "avoid segregation and transform into interculturality . . . to work democratically with divergences so that history is not reduced to a war among cultures, as Samuel Huntington imagines. We can choose to live under conditions of war or hybridization" (xxxi). This view is

consistent with the multiple ways of life that people should have the freedom to choose, as promoted by the 2004 UNDP Human Development Report, "Cultural Liberty in Today's Diverse World" and the Convention for the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, adopted by 148 countries in October 2006 and ratified in March 2007. Indeed García Canclini participated in events at which the founding documents of the Convention were discussed, such as the Intergovernmental Conference on Cultural Policies for Development (Stockholm, 1998), in which development is defined not in terms of economic growth but by the sense that quality of life depends on the freedom to choose how one wants to live, including one's identity or identities.

The Trouble with Multiculturalism

Another theme that García Canclini (1998: 12) returns to frequently is his dissatisfaction with U.S. multiculturalism, because he understands it as a form of segregation: to each ethnicity and race its own identity, set of institutions, and (taken-for-granted) culture, on the basis of which the groups ground their claims. For García Canclini, globalization makes an unconditional defense of identity counterproductive; intercultural encounter and interaction, on the other hand, may lead to new forms of agency in what seems to be an overdetermined world: "I do not think that the main option today is to defend identity or to globalize. The most illuminating studies of the globalizing process are not those that lead us to review questions of identity in isolation but those that lead us to understand the benefits of knowing what we can do and be in relation to others, like dealing with heterogeneity, difference, and inequality" (13).

Imagined Globalization includes an insightful comparative reflection on the various national and regional ways in which otherness is dealt with. To this end, García Canclini identifies four models in the West: "the European republican system of universal rights, the multicultural separatism of the United States, multiethnic integrations under the nation-state in Latin American countries, and—cutting across all of them—multicultural integration fostered by the mass media" (xlii and chapter 4). While he finds all of these models of intercultural relations to be quite insufficient to guarantee democratic participation in national polities and transnational contexts—"A democratic political culture and a democratic cultural policy go beyond recognizing differences; they must also create the conditions to live those differences in ambiguity" (97)—he is particularly skeptical of the generally expedient forms of recognizing others in U.S. multiculturalism. This skepticism is in part produced

by the academic, political, and media claims made regarding Latinos, which are to this day largely stereotypical, not only from without (e.g., assumptions about undocumented workers extended to all Latinos) but also from within (the attempt by Hispanic marketers to sell their "expert" knowledge of Latinos to advertisers in order to cash in on the demographic boom; Dávila 2001, 2008; Yúdice 2009).

Coherentist understandings of U.S. minorities, and in particular Latinos, are breaking down, which means that some of the assumptions that García Canclini has had regarding multicultural separatism may have to be altered. Whether we look at Obama's statements on multiracial belonging or the 37 percent increase in the number of people who selected more than one race on the 2010 U.S. Census or the contradictory findings regarding how Latinos identify (40 percent as brown, mestizo, or mulatto, according to the Beyond Demographics Latino Identity Research Initiative study, or 58 percent as white, according to a U.S. Census Bureau analysis of the 2010 data), the imaginaries are becoming more diverse.[2] This observation confirms García Canclini's premise of differential and/or multiple identities, but it also mitigates the claim that U.S. Latinos add another 30 million (in 1999) to the number of Spanish speakers of Spain and Latin America as part of a transnational regional imaginary (45), for an increasing number are English-dominant and monolingual English speakers.[3] The point of this observation is not to prove that Hispanics have this or that identity but rather that they constitute a heterogeneous demographic that is undergoing rapid change and that any attempt to capture their reality is like shooting at a moving target, precisely the metaphor that García Canclini uses for the analysis of interculturality in globalized times (25).

2. The Beyond Demographics Latino Identity Research Initiative was reported on by Cartagena (2010). It was conducted by Starcom Mediavest Group and reflects the marketing pitch of the client, Telemundo. Marketing is one source of information on Latinos, but as Dávila (2001, 2008) and other observers argue, it is often not reliable. The U.S. Census Bureau's analysis is seemingly more accurate, but it is based on a limited number of questions. Nevertheless, given that respondents were given the option to identify as Hispanic/Latino and select a racial category, it is indeed significant that so many chose the white racial category, to the point that they "accounted for three-fourths of the white population growth" from 2000 to 2010 (U.S. Census Bureau 2011b). Another telling datum is an increase in the number of Latinos who identified with two or more races (U.S. Census Bureau 2011a).

3. Analysis of the 2010 Census data and the Pew Hispanic Center's studies on Latino language use reveals that the number of Spanish speakers is decreasing compared to the number of English-dominant Latinos because the majority of Latinos—as high as 67 percent of the sixteen-to-twenty-five age cohort—is born and raised in the United States (Pew Hispanic Center 2009). By the third generation the vast majority of Latinos speak only English, and virtually all of their cultural fare is in English (Yúdice 2011a).

Regional Integration

Some critics interpreted *Hybrid Cultures* as a celebration of hybridity, but García Canclini makes clear in the new introduction to that book and in *Imagined Globalization* that globalizing processes throw people together, produce forms of homogenization, as in consumer products and commercial media, and "articulate fragmentation of the world that reorders differences and inequalities without eradicating them" (24). He is neither globophilic (a McDonaldizer) nor globophobic (a Macondoizer) but an analyst of the contradictory tendencies, seeking to detect "spaces of cultural and political intermediation" (14) and work toward the formulation of policies that transform interculturality into a "transnational exercise of cultural citizenship" (164). To this end, he has a cautious utopian hope in regional integration, for two reasons: to create a resilient foundation to resist the neocolonial economic projects of Europe and the United States and to compensate for failed national projects.

With regard to the first reason, Latin American countries historically have been prey to economic control by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and more recently U.S.-led free trade agreements seeking to implement neoliberal restructuring prescriptions: privatization, monetary devaluations, shrinkage of public employment and critical public services like unemployment insurance, health care, and education. But recently, as García Canclini observes in the epilogue, a number of countries have abandoned these prescriptions and, at least in the past decade, have seen growth, while the United States, Japan, and Europe have undergone steep economic crises. Lack of economic "discipline," in the terms dictated by the IMF and the World Bank, has not led to an economic crisis in Argentina. On the contrary, its economy has grown at rates of 7 to 9 percent annually in recent years. Brazil and Uruguay successfully have also sought alternative economic models, and as in Argentina they have been able to reduce poverty and increase social services. The new imaginary of economic growth and social responsibility is most associated with Brazil. Indeed in the epilogue García Canclini goes so far as to consider Brazil's rise on the international scene as a major departure from Euro-Americo-centric history: "We can contrast this to a previous transformative event, the fall of the Berlin Wall, which was interpreted as a change in world history but in reality was a Eurocentric affair" (203).

When it comes to culture, however, not enough is known about the vibrancy of what is taking place in Brazil, to which I return later. Latin American cultural imaginaries are still largely rooted in the distributional control of transnational and global conglomerates, which erodes the possibilities, with few

exceptions such as *telenovelas*, for Latin Americans to circulate their audiovisual and literary narratives across the region. The problem is even worse in publishing because distribution in each country is limited to national authors. Moreover García Canclini is particularly critical of the lack of interest by transnational publishing conglomerates in disseminating the intellectual and social scientific work of Latin Americans (125); this problem extends to the politicians and businessmen involved in regional economic integration who "take little interest in higher education, scientific research, and technology because they ignore the connections between culture and modern, globalized knowledge among Latin Americans" (62).

Regional integration should, on the contrary, create larger markets, if only there were adequate intergovernmental policies and follow-up procedures to make this dream a reality. Two comments can be made about this project. The first is that the model for integration—the European Union—at present seems to be coming apart at the seams, economically and sociopolitically. García Canclini quotes Ulrich Beck's (2000) snide remark about the impending "Brazilianation of Europe" (62), but after more than eight years of steady growth and an impressive decrease in poverty, Europe would do well to emulate the direction in which Brazil has been moving. As regards sociopolitical matters, anti-immigrant and anti-intercultural sentiments have enabled xenophobic right-wing parties, even in countries like Holland and Sweden, to elect sufficient numbers of parliamentarians to hold a balance of power. The European crisis is generating a new set of imaginaries, including those of the indignants, about which more below.

Regarding the second reason for seeking regional integration, the 1990s were a period of decline under neoliberal policies throughout Latin America. While the region was not capable of reversing the downslide, García Canclini has been hopeful that regional integration might prepare the ground for a turnaround. This hope is also present with respect to the development of the culture and media industries in cities, despite their problems with segregation, criminality, and security. He writes, "If arts and crafts traditions, museums, and historic neighborhoods could become part of an urban (and national) development project together with advanced communication and computer systems, they would provide other opportunities for dealing with the problems of disintegration and inequality" (147). The correction to national decay seems to be both infra- (cities) and supranational (regional integration). Insofar as culture is concerned, it should be pointed out that two regional research and funding projects cited by García Canclini—the U.S.-Mexico Fund for Culture, a public-private initiative to encourage collaborative work between Americans

and Mexicans, and the Andrés Bello Covenant, a UNESCO-like Latin American treaty to promote the development of education, science, and culture, initially in the Andean countries—have shuttered, a testament to the difficulties of maintaining regional collaboration. Moreover the crisis of Spanish financial and infrastructural promotion for the development of Ibero-American cultural and media initiatives in the region—seemingly in tandem with Spanish inroads into a number of Latin American industries: banking, insurance, telecommunications, hospitality and tourism, publishing, and audiovisual media, a move that García Canclini criticizes (131 and especially García Canclini 2002)—is likely to have a negative impact on the development of progressive cultural policies.[4] Nevertheless there is momentum as the economies of several Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Panama, Peru) have fared well during the current global economic crisis, some bolstering their progressive cultural policies (Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia) and others instituting or upgrading ministries of culture (Panama, Peru). And there are initiatives in place, especially Brazil's innovative bottom-up cultural policies under Ministers of Culture Gilberto Gil and Juca Ferreira, that give some cause for hope.[5] The bottom-up policies implemented in Brazil have aided an already vibrant civic and independent cultural scene that bears out García Canclini's observation in the epilogue that citizens disaffected with abstractions like those of the European Union or with failed political top-down projects like those of most political parties, are interested in new arrangements contrary to neoliberal prescriptions. However, insofar as culture commands

4. Two examples of beneficial influence on Latin American cultural policies and initiatives are the creation of a new cultural ministry in Peru, oriented toward cultural development and not simply the support of elite arts or national heritage (Losson in press), and the creation of the Central American Culture and Integration Project to "strategically promote the insertion of civil society cultural networks into the institutional process of Central American integration in concert with international cultural cooperation" (Cultura e Integración n.d.; Yúdice 2011b). Both have been supported by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation and Development.

5. President Dilma Rousseff's replacement of Ana de Hollanda in September 2012 with Marta Suplicy, a veteran Workers Party politician and former mayor of São Paulo, was a welcome relief for progressives in Brazil. Hollanda was perceived to be a supporter, in the cultural sphere, for Rousseff's aggressive and hardly democratic developmentalist policies (e.g., the environmentally destructive and ethnically detrimental Belo Monte hydroelectric dam project, recently halted by a Brazilian federal court). After eight years of the most progressive digital culture initiatives under Gil and Ferreira, Hollanda fought down copyright reform initiatives, including those of many local cultural and civil society organizations and enterprises that claimed that U.S.-endorsed digital protection policies were deleterious to the circulation of the vast majority of Brazilian cultural expressions. Rousseff's decision to replace Hollanda was certainly welcome for progressives, but what has also become visible is a political scramble, even by civil society organizations, to cash in on the lucrative cultural policy "market" in Brazil.

increasing influence, it is falling prey to traditional political horse-trading, which extends to Brazil's halting entry into international cultural policymaking, as we will see below.

The Imaginary and Interdisciplinary Methodology

García Canclini is not the first author to develop the notion of imaginaries of the global era. Arjun Appadurai, for example, posited the notion of "imagined worlds," an adaptation of Benedict Anderson's (1983: 15–16) proposal to treat nations as "imagined communities," experiences of belonging, of "deep, horizontal comradeship" among fellow members that never meet each other. An imagined community is a "structure of feeling," "a kind of feeling and thinking," a constellation of "meanings and values as they are actively lived and felt, [whose] relations [with] formal or systematic beliefs are in practice variable." A structure of feeling, in sum, is a "cultural hypothesis" (Williams 1977: 128–35). Appadurai (1996: 33) expands the concept to capture the "multiple worlds that are constituted by the historically situated imaginations of persons and groups spread around the globe."

Appadurai emphasizes the disjunctive and deterritorializing character of global flows; García Canclini, in contrast, criticizes this overemphasis on nomadism and argues that the subjects of these imagined worlds are not nomadically constructed and reconstructed in a free or unconstrained manner but are drawn into given frameworks by variable yet overdetermined forces. On the one hand, finance institutions, transnational corporations, global media and telecommunications conglomerates, and trade agreements have important effects on culture and generate the imaginaries of a better world for everyone, although they curtail possibilities of well-being, especially for those who are excluded from consumption because of lack of resources. On the other hand, various kinds of migrants and the excluded also generate imaginaries that open windows onto the "fractures and segregations of globalization" (xxxviii) as well as knowledge of the contexts through which they move. García Canclini offers a compelling portrayal of the differences in imaginary of the older migrations to the Americas and the contrasting imaginaries of those who live in transnational circuits today (chapter 3). And even among today's migrants, there are significant differences in the ways they imagine globalization: "For a Mexican or Colombian family with various members working in the United States, globalization alludes to the narrow connections to what occurs in that part of the country where their family members live, which differs from what Mexican or Colombian artists, such as Salma Hayek or Carlos

Vives, imagine as they encounter an audience spread throughout the U.S. market" (xxxix). In the epilogue García Canclini refers to new imaginaries that accompany the change from south-to-north migrations to north-to-south and south-south flows: Latin Americans are returning to their countries of origin, some Europeans (e.g., the Portuguese) are seeking work in Brazil as opportunities abound there, and Haitians, for example, are finding new hopes of making a living in Brazil (Romero 2012).

García Canclini is particularly eloquent in his development of an interdisciplinary methodology that integrates metaphor and narrative, a result in part of his own training as a philosopher and anthropologist as well as his socioeconomically grounded analyses of art, literature, crafts, media, and other forms of expression. If one had to situate him with respect to other theorists of globalization, he would fall into the third or postskeptical or transformational wave, conveniently distinguished from the globalist and the skeptical waves in Martell (2007).[6] Like other third-wavers, he acknowledges global transformations and recognizes the differentiation and stratification they have wrought; as a policy thinker, he believes nation-states continue to be important, but he imagines them reconstructed in sovereignty-sharing arrangements that enhance citizenship as economic and political borders are traversed; his view of the desirable society is definitely cosmopolitan democracy; and culturally he is a major theorist of hybridization and complexity. With regard to the future, he detects imaginaries that engage uncertainty, but his work is aimed at thinking through strategies for dealing with contingency that produce new forms of citizenship oriented to multiple forms of social organization rather than to their homogenization or exclusion.

Methodologically García Canclini seeks explanatory power, and that is precisely why globalization cannot be posited as a "clearly delimited object of study" (he wittily characterizes it as an unidentified cultural object, which

6. For globalists, globalization is causal; they favor free trade and economic integration; they emphasize global governance or neoliberalism and the increasing irrelevance of the nation-state; culturally they celebrate the homogenized diversity of global brands. For the skeptics, globalization is discursive and multiply determined; the nation-state and regional blocs continue to be important, evidenced in protectionist policies that foster or attempt to undo inequality; they favor social democracy and international regulation; culturally globalization is characterized by clash and conflict, which will increase in the future. For the third-way transformationalists, globalization has indeed wrought major changes, but these have not resulted in the global village celebrated by globalists; instead there is greater differentiation and embeddedness; rather than a global or national sovereign, there is shared sovereignty; politically transformationalists prefer cosmopolitan democracy; the future is uncertain, neither right nor left nor oscillating between those poles; and culturally globalization generates hybridity (Martell 2007).

may be imagined, even seen and experienced, but not easily explained socioscientifically), nor does it correspond to "a scientific, economic, political or cultural paradigm that can be postulated as a singular model of development";[7] instead it is "a collection of *narratives*, obtained through partial approximations, and diverging on many points" (23). He emphasizes the imaginary dimension precisely because even globalist first-wavers and skeptical second-wavers as well as common folk guide their actions according to utopian or dystopian eventualities that defy the conceptual clarity that social science pursues. He is interested not only in theories but in what people say, what they do, and how they know the world. "The hypothesis is that the statistics released by migration censuses and those agencies that track planetary circulation of investment and consumption make more sense when they are fleshed out with narratives of heterogeneity. Then subjects reappear within structures" (18). And to include people in the analysis entails paying attention to the role they play in reorienting how they navigate globalization so that it is not understood as an "anonymous game of market forces ruled solely by the demand for greater profits in supranational competition" (41).

García Canclini's extensive ethnographic work in a number of collaborative research projects is synthesized in books like *Consumers and Citizens: Globalization and Multicultural Conflicts* ([1995] 2001) and *Imagined Globalization*. It is from that ethnographic work, which includes his analysis of artworks (indeed, he is one of very few ethnographically oriented art critic-theorists), as well as in his philosophical reflections, inspired by Ricoeur (his PhD dissertation director) and to a lesser extent Merleau-Ponty, Rancière, and Derrida, that he draws his responsiveness to narratives and metaphors as heuristic resources. Narratives and metaphors help us imagine "outside of our cognitive framework" (28). "We concern ourselves with the narratives and metaphors being constructed to incorporate what generally remains within the cracks and insufficiencies in theories or policies" (xli), in "the inaccuracies of statistics and prognoses" (25). Given the complexity and ambiguities of globalization, narratives and metaphors are particularly apt for capturing messiness and flux: "Metaphors tend to figure, to make visible that which moves, combines, or mixes. Narratives seek to trace an order amid the profusion of travels and communications, in the diversity of 'others'" (35). This method enables García Canclini to transcend both the arrogant triumphalism of neoliberals who

7. García Canclini uses the term *scientific* in reference to social science and not natural science. The Spanish *ciencia*, like the German *Wissenschaft*, has a wider meaning than *science* in English and includes the social sciences and sometimes even the humanities.

promote "monolithic thinking" and the postmodern renunciation of universal knowledge by including the metaphors and narratives of a wide array of subjects in the "interculturally shared rationality that organizes statements coherently" (24).

In the methodological chapter (9) on the anthropology of intercultural misunderstandings, García Canclini examines a few behavioral or discursive genres (emblematic national sentences that exert performative force and the "bureaucratic window interaction" developed by Amalia Signorelli) that enable insights into the "thresholds between different subjects and asymmetrical powers, such as geographic boundaries, . . . places where one negotiates various ways of articulating public and private, collective and individual" (198). I am reminded of Vološinov's little behavioral genres through which individuals negotiate in social situations.[8] These genres help maintain social stability, but under conditions of flux, and particularly in intercultural situations, they generate information on aspects of misunderstanding that are not easily discernible. This does not mean that adjusting these genres will eliminate the problems raised by the "asymmetrical powers" inhering in interaction. But it is important to recognize these forms of communication in order to facilitate García Canclini's goal to produce transnational public spheres that "guarantee rights with relative independence of the actors and their subjectivities: the same public space, with common rules for those who are cordial and hierarchical, for those who get angry, and for those who ritualize their confrontations" (198).

Unlike most theorists of globalization, García Canclini looks to art and literature as opportunities for heuristic investigation of embodied imaginings that are usually unavailable to thought. The public space that he seeks and the intercultural social arrangements that ensue therefrom need to incorporate what the world of felt embodiment reveals; García Canclini thinks this is possible through artistically elaborated metaphors. An eloquent example is Yukinori Yanagi's *The World Flag Ant Farm* installation, in which ants are released into a set of interconnected Plexiglas boxes containing colored sand in the form of national flags, resulting in the decomposition of the flags, mixing

8. "Each situation, fixed and sustained by social custom, commands a particular kind of organization of audience and, hence, a particular repertoire of little behavioral genres. The behavioral genre fits everywhere into the channel of social intercourse assigned to it and functions as an ideological reflection of its type, structure, goal, and social composition. The behavioral genre is a fact of the social milieu: of holiday, leisure time, and of social contact in the parlor, the workshop, etc. It meshes with that milieu and is delimited and defined by it in all its internal aspects" (Vološinov 1973: 96–97).

the colors throughout the entire set, and suggesting a transnational reordering of identities. García Canclini glosses, "The metaphor suggests that massive migrations and globalization may convert today's world into a system of flows and interactivity in which the differences between nations dissolve" (30). Likewise Ramírez Erre's two-headed Trojan horse installation looking north and south at both countries at the border checkpoint between Tijuana and San Diego suggests that "intercultural misunderstandings" occur in both directions in border areas (33).

Poetics

In his most recent single-author book, *La sociedad sin relato: Antropología y estética de la inminencia* (Society without a Narrative: Anthropology and the Aesthetics of Imminence; 2010), García Canclini expands this heuristic approach to contemporary art because, he tells us, art is no longer only in museums and galleries but has migrated to other areas (media, fashion, social action, investment funds, urban revitalization, new technologies, security, recovery programs for at-risk youth, etc.). Globalization is accompanied by this relative exit from the autonomous fields posited by Bourdieu, and art can be examined for the semiotic traces of that transit, the different contexts in which it operates, its reception by viewers and participants. "By upsetting the usual relations between public and private, between cultural experimentation and economic performance, the slow economy of artistic production fulfills the public function of encouraging us to rethink what the impetuous economy of the symbolic industries imposes as public, fleeting, and forgetful" (173). Much can be learned by "being near the works and achieving the agility to follow [their] meanderings" (2010: 243). The subtitle of the book highlights the imminence or unfinished character of social life. In heuristic terms, it could be said that the book is a far-reaching exploration of what Peirce (1903) called abduction, "the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis . . . the only logical operation that introduces a new idea." This heuristic is also at work in *Imagined Globalization*, where García Canclini posits that it is "necessary to maintain the surprise and allow for multiple narrations . . . [and] ask whether or not these different narratives are compatible and hope for thick descriptions that articulate the more or less objective structures with the more or less subjective levels of meaning" (18–19).

García Canclini is exceptional in that he proposes a poetics of globalization. It ensues in part from the abductive method that seeks the knowledge that ensues from surprise, from astonishment, as he calls it in *Imagined Globalization*.

But he also tells us that astonishment is in short supply: "We no longer are in awe of intercultural crossings and mixtures. Nor is there room in this transition from one century to another for the unexpected when revolutionary hopes fade and it is assumed that there is only one way to imagine globalization" (155). In this regard, most research—in social science, anthropology, and cultural studies—comes up short. This is a lack his book is meant to correct. García Canclini finds sources of astonishment in the 1994 neo-Zapatista uprising (18), in his encounter with a Mexican waiter in an Italian restaurant in Scotland ("Doing Fieldwork on Mexico in Edinburgh"; 36); in his own puzzlement at the tragicomedy of errors of being an Argentine in Mexico and the tensions between his philosophical and anthropological attempts to understand the circumstances that generated that consternation. Understanding these moments requires going beyond the interpretive modalities of globalists (epic) and skeptics (melodrama) and occupying that middle ground between the processes—globalization and interculturality—that generate these modalities. The first, he tells us, consider that globalization will override the resistances of "intercultural dramas," and the second consider that it will overlook the differences in cultures.

Just as globalization cannot be understood without reference to interculturality, the epic accounts of globalization put forth in economics, sociology, and communications are partial without the melodramatic narratives that anthropologists, psychoanalysts, and literary and art critics construct from the "fissures, violence, and pain of interculturality" (17). The epic accounts tend to be resistant to the melodramatic resistances to globalization, and "they are quick to inform that they will be eliminated by the march of history and generations" (17). The melodramatic accounts point to the partial character or failure of globalizing processes. What García Canclini offers is an analysis of globalization in which not only do the epic and the melodramatic intersect, but multiple narrations make it possible to maintain the astonishment that is otherwise dissolved. This is an analysis mindful of structures and hegemonies yet attuned to the agency of subjects that traverse and attempt to remake those structures and hegemonies.

Although he does not establish a direct connection with classical poetics, it could be said that García Canclini is interested in the ways subjects negotiate a radically contingent world, one in which centrifugal forces seem to overpower those of structure and hegemony, whether the older ones of national sovereignty or the newer ones of transnational corporations, trade agreements, and regional integration. From ancient rituals (including Dionysian rites and

Greek tragedy) to the political, literary, artistic, and everyday actions that he explores, imaginaries confront contingency: the arbitrariness of gods, autocrats, and now the global disorder wrought by deregulation, financial speculation, and global trade (whether legal or illegal). It is telling therefore that García Canclini ignores religion, the most conventional generator of imaginaries that deal with contingency. In this regard, he is somewhat of a modernist, for whom art takes the place of religion. But as explained earlier, the narrative mode that he seeks is neither epic nor melodrama but the various permutations in which they intersect or dissolve to make way for other narrative possibilities.

Imagined Globalization offers a poetics of interculturality because it acknowledges that underlying the narratives of heterogeneity there is a global disorder, a fundamental power-driven arbitrariness that can be purged or purified only through imaginaries, whether artistic or social scientific or inhering in everyday popular culture. In his *Poetics*, Aristotle examined tragedy as a genre that purified the audience of pity and fear through catharsis in beholding the disastrous consequences that fall upon the hero who misses the mark (*hamartia*). It could be argued that the hero will always miss the mark because of the arbitrariness of the gods. As an artistic and experimental representation of the political space, tragedy maintains a tension between necessary authority and fiction (human invention), heteronomy (obligation to another), and autonomy (internalization of the other's discourse through the illusion of authoring and free choice), ethics, and politics, and intertwines the legal, mythical, and religious spheres. Mutatis mutandi, García Canclini examines how subjects confront contingency through narrative and metaphor.

Social Science Fiction

It follows from García Canclini's poetics that he should try his hand at narrative in this book. The most obvious fictional narrative is the roman à clef of a Latin American anthropologist, a Spanish sociologist, and a U.S. cultural studies scholar who try to make sense of intercultural relations in a changing world (chapter 5). I am tempted to guess at the people behind these characters—I certainly recognize their professional biases—but suffice it to say that García Canclini himself is the model for the anthropologist. What this chapter does is show us that theory ("science") is not something abstract but actually inheres in scholars' own lives, the places they come from and how they are situated in "delocalized information flows, in networks and travel that go beyond one's

own country" (101). The characters are thus set in professional conferences or in their mediated discussions about joint research projects and what the narrator calls "transatlantic and inter-American circuits" (103).

The object of their discussion is in great part the counterpoint of their perspectives on a number of themes, which are the same ones that García Canclini discusses more "scientifically" in other parts of the book: the significance of European capitals (Paris, Berlin) or U.S. universities for Latin Americans and research on Latin America; what topics and what societies on which to conduct research will be significant for landing a job in Europe; mestizaje and Latin American identities versus French rationalism and U.S. multiculturalism and in particular the bizarre "magical realism" of U.S. racial categories; migration and transnational approaches to what were previously thought to be neatly bounded societies; the challenge of other cities (Venice, Madrid, São Paulo, Kassel) to New York as important nodes of diffusion of art; the "paradoxical combinations of economic globalization and cultural nationalism" (e.g., Spaniards who buy exclusively Spanish art), which raises issues that economists do not deal with (107); the staggered and contradictory theoretical perspectives (the characters discuss postcolonialism and Fanonism) that drive interpretation, and the relevance (or lack thereof) of their applicability to Latin America nearly two centuries after Latin American independence; the culturalist and interpretationist bias of cultural studies and its disinterest in statistics and "hard data" (xxxviii); and the recognition that despite these scholars' provenance, there is no such thing as "*the* U.S. cultural studies scholar" or "*the* Latin American anthropologist" (110). The chapter ends with a plan to coauthor an intercultural novel in which "a secondary character, half hidden in the narrative, caught unexpectedly in a corner, gathers phrases from Latinos and Anglos and speaks them as if they were his own, as if he lived elsewhere and this was his way of being here" (111).

Another semifictional or autoethnographic passage is (the narrator-character) García Canclini's encounter with a Mexican waiter in an Italian restaurant in Edinburgh. Through their conversation, García Canclini examines the contradictions and contingencies of identity or identities, both the waiter's and his own. The waiter is the epitome of cosmopolitanism, but he chooses Edinburgh to live in because it is not cosmopolitan; García Canclini is an Argenmexican fascinated by Mexican traditions but draws the line at spicy food. The passage concludes with the flair of the author who coined *hybrid cultures*: "Belonging to a fusion identity, of the displaced, helped this philosopher-turned-anthropologist to represent Mexican identity to a Mexican

married to a Scottish woman, who represented Italianness in a restaurant in Edinburgh" (41).

The original *Imagined Globalization* ends with an appendix (now chapter 9) in which García Canclini explores the "anthropology of misunderstandings," subtitled "A Methodological Discussion on Interculturality." After a discussion of Mexican-Argentine relations ("Can a foreigner capture what Mexico is?"; 181), brought on by García Canclini's own experience of exile, we encounter another interesting social science fiction. García Canclini invokes Roberto Da Matta's and Guillermo O'Donnell's analyses of particular urban societies on the basis of "what sentence is most distinctive of a society" (192). The sentences are hilarious: when confronted with someone who wields (or attempts to wield) authority over another person, the Carioca's typical response is "Do you know who you're talking to?," suggesting that perhaps the speaker is important or is related to someone important. In Buenos Aires the response is likely to be "Who gives a shit?" García Canclini then imagines what the sentence might be in Mexico and comes up with "He who gets angry loses" (193), a sentence that is particularly relevant to his experience in Mexico as an Argentine. This is evident in another autoethnographic passage in which he tells of his frustrating failure to get his bank account balance: when he complained, he was told by the clerk to stop screaming at her. He realized that it was the Argentine manner of speaking that produced the clerk's retort. The episode exemplifies a series of misunderstandings at the heart of intercultural communication. What we see is that the protocols of communication in the small behavioral genres referred to before are often inscrutable to someone from a different society, or from a different class or even area of the city. Inscrutable even to (especially to?) the anthropologist. And it is that inscrutability that becomes grist for analysis and hopefully negotiation across the divide (or the clerk's window).

Intermediation

Globalization multiplies the misunderstandings, and that is why art is interesting to García Canclini, for rather than apply protocols, it brackets them, savors their strangeness, and holds open the tangential and the deviant. It "reinstate[s] the social drama, the tension between languages, between ways of living and thinking, that the media want to reduce to a spectacle, a quick show so they can go on to the next one" (174). "In a world narrated like circular globalization, which simulates that it contains everything . . . art holds

open the possibility of choice, something much more strategic than handling the TV's remote control. Interrupting and choosing another logic sustains the unstable tension between the social and modes of reimagining it, between what exists and how we may criticize it. It refuses that globalization and its massifying potential will look like the end of history" (174).

Interruption by artistic means has its correlate for García Canclini in broader cultural and social movements, such as indigenous, feminist, environmental, and other movements, which have both hegemonic and antihegemonic aspects. But he advocates going beyond this poetics and the possibilities of interruption to a politics of intermediation. This politics of intermediation reproduces neither the hegemonic control by governments, large business enterprises, or large NGOs, nor the Deleuzean option for a nomadism that eludes control, not to speak of the naïveté of Internet enthusiasts who believe that the distributed networks of the web have eliminated intermediaries simply because people get to upload their own contents, or that the conceptual harnessing of these networks ushers in the rather vague and wistful "communism to-come" of Antonio Negri (2003: 144).

A strategy for remaining relevant in the era of globalization means developing the capacity to mediate what culture people consume. The culture industries of the United States, Europe, and large countries like Mexico and Brazil have developed the international mechanisms—free trade policies, "covert" support for certain industries (e.g., Hollywood productions), strong copyright laws that favor large corporations, intergovernmental bodies (World Trade Organization, World Intellectual Property Organization, etc.) that generally take the side of the economically stronger countries—to establish profitable markets worldwide. The problem is not that these contents are available worldwide but that in many Latin American countries they saturate mediated public spheres. Intermediation in the distribution and circulation of cultural contents is important because people generally engage in conversations and debates about what they hear and view in public spheres. If most of the cultural fare to which people have access has little to do with their society, then there is an impoverishment of discussion about that society. Moreover if what people have access to from other societies is determined by large media conglomerates, then what they get to hear and see is a very skewed and narrow selection of the full spectrum of cultural offerings from around the world.

This view entails formulating policies that will change the intermediaries (there is no such thing as a society without intermediaries except in the narratives provided by the frictionless planes of art and philosophy, although art and philosophy as disciplines are themselves heavily intermediated) and make

them more responsible to citizens, migrants, and residents. But who will design and carry out these policies? In *Imagined Globalization* García Canclini still considers that regional integration can provide the framework for such policies. But the people who would carry them out would still be politicians, or bankers or high-level officers of NGOs. These are precisely the people who are no longer trusted.

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, I would like to focus on two kinds of movements that have been transforming intermediation and innovating in the circulation of cultural expressions in the context of globalization. These either have not appeared or done so only quite recently in García Canclini's work. The first has to do with what the Brazilian anthropologist Hermano Vianna calls "parallel culture," that is, production, circulation, and consumption that take place outside formal enterprises. Most people involved in parallel culture are low-income and from the popular classes, most often ethnically marked; however, their cultural practices are quite different from the *cultura popular*, especially artisans, that García Canclini studied in his best-known books. The second has to do with the practices of youth networks that seek to establish independent cultural circuits. These youth are largely middle class. Both kinds of movements are affirmative innovations with respect to globalization and not simply reactions against it; for both as well, the status quo is a hindrance or ineffective.

PARALLEL CULTURE

The most spectacular expression of the first kind of movement is Nollywood, the Nigerian film industry, which produces about three times as many films as Hollywood and twice as many as Bollywood and employs, albeit at very low incomes, 500,000 people. Yet this industry developed without investment from formal companies or venture capital firms, as is the case in Hollywood, without a huge corporative infrastructure, and without recourse to copyright (Ogunyemi 2009).

This industry has prospered, and there are government initiatives to invest in it and even create a film village in Abuja. Moreover the World Bank included Nollywood in its Growth and Employment in States (GEMS) project, providing U.S.$20 million to upgrade the industry. This is certainly much more than any government or intergovernmental multilateral development bank has done for the parallel culture industries in Latin America, with the exception of the Points of Culture program in Brazil (described in the next section), with the

major difference that it seeks to promote not entire industries but rather the local expressions of thousands of communities throughout the country.

In Latin America there are vibrant parallel culture industries such as *champeta* in Cartagena de Indias, Colombia; *tecnobrega* in Belém do Para, Brazil; *funk carioca* in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil; *cumbia villera* in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and Montevideo, Uruguay; and the Andean video industry related in part to *huayno pop* and other vernacular musics in Lima, Peru.[9] They all have in common that local entrepreneurs work with local musicians and video makers, distribute in informal markets, often associated with so-called piracy, and produce live shows where most money is generated, thus fulfilling the desires of vast low-income audiences for cultural fare that is not available in the mainstream media. There has been an explosion in the parallel cultural forms since portable technologies were introduced, beginning with the audio cassette in Latin America in the 1980s, and then the CD when prices dropped in the late 1980s and piracy took off, and very recently social media platforms like Facebook. Additionally the electronic drum machine and synthesizer are used in music and digital camcorders in Andean videos, as in Nollywood. In some cases, the demand for these cultural forms is so great that they are adopted by mainstream media, as in the case of the Peruvian singer Dina Páucar, the "beautiful goddess of love," on the basis of whose pubic persona *La lucha por un sueño* (The struggle to make a dream come true), a very successful TV miniseries, was produced in 2004 (Alfaro 2009). The important point is that

9. Champeta is an electronic urban dance music that blends Caribbean (rap-raggareggae, zouk, soca, and calypso) and African (soukous, highlife, mbquanga, juju) rhythms with Afro-Colombian-indigenous hybrid sounds (bullerengue, mapalé, zambapalo, and chalupa) and is played by DJs in elaborate sound systems. Tecnobrega combines Afro-Brazilian rhythms from the state of Pará, such as carimbó and lundu, with popular genres like Caribbean calypso, on electronic drum machines. Tecnobrega is an electronic form of *brega* music (*brega* means cheesy). *Funk carioca* is the name of a music and dance style developed in Rio de Janeiro from the 1970s on. DJs associated with the black and soul cultural movement sought out U.S. black music for their dances, particularly Miami Bass and Freestyle. Over the years the music was Brazilianized in Rio's favelas and there emerged a robust funk carioca music industry with DJs and sound systems at the helm. Cumbia villera, the most popular music in Buenos Aires's and Montevideo's shantytowns (*villas*), is a derivative of modern urban Colombian cumbia, a mixture of African, indigenous, and, to a lesser degree, Hispanic influences. In addition to traditional acoustic instruments, cumbia villera uses drum machines and electronic or sampled percussion. Huayno pop is a hybrid of traditional huayno music with other genres such as cumbia, rock, pop, and techno. While the origin of huayno in the Peruvian highlands dates back to the time of the Incan Empire, in the twentieth century, as migrants from the highlands populated coastal Peru and particularly Lima, the flourishing music and video industry of huayno pop developed in the popular classes of Lima (Alfaro 2009; Yúdice 2012).

local actors from within these industries emerged as intermediaries and with very few exceptions have been appropriated by formal or large enterprises.[10]

YOUTH CULTURAL NETWORKS

In the epilogue to this book, García Canclini sees significant differences in the youth of today and those of former countercultural movements such as the *soixante-huitards* of France, the United States, Mexico, and other countries. His current research on youth (about which he says little in the epilogue) finds that they "follow a logic different from that of other movements that oppose dictatorships, promote social democracy and the socialization of commodities, and question gender hierarchies" (208). He gives the example of the Chilean students who are demanding changes that in the past would have been considered revolutionary: the nationalization of foreign mining enterprises, reform of the tax code so that the rich pay more taxes, and reduction of the defense budget. But these measures "are proposed by youth who do not identify as revolutionary but on the contrary grew up under neoliberalism and a social democratic system that never dared to make changes to correct the system imposed by Pinochet" (208). These youth are imagining another way to live in a globalized world. García Canclini also observes that "there already are places where independent banks are being established outside the finance system, that give loans and credit. New collective forms are appearing, many ways of realizing themselves outside the regime of financial speculation. They are still weak, but they show that it is not impossible, and they achieve a measure of sustainability" (213).

As general editor of a fascinating new book on youth cultures in the digital era, García Canclini oversaw research on youth enterprises in publishing, music production, and art spaces and galleries in Mexico (under the coordination of Maritza Urteaga Castro Pozo) and Madrid (under the coordination of Francisco Cruces; García Canclini et al. 2012). The changes and innovations wrought by these youth in the production, circulation, and outreach of these enterprises, often brought into transversal synergies and managed in physical and virtual distributed networks, led him and his colleagues to question the usefulness of Bourdieu's framework for studying the cultural sphere according to separate fields. If, in modernity, we became accustomed to having long careers as artists, producers, technicians, marketers, managers, and so forth, in the current globalized and technified conjuncture—which some have characterized as immaterial or cognitive or affective capitalism—young people

10. For more information on these phenomena, see Yúdice 2012, 2013a.

interested in pursuing careers find themselves shuttling among previously defined job descriptions, and in conditions of precarity, without the hope of a job that will provide stability and benefits. On this view, García Canclini and colleagues add their voices to the loud critical chorus of creative industries discourse, arguing that it doesn't hold up to the statistics on cultural labor. This does not mean, however, that the openness, flexibility, and innovation seen in these youths' modus operandi stems from the dire employment conditions. They enter the cultural sphere because of a passion for music or art or literature or new technologies, and they do so inventing entrepreneurial modes—taking whatever opportunities are available in public and private and nonprofit sectors, without necessarily having an ideological investment in these sectors.

While the intermingling of the arts and the value chain functions—production, circulation, communication, reception—have become the norm throughout the world, García Canclini holds firm to the artistic sphere. Yet there has been a globalization of the subsumption of art into culture throughout the world, a much more radical transformation than what is discernible in the new trendsetting youth entrepreneurs about which he and his colleagues write. Perhaps the relative neglect of cultural activism, which may combine the arts with community rights activism, is due to García Canclini's long-held belief in the power of art, defined as the interruption or bracketing of accepted narratives. Cultural activism, in contrast, promotes rather than interrupts a diversity of local practices. Another reason for the relative neglect of this modality in García Canclini's work may have to do with a lack of work on Brazil, particularly its innovations in cultural activism, which is not the same as cultura popular, the culture of that metaphysical entity, the people, which he himself revolutionized in *Hybrid Cultures* and *Consumers and Citizens*.

As mentioned earlier, the goal of Brazil's Points of Culture program has been to facilitate the local expressions of thousands of communities throughout the country, or as Gilberto Gil said, to give a boost to the myriad "living cultural" initiatives already evident in the vast diversity of communities that compose the country: inner cities, indigenous peoples, Afro-descendants, rural peoples, activist digital culture movements, and so on. Gil compared this promotion of the living culture of the communities to the release experienced in do-in Chinese massage, in which energy stopped up by physical and emotional disorders is liberated. State action applied to the pressure points of culture is like that massage (Ecologia Digital 2004). The notion of culture deployed in this program is very wide-ranging and has more to do with local creativity than with a single or even a plural definition of culture. Creativity may apply to political

cooperation, innovative solidarity economic initiatives, communication networks, and new technologies as well as traditional knowledge and practices and artistic expression.

Brazil is not the only country in which this cultural activism is being legislated into policy. The Points of Culture program is being adopted throughout Latin America, in Peru, Uruguay, and Costa Rica. In Argentina a network called Cultura Viva Comunitaria (Living Community Culture) consists of not only community organizations but a very heterogeneous set of people and associations interested in social transformation in democratic, responsible, sustainable, and respectful arrangements, precisely what twenty-plus years of neoliberal policies have made quite difficult. It would be impossible to try to characterize the seventeen thousand experiences of Living Community Culture that this network claims exist in Argentina (La Posta Regional 2012). Brief mention of two experiences shows that these networks not only promote local cultures but seek to pressure governments to legislate policies similar to those urged by the Points of Culture program.

There is a transnational Living Community Culture movement operating across several Latin American countries. One network within this movement is the Pueblo Hace Cultura (the People Make Culture), which has been pressing the Argentine congress to pass a law that will designate 0.1 percent of the national budget to a national fund of support for independent, self-managed community culture (Krakowiak 2009). These alternative organizations serve the purpose of propagating the myriad cultural expressions of very diverse groups and at the same time serve as a platform to intervene in public policy and make it more democratic. Another Argentine experience is that of the Union of Independent Musicians, which encompasses musicians of all styles and genres and seeks to protect their livelihood and access to spaces and opportunities for rights, production, distribution, and live musical performance. The union also intervened in public policy by presenting a new law to the Argentine Congress that would create the National Institute of Music as the principal promotion agency, provide infrastructure for production, guarantee representation of independent musicians' organizations from different cultural regions in rights agencies that distribute revenues, create stable circuits of live music performance in each cultural region of the country, create initiatives for improving the dissemination of national music in the media, and create a social cultural circuit to bring musical art to sectors that have little or no access to this kind of art (Unión de Músicos Independientes de Argentina n.d.).

In these and other similar networks, in which some of the groups mentioned in García Canclini et al. (2012) are involved, the passion for art and

culture is not limited to production, circulation, and reception but extends to the creation of new entrepreneurial models and interventions into policy to facilitate their work. Some of these networks collaborate with or are fellow travelers of indignants movements. Some of these coincide with indignants movements—such as the the Occupy-like #YoSoy132 movement in Mexico. The controversial Circuito Fora do Eixo (Outside the Axis Circuit), which started a network of independent music festivals throughout Brazil and now seeks to do the same with cinema, video, theater, and even social protests, characterizes itself as a Brazilian kin of Occupy, although it now hobnobs with corporate and political elites as it seeks to gain power.[11] These and other networks that could be mentioned all seek to change the postindustrial-politics-cum-market complex (Yúdice 2013b). Moreover they have come to realize that establishing transnational relations and markets is part of crucial strategies for seeking sustainability in the current stage of globalization. They do not find these strategies to be in conflict with local needs; on the contrary, they strengthen the reach of the local.

García Canclini's work is consistent with the goals of these networks. Indeed many of the youth who form part of them have read his work and been inspired by it. They constitute the "decentered multifocality" that he writes about, and as such they are creating another globalization. Although it marks a relative departure from *Imagined Globalization*, the new book on youth cultural networks is both an outgrowth of certain questions that García Canclini sought to answer over a decade ago and a testament to his ability to grasp the imminent through an interdisciplinary methodology, grounded in empirical research yet attentive to what art and philosophy adumbrate.

11. Fora do Eixo has found a controversial solution to the pressures of globalization: it finds its sustainability by simulating horizontal, distributed networking, at the same time absorbing those with whom it comes into contact. As such, it follows a capitalist logic: to continually expand. It is increasingly criticized for taking advantage of the bands and artists who enter their network, not only because they often are not paid but also because it uses their cultural capital to its own advantage. Many venues will no longer work with them, alleging that they ride roughshod over them, putting their logo on events produced locally, thus acting like a holding company that assumes control. As they grow, they establish close relations with politicians and organizations that benefit politically from the visibility and large number of members in the network that they can deliver. They have sought to portray themselves as a Brazilian Occupy movement, albeit one with strong connections to corporations and political interests. See Argüelles 2012; Garland 2012.

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INTRODUCTION:
CULTURE AND POLITICS IN THE IMAGINARIES OF GLOBALIZATION

Sometimes we come across eloquent stories from writers whom we would rather not cite. A few months ago I read this story by Philippe Sollers: "Two plus two equals six, says the tyrant. Two plus two equals five, says the moderate tyrant. The heroic individual who remembers, with all its risks and dangers, that two plus two equals four, is told by the police: You don't really want to return to the times when two plus two equaled four."

You wouldn't want to return to the times of the dictatorships and the guerrillas, say the politicians. Nor would you want to return to the years of hyperinflation, warn the economists. At the same time, we wonder how much clout can be gained by the countries seeking regional integration in order to protect themselves from globalization in the new world disorder: the United States with Europe against Japan and China, the United States with Latin America so that the Europeans do not appropriate the Latin American market. In the meantime we Latin Americans have established free trade agreements among

ourselves, peering warily outside the region to attract North American, European, and sometimes Asian capital.

The United States has been pushing, with the support of some Latin American governments, the signing of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. The fifteen countries that compose the European Union have been meeting with the countries of the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) and Mexico, and as of June 1999 with the rest of Latin American countries, to study the possibility of reaching a free trade agreement with some of them before 2005, possibly as early as 2001. This, despite the resistance of the French, who see Latin American competition in agriculture as a threat. The United States periodically accuses Mexico and European countries of dumping or protectionism. In the Mercosur countries, disagreements and suspicions threaten treaties each year. What's at stake: Free trade, integration? New forms of subordination or resistance, or regional alliances? Can citizens consider alternatives to prevailing arrangements and decide what would work better, without taking into account intercultural ties? Old histories of rivalries and prejudiced viewpoints burden these conversations about a future that is more imagined than actually possible.

It isn't easy to bring these agreements down to earth with statistics because accounting practices are faulty. In the past twenty years the external debt of Latin American countries has quadrupled or even sextupled. What can nations like Argentina and Mexico do with debts of $120 or $160 billion if just paying the interest each year requires half or more of the GDP?[1] U.S. foreign debt (three times larger) is also unpayable.[2] Who can understand at the level

1. Argentina defaulted in December 2001, after the IMF refused to extend further loans due to difficulty in paying burgeoning debt resulting from the adoption of excessive neoliberal policies, including an untenable convertibility between the peso and the dollar, prescribed by that very same IMF. The government had frozen bank accounts and appropriated pension funds in a desperate attempt to make debt payments without devaluating its currency, but riots brought down the government, and in the next two weeks Argentina went through five presidents. Three years later, Larry Rohter wrote in the *New York Times*, "Doomsday predictions abounded. Unless it adopted orthodox economic policies and quickly cut a deal with its foreign creditors, hyperinflation would surely follow, the peso would become worthless, investment and foreign reserves would vanish and any prospect of growth would be strangled. . . . Instead, the economy has grown by 8 percent for two consecutive years, exports have zoomed, the currency is stable, investors are gradually returning and unemployment has eased from record highs—all without a debt settlement or the standard measures required by the International Monetary Fund for its approval." Larry Rohter, "Argentina's Economic Rally Defies Forecasts," *New York Times*, December 26, 2004, accessed December 21, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/26/international/americas/26argent.html. [Trans.]

2. U.S. debt was substantially more, about $5.8 trillion, at the end of 1999 (Treasury Direct 2011b). As of December 22, 2011, it was $15.124 trillion (Treasury Direct 2011a). [Trans.]

of everyday life the numbers that one reads in the newspaper? To think about politics requires imagination, although the statistics are so disproportionate and the conflicts they provoke so barely manageable that they often paralyze our imaginaries.

It is curious that this dispute of all against all, in which factories go bankrupt, jobs disappear, and mass migration and interethnic and regional conflicts increase would be called globalization. It's curious that businesspeople and politicians would interpret globalization as the convergence of humanity toward a future of solidarity, while many critics read this painful transformation as a process that will homogenize us all.

Circular and Tangential Globalizations

Despite these dubious results, a uniform planetary market is celebrated as the only way of thinking, and those who insinuate that the world can move in another direction are disqualified as nostalgic for nationalism. If someone even more daring questions not only the benefits of globalization but the premise that the only means to attain it is trade liberalization, he or she will be accused of wistfully yearning for an era before the toppling of an unbearable wall. Since no sensible person believes a return to those times is possible, it is concluded that capitalism is the only possible model for human interaction and that globalization is its inevitable and superior result.

This book seeks to find out what those of us who work on culture can do in the face of this future, which is promising for some and stifling for others. That is, what questions does interculturality pose regarding the market and globalization's frontiers? At stake now is rethinking how to make art, culture, and communication. If from the purview of culture we examine the shifting relations between Europe, the United States, and Latin America, we may be able to act differently from those who see globalization as an exclusively economic exchange.

The first point that must be clarified is that culture is not only that place in which one knows that two plus two equals four. Culture is also an indeterminate vantage point from which one imagines what to do with statistics whose significance is not very clear, whose cumulative and expressive potential has yet to be discovered. One cultural sector produces knowledge that makes it possible to affirm, in no uncertain terms and against political and ecclesiastic powers, that two plus two equals four: knowledge has made it possible to understand "the real" with a certain objectivity, to develop globalized communication technologies, to measure the culture industries' consumption

and to design media programs that increase mass knowledge and create social consensus. Since the onset of modernity, another part of culture has developed through dissatisfaction with the disorder, and sometimes the order, of the world; in addition to knowing and planning, this tendency seeks to transform and innovate.

To come to terms with these two ways of understanding culture, which pit scientists and technologists on one side and humanists and artistic creators on the other, is a different venture in times of globalization.[3] To know what one can understand and manage and what it makes sense to modify and create, scientists and artists have to deal not only with patrons, politicians, or institutions but also with a pervasive power that hides behind the name of globalization. It is said that globalization functions through institutional structures, organizations of every scale, and markets with material and symbolic goods ever more difficult to identify and control than when economies, communications, and the arts operated solely within national horizons. Nowadays it is hard for David to find Goliath.

To understand this complexity, those of us who study creativity, circulation, and cultural consumption increasingly dedicate ourselves to understanding hard data, the "objective" socioeconomic processes that govern scientific and artistic markets, as well as our unstable everyday lives. Nevertheless, given that globalization is an evasive and unmanageable process, its managers also account for it with narratives and metaphors. Hence, from a socioanthropological perspective on culture, it is essential to work with statistics and conceptual texts, as well as the stories and images that attempt to name globalization's designs. Moreover the turmoil experienced in migration, ineffective borders, and travel evinces the fractures and segregations of globalization. This is also why stories by migrants and exiles are replete with such narratives and metaphors.

A similar uncertainty destabilizes other social actors who are not usually interested in culture. After the euphoria over globalization in the 1980s, politicians (who do not realize how their role is restructured when national bureaucracies control ever fewer spaces in the economy and society) now ask themselves what they can do and where. Businesspeople, disconcerted by the brusque shift from a productive to a speculative economy, formulate similar questions. Both invoke the need to create a new culture of work, consumption, investment, publicity, and administration of information and communications

3. García Canclini is referring to social scientists and not natural scientists. The Spanish *ciencia*, like the German *Wissenschaft*, has a wider meaning than *science* in English and includes the social sciences and sometimes even the humanities. [Trans.]

media. Hearing them, one gets the impression that they call upon culture as an emergency resource, as if "to create a new culture" could magically give order to what escapes from the economy in terms of work and investment, compensate for what competition cannot achieve in the domain of the media or consumption.

The call to construct a culture out of these globalizing processes can also be understood as a way of establishing order among conflicting imaginaries. How we imagine globalization varies: for the CEOs of transnational corporations, *globalization* principally encompasses the countries where their businesses operate, the activities they engage in, and competition with other companies; for Latin American rulers who focus on trade with the United States, globalization is almost synonymous with *Americanization*; in the discourse of Mercosur, the word also includes European nations and sometimes is identified with novel interactions between Southern Cone countries. For a Mexican or Colombian family with various members working in the United States, globalization alludes to the narrow connections to what occurs in that part of the country where their family members live, which differs from what Mexican or Colombian artists, such as Salma Hayek or Carlos Vives, imagine as they encounter an audience spread throughout the U.S. market.

In reality only a fraction of politicians, financiers, and academics think about the entire world, about a *circular* globalization, and they are not the majority in their professional fields. The rest imagine *tangential* globalizations. The amplitude or narrowness of global imaginaries reveals the inequalities of access to what is usually called global economics and culture. In this inequitable competition between imaginaries one perceives that globalization both is and is not what it promises. Many globalizers operate throughout the world feigning globalization.

Nevertheless even the poor or marginalized cannot disregard the global. When Latin American migrants arrive in northern Mexico or the southern United States they discover that the factory that hires them is Korean or Japanese. Moreover many of those who left their country arrived at that extreme decision because "globalization" shut down jobs in Peru, Colombia, and Central America, or because its effects—combined with local dramas—made the society in which they always lived too insecure.

An American filmmaker who works in Hollywood, that "symbolic home of the American dream," no longer has the same idea about his country's position in the world since learning that Universal Studios was purchased by Japanese capital. After so many years of thinking that the West was modern and the

East traditional, the Japanese advance on the United States and other Western regions forced him to ask, with David Morley, if now "the world will be read from right to left, and not from left to right" (Morley and Chen 1996: 328).[4]

The emphasis we place on migratory processes and the populations exposed to these changes suggests how we might understand the movement of capital, goods, and communications as well as the confrontation between different lifestyles and representations. Having to think on a global scale produces vertigo and uncertainty that lead us to entrench ourselves in regional alliances and to delimit—in markets, societies, and their imaginaries—territories and circuits that are a digestible form of globalization. There is much debate about erecting new barriers that give order to investments, ethnicities, regions, and groups that either mix too rapidly or remain threateningly excluded. Can the processes of supranational integration achieve anything in this regard? Although these questions have only just been broached in the European Union, and more recently among the members of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Mercosur, the connections between globalization, regional integrations, and diverse cultures is becoming a key issue, as much in academic agendas as in business.[5]

As an introduction to this type of analysis, in chapter 1 I address three problems discussed in recent years when trying to understand where globalization is leading us. The first is that sometimes globalization is summarized as the opposition between the global and the local, which in my view is better characterized as the diverse levels of abstraction and concretion into which the economy, politics, and culture reorganize themselves within a globalized epoch. The second question, tied to the previous, is whether it is possible to reverse the political impotence we feel when the main decisions are made in inaccessible, even difficult-to-identify places. Third, I explore the theoretical-methodological consequences of these difficulties for transdisci-

4. If Japanese capital in the 1980s acquired U.S. media companies, Chinese capital is now seeking to acquire Internet enterprises (Russell Flannery, "Get Ready for More Chinese Tech Acquisitions in the U.S.," *Forbes*, August 25, 2010, accessed December 26, 2010, http://www.forbes.com/sites/russellflannery/2010/08/25/get-ready-for-more-chinese-tech-acquisitions-in-the-u-s/print/). Internet companies may be more important since most culture is already being circulated or distributed through convergence of TV, telephony, and Internet. [Trans.]

5. The rise of Chávez and his sponsored Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, the Brazilian and Argentine rejection of the U.S.-sponsored continental trade agreements, and even bilateral ones, and the Brazilian-sponsored Union of South American Nations have rendered U.S. trade strategies a serious blow. The newest regional integration scheme, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean Nations, excludes the United States and Canada as well as British and French dependencies. [Trans.]

plinary research, which boils down to the challenges of working with a culture's economic and political data and at the same time with the narratives and metaphors with which it imagines globalization.

In chapter 2 I analyze the consequences of globalization as an "unidentified cultural object." Distinguishing between international, transnational, and global can make things clearer. Even so, globalization is not a clearly delimited object of study, nor is it a scientific, economic, political, or cultural paradigm that can be postulated as a singular model of development. We should accept that there exist multiple narratives about what it means to globalize, but since its central characteristic is to intensify interconnections between societies, we cannot accept the variety of stories without considering their compatibility within a relatively universalizable body of knowledge. This entails a discussion of sociological and anthropological theories, and also that we concern ourselves with the narratives and metaphors being constructed to incorporate what generally remains within the cracks and insufficiencies of theories or policies. Narratives and images reveal globalization's utopian aspects as well as what cannot be integrated, for example the differences between Anglos and Latinos, or the upheavals experienced by people who migrate or travel, who do not live where they were born, and communicate with others whom they do not know when they will see again. The metaphors serve to imagine difference and the ritualized narrations give order to it.

Then chapters 3 and 4 attempt to characterize a possible globalization in the West by means of interactions between Europe, Latin America, and the United States. I try to see how older and more recent migrations shape the ways we view ourselves. The narratives formed in commercial and symbolic exchanges from the fifteenth century to the middle of the twentieth seem to be reproduced in the stereotypes of the most recent globalized decades: the North's discrimination toward Latin Americans, or its alternating admiration and distrust. Nevertheless the reading of these narratives can be more complete if we move from interpreting the confrontation between *identities* to examining the *cultural* processes that either connect or alienate us. Identities may seem incompatible, but business and media exchanges multiply. In order to understand this gap between ideologies and practices, I analyze how the politics of citizenship employs imaginaries of similarity and difference in Europe, the United States, and three Latin American countries: Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. For each case, I outline critiques of these models' contradictions, the difficulty in reconciling them, and, at the same time, the need to achieve agreements in a time in which globalization draws distant nations ever closer. I reflect on how to construct a transnational public sphere where

the cultural concepts, and the consequent policies, are not incommensurable. I consider four models: the European republican system of universal rights, the multicultural separatism of the United States, multiethnic integrations under the nation-state in Latin American countries, and—cutting across all of them—multicultural integration fostered by the mass media.

In chapter 5 I propose an intermediate and semifictional narrative. Just as characters and syntheses are constructed in life stories, here I try to imagine the misadventures of a Latin American anthropologist, a European sociologist, and a U.S. cultural studies scholar. Given that one can no longer problematize the relationship between theories and their social conditions of production by referring only to the nation, class, or university in which they are elaborated, I incorporate the daily life of researchers who travel and have access to transnational experiences and delocalized flows of information. This account is constructed with biographical data, both my own and those of others, but that is of little importance because the discussion about the social sciences and cultural studies that runs throughout these pages is concerned not so much with what is true or false as with giving a credible version of the dilemmas in which research finds itself today.

The different ways of globalizing, or transitioning from European to U.S. hegemony, are evaluated in chapter 6 by comparing what happens in the arts and culture industries. The application of industrial formats and transnational competitiveness criteria to the visual arts and literature is modifying their production and valuation, even though most artworks continue to express national traditions and to circulate only within their own countries. The publishing industry is organized by transnational publishers, who group their catalogues and distribution into linguistic regions. Where globalization appears to be most effective is in the audiovisual world; music, film, television, and information technology are being reorganized by a handful of companies for diffusion throughout the entire planet. The multimedia system that partially integrates these four fields offers unprecedented possibilities for transnational expansion, even in peripheral cultures. But it also creates, in the case of Latin America, greater dependencies than those we had in the visual arts in relation to France and now the United States and those that exist with Spain in the publishing world. In addition to differentiating between the challenges of transnationalization or globalization in each cultural area, I explore the tensions generated between homogenization and differences in the existing asymmetric relations between countries and regions.

In chapter 7 I focus on cities, because that is where the global is imagined. Above all, it is in the major cities where the local is articulated with the

national, as well as with globalizing movements. In analyzing the requisites for being a global city and how cities of the "first" and "third" world are differentiated, we must grasp the key problems of dualization and segregation provoked by global processes. We also will see ambivalent opportunities for urban renewal offered by integration into circuits of commerce and consumption, transnational administration, and information. The result is cultural cosmopolitanism in consumption with a concomitant loss of employment, heightened insecurity, and environmental degradation.

In chapter 8 I propose a polemical agenda of what cultural policies in globalized times might look like. Some of the challenges analyzed are how to reconstruct public space, promote a supranational citizenship, communicate commodities and messages to audiences disseminated throughout many countries, and rethink the potentiality of national cultures and regional and global institutions. I discuss why aesthetic questions today are of central interest to politics and how this concern can be addressed in a market cultural economy.

First Questions of Method

There are several difficult problems to resolve in selecting narratives and metaphors, interpreting them, and linking them to hard data. I pose these problems, when the opportunity arises, in various chapters. I want to deal here with one basic problem. Why choose the facts, stories, and symbols that appear in this book about migrants and interculturality, about the relations between Europe, Latin America, and the United States, when so many others exist?

The number of pages in this volume shows that my task is not to write an encyclopedia of stories and metaphors compiled about such topics. The rules for selecting those that do appear are as follows:

1. I chose, after various years of reading ethnographic studies and chronicles and dozens of interviews with intercultural informants from various countries, a repertoire that seemed representative of the existing universe. I strove to cover emblematic structures and transformations more than the diversity of situations.
2. I was interested, above all, in the events, narratives, and metaphors that condense central aspects of international relations and the diverse ways of imagining globalization—or its equivalent forms on a lesser scale: international or regional confrontations and agreements—and that challenge the usual ways of understanding them.
3. I presented this selection and part of the interpretations that will

> be read here at conferences in the United States and Latin America (Buenos Aires, Mexico City, São Paulo) and in international meetings of Latin American Studies in Europe (Halle, 1998) and Canada (Vancouver, 1997) and at the Latin American Studies Association (Chicago, 1998). These ideas were also aired at cultural studies conferences in the United States (Pittsburgh, 1998) and in anthropology conventions in the United States (1996), Mercosur (1997), and Colombia (1997) and at a symposium about the borders between various regions (Buenos Aires, 1999). In these meetings I collected accounts of other studies that challenged my selection and also received critiques of my interpretations. Some reworked fragments from these conferences are incorporated in this book. It would no doubt be possible to multiply the debates; the selection and the interpretations can be fine-tuned, refuted, and contrasted in more settings, and alternatives can be proposed. It should be obvious that the examples in these pages represent a provisional closure with the aim of producing an argumentative—not encyclopedic—"totalization" to be published and disseminated for further discussion. At any rate, an effort was made to think of the whole, as this is a book and not a collection of articles and papers.

GIVEN THE NUMEROUS meetings at which I debated parts of this book, the list of those who helped me to think and rethink what is written here is too extensive to acknowledge. Abundant mentions will be found in the references utilized throughout the text. I want to point out, without claiming to be exhaustive, conversations with Hugo Achugar, Arturo Arias, Lourdes Arizpe, Lluis Bonet, Heloisa Buarque de Holanda, Román de la Campa, Eduard Delgado, Aníbal Ford, Juan Flores, Jean Franco, Alejandro Grimson, Fredric Jameson, Sandra Lorenzano, Mario Margulis, Jesús Martín Barbero, Mary Pratt, Nelly Richard, Renato Rosaldo, Beatriz Sarlo, Amalia Signorelli, Saúl Sosnoski, and George Yúdice.

The conditions for research and teaching provided to me by the Autonomous Metropolitan University of Mexico (UAM), especially the Department of Anthropology, and conversations with colleagues in the Urban Culture Studies Program, whose names and joint publications appear below, contributed to the preparation of this book. The economic support of UAM during my sabbatical year 1996–97, together with the aid granted by the U.S.-Mexico Fund for Culture, facilitated field research and interviews in these two countries during

that period. Dialogues with Rainer Enrique Hamel, Eduardo Nivón, Ana Rosas Mantecón, Tomás Ybarra Frausto, José Manuel Valenzuela, and Pablo Vila were significant to my advancement in border, multinational, and political culture issues. My references to the art experiences of *inSITE* on the Mexico-U.S. border, which allowed me to elaborate a good part of what I propose about global imaginaries, I owe in part to conversations with Carmen Cuenca and Michel Krichman, coordinators of that program. André Dorcé and Luz María Vargas very ably supported the publication of this book.

In subsequent sections I analyze other justifications for this selection of events, narratives, and metaphors, and I add more personal and institutional acknowledgments. It will also be seen that it is not a secondary detail that I have lived in Mexico during the past twenty-three years as a more or less "Mexicanized" foreigner who does not stop being Argentine and has "compatriots" born in Mexico and in other countries whose proximity requires removing the quotation marks from that word.

It would be contradictory to the thesis and methodology of this book to fail to recognize this heterogeneity or to attempt to speak only from one of these places. For that reason I elaborate at times on what I suppose Tzvetan Todorov's (1996: 23) expression "this encounter of cultures within oneself" means. If it is complicated to situate oneself within the interaction between diverse symbolic heritages, it would be even more arduous to try to study these themes from a single national or ethnic point of observation. "What makes me myself rather than anyone else," writes Amin Maalouf (2000: 1) at the beginning of his book *In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong*, "is the very fact that I am poised between two countries, two or three languages and several cultural traditions." Like him and others who share this intercultural position, I have asked myself, "But what do you really feel, deep down inside?" (2). The Lebanese French author says that for a long time that question made him smile. Now he considers it dangerous because of the assumption that each person or group has a "profound truth," an essence, determined by birth or by religious conversion, and that one could "affirm this identity" as if compatriots were more important than fellow citizens (who can be from various countries), as if biological determination and childhood loyalties prevailed over the convictions, preferences, and tastes that one learns in different cultures.

"Border people," says Maalouf, can feel like minorities and often are marginalized. But in a globalized world we are all minorities, including English speakers, at least when they accept the many components of their own identity, and we try to understand each other without reductionisms, although some are more minority than others. In short, it is a question of thinking about

the paradoxes of being simultaneously Arab and Christian, Argenmexican or Mexiconorthamerican, Brasiguayo (the 500,000 Brazilians who live in Paraguay), or Franco-German. It is also a question of the differences between these fusions-fissures. They cannot be fixed by saying that two plus two equals this or that, nor by a tyrant's decision nor by individual heroism. These intercultural tensions today are also the most fecund objects of research and an opportunity to construct collective subjects and open, democratic policies.

Mexico City, September 1999

PART I

NARRATIVES, METAPHORS, AND THEORIES

ONE

GLOBALIZE OR DEFEND IDENTITY

How to Get Out of This Binary

When we listen to the different voices that speak of globalization, "paradoxes" arise. Globalization is understood as an expansion of markets and hence as an increase in the economic potential of societies; yet it is also conceived as a narrowing of the capacity for action of nation-states, political parties, unions, and the classic political actors in general. Globalization improves transnational exchange and shakes the ground of the nation-state on which certainties once stood firm.

Much has been written about political crises due to corruption, political parties' loss of credibility, and their replacement by the media and technocrats. I would like to add, and emphasize, that shifting the arena of decision making from national *policy* to a diffuse transnational *economy* reduces national governments to administrating others' decisions, atrophies their socioeconomic imagination, and discourages long-term policy planning. This symbolic and material emptying of national projects diminishes interest in participating in

public life. And the turn to marketing techniques in pre-electoral periods only minimally reactivates this interest.

At the level of the nation-state in democratic regimes, power was pursued through the interactions of local, regional, and national institutions. Forms of representation among the three levels were not always reliable or transparent, nor were national institutions fiscally accountable to citizens. But the dissimulations and betrayals were easier to identify than in today's remote relations between citizens and supranational entities. Surveys conducted in the European Union, the countries of the North American Free Trade Agreement, and Mercosur reveal that the vast majority of citizens do not understand how these institutions function, what they discuss, or why they make certain decisions. Many members of national parliaments fail to grasp what is at stake in these complex deliberations; this information is managed solely by elite transnational politicians or experts who possess the necessary competencies to "resolve" European, North American, or Latin American problems, and even to establish the sequence of agendas.

Citizen Integration or Corporate Lobby?

1. HOW DO LATIN AMERICAN societies, which in the past fifty years moved the greater part of their population from the countryside to cities as they pursued development via import-substituting industrialization and modern forms of intermediation, react to this sudden reordering that in one or two decades dismantled the history of half a century? Countries de-industrialize, national democratic institutions weaken, and economic and cultural dependency on the centers of global power intensifies. Yet at the same time, economic integration and regional free trade agreements generate signs of hope. After a tired history of promises about "the great nation" and the failures of so many intergovernmental conferences and meetings between presidents and economic and cultural ministers, expectations increase as NAFTA, Mercosur, and other regional agreements advance swiftly.

At the beginning of the 1990s it seemed that Latin American states were rapidly reordering their national economies to attract investments and render them more competitive in the global market. But from the Mexican crisis of 1994 through the Brazilian crisis of 1998–99, which had destabilizing effects throughout the entire region and even in the largest cities, what remains clear is the low credibility and limited power of our governments. Intergovernmental integration agreements now appear to support the monopolistic convergence of the most powerful business and financial sectors. Academic assessments of

our limited abilities to construct, via continental integrations, institutions that strengthen Latin American societies and cultures (McAnany and Wilkinson 1996; Recondo 1997; Roncagliolo 1996) leave no room for optimism. Neither do data from recent studies that reveal worker and consumer suspicion of business and government pronouncements regarding the new path to modernization via "globalization and regional integration." What economic and political elites preach does not jibe with the opinions of the citizen majority.

At the Second Summit of the Americas in April 1998, the United States, allied with various Latin American countries, initiated a Free Trade Area of the Americas Initiative in order to liberalize economic exchanges. It proposed to integrate imports and exports by 2005 and improve the position of the continent in global competition.

Nevertheless in November and December 1997 a large survey (17,500 interviews) by the Latinobarómetro Corporation in sixteen countries in the region revealed that citizens did not share this optimism. The results, reported at the Santiago Summit, revealed that barely 23 percent of citizens thought their country was making progress, and in almost all nations this sentiment was worse than in the previous year. The institutions considered most powerful by those surveyed (government, big business, the military, banks, and political parties) were also the least trusted.[1] The crises of governability, devaluations, and an increase in unemployment and poverty were some of the factors that led an increasing number to distrust democracy and ask for strong-arm policies: the level of distrust was less in countries that recently had emerged from military dictatorships (Argentina, Chile, and Brazil), but it rose significantly in countries with incipient democratization, among them Paraguay and Mexico. From 1996 to 1997 Paraguayans favoring an "authoritarian" solution increased from 26 to 42 percent, and in Mexico the increase was from 23 to 31 percent. Aside from Costa Rica and Uruguay, whose political systems enjoyed high credibility, in the rest of Latin America 65 percent were "little or not satisfied" with the implementation of democracy.[2]

1. Twelve years later the confidence in government is significantly higher, 40 percent, although that is a 5-point drop from 2010 as confidence wanes in the ability of government to distribute wealth equitably and reduce inequality (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2011: 55). Low confidence in institutions remains largely unchanged, although it has increased slightly in some of the institutions mentioned by García Canclini: government 40 versus 37 percent; banks 43 versus 39 percent, and political parties 22 versus 20 percent. On the other hand, big business dropped 1 point to 38 percent, and the military 4 points to 39 percent (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2011: 52). [Trans.]

2. Javier Moreno, "Los latinoamericanos temen que su crisis sea eterna," *EI País*, April 18, 1998. The level of dissatisfaction with democracy decreased from 2001 to 2011, 65 versus 57 percent, but it should be noted that dissatisfaction is on the increase again with respect to 2009

The same survey reveals that the rise in authoritarianism in political culture is associated with citizens' conviction that governments are losing power. From 1996 to 1997 the percentage of people who believed that government was the most powerful actor decreased from 60 to 48 percent. On the other hand, what rose was the number of those who believed that decisions about the future increasingly were made by transnational corporations and with greater military participation.

Given that such political apathy and heightened inequalities engender not only disbelief but also turbulence in the leading financial centers and economies as well as high electoral abstention and random disturbances in the grassroots, one must question the governability of this unjust mode of globalization. Simply put, does globalization, implemented this way, have a future? According to *The Report on Human Development in Chile*, where economic liberalization supposedly has been most successful, the expectations are that insecurity will increase because of delinquency, the fraying of the social fabric, and economic instability. Uneasiness also increases, as this survey shows, due to "the fear of exclusion" (PNUD 1998: 115–26). Norbert Lechner observes that Chile's annual economic growth of 7 percent and other good macrosocial performance indicators are accompanied by a widespread unease that takes the form of fear of the other, of exclusion, and of meaninglessness. Statistics confirm that the modernization and economic liberalization of the country increased access to employment and education and improved health indicators. "Nevertheless, the people lack faith in . . . the future." Globalization is "lived like an invasion from outer space" (Lechner 1998: 187, 192).[3]

What can one expect from this weakening of nation-states, citizen powerlessness, and global redistribution of power and wealth? What implications

(51 percent) and 2010 (52 percent; Corporación Latinobarómetro 2011: 106). Significantly the countries with the greatest indicators of success in terms of GDP (Chile, Brazil, and Uruguay) were also the ones with the greatest increase in dissatisfaction with the performance of the president and government in bettering prospects for the future (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2011: 24), particularly in delivering social services, reducing inequality and eliminating corruption. Widespread student demonstrations in Chile and six of seven resignations by ministers due to corruption in Brazil are merely the more visible indications of such dissatisfaction. [Trans.]

3. The Corporación Latinobarómetro report for 2011 makes the same point regarding the discrepancy of economic indicators and citizen satisfaction, evidenced by Chile's good economic performance (5 percent real GDP growth) and decreasing citizen confidence in the president and government (28 percent) and Venezuela's low GDP growth (–1.5 percent) and relatively strong support of the Chávez government (49 percent; Corporación Latinobarómetro 2011: 24). Latinobarómetro concludes that "indicators are not providing the information that we need to know what is happening" (8).

does this process have for culture, especially in its most dynamic and influential sector, communications? Globalization, which exacerbates international competition and dismantles local cultural production, favors the expansion of culture industries that homogenize and at the same time target sectoral and regional diversities. Globalization destroys or debilitates less efficient producers and concedes to peripheral cultures the possibility of locking themselves in their local traditions. In a few cases it gives these cultures the possibility of stylizing and distributing their music, feasts, and gastronomy via transnational companies.

The concentration of scientific research and innovation in information and entertainment in the United States, Europe, and Japan accentuates the distance between the First World and the peripheral nations' meager and outdated production. Even with respect to Europe, Latin America's disadvantage looks bad, as shown by demographic development statistics: our continent (with 9 percent of the world's population) produces 0.8 percent of world exports in cultural goods, whereas the European Union (with 7 percent of the world's population) exports 37.5 percent and imports 43.6 percent of all commercial cultural goods (Garretón 1994).

2. IS THERE GREATER citizen consensus about supranational integration in the countries of the North? Research on the European Community reveals difficulty in constructing a public sphere that fosters democratic debate, because in supranational treaties and institutions (and more so in those of each country) negotiation trumps representatives' mandates; agreements among corporate groups override the public interest of the majority; and lobbying prevails over regional or continental governments. What does politics become, asks Marc Abélès, when in Brussels more than ten thousand consultants, lawyers, and experts—sometimes representing territorial groups and in other cases agricultural, financial, or legal experts—sprout all over community institutions seeking to sell their services to ambassadors, ministers, unions, journalists, businesspeople, and even to several interests at the same time? "Politics is identified more and more with the practice of lobbying" (Abélès 1996: 102).

The European Union has attempted to reduce the opacity of the supranational treaties and render them more understandable to citizens. By establishing educational and cultural programs, in addition to commercial agreements, among the fifteen member countries, it sought to integrate societies. The formation of "an audiovisual European space" has been sustained with common normative standards and programs like Media, Euroimages, and

Eureka that favor the coproduction and circulation of the culture industries in that region. In other words, the EU goes beyond the rhetorical defense of identity. Similarly the citizens of the fifteen countries share a European passport, they created a European flag and anthem, they hold shared events each year (on European cinema, on road safety), and they conduct periodic studies to identify "a European public opinion" (Moragas 1996). The adoption of the euro as the sole currency in 1999, to be consolidated in 2002 as national currencies disappear, strengthens economic unification and has significant consequences for the symbolic identity of the community.[4] These changes have been operationalized throughout the community and are explained in detail to all voters. Nevertheless journalists give little coverage to the majority of these transformations and admit their difficulty in rendering them in newspaper stories. Analysts concerned about social participation ask themselves if the technical complexity of the Europeanization of politics "is not contradictory to the ideal of a democracy founded on transparency and the capacity of each person to understand what is at stake in the debate" (Abélès 1996: 110).

Anthropological and sociopolitical studies of European integration raised the possibility that programs with the purpose of constructing common projects are not sufficient to overcome the distance between the Europe of merchants or governments and the Europe of citizens. Although the role of culture and the imaginary in that continent's supranational integration projects is given greater recognition than in other regional agreements, current programs that posit shared identification are not effective for the internalization of this new scale of community for the majority. One possible explanation for this deficiency is that these voluntaristic programs do not know what to do about heterogeneity, about the differences and conflicts that cannot be reduced to a homogenized identity.

Many intellectuals and social scientists, for example those who collaborate on the magazine *Liber*, edited by Pierre Bourdieu in ten European languages, point to the predominance of monetary integration, of "the Europe of the bankers," as the reason for the lack of consensus on social integration. They question the weakness of social linkages sought on the basis of a theory of globalization that does not factor social costs into economic calculations—the

4. What seemed like a solution a decade ago is now widely considered the source of difficulty in surmounting the current economic crisis. The European economic crisis since 2010 shows that "the euro is woefully under-institutionalized and consequently incapable of acting with the required political and economic decisiveness and credibility to end a financial crisis" (Kierkegaard 2011). Moreover the crisis will have serious spillovers in the most vibrant economies of Asia and Latin America (Moeller 2011).

costs of sickness and suffering, suicide, alcoholism, and drug addiction. Even in a strictly economic sense, it is an erroneous, "not necessarily economic" policy because it does not take into account the costs of its effects on the "insecurity of people and goods, which requires policing." It posits an abstract and narrow definition of efficiency (the financial profitability of investors) and neglects clients and users (Bourdieu 1998: 45–46).

The eleven languages spoken in the European Parliament correspond to cultural differences that do not disappear in economic integration agreements. Something similar occurs with the diversity of languages and cultural and political antagonisms between U.S. citizens and Latin Americans (Protestants vs. Catholics, whites vs. "Hispanics" and indigenous peoples). Likewise marked differences among Latin Americans present themselves in economic negotiations and become more pronounced when the upper echelons of government and experts seek to make policy. The few ethnographic and communication studies on the processes of free trade and integration (which I review in following chapters) reveal the many economic, ethnic, political, and cultural interests that intersect in the construction of supranational public spheres: too often the attempts to construct a public agora culminate in towers of Babel.

When David Cannot Find Goliath

A key obstacle to citizens' faith in supranational integration projects is the negative effect that the above-mentioned transformations have on national and local societies. It is difficult to obtain popular consensus on changes in the relations of production, exchange, and consumption that usually devalue the ties between people and their native territories: they eliminate jobs and lower the prices of what is still produced locally. The imaginary of a prosperous *economic* future generated by processes of globalization and regional integration is too fragile if it does not take into account behaviors, *cultural* goods, and the unity or diversity of languages that bestow meaning on the continuity of social relations. But currently the processes of integration that have made the greatest headway are between countries that do not take these cultural coincidences into account.

If the lack of cultural integration that Spanish, French, or Greek workers feel with regard to Brussels, or Chileans, Argentines, or Mexicans experience in relation to what is decided in Brasilia or Cartagena is already great, even greater is the disempowerment when the power broker is a transnational company that manufactures automobile or television parts in four countries, assembles them in another country, and has its headquarters in two or three others. We

experience something similar when the messages that television, film, or the music industry bring us are distant and from unidentifiable locations. The question that arises, then, is whether there can be active subjects in production and consumption in the domain of these anonymous and translocalized powers. More and more, people do not work for identifiable patrons or bosses but for transnational businesses, phantasmatic corporations that dictate unquestionable and indisputable rules from indeterminate locations.

What unions negotiate is increasingly limited, including what is called "flexible work" by faceless corporations that have logos but no proper names. In truth, what happens is that working conditions become unstable rather than flexible. Work becomes rigid because it is insecure: workers have to adhere strictly to schedules, rituals of submission, and acquiescence to others' orders, internalizing them so as not to end up without a salary. I recall, among many examples drawn from the literature on globalization, the following passage by Ulrich Beck (2000: 18): "It is ten o'clock in the evening. At Berlin's Tegel Airport a slick-friendly voice informs the weary passengers that their flight to Hamburg is ready for boarding. The voice belongs to Angelika B., who is sitting in front of a console in California—for after six p.m. Berlin time Tegel's announcement service is provided online from California. The reasons are as simple as they are understandable: in California, no overtime has to be paid for late working hours because it is still daytime; and indirect labour costs for the same activity are lower than in Germany."

Similarly entertainment programs are produced by people in faraway places, also without names, like trademarks—CNN, Televisa, MTV—whose complete designations most people are not aware of. Where are those thrillers, soap operas, news programs, and variety shows produced? In Los Angeles, Mexico City, Buenos Aires, New York, or maybe in studios hidden in a bay somewhere in the United States? Isn't Sony Japanese? Then what is it doing operating out of Miami? It means little that the hosts of the program speak English or Spanish, or speak Argentine or Mexican Spanish, as on MTV, to suggest identification with specific countries. At the end of the day, the delocalized English of CNN and the washed-out Spanish of Televisa news anchors or of dubbed series have greater verisimilitude and correspondence with this deterritorialization and imprecise remoteness.

During the age of imperialism one could experience the struggle of David against Goliath, but one knew that politically Goliath lived partly in the capital of one's own country and partly in Washington or London, that media-wise Goliath was in Hollywood, and so on for all the other Goliaths. Today Goliaths are disseminated in thirty locations and migrate easily from one country to

another, from one culture to many, within the networks of a polymorphous market.

Rarely are we able to pinpoint the precise place from which we are addressed. That creates the impression that it is difficult to modify anything, to imagine that instead of this television program or that political regime there could be another. Some spectators may be included in simulacra of radio and TV participation such as the open phone line or studio attendance, or they may be interviewed for a ratings poll. These exceptional brushes with power, the sensation of being consulted, do not modify for the majority the impression that the media speak from unapproachable positions, as Angela Giglia and Rosalía Winocur's (1996) research confirms. The design and decisions of these programs are made in inaccessible places by organizational structures and not by individuals.

In the past some of us thought that studies of consumption habits could contribute to understanding what consumers indeed want. These studies may still help democratize the cultural policies of cities, radio networks, or independent cultural centers in the domain of micropublics. But the majority of audience surveys do not target consumption habits, but rather seek to confirm or disprove specific preferences (on a given day and according to a given schedule). They do not study particular viewers' or listeners' needs but rather "publics" or "audiences" simultaneously in several countries. It is not important to know about their daily life or their unaddressed tastes but rather to make them adapt their tastes to what is programmed in unknown and standardized offices and recording studios.

A serious discussion about the type of society that the mass media shape cannot be based on ratings. We need to study consumption as the expression of the agency of subjects, as the process that favors their emergence and interpellation, that supports or obstructs their interaction with other subjects. Maybe the fascination with soap operas, melodramatic or heroic movies, and the news programs that turn structural events into personal or family dramas not only derives from a morbid spectacle, as is often said, but also inheres in the illusion that there exist subjects who are important, who suffer or accomplish extraordinary acts.

But the recent restructuring of power relations, in the workplace and in entertainment, reduces the possibility of such subjects to a media fiction. It is a known fact that this does not happen in the same way across the social spectrum. Without denying this, I want to propose that we examine why popular as well as hegemonic actors, in politics and in the economy, are immobilized by what we can call the atrophy of conflictive action and democratic

deliberation. The problem is not only that important decisions about conflicts and the future are not made by elected governments or institutions, but that they are not taken up by "those who have seized the market." John Berger uses this expression instead of "control" "because chance has a significant role here."[5]

No other century had so many economists, historians, and anthropologists studying all eras and societies, nor so many conferences, libraries, magazines, and information networks to connect all this knowledge, to relate what happens regarding entertainment and work in other places in the world. What can one change, or at least control, thanks to this multidirectional proliferation of information? Where are we taken by this expansion of transnational corporations, markets, and monolithic thinking, and on the other hand, by the proliferation of dissidence and social movements, the heterodox solidarities of the NGOs, and their alternative imaginaries? That the latter are alternative is doubtful, given that often they are subordinated to the totalizing order. At the end of the most productive century in terms of political, technological, and artistic innovations, everything seems to be institutionalized precariously according to the rules of quick reproduction, short-sightedness, adherence to economic speculation, or the accumulation of unstable powers.

Perhaps we can explain this shrinkage of social potentialities by abandoning the customary opposition between the local and the global. To this end it is necessary to rework the articulations between the concrete and the abstract, the immediate and the intercultural. We need to appeal to metaphors that designate the changes in the ways we make culture. We must communicate with people different from us or who we imagine as similar, and construct concepts that enable us to analyze the redistribution that in these globalized times takes place between what is ours and what is someone else's.

A first stab at organizing this diversity of situations and rethinking the impotency induced by remoteness or the abstraction of the connections is to take into account the schema with which Craig Calhoun, and subsequently Ulf Hannerz (1996), reformulate the ancient opposition between *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, between community and society. Globalization has complicated the distinction between *primary relations*, by which direct links between people are established, and *secondary relations*, which operate through functions or roles carried out in social life. The indirect character of many present-day exchanges leads to discerning *tertiary relations* mediated by technologies and large-scale organizations: we write to an institution or we call an office and

5. John Berger, "Señuelos," *El País*, December 10, 1995.

obtain de-personalized answers, just as when we listen to a politician or receive information about consumer goods via radio or television.

Above all, I am interested in the last type identified by Calhoun, *quaternary relations*, in which one of the parties is not conscious of the existence of the relation: acts of surveillance, telephone espionage, data mining that yields personal information drawn from the census, credit card transactions, and other data sources. When we try to "analyze" these interactions we are treated like "imaginary clients" (Calhoun 1992; Hannerz 1996), for example when we are spammed without knowing who provided our address and the sender tries to disguise its intrusion by imitating the language of primary relations: "Dear Néstor: given your frequent travel, your lifestyle and that of your family, we have decided to offer you . . ." The data accumulated every time the credit card is used constitutes a super-panopticon, but with the peculiarity that "the surveilled, supplying the data for storage, are prime—and *willing*—factors in the surveillance" (Bauman 1998: 50).

What can we do in a world in which the few observe the many? Is it possible to reorganize the mediated connections and their crafty simulation so as to personalize them, and to detach ourselves from their methods of selection and segregation, of exclusion and surveillance? In brief, can we remake ourselves as subjects of work and consumption?

One possible reaction is to evoke nostalgically the age in which politics appeared as a militant struggle between what were thought to be antagonistic conceptions of the world. Another possibility is to retreat into territorial, ethnic, or religious units in the hope of shortening the distance between those who make decisions and those affected by them: to escape through the tangent. I share the hypothesis that both stances can be productive in improving the quality of politics (in the first case) and coexistence in restricted environments (in the second case). But the viability of these strategies depends on getting beyond their reactive character and elaborating projects that interact with the new conditions established by globalization.

To put it briefly: I do not think that the main options today are to defend identity or to globalize. The most illuminating studies of the globalizing process are not those that lead us to review questions of identity in isolation but those that lead us to understand the benefits of knowing what we can do and be in relation to others, like dealing with heterogeneity, difference, and inequality. A world in which local certainties lose their exclusivity and hence can be less self-centered, where stereotypes by which we represent far-off peoples collapse as we cross paths with them more frequently, holds the promise (without many guarantees) that global coexistence will be less incomprehensible,

less confusing than in the eras of colonialism and imperialism. To this end, globalization needs to take into account the imaginaries with which it operates and the interculturality that it mobilizes.

By moving the debate on globalization from questions of identity to the discrepancies between supranational integration policies and citizen behavior, we reject reducing it to the opposition between the global and the local. Instead we seek to reorient it to the general reconfiguration of the abstract and the concrete in contemporary life and to the formation of new mediations between both extremes. Rather than pitting essentialized identities against globalization, the issue at hand is to explore whether subjects can have agency in larger social structures. It is true that the majority of production and consumption today is organized in scenarios beyond our control and that we often do not understand them; nevertheless amid these globalizing tendencies social actors can draw new interconnections between cultures and circuits so as to empower social initiatives.

The question regarding subjects' ability to transform today's globalized organization leads us to pay attention to the new spaces of cultural and sociopolitical *intermediation*. In addition to the already mentioned forms of mediation—transnational organizations, consultants, finance institutions, and security systems—there exist international circuits of news agencies, galleries and museums, publishers that operate in various continents, NGOs that communicate distant local movements. Between international organizations and citizens, corporations and their clients, there are flexible institutions that operate in various languages, experts trained in different ethnic and national codes, civil servants, cultural promoters, and political activists trained to work in diverse contexts. If we want to avoid fetishizing the global, and its excessively polarized relations with the local, a fruitful methodological point of departure is to pay attention to the proliferation of networks dedicated to the "negotiation of diversity" between center and periphery, North and South. George Yúdice (1996) uses this expression to describe how U.S. exhibition curators and art magazines affect the image of Latin American art in the United States, as well as the self-perception of the artists, the value criteria of Latin American and U.S. publics, and even questions that transcend the artistic realm. Daniel Mato (1998a, 1999b) reveals how the actions of the Smithsonian Institution have contributed to reconceptualizing the significance of the indigenous peoples of Latin America; representations of ethnicity, gender, and the transcultural relations between the Americas; and also how dominant countries' representations of peripheral peoples are reformulated by NGOs that disseminate peripheral perspectives on a transnational scale.

Ways of Imagining the Global

Globalization can be seen as a set of strategies to consolidate the hegemony of industrial conglomerates and finance corporations, as well as film, TV, music, and information majors, and thus to enable them to appropriate poor countries' natural and cultural resources, labor, leisure, and money, subordinating them to the concentrated exploitation by which those actors reordered the world in the second half of the twentieth century.

But globalization is also a horizon imagined by collective and individual subjects, that is, by governments and businesses in dependent countries, by film and television directors, artists and intellectuals seeking to reinsert their products in expanded markets. Globalized policies achieve consensus in part because they excite the imagination of millions of people with the promise that the two plus two that until now equaled four can be stretched to five or even six. Many stories about those who were able to adapt their goods, messages, and financial operations to reposition themselves in an expanded territory suggest that the realism of the local, of those who resign themselves to tallying national figures, has become a shortsighted vision.

Let us look at various cultural processes and try to distinguish what is real and how much is imaginary in this expansion of the local and national horizon. It is necessary to differentiate who benefits from expanded markets, who from the peripheral economies and cultures can participate in them, and how many remain disconnected from global circuits. The new frontiers of inequality generate ever greater separation between those who connect to supranational networks and those who take refuge in their local bastions.

If I speak of globalized imaginaries it is not only because integration embraces some countries more than others or because it benefits elite sectors in those countries but remains a fantasy for the majority. I also speak of imaginaries because globalization discourse refers to mergers that really take place only among a few nations. What is advertised as globalization generates, in the majority of cases, regional interrelations, business alliances, and communication and consumption circuits among European or North American or certain Asian zone countries. Not everyone participates. After decades of free trade agreements that reveal the degree to which each economy and national culture opens up, we are in a position to differentiate globalizing narratives from the medium-range actions and policies through which these imaginaries take shape. One example: audiovisual industry earnings reports show that Ibero-American countries take a 5 percent share of the world market, but if we aggregate the inhabitants of Latin America, Spain, and the Spanish speakers

of the United States we are more than 550 million. To reflect on globalization means explaining why we have such a low percentage of the cultural exports revenue and, at the same time, imagining how we may take advantage of being one of the most literate linguistic groups with one of the highest levels of cultural consumption.

I am not equating the imaginary with falsehood. Just as it has been shown that imaginary constructions make the existence of local and national societies possible, so also do they contribute to the architecture of globalization. Societies open up to the import and export of material goods that move from one country to another, and also to the circulation of messages coproduced among various countries, expressing in the symbolic domain a set of processes of cooperation and exchange. For example, musicians fuse previously distant traditions, and films are made with multinational capital, actors, and sets. This transnationalism frees many cultural and symbolic goods from rigid national adscriptions. (A Ford automobile is not an expression of North American culture, nor does a Spielberg film refer solely to Hollywood.) They are converted into emblems of a supranational imaginary. Even what remains of Brazilian or Mexican culture in a telenovela, of French culture in a perfume, of Japanese culture in a television set are integrated into narratives and practices reproduced in sixty or one hundred societies. Our globalized age also connects us effectively to many societies; we can situate our fantasy simultaneously in multiple settings. In this way, according to Arjun Appadurai (1996), we deploy "imaginary lives." The imagined might be the realm of illusion, but it is also, according to Etienne Balibar, where "one tells stories, which means that one has the power to invent stories."

With the global expansion of imaginaries, cultures that a few years ago we considered alien to our existence are now within our horizon. Until the middle of the twentieth century, in the West a few merchants, artists, religious people, researchers, and adventurers took an interest in the ways of the Far East. Now India, Japan, Hong Kong—the examples could be multiplied—have become tourist destinations, investment opportunities, and objects for business travel for millions of Westerners. During the 1980s and until the crisis of the mid-1990s, the Asian tigers served as models of economic development and piqued the curiosity of Western Third World elites because of the way they brought together industrial innovation, ancient cultures, and work habits, not to speak of the expansion of Eastern religions in Europe, the United States, and Latin America, or of other exchanges—along with Japanese or Taiwanese artifacts—that grafted into our daily life the cultural resonances of those societies.

There is much more than expansion into previously ignored territories. The intensification of the exchanges, above all with countries in neighboring regions, reassembles the stereotypes we had about them. Understanding globalization requires, we said, exploring how the imaginaries of Europe and the United States are changing in Latin America. Are they truly changing? We shall examine which narratives about others persist (hindering new opportunities for integration) and which new ones are taking shape in recent migratory, commercial, and tourist exchanges. We must also examine how our understanding of migration is modified when it is narrated by businesspeople, citizens, or undocumented workers.

Insofar as entering globalization means for the majority increasing exchanges with others who are more or less nearby, it serves to renew the understanding we had about their lives. Consequently borders become laboratories of the global. That is why we seek to understand how the global modulates at the borders, in the multiculturality of the cities, and in segmented media audiences.

Spectacles of Globalization and Melodramas of Interculturality

One of the conclusions that we can draw from this differential approach combined with such heterogeneous materials is that we need to deal simultaneously with globalization and interculturality. Those who speak about how our times are being globalized narrate processes of fluid exchanges and homogenization, nations that open their borders, and peoples that communicate. Their arguments are based on statistics that show increasing transactions and the speed or simultaneity with which they take place: volume and velocity. Meanwhile studies of migration, transculturation, and other intercultural experiences are replete with cleavages and conflicts, retrofitted borders and the longing to restore lost national, ethnic, or familial unities: intensity and memory.

Thus the tensions between globalization and interculturality can be thought of as a relationship between epic and melodrama. The schism evident today in the social sciences is played out, to a great extent, between those who seek to construct epic accounts of the achievements of globalization (economics, subfields of sociology, and communications) and those who construct melodramatic narratives from the fissures, violence, and pain of interculturality (anthropology, psychoanalysis, aesthetics). When the first group lets intercultural dramas creep into the margins of their narratives, as if they were resistances to globalization, they are quick to inform that they will be eliminated by the march of history and generations. For the second group, the tenacious

differences and incompatibilities between cultures reveal the partial character of globalizing processes, or their failure, or new displacements engendered by their hasty unification of the world, indifferent to what distinguishes and separates. In recent years a few narrators of globalization and some defenders of local and subjective differences have begun to listen to each other; more than the determination to narrate an epic or a drama, it is interesting to understand what happens when both tendencies come together.

The hypothesis is that the statistics released by migration censuses and those agencies that track the planetary circulation of investment and consumption make more sense when they are fleshed out with narratives of heterogeneity. Then subjects reappear within structures. Conversely, we draw greater meaning from the accounts of local actors when we ask how the large-scale movements of globalization and the collective discourses shaped by current rules of production and styles of consumption speak through their particular dramas. It is not easy to bring together both perspectives in this age in which people no longer believe in the explanatory capacity of a paradigm. But it is also impossible to understand such intense and frequent coexistences as are demanded by our world if we compartmentalize societies, as cultural relativism did when it imagined each culture as separate and self-sufficient. What narratives—neither simply epic nor melodramatic—can account for the reconfigurations that are taking place between the local and the global?

When, on January 1, 1994, a neo-Zapatista insurgency broke out in southern Mexico, I heard that a Mexican economist and a Mexican anthropologist were surprised in different ways by the news. The economist proclaimed it unlikely that the event would have significant repercussions in national society because the state of Chiapas represented only about 1.5 percent of the Mexican economy. The anthropologist's meanderings (*tropismos*) led him to answer that the region consists approximately of a 30 percent indigenous population, one of the highest percentages in Mexico, that it is important to the history and culture of the country, and that it constitutes the border with Central America. Several months later it became evident that the Zapatista movement continued a long past and entailed political and communication innovation, both of which required going beyond the parallelism of the economic and anthropological explanations, their disconnected manners of explaining what integrates and what distinguishes or marginalizes.

We cannot overcome the astonishment that these events generated by appealing to the (economic or anthropological) accounts that organized the facts in a biased manner; it is necessary to maintain the surprise and allow for multiple narrations. But since the issue at hand does not require writing a complicated

novel but rather crafting explanations and interpretations of what we construct as real, we need to ask whether these different narrations are compatible and hope for thick descriptions that articulate the more or less objective structures with the more or less subjective levels of meaning. We have to produce logically consistent constructions that contrast with the ways the global "parks itself" in each culture and the ways the local restructures in order to survive, obtaining perhaps some advantages within globalized exchanges.

No matter how much one would like to limit research to a neighborhood or a city or to those foreigners residing in a particular country, there comes a moment in which—if one works in the West—one has to ask how globalizing structures and supranational integration processes are changing. Take, for example, the relations between Europe, Latin America, and the United States. It is possible to respond that such an extensive universe is impossible to tackle and abandon the question. But the questions remain, conditioning what one studies, and even when one decides not to generalize about the development of the West, the old assumptions of Western philosophy and epistemology remain as hypotheses. The problem is that those hypotheses correspond to a preglobal age, when nations were apparently more cohesive, constraining the majority of their intercultural relations. That was when it was possible to distinguish clearly between the local and the universal.

I do not know a better way of confronting these risks than to work simultaneously, on the one hand, with statistics and other hard, macrosocial data that enable us to grasp the large-scale trends of globalization and, on the other, with sociocultural descriptions that capture specific processes, their objective structure as well as their imaginaries that express the ways individual and collective subjects represent their place and their agency in said processes. It is a matter of bringing together what is so often sundered in the social sciences: explanation and comprehension. In other words, it is a matter of articulating telescopic observations of social structures and the gazes that convey the intimacy of relations between cultures. I think this endeavor offers a key resource so that multicultural citizens may decide the future of globalization.

TWO

GLOBALIZATION

An Unidentified Cultural Object

Much of what is said about globalization is wrong. For example, that it makes the entire world uniform. Globalization has not even managed to generate one definition on which everyone agrees, nor do we agree about the historical moment when it began or about its capacity to reorganize or undo the social order.

As for the date on which globalization might have begun, various authors situate it in the sixteenth century, with the onset of capitalist expansion and Western modernity (Chesnaux 1989; Wallerstein 1989). Others pinpoint its origin in the middle of the twentieth century, when innovations in technology and communications articulated markets on a worldwide scale. This conjunction of technological and market changes acquired global proportions only with the emergence of worldwide communications and money markets, consolidated in turn by the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar division of the world (Albrow 1997; Giddens 1996; Ortiz 1997).

These discrepancies have to do with the diverse ways of defining what is understood by globalization. Those who give it a more remote origin privilege

the economic aspect, while those who argue for the recent emergence of this process emphasize its political, cultural, and communicational dimensions. As for me, I believe there are good reasons to agree with Giddens (1996) that "we are the first generation to enter a global age."

Internationalization, Transnationalization, Globalization

The identification of globalization's emergence in the second half of the twentieth century ensues from its differences from internationalization and transnationalization. The *internationalization* of the economy and culture began with the transoceanic navigations and the commercial opening of European societies to the Far East and Latin America, and the colonial regimes resulting therefrom. The ships delivered objects and information previously unknown in Spain, Portugal, Italy, and England. The narratives of Marco Polo and Alexander von Humboldt as well as migrants' and merchants' accounts from the nineteenth century and early twentieth served to integrate part of what today we call the world market. Nevertheless the majority of the messages and goods consumed in each country was produced locally; the barrage of external objects and information that enriched everyday life passed through customs houses and was subject to laws and controls that regulated local production. From the staircase of the palace, Marco Polo says to the Great Khan, "Whatever country my words may evoke around you, you will see it from such a vantage point" (Calvino 1978: 27). You will see different societies from your neighborhood, city, or nation, is what an anthropologist or journalist might have said to his or her compatriots regarding what happened far away from them, when national societies and ethnicities were well-delineated vantage points.

Transnationalization is a process that takes shape through the internationalization of the economy and culture, but it has leapfrogged since the first half of the twentieth century with the advent of organizations, businesses, and movements whose headquarters are not exclusively nor principally located in one nation. Phillips, Ford, and Peugeot straddle various countries and move with relative independence with respect to states and populations with which they form ties. Nevertheless in this second instance the interconnections continue to bear the imprint of their nations of origin. Hollywood movies transmitted the U.S. vision of wars and daily life to the world; Mexican and Brazilian telenovelas moved Italians, Chinese, and many others with the manner in which the nations that produced them conceived of family cohesion and conflicts.

Globalization was taking shape during these two previous processes through an intensification of reciprocal dependencies (Beck 2000) and the growth and

acceleration of economic and cultural networks that operate on a global scale and upon a worldwide foundation. Nevertheless satellites and information systems, manufacturing, and the processing of goods with electronic resources, air transport, high-velocity trains, and services distributed throughout the entire planet were necessary to construct a world market in which money and the production of goods and messages are de-territorialized, where geographic borders often become porous and the customs houses sometimes become inoperative. There ensues, then, a more complex and interdependent interaction between dispersed focuses of production, circulation, and consumption (Castells 1989; Ortiz 1997; Singer 1997). I am not suggesting that technology is determining, but rather that it acts as a facilitator. In truth, the new communicational and informational flows generated global processes as they connected with powerful concentrations of financial and industrial capital; they were also connected with deregulation and elimination of national restrictions and controls to which international transactions were subject. Transborder movements of technology, goods, and finances were also accompanied by an intensification of migratory and tourist flows that favored the acquisition of languages and multicultural imaginaries. Under these conditions, in addition to exporting movies and television programs from one country to another, it is also possible to construct global symbolic products without specific national moorings, or with several at the same time, as in Steven Spielberg's movies or video games and world music. These economic, financial, migratory, and communicational dimensions of globalization are brought together by various authors (Appadurai 1996; Giddens 1998; Sassen 2000) in their claim that globalization is a new regime of production of space and time.

Although this conceptual and historical distinction seems convincing to me, it is also the case that there is no total international or transdisciplinary consensus on this matter. Also debated is whether this process should be called globalization or *mundialización*, a disagreement that not only separates English-language and Francophone authors but entails conceptual differences (Ortiz 1997).[1]

1. Although different authors give greater or lesser weight to the economic, political, and cultural dimensions of the expansion of finance, media, the Internet, and so on, many users of *mundialización*—or *mondialisation*, used originally by French authors—focus on the growing interaction of societies and economies made possible through scientific, technological, and communication advances. The process has a long history (Grataloup 2010), but most writers focus on the recent half-century, in which the exchange of ideas, values, and culture has accelerated exponentially. Globalization, on the other hand, is taken to mean the political steering of this growing interaction. Since the salient direction of this steering has been (neo)liberalization, many authors see it as a negative concept; some even take it to be indistinguishable from the Washington

Even less clear is whether the balance sheet on globalization is weighted more to the negative or the positive. It is difficult enough to argue that every international opening and integration is beneficial for everyone. To deal with deepening problems and conflicts—unemployment, pollution, violence, narcotraffic—resulting from the subordination of global liberalization to private interests suggests the need for a political management of globalization and the arbitration of competition among large capital interests through regulation via regional integration projects (European Union, Mercosur). Today discussion revolves around globalization's inevitability: to what degree and whether it is desirable in relation to every aspect of production, circulation, and consumption (Singer 1997).

These differences regarding the meaning and scope of globalization enable us to draw some basic conclusions, but with strong theoretical and methodological consequences: (a) globalization is not a scientific or economic *paradigm* in the sense that it does not need a clearly defined object of study, nor does it offer a coherent and consistent collection of knowledges, digested intersubjectively by specialists and verified in relation to empirical referents (Passeron 1991: 37–48, 362–63); (b) nor can globalization be considered a political or cultural paradigm insofar as it is not the only possible means of development. More than a social order or a single process, globalization is the result of multiple movements, in part contradictory, with open results that entail diverse "local-global and local-local" connections (Mato 1996). The available knowledges on globalization constitute a collection of *narratives*, obtained through partial approximations and diverging on many points.

We observe that this precariousness is usually made invisible in one tendency in recent literature according to two procedures. In the first, globalization is reduced almost to a synonym for neoliberalism and therefore to an indisputable point of departure, a "monolithic thinking" that claims to be beyond ideological struggles. Globalization, in its neoliberal version, attempted to establish a single model for developed and underdeveloped countries that did not want to be left out of the world economy. Thus there appears in some authors something analogous to Marxist theory's category of modes of production (which encompassed in one paradigm the totality of world development and each of the processes by which all societies operate). The central

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Consensus. Other authors argue that the term refers to a conceptual complex that better encompasses cultural aspects. For Ortiz (1997), it is better to use *mundialização* (the Portuguese version) because the word *mundo* or *world* aligns better with the notion of worldview and hence to symbolic representations of the cultural domain (Wolton 2003). [Trans.]

ingredients of this "paradigm" or narrative are the market economy, multipartisanship, the opening of national economies to the exterior, the free circulation of capital, the protection of foreign investment, and intellectual property, fiscal equilibrium, and freedom of the press. Those countries that do not fit this model, like Iraq, Iran, Libya, and Albania, would be exiled from history. Other countries that attempted it would be confirming the universal validity of the paradigm by their adaptation (China, Cuba, and Vietnam). This is the vision of some intellectuals (Fukuyama, Huntington) and of course of the Group of 7 and the First World corporations and banks that direct political economy. The crisis of this model in Mexico and other Latin American countries after December 1994, in Russia and Southeast Asia since 1997, and in Brazil in 1998 and the deepening social conflicts everywhere generate doubts about its consistency and benefits.

The other procedure that conceals the deficiencies in our knowledge of globalization is deployed by those who could care less whether or not it is a paradigm or a scientific model, in keeping with the postmodern principle whereby knowledge is reduced to the coexistence of multiple narratives. I am not proposing a return to positivism, which posited a universally valid knowledge, whose abstract formalization made it applicable to any society. But neither does it seem plausible, in such an interconnected world, to renounce engaging the problems of the universality of knowledge, that is, to seek an interculturally shared rationality that organizes the basic statements coherently. This is even more important when the question is theorizing globalization.

Thinking about the global demands transcending these two positions: the one that renders globalization as the sole and irreversible paradigm, and that which doesn't care whether there is coherence and the inclusion of all. Indeed it seems methodologically necessary, given the tendencies to homogenize *parts* of material and symbolic markets, to find out what is represented by that which globalization excludes in order to constitute itself.

Consequently the hypothesis that I want to develop is that if we do not have a unifying theory of globalization, it is not only because of deficiencies in the present state of knowledge but also because fragmentation is a structural feature of globalizing processes. To state it more clearly: what is usually called globalization appears as a collection of processes of homogenization and, at the same time, an articulated fragmentation of the world that reorders differences and inequalities without eradicating them. I believe that this is beginning to be recognized in a few artistic and scientific narratives.

How do we situate ourselves with respect to these different theories of glo-

balization? In addition to the aforementioned distrust of generalizing theories and the inexistence of universal consensus on them we are confronted with the difficulty of including in a single system of explanation the various dimensions that intervene in these processes. Even economists, business executives, and politicians who strive for a more solid and precise discourse on globalization are obliged to turn to metaphors to describe it. Renato Ortiz (1997: 14) has already called attention to the many images that played the role of concepts: "amoebic society" (Kenichi Ohmae), "global village" (McLuhan), "third wave" (Alvin Toffler). Octavio Ianni (1995: 15–16) expanded the list: "global Disneyland," "technocosmos," "new Babel," "global shopping center." George Soros (1998) uses one of the most eloquent metaphors in referring to the participants in the market: "if they are nationals," they will recognize that, more than aiming at a future equilibrium, "they are shooting at a moving target."

In the context of the European Union, free trade agreements and regional integrations function like a symptom, Marc Abélès tells us, through which we project our disenchantment with modern adventures and our hope for what we might find in globalization. Not even the most integrated and planned unification agreements, like those of the European Union, resolve negative effects (unemployment), nor do they achieve lasting arrangements on social questions and market issues. Even more difficult is organizing free trade zones in which negotiators take the position that it is unnecessary to harmonize policies on employment, migration, and intercultural relations (NAFTA) or where economic negotiation is so hurried that there is no time to coordinate social and political systems (Mercosur).

Narratives and metaphors find their place in the inaccuracies of statistics and prognoses, the vacillations and insufficiencies of policies; during the euphoria of negotiations, under pressure not to lose opportunities to become more competitive, officials dismissed complaints and protests because they "drive without a rearview mirror" (Abélès 1994: 101). Another metaphor heard by the same author while he studied daily life in the European Parliament was that officials, caught in the machinery of supranational decisions, removed from the societies they represent in Brussels, felt like "bodiless angels." Yet the study of the everyday, routine character of negotiations brings into view the cultural bodies that distinguish Anglo-Saxons from Latins, the different value that northern and southern Europeans give to ecology and the media (102). Thus a good part of this book is dedicated to examining how these differences between Anglos and Latins, between Europeans, North Americans, and Latin Americans, evolve and repeat themselves.

If this book gives considerable space to narratives and metaphors it is not only because of globalization's elusive character, like a moving target, but also because in dealing with globalizing processes one has to speak, above all, about the people who migrate or travel, who do not live where they were born, who exchange goods and messages with distant people, watch movies and television from other countries, or tell stories, gathered together, about the country they left. They reunite to celebrate something remote or communicate via email with others without knowing when they will see them again. In a certain sense, their life takes place elsewhere. I want to think about globalization from the perspective of the stories that reveal, in addition to its public existence, the intimacy of the intercultural contacts without which globalization would not be what it is. Insofar as globalization not only homogenizes and brings us closer but also multiplies differences and engenders new inequalities, one cannot value the official version of global finances and mass media that promise to be in all places without understanding the seduction and simultaneous panic of arriving easily at certain places and getting close to different beings, of experiencing the risk of exclusion or feeling condemned to coexist with those whom we are not seeking. Since globalization does not entail being available to all or that we can enter all places, we cannot understand it without the dramas of interculturality and exclusion, the cruel aggressions and self-defenses of racism, and the disputes blown to worldwide proportions when we establish differences between those whom we choose and those who are our unavoidable neighbors. Globalization without interculturality is a UCO, an unidentified cultural object.

Speaking of an unidentified cultural object does not mean that globalization's administrators and analysts do not notice the existence of intercultural processes, diverse modes of communication, cities with different profiles, and divergent artistic movements. But globalization's hegemonic strategy tends to focus only on what can be reduced to the market—that is, what fits in with policies aimed at clients. When those who are different are taken into consideration, they are asked to disidentify, to de-characterize, not necessarily to extinguish themselves.

What Lies between McDonald's and Macondo

We must be careful that the critique of the leveling effect of integration does not thrust us, by impetus of the pendulum's swing, into the opposite extreme, which is to suppose that whatever cannot be reduced to globalization's tendency

to homogenize is resistance.[2] The versatility of cultural processes diminishes when we let our inclination to celebrate what globalizers have not destroyed lead us to forget our desire to participate in globalization. Multicultural migrants, mass media producers and entertainers, and artists want to have the benefit of other audiences, to know and appropriate the fruits of diversity in order to enrich themselves. Critics of market globalism, like Greenpeace and *Le Monde Diplomatique*, take advantage of the opportunities brought by ecological, informational, and political globalization to expand their influence in more countries and languages. Their actions are not a simple resistance to global movements but exploit their ambivalences and contradictions so that they might proliferate together with them. The paradoxes pertain not only to globalization or local cultures but also to "glocalization," that neologism that spreads with the need to designate the interdependence and interpenetration of the global and the local (Beck 2000; Mattelart 1996; Robertson 1996).

Research that pays attention to the exchanges between the global and the local cannot be simply a list of globalization's triumphs or a tally of resistances that limit its success or predict its failure. In accordance with what we now know about globalization, it seems better to conceive of it as a process with various real and virtual agendas, that positions itself on borders or in translocal situations, and works with their diversity. Coca-Cola and Sony "are convinced that globalization does not mean building factories throughout the world, but rather converting themselves into a living part of every culture,"

2. García Canclini crafts the title of this section to convey the complexity of Latin American reality, which encompasses more than the homogenized Americanization of McDonald's or the localist myths of magical realism. The opposition between McDonald's and Macondo, the town in which García Márquez's *One Hundred Years of Solitude* (1966) takes place, was first made and collapsed wittily by Alberto Fuguet and Sergio Gómez in *McOndo* (1996), an anthology of a new generation of writers (most of whom were born in the 1960s) who sought to break the hold that magical realism (of which García Márquez's novel is the epitome) had in the publishing world and hence in the view that others have of Latin Americans. In the prologue the editors declare independence from the "reductionist essentialisms" of magical realism and seek to narrate a world in which the localist clichés rub shoulders with pollution, highways, subways, cable TV, slums, McDonald's, Mac computers, condominiums, five-star hotels, and huge malls. In "Magical Neoliberalism," Fuguet (2001) writes, "McOndo is a global, mixed, diverse, urban, 21st-century Latin America, bursting on TV and apparent in music, art, fashion, film, and journalism, hectic and unmanageable. Latin America is quite literary, yes, almost a work of fiction, but it's not a folk tale. It is a volatile place where the 19th century mingles with the 21st. More than magical, this place is weird. Magical realism reduces a much too complex situation and just makes it cute." This anthology, in turn, led to another set of clichés and the accusation that the writers simply accommodated to neoliberalism. The reality is neither one nor the other set of clichés but a multiplicity of imaginaries. "There are many more options in our future than choosing between McDonald's and Macondo" (28). [Trans.]

says Beck (2000: 46). I do not agree with his next statement: that "a single world culture," that annuls the diverse ways of eating, dressing, and thinking, "would be the end of the market, the end of profits" (46). Aside from anthropological reasons for doubting that local cultures will evaporate, the main problem is that capitalism develops its expansive tendencies by *homogenizing* and *at the same time* taking advantage of multiplicity. In this sense I do agree with Beck's last statement, in that part of his reasoning in which he posits that relocalization subsequent to delocalization does not mean automatically "the rebirth of the local." The celebration of Bavarian sausages, cited by Beck, or of reggae and tango musics or of Nordic design is not a barrier to entering the global domain. The affirmation of particular traditions may lead us to situate ourselves in the global or its margins in ways quite different from simple "McDonaldization," but not in only one manner nor as a simple opposition. We will be able to more thoroughly address this matter when we deal with contrasting cultural policies that Latin American countries deploy to situate themselves competitively in cultural markets: the export of melodramas and folk music, submission to the equalization of their differences, the strengthening of endogenous production and intraregional circulation, the development of new regional cultural programs and institutions to accompany trade integration among countries. There are many more options in our future than choosing between McDonald's and Macondo.

There are socioeconomic reasons why the global cannot do without the local, or why the local or national cannot expand, or even survive, disconnected from globalizing movements (Robertson 1996). Here I will dwell on the cultural arguments that lead us to think of them together. One of them is that narrating stories in the global era, even if they tell our own history, where we were born and live, is to speak for others, narrating not only what exists but imagining it outside of our cognitive framework. And for this reason as well, metaphors are important because they explain the meaning of something by comparison with something different. We tell stories and employ metaphors because when speaking of what we have, we want to refer to something else, because participating in any market—whether of food, money, or images—is like shooting at a moving target.

The narratives of what is remote but feels like one's own, the metaphors that compare this with that, intensified since Europe initiated its modern expansion. Latin America was one of the catalysts of this metaphoric game. But narratives and metaphors have an even greater protagonist role in this century of massive labor migrations and political and economic exile of those who flee wars and governments dedicated to globalizing the macroeconomy in such a

way that it excludes those who are not elites. Although the process began before we can call it globalization proper, these movements of the second half of the twentieth century bring us to the point at which, for example, a fifth of all Mexicans and a fourth of all Cubans live in the United States. Los Angeles became the third-largest Mexican city, Miami the second-greatest concentration of Cubans, Buenos Aires the third-largest Bolivian city. How can we think of a nation when it is to a great degree in another place? How do we imagine a city or a country when a large number of those who inhabit it are not from here, when the books, movies, and television programs that define us are produced in remote vantage points?

Postcards for a Bestiary of Globalization

If it is useful to inform oneself about any aspect of social life through those experts in narrative and metaphors known as artists and writers, it is even more pertinent when the phenomena we try to describe are elusive and refer to places and peoples who are elsewhere. As sometimes occurs in history, when metaphors of the ungraspable allude to very rapid and violent changes in customary identities, they sometimes result in conciliatory images. In other cases, they conjure up monsters.

1. THERE ARE THIRTY-SIX FLAGS of different countries, made with little plastic boxes filled with colored sand. The flags are interconnected by tubes, through which ants travel, eating away at them and muddling them. Yukinori Yanagi made the first version of this work in 1993 for the Venice Biennial. In 1994 he re-created it in San Diego with the flags of three American countries, in the context of *inSITE*, a multinational art triennial. After a few weeks the flags were unrecognizable. Yanagi's work can be interpreted as a metaphor of the workers who, by migrating throughout the world, are muddling nationalisms and imperialisms. But not all viewers saw it this way. When the artist presented this work at the Venice Biennial, the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals succeeded in shutting it down for a few days so that Yanagi would not continue "exploiting ants." Other reactions had to do with spectators' reluctance to see the differences between nations undermined. The artist, on the other hand, tried to top off this experience by dissolving identities: the species of ant obtained in Brazil for the 1996 São Paulo Biennial seemed too slow to Yanagi, who feared, at the beginning of the exhibition, that it would not disarray the flags quickly enough.

The metaphor suggests that massive migrations and globalization may convert today's world into a system of flows and interactivity in which the differences between nations dissolve. Demographic data do not buttress this image of total fluidity, nor that of a generalized transnational mobility. The total number of people that leave their country to settle in another for more than a year oscillates between 130 and 150 million, that is, 2.3 percent of the world's population. "The 'nomadic planet,' in which one moves and circulates ever more rapidly at a globally diminishing cost," affirms Gilda Simon (1999: 43), "is, in fact, populated by sedentary people, and the image of a world overrun by uncontrollable migratory waves is but one in a great storehouse of clichés."

Not even from the perspective of economics can one make the generalization that globalization supersedes nations and that we live in a world without borders. Financial markets are fully globalized, and the fact that they have increased their transactions five times over in the past fifteen years gives them greater importance within the wider economy. But a large share of trade is still national or intraregional, and globalizing pressures foster the creation of regional economic blocs, such that some states' decision-making capacity is reinforced, especially in Europe (Giddens 1998). With regard to culture, as I analyze in the following chapters, there are globalizing tendencies, especially in the culture industries, but that doesn't justify speaking of a global culture that would replace national cultures because only a small fraction of film, music, and Internet productions are generated without local features.

Some anthropologists, following Ulf Hannerz, adopt the narrative of "global cultural flows," with the proviso that interaction is not indiscriminate. This specialist in "transnational connections" explains that "flows have directions" and gravitate to particular scenarios. Which scenarios prevail? He cites "New York, Hollywood and the headquarters of the World Bank" (Hannerz 1997: 5). We could expand the list, but we would only continue to confirm that almost all important symbols of globalization are found in the United States and Japan, a few in Europe still, and almost none in Latin America. Hannerz also gives examples of counterflows, exhibitions of African artists in London and therapeutic groups in Oslo that use Malaysian dream interpretation techniques. But these and other recognitions of crafts, literature, and peripheral knowledges do not let us forget the "asymmetries of flows," evident in the unequal diffusion of basic skills and modern institutional forms, of Western-style primary and higher education, of managerial practices and biomedical knowledge. Because of this, Hannerz argues that the fluidity with which goods and messages flow and counterflow does not elide the difference between centers and peripheries.

Globalizing movements sometimes condense into artistic or literary metaphors that make visible the new conditions in which the world's cultural diversity interacts. Nevertheless we need to contextualize these images with hard macrosocial data in order to locate the horizon of intelligibility of a metaphor and where its imaginative potential loses heuristic value.

2. COMMUNICATION WITH what is beyond the local may make it seem that identities dissolve or may lead us to look for vague global referents. A theater director returns to the streets of Montevideo where he played soccer as a child and remembers that when that sport was a game and not a business the relations between children were also different. Each time someone scored a goal, the group embraced in celebration: "This gave us the chance to look at each other face to face, and position ourselves body to body, showing a kind of unity" within the neighborhood or the street that was closed for play. Today when someone scores a goal, he and the others behind him go out to celebrate, "greeting an imaginary public, as if in front of an audience." They no longer form a circle, but rather—as one sees on television sports programs—they greet "a planetary public" (Galli 1999). This more "abstract" relation with the virtual media grandstand, which we find in other cities, incorporates gestures of famous players from diverse nations. In the streets of Mexico, after scoring a goal, I have seen some children running to the edge of the field, in front of a nonexistent yet imagined box seat, repeating the acrobatics of Hugo Sánchez, or others making the rock-a-bye-baby motions that Bebeto initiated after becoming a father, or still others leap-crawling like "Nápoles the worm."

3. BEYOND THE BOUNDARIES of national communities there is a dispersion of goods, people, and messages. The rejection of people who live otherwise or of compatriots who moved to another country is accompanied by the use of animal names to designate their difference. The Cubans in Miami, called *maggots* (*gusanos*) on the island, became *butterflies* when Cuba began to accept the dollars they brought as tourists and reestablished relations with those who lived there. The rapprochement between Cubans inside and outside the island, and the increasing exchanges between Mexicans, Colombians, and Argentines who live in their home countries with their conationals residing in the United States, shows that separation generates disqualifications and attractions—in other words, ambivalent transnational communities. New circuits and networks form, linking together those who live in distant places. The continual

remittances from Mexicans residing in the United States add up more or less to $7 billion per year.[3] Absent community members return for feasts or short visits. Communication is sustained and renewed every week by telephone, fax, email, radio, and written messages. How much do Latin Americans living in the United States spend on telephone calls to their countries of origin? Maxine L. Margolis's study in the early 1990s, before Internet use was widespread, found that 95 percent of Brazilians residing in New York habitually telephoned Brazil, spending between $85 and $200 monthly.

This globalized traffic can be just as significant in peripheral societies, as evidenced by the remittances in dollars sent by migrants, constituting the third source of external revenue in the Mexican economy and the first in the Salvadoran economy. Moreover narratives are sent from one country to another, each national culture's horizon is broadened, and binational shared rituals soften borders. Distances are almost eliminated. A Bolivian radio station in Buenos Aires, in addition to transmitting melodies and news that generate nostalgia, proposes rituals for imaginary encounters: "Our music. Join your hands, friends. Close your eyes and imagine that we are in our homeland." As an anthropologist who studied this group said, communication no longer takes place "around the village fire but around the village constituted by the radio." In that media space the nation recomposes itself outside of relations with the specific territory called Bolivia (Grimson 1999).

4. OTHER MOVEMENTS expressive of transnational permeability are represented by Marcos Ramírez Erre's Trojan horse installation at the border checkpoint between Tijuana and San Diego in the 1997 edition of the *inSITE* urban art program. That Tijuanan constructed an eighty-two-foot-tall wooden horse with two heads, one facing the United States, the other facing Mexico. This way, he avoids the stereotype of the unidirectional penetration from South to North. He also distances himself from the contrary beliefs of those who say that migrations from the South are unwittingly smuggling in what is not accepted in the United States. The artist told me that this fragile and

3. Remittances from the United States to Mexico increased exponentially, from $9 billion in 2001 to $26 billion in 2007, then dropped 3.6 percent in 2008 to $25.15 billion and 15.7 percent in 2009 to $21.2 billion, due to the economic crisis, which discouraged many Mexicans from migrating to the United States, and many of those in the United States to return to their homeland. Since then, remittances (and migration) have begun to increase slowly, 0.12 percent in 2010 to $21.27 billion and an estimated 5 percent in 2011, according to the Mexican Central Bank (Moreno 2011). [Trans.]

ephemeral “antimonument” is “translucent because we already know all their intentions toward us, and they know our intentions toward them.” Located in the midst of Mexican vendors circulating between the cars amassed in front of the checkpoint stations, who previously offered Aztec calendars or Mexican handicrafts and now add “Spider Man and Walt Disney characters,” Ramírez Erre presents not a work of nationalist affirmation but a modified universal symbol. The alteration of that commonplace of historical iconography that is the Trojan horse seeks to convey the multidirectionality of the messages and the ambiguities generated by the use the media make of them. The artist reproduced the horse on T-shirts and postcards so they could be sold alongside the Aztec calendar and the Disney characters. He also made available four Trojan costumes so that people could put them on to be photographed next to the “monument,” an ironic allusion to the photographic mementos that tourists take of the symbols of “Mexicanness” and the American way of life.

IN THESE FOUR CASES local community is transcended. But its articulation with the global is imagined in diverse ways. Yanagi’s ants’ deconstruction of the flags suggests a generalized interaction in which signs of identity are dissolved. In the second example, when the children greet a planetary public, the particular references to Mexican and Brazilian players are not totally lost but are subordinated to a global imaginary: the actors celebrate an event that is local only for those who see it on that street, all the while thinking transnationally. As for the Bolivians who live in Buenos Aires, one imagines a community that includes those who live in Bolivia, which affirms nationalism despite the dispersion and the distance; the ritual of holding hands with those who are here and listening to music made by those who are over there brings together groups that attempt to erase the distance without forgetting their ethnonational difference. In the last case, in which the two-headed horse represents bidirectionality and reciprocity of interactions, the transparency of the animal suggests that what “they want to do with us and we with them” can no longer be hidden. The conflict is explicit, yet it isn’t represented by nationalistic images but by a multinational symbol, which when reinterpreted invites reflection on a specific border. While Yanagi’s work, situated on the same U.S.-Mexican border, celebrates the dissolution of national boundaries, Ramírez’s two-headed horse together with his installation-performance (T-shirts and Trojan costumes for cross-dressing and taking photographs, souvenirs that parody the neohandicrafts for tourists’ consumption) shed light on how intercultural misunderstandings occur on a particular border.

These examples are four prevailing ways of reelaborating the connections and breaks between the concrete and the abstract, the immediate and the intercultural. The difficulty of naming these changes and communicating with those who are different compels us to imagine them with metaphors and give them order through rituals. The different images reveal different ways of conceiving the redistribution that nowadays takes place between what is our own and what is foreign. We need to determine with the most objective facts that we can obtain whether these recompositions are to be named internationalization, transnationalization, or globalization; multiculturalism, racism, North-South inequality, clash of civilizations, or contact zones. I suggested at the beginning of this chapter why some words designate different processes with greater relevance, which ones leave out too many innovations or enduring traditions, and which others remained anchored in other eras. But at the same time, the narratives and metaphors suggest the coexistence of different eras in tension between the local and the global, and actors' contradictory personal experiences, whose intensity and multivalence are difficult to enclose within concepts.

Is the use of metaphors a deficient, provisional, almost inadmissible resource of social thought, which we turn to while we forge scientific concepts? Or is the use of metaphors necessary to better understand how society functions and how to act within it? The first, positivist perspective is incompatible with the most respected theories of metaphor, for example those of Jacques Derrida and Paul Ricoeur, yet it survives in the crude empiricism with which many economists look at the ambiguities found in research on culture. But since metaphors in fact proliferate in the hard discourses on globalization, it is fitting to take them seriously as a resource that is not transitory. It is beyond this book's objectives to focus on the debates on metaphor, for example that between Derridean deconstruction and Ricoeur's hermeneutics. But at least let me say that I refer to the metaphors used by those who speak about globalization not with the intention of pointing to the precariousness of their discourses but rather because what is said about the global evinces, to an extreme, the indeterminacies of the social. Metaphorical operations can be read as allusions to what cannot be captured by univocal concepts, to what is lived in tension with what might be lived, between structured and destructuring forces.

For similar reasons, narration is much more than a resource for speaking within culture. Every economic discourse can be read as narrative (as opposed to paradigm, as I stated earlier), and even more so when it refers to globalizing movements, regarding which discourse as a bearer of meaning and reference

is indefinite. Where are financial activities taking us? What type of society is taking shape with the accumulation of migrants? The imaginary is a dimension of their "reality." Metaphors and narratives, which create the imaginary, produce knowledge in their attempt to grasp what becomes fleeting in the global disorder, that which cannot be delimited by borders but rather crosses them, or believes that it crosses them but sees them reappear a little farther on, in the barriers of discrimination. Metaphors tend to figure, to make visible that which moves, combines, or mixes. Narratives seek to trace an order amid the profusion of travels and communications, in the diversity of "others."

Metaphors moreover are of particular importance when we speak of interculturality because their vocation for comparison, playing with what is different and what is similar, constructs meaning not as something in itself, self-controlled, and self-sufficient; it takes into account what pertains to others. Society, understood in this metaphoric mode, "exists only in the detour of other phenomena," other ways of being. This relay to what is diverse can be achieved via detours through the animal world, as we saw in the metaphors referred to earlier (which are not necessarily pejorative). It can also make present the multiplicity of meanings of what is human. If to understand we need the rigor and fixity of concepts, metaphors deliver meaning "obliquely, through allusions and associations, through an *intelligence of passage*" (Mons 1994: 216).

An arduous issue for the social sciences is how to combine narratives and explanation, metaphors and theory. In what follows it will be seen that I have tried to avoid two ways of doing this: (a) treating narratives and metaphors as cases whose accumulation permits generalizations (inductivist empiricism); (b) treating them as utilitarian illustrations that exemplify theoretical principles constructed a priori (deductivist theoricism). I prefer to see these cases as exemplary or strategic because of their capacity to challenge prefabricated conceptualizations about globalization and interculturality, whether they are theoretical and abstract schemas or common "empiricist" meanings. Case studies are important to me because they help to re-create those ways of thinking and at the same time configure new readings of empirical materials on the basis of theoretical work.

Doing Fieldwork on Mexico in Edinburgh

This articulation of the objective and the subjective has to do not only with the subjectivity of informants. As is often the case in cultural and anthropological studies, it is useful for the researcher to specify under what contextual

conditions, including personal or group locus of enunciation, he or she selects the data and constructs the questions so as to control, insofar as is possible, those very contextual conditionings.

Let me try to give various explanations of how I confront these issues, as an Argentine exiled in Mexico, who studied in France and in recent years feels compelled to answer, like any other Mexican, when asked if to live in this country makes one a Latin American or a North American. For now I want to refer to a situation that made me realize how urgent it is to renew the capacity of the social sciences to reflect on such vast and diversified universes. It happened in October 1996, when I found myself doing anthropology about Mexico in Edinburgh.

I was invited, along with other specialists from Europe and Latin America, to the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Stirling to speak about "the borders between cultures." I wondered where the intercultural borders are today if we contrast this growing interest in Latin America in the Anglophone world with the limited dialogue we have with the Latin countries of Europe, like France and Italy, that have sent us large migratory contingents and have had and continue to have such a forceful influence in our continent. Why are academic exchanges with and translations of Latin American authors more prevalent in the United States than in the Latin societies of Europe?

I thought of these "paradoxes," which I worked on in the meeting at Stirling, and treat more extensively here, while having dinner in an Italian restaurant in Edinburgh. After being obligated to speak in my English-in-case-of-emergency by a loquacious waiter, I found out that he was Mexican. There began one of those unforeseen fieldwork experiences: he told me that it was difficult for him to say from what part of Mexico he came because his father, a government official, had been sent to direct projects in Querétaro, then in San Miguel de Allende, Mexico City, and other cities. In the intervals between waiting on other tables, he told me that he had studied engineering in Querétaro and had gotten a scholarship to work "on marine biology" in Guaymas, but he preferred to go to Los Angeles following a friend. "I was more interested in meeting people from other countries than socializing with the same people all the time." He had also lived in San Francisco, Canada, and Paris, and he had combined what he heard in those heterogeneous societies with his own ideas on multiculturality. He told me that in Los Angeles "they are cosmopolitan, but not so much because many groups only socialize among themselves. They meet in their workplaces, but then each returns to his house, to his neighborhood." And he concluded that "capitalism breeds segregation." Every so often he said "the Jews have the most power in the United States." About blacks, he

said "they have great belief in their heroes, but the discrimination they face weakens them. They are strong only in music." "And what throws us Mexicans off is our need to drink when we do business." His reflections showed that the mere accumulation of multicultural experiences does not automatically generate hybridization, nor a democratic understanding of differences.

When the restaurant closed, we went to my hotel to have a drink, and there he explained to me that "things function better in the United States than in the United Kingdom. The Scots are proud, but passive. The Americans have an active pride: they are recognized throughout the world, they make themselves known in business, and they never want to lose." He spoke with such admiration for his life in Los Angeles that I asked him why he had left that city. "Because when I understand something and I learn how it is done, it's like wanting to change a video: I get bored." His multicultural flexibility was remarkable; when he spoke Italian it was almost as good as his English, despite never having been in Italy. He learned it by interacting with his coworkers and performing "Italianness" every day via *agnellottis*, *carpaccios*, and Chianti wines.

When I asked why he decided to live in Edinburgh, he told me that his wife was Scottish, and then he surprised me—for someone who had traveled through many parts of Mexico, the United States, and Canada—by saying that he liked the Scottish because "they are not cosmopolitan. They are conservative people who believe in family and are proud of what they have. They travel as tourists, but they are at ease and feel content with the security in this city of 400,000 inhabitants."

Last, he told me he wanted to open a quality Mexican restaurant because he did not like the tortillas sold in Tex-Mex restaurants in Edinburgh because they came from Denmark. (This reminded me of the celebrations of Mexican independence on September 15 in Buenos Aires. The few Mexicans who live there and hundreds of Argentines who were exiled in Mexico get together, and the ambassador hires the only group of mariachis to be found in Argentina, made up of Paraguayans living in Buenos Aires.)

Then the Mexican waiter in Edinburgh asked me to send him a tortilla recipe when I returned to Mexico. He asked this of me, an Argentine who arrived two decades ago in Mexico as an exiled philosopher who stayed because I learned anthropology and was fascinated by many Mexican customs, although one of the difficulties in adapting is the spicy food, which is why I choose Italian restaurants as my preferred eateries. This inclination comes from the precarious system known as Argentine cuisine, which came into being with the energetic presence of Italian migrants, who mixed with Spaniards, Jews,

Arabs, and gauchos to form a nationality. Belonging to a fusion identity of the displaced helped this philosopher-turned-anthropologist to represent Mexican identity before a Mexican married to a Scottish woman, who represented Italianness in a restaurant in Edinburgh.

I know that among the millions of Mexicans residing in the United States, or those who have passed through the country, similar stories can be found that make it problematic to know who represents nationality nowadays, and how. This cannot be limited to those who inhabit the territory of a nation. It was not the place of residence that defined our preferences that night in Edinburgh. Nor was it language or food that constituted the identity features that assigned us rigidly into a single nationality. He and I had drawn from several repertoires, habits, and ways of thinking, heterogeneous signs of identity that allowed us to perform diverse roles, even out of context.

It seemed evident to me that it is no longer possible to understand these paradoxes with an anthropology whose object of study is local, traditional, and stable cultures. Hence the future for anthropologists (and other social scientists) depends on our taking up again that other part of the discipline that has trained us to examine alterity and interculturality, the tensions between the local and the global. James Clifford (1997: 31) writes that the object of investigation should be "translocal cultures," mediations between inhabited spaces and itineraries: it is imperative "to rethink culture as sites of dwelling and travel."

From Narratives to a Cultural Theory of Globalization

I revisit here the issue I raised a moment ago: What to do with these stories and metaphors so as to construct a conceptual framework capable of organizing the divergent perspectives and imaginaries of globalization in a definition and ensemble of methodological procedures that enable a reasonable examination of its ambivalences? Let me point out some necessary theoretical changes to the customary understandings of *culture* and *globalization*.

CULTURE REDEFINED

Globalizing changes have modified how we conceive of culture. Between the 1960s and 1980s sociosemiotic studies, along with anthropology, sociology, and other disciplines, determined that culture designated processes of production, circulation, and consumption of meaning in social life. This definition is sill useful in allaying the temptations to reinstate dualisms (between material and spiritual, economic and symbolic, or individual and collective).

This definition also has the virtue of grasping culture as a process in which meanings can vary.

Nevertheless that definition—conceived for each society with the pretension of universal validity—does not include what constitutes each culture in its difference from others. It is noteworthy that various authors proposed to reconceptualize this term in the 1990s in order to speak about interculturality. Arjun Appadurai prefers to consider culture not as a noun—as an object or thing—but as an adjective. *The cultural* facilitates discussion of culture as a dimension that refers to "differences, contrasts, and comparisons," permitting culture to be thought of "less as a property of individuals and groups and more as a heuristic device that we can use to talk about difference" (1996: 12–13).

Fredric Jameson has been more radical in redefining culture "as the ensemble of stigmata one group bears in the eyes of the other group (and vice versa)." He also affirms that culture "is not a 'substance' or a phenomenon in its own right, it is an objective mirage that arises out of the relationship between at least two groups." "Culture must thus always be seen as a vehicle or a medium whereby the relationship between groups is transacted" (1993: 33, 34).

On this view, the role that the imaginary plays in the cultural is evident, but it is an intercultural imaginary, not a mere supplement of what each local culture represents of what is lived in a given society. In the first place, images *represent and constitute the social*, as has often been demonstrated in studies of the role of urban and media imaginaries. In the second place, today it is evident that we represent and constitute with images what happens to our society in *relation to others* because the territorial relations with what is one's own are traversed by links to those who reside in other territories, who speak to us and send messages that cease being foreign because so many of our own live over there and many of the others come here. Metaphors and narratives are forms of organization of imaginaries; they give order to the dispersion of meaning in the act of imagining, a dispersion that is accentuated in a globalized world. Last, that ordering is always a "fluctuating framework" (Mons 1994: 252): an instrument that enables society to function in a meaningful way and poetically approach that which is not visible. In sum, the cultural encompasses the ensemble of processes through which we represent and constitute the social imaginarily, through which we conceive and manage our relations with others, that is, our differences, by which we give order to their dispersion and incommensurability by delimitating what fluctuates between the order that makes possible the functioning of (local and global) society and the actors that open society to the possible.

GLOBALIZATION TAKING CHARGE OF CULTURE

As we began to see in this chapter, macrosocial data demonstrate that globalization is a historical stage that took shape in the second half of the twentieth century, in which the convergence of economic, financial, communication, and migratory processes accentuates the interdependence between vast sectors of many societies and generates new flows and structures of supranational interconnection.

Let us analyze the parts of this definition. When I characterize globalization as *a phenomenon initiated in the second half of the twentieth century*, I do not forget that the transformations that have taken place since the beginning of capitalism and modernity paved the way for the global era. But I can't ignore the qualitative and quantitative differences in the interrelation between nations engendered by the conjunction of economic, financial, communication, and migratory changes, which distinguish this period from what occurred in the colonial and imperialist stages and from the internationalization of economy and culture.

The second observation that I want to make is that the definition not only stresses the three most developed factors in theories of globalization: economic, financial, and communicational. Global processes, and the images that represent them, are constituted by the most fluid circulation of *capital, goods, and messages*, but also of *people* that move between countries and cultures—migrants, tourists, executives, students, professionals—with frequent trips back and forth, who maintain steady links between societies of origin and transit, all of which was not possible until the middle of the twentieth century. To incorporate this aspect into the theory of globalization, as do various anthropologists (Appadurai, Hannerz, Ortiz, among others) and some sociologists (Beck, Giddens), is to recognize, so to speak, the human foundation in this process, without which the theory is reduced to economic flows and anonymous processes. To register the global from a depersonalized point of view is to collude with the neoliberal doctrine that affirms in a single proposition both the freedom and the fatality of markets, but at the cost of isolating the economy by precluding dialogues compatible with sociological and anthropological theories that refuse to disregard people when they raise questions about the place where liberty and decisions are wrought.

Building on these arguments, let me anticipate an insight that I develop further on, which is that to include the role of people, and therefore the cultural dimension of globalization, permits taking into account three issues: *drama, responsibility, and the possibility of reorienting the itinerary.* When I say that it

is not only a matter of the movement of capital, goods, and messages, I am thinking of the uprooting of migrants, the pain of the exiled, the tension between having the goods one has and those that publicity promises—in sum, the dramatic rifts endured by people who do not live where they were born.

Then we need to turn to the people who make, reproduce, and undergo globalization—and even those who are excluded from it—to make it possible once again to identify those who are responsible for these processes. While corporations (that legal-economic figure symptomatic of globalization, which nevertheless preceded it) may overshadow the protagonism of other social actors, social theory cannot so easily ignore the subjects of actions. It is necessary to identify the responsible groups and those who undergo the changes, those who move the capital and the goods, and emit, circulate, and receive messages.

Insofar as we encounter actors who choose, make decisions, and provoke effects (that might have been otherwise), globalization ceases to be seen as an anonymous game of market forces ruled solely by the demand for greater profits in supranational competition. "The laws of the market" comes into view as too rational and teleological a formula when we observe in recent years the erratic fluctuations of capital and goods as they shift, grow, or vanish. But the most interesting line of reasoning is that the reappearance of people and groups in social theory permits us to conceive of globalization in other ways.

The worldwide reorganization of societies seems to be an irreversible process that leaves few possibilities of success for those who want to return to previous epochs or construct alternative societies delinked from the global. In this sense, the metaphor of the ants that dissolve flags is eloquent. But this economic, political, and communicational realism does not imply that we need agree with the fatalistic one-dimensional way in which economists and businesspeople globalize us, with the complacent or irascible assent of many consumers. To think of globalization as a logical consequence of the convergence of economic, communication, and migratory changes does not foreclose conceiving of it at the same time as an open process that can develop in various directions. This is insinuated in the comparison of imaginaries of children playing soccer in the street, of displaced Bolivians, of the two-headed horse on the Mexico-U.S. border, and the Mexican performing Italianness in Edinburgh.

Letting the actors speak from the purview of their particular experiences of interculturality can contribute to regaining power in the face of the prevailing fatalism of economists. We consumers can expand the active character of our behavior to the point of reinventing our way of being citizens. Because of this, the critical analysis of globalization goes hand in hand with overcoming the

political impotence at the end of this century that began with a profusion of revolutions, political and artistic vanguards, and other transformative imaginaries. The problem of the (open) meaning of globalization leads to including cultural and political issues in its theorization.

In any case, I am not being voluntaristic when I include the imaginary in the definition of the global. Rather I am being rigorously descriptive. On the one hand, the proposed definition indicates convergence of empirically observable—economic, financial, communication, and migratory—processes that accentuate interdependence on a world scale. At the same time, the intensification of ancient links and the construction of new flows and exchange structures do not put all inhabitants of the planet in a situation of copresence and interaction. Only some sectors produce, sell, and consume globalized goods and messages. If Benedict Anderson (1983: 6) called nations "imagined communities" because "the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them," it is even more pertinent to call globalization imagined. In that same text, Anderson recalled a sentence by Ernest Renan to the effect that "the essence of a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten many things"; Renan gave the example of the French, who in order to affirm what unites them forget the night of Saint Bartholomew and the Midday Massacres in the twelfth century.

In regard to globalization, those who propagate it would not be very persuasive if the precarious world integration achieved in economy and communications were not accompanied by the imaginary whereby all members of all societies can know, see, and hear others, and by forgetting those who never will be incorporated into global networks. That is why the imaginary is a necessary feature of globalization. Segregation is the "necessary" reverse of integrations, and inequality limits the promises of communication.

THREE

MARKET AND INTERCULTURALITY

Latin America between Europe and the United States

Who are our others? This question is being reformulated in times of globalization. Moreover it is impossible to answer it in the same way in all cases; for example, it is one thing to speak of finances, a sector where all the governments and companies interact feebly each day, and another to speak of other, more durable economic, communication, and migratory exchanges, which link us to some societies and certain sectors within them. Globalizing movements adopt distinct formats in different regional integrations, which sometimes operate defensively and other times serve as filters of global exchanges. In this chapter I elaborate on the particular ways the cultural relations between Latin America, Europe, and the United States are negotiated within a global system.

The historical interaction among these regions was recomposed in the past two decades by the free trade agreements that link the United States, Canada, and Mexico, or those developing in the Southern Common Market (Mercosur), and between the latter and those of other Latin American countries with the European Union. However, there are few studies on how Latin American

cultures are changing as they move from their historical relationship with Europe to a new relationship with the United States. Just as globalization carries hidden cultural effects, these processes of regional integration are moving forward quickly to forge agreements with little consideration for the radical symbolic changes they generate, both in societies and communication systems as well as in the representations that each nation has of itself and of others.

I propose to bring together some historical and anthropological analyses of these changes and to suggest research agendas for comparing and contrasting the events, data, and narratives of the past with the present situation. This entails exploring what remains of the conquest and colonization of America, of the modern relations between Latin American and European nations after independence in the nineteenth century, of the exchanges during the twentieth century, and of the partial transfer of these economic and cultural links to the new dependency on the United States. What remains of the European rediscovery of America brought about by the fifth centennial (1992) and the attempt by the Latin countries of Europe, especially Spain, to compete with North Americans for a share of Latin American markets and to capitalize on their mediation of the 480 million consumers there as a means to prove themselves to other European countries?[1]

There are now many more books and journals dedicated to these themes than have been published in the previous five hundred years, and there has emerged a spate of conferences and seminars, several international expositions, new cultural centers and the strengthening of those already established by Germany, Spain, and France in Latin American countries. I should mention, moreover, European companies' acquisition of banks and industries in various Latin American countries and of Argentine and Mexican publishing houses, and more recently the purchase of various Latin American telephone companies, as well as investments in television and the press, all of which are destined to occupy a significant role in the multimedia recomposition of Latin America.

If to this incomplete list of the historical links between Europe and Latin America we add the twists and turns of interculturality, the modifications

1. As of July 2011 the CIA *World Factbook* registers over 580 million Spanish and Portuguese speakers in Latin America (https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2119.html?countryName=&countryCode= ®ionCode=%C5%BE). According to the 2010 U.S. Census, there are 50.5 million Hispanics in the United States, over half of whom speak Spanish. According to Statistics Canada, there were 304,245 Hispanics in Canada. With U.S. and Canadian Hispanics included, the total number of Spanish and Portuguese speakers in the Western Hemisphere is significantly over 600 million. [Trans.]

wrought by these exchanges becomes more complete. Latin American societies, formed by Spanish, Portuguese, French, English, and Dutch colonization, and augmented during the twentieth century by vast migrations from European and Asian countries, have expelled millions of children and grandchildren of those migrants to Europe during the military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s and also because of economic impoverishment and unemployment.

These comings and goings between Europeans and Latin Americans become even more intricate when we recognize that the United States is interposed in their midst. Various European publishing houses, telecommunications companies, and manufacturers of automobiles, food, and clothing that invest in Latin America also look to the almost 30 million Spanish speakers that constitute the U.S. market.[2] In the meantime Latin American governments signed free trade agreements with European countries in the 1990s in order to diversify their economies so as to not remain trapped in too exclusive a relationship with the United States.

Such oscillations are being studied more by North American than European and Latin American universities. Some institutions study the Latin American, U.S., and European markets and the economic alliances between these regions for pragmatic reasons; other researchers deconstruct and criticize what they consider the postcolonial condition of Latin American societies. A Cuban professor at the State University of New York at Stony Brook estimates that "there are more professors of Latin American literature remunerated at middle-class levels in New York and California than there are in all of Latin America. . . . If the nation is an imagined community we conjure into existence, how do we describe those 'other' nations or regions we construct in the process of teaching and writing about them from discursive communities anchored in Europe or North American societies?" (De la Campa 1999: 15, 2).

The dispute over how Latin America, Europe, and the United States should integrate and compete economically is also a dispute over how to narrate the convergences and the conflicts. Can the old narratives that organized the expectations of migrants and the agreements that in another age of the international division of labor managed the exchanges now include new phenomena and processes: political exiles and migrations due to globalization, the imaginary of tourists, recent forms of discrimination, the recomposition of local and regional traditions, of what is Latin and what is Anglo, propelled

2. As stated in note 1, there are 50.5 million Hispanics/Latinos (not necessarily Spanish speakers) in the United States, according to the 2010 U.S. census. Hispanic buying power was estimated at $1 trillion in 2010 by the Selig Center for Economic Growth (Humphreys 2010). [Trans.]

by transnational media strategies? What has changed is not only what must be narrated but also who narrates. Although schools, museums, and books continue to shape how we see others, lettered culture has been displaced by audiovisual and electronic communication, and the public institutions of every nation have been replaced by transnational corporations.

I have selected four nuclei of interaction between Europeans, Latin Americans, and North Americans: the sociocultural meaning of migrations, conceptions of the market and interculturality, identities within globalization, and cultural policies. I do not propose to trace the history of these processes, which has been accomplished in part, although there is still much that remains to be researched. I want to tackle how some narratives about these histories are structured and confront them with hard data that challenge them. Unlike other studies, I am less interested in destroying the "myths" transmitted by those stories than in identifying zones of disagreement between narrations and practices. It's a matter of understanding, to some extent, how those narratives condition the practices and facilitate or hinder alliances.

Migrations Then and Now

One of the areas in which the narrations do not coincide with historic events is the displacement of populations. I already pointed out that the importance acquired by migrations and other forms of travel in the second half of the twentieth century led postmodernists to posit nomadism as the explanatory key of our contemporaneity. But, to be exact, massive migrations did not begin in this century. It is calculated that between 1846 and 1930 some 52 million people left Europe, of which 72 percent went to the United States, 21 percent to Latin America, and 1 percent to Australia. The British Isles contributed the most to those movements (18,020,000 migrants). Of the Europeans who in that period arrived in Latin America, 38 percent were Italian, 28 percent were Spanish, and 11 percent were Portuguese. The majority of Latin migrants chose Argentina as their destination, then Brazil, Cuba and the Antilles, Uruguay, and Mexico. Thus of the 200 million people living in Europe at the beginning of the twentieth century, 25 percent left. In regard to America, the arrival of migrants during the period 1840–1940 increased the population of Argentina by 40 percent, the United States by 30 percent, and Canada and Brazil by almost 15 percent each (González Martínez 1996).

As is usually pointed out in the literature on migration, in this period it is necessary to distinguish between voluntary migration, almost always for economic reasons, and migration due to violence, political persecution, or wars. It

is not the same, writes Clara E. Lida (1997: 17), to cross the Atlantic "in search of bread or peace." It is also fitting to differentiate the impact of each migrant group, measured by the volume of the displaced and their economic capacity and educational level, which either helped or hindered their contributions to the development of the receiving country. Groups like the Spanish, Italians, and Jews bolstered their contributions to various American societies due to their strength in those three areas. Although it is not possible to ascertain definite proportions, not even with respect to the volume and impact of the Spanish presence, it can be said that in 1914 there were 830,000 Spaniards in Argentina (11 percent of the population) and that 30,000 Spaniards resided in Mexico (0.2 percent of the population). But one must remember that they had established New Spain in this territory in preceding centuries. The differences in these migratory stages and the reasons for migrating shaped the perceptions that Europeans and Americans had of each other. Insofar as those migrants not only made it in America but also made America,[3] as Lida explains, clashes with the indigenous peoples, later with the *criollos* and postindependence modernizers cannot be analyzed only from the purview of conflict and divergences; we also should reflect on assimilation and the reconfiguration of the local that intertwines with the divergences.

In this and the following chapters I return to some of these historical differences to understand diverse modes of interculturality. I am interested in investigating, above all, how Europeans' American dream became *the American dream*: What happens to intercultural imaginaries when their references and conditions of interaction change?

Beyond quantitative differences, today's demographic movements are distinguished by other characteristics. The migrations of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth were almost always permanent and permanently separated those who left from those who remained, while today's displacements combine definitive and temporary moves, as well as tourism and brief business trips.

Three migratory systems are prevalent today: migration resulting in permanent settlement, temporary migration for labor opportunities, and migration of variable settlement, an intermediate position between the other two. The latter two tendencies increased in recent decades (Garson and Thoreau 1999).

3. *Fare l'America* (literally, to make America) is the expression used by Italian immigrants to Argentina and other countries to convey their expectation of making a living in America (i.e., the Western Hemisphere). Many social observers also point to the by-product of this expectation: immigrants not only made it in America, they also made America. [Trans.]

Their flows are controlled and subject to restricted duration and conditions. Unlike permanent migrations linked to population policies, which were implemented in the past in Argentina, Australia, Canada, and the United States, among other countries, in most recent years, and even in those nations, residency permissions are given on a periodic basis and there is discrimination according to nationality and the economic needs of the receiving country. The authorization to remain can be renewed, but the most attractive countries with the greatest influx of migrants (usually identified as OECD countries) grant nationality only to a small minority and limit the rights, stability, and integration of foreigners in the country. Although migrants are accepted because their labor interests converge with the needs of the economy that adopts them, there are short circuits in the sociocultural context, thus leading to segregation in neighborhoods, schools, and health services and in the valuation of beliefs and customs, all of which can result in aggression and expulsion.

These tendencies vary in accordance with the different policies in each country and also with respect to the skills of the migrants; professionals, technicians, intellectuals, and specialized workers are better received. Rarely is the right to travel of the rich or the well educated questioned. As Hans Magnus Enzensberger (1992: 42) observes, those with well-nourished bank accounts, drug and arms traffickers, and money-laundering bankers "do not encounter prejudices" and "are above any nationalism."[4] But in general the instability that is common today to all job markets as a consequence of globalized competition accentuates the uncertainty that foreigners face and complicates their integration into the new society (Garson and Thoreau 1999).

On the other hand, for today's migrants there is an increased possibility of maintaining fluid communication with their place of origin. The Spanish, and any resident of Mexico, can buy the newspaper *El País* the very day it is issued in Mexico City, and an Argentine can buy his or her national newspapers in Rio de Janeiro or Madrid. The *New York Times* and *Le Monde* arrive daily in large cities in various continents, and over-the-air and cable television in hotels and homes grant access in Latin America to channels from the United States and various European countries. Audiovisual media, email, and networks of family and friends have made intercontinental contacts an everyday matter, whereas in the past they took weeks or months. Disembarking is not the same

4. This scenario was significantly altered by the security systems imposed after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. While the rich no doubt have an easier time entering the United States, travelers from the Middle East and Central, South, and Southeast Asia are subject to scrutiny. And anti-immigrant sentiment aimed at Latin Americans has increased exponentially as well in this period. [Trans.]

as landing, nor is physical travel the same as electronic navigation. Today interculturality takes place more through communications media than through migratory movements.[5]

To better see how migrations have changed, one must remember also that in the second half of the twentieth century the direction of the travel reversed. If Argentina, Venezuela, Brazil, and Uruguay received 105,783 Spaniards between 1960 and 1965, in the following two decades more than a million Spaniards preferred to travel to other European countries (González Martínez 1996). At that same time there began a new cycle of migration of millions of people from Latin America to Spain, Italy, Germany, and to a lesser extent other European countries. The migrants were politically persecuted, unemployed, or tired of the contracted horizon offered them in the nations of the Southern Cone or Central America. The era of "making it in America" ended for the Europeans as the *sudacas* began to imagine the possibility of participating in the economic growth of Europe.[6] Even countries distant from the language and cultural style of Latin Americans, like Sweden and some Eastern European nations, saw colonies of Chileans, Uruguayans, and other groups appear, some of whom still live there. A special case is that of Mexico, which since the middle of the nineteenth century received little immigration and experienced an exodus of peasant labor to the United States and to a lesser extent Guatemala (Lida 1997: 35).

Without dwelling on the many psychosocial and intercultural aspects that complicated the links between Europe and Latin America during these migratory movements, it is fitting to emphasize, as regards our topic, that throughout history this interaction was not only an intercultural process but a commercial one as well. It can seem obvious to point this out, but the circulation of people and messages since 1492 and through all the migratory waves in both directions, which had to do with capital, merchandise, and employment, has not always been given adequate weight in the analyses.

That the center of gravity of exchanges has shifted to the United States is not unrelated to the *simultaneously* economic and cultural character of interrelation. In the imaginary of many writers and artists, and also of "common" migrants, the relationship between Latin America and Europe tends to be

5. Just a few years after García Canclini wrote this book, MySpace, Facebook, Flickr, and other social media platforms proliferated, exponentially increasing the communication to which he refers. [Trans.]

6. *Sudaca* is the derogatory term used in Spain to refer to migrants from South America. The word has the same prefix as *Sud*américa as well as the root of *sud*ar (to sweat), implying that South Americans are sweaty working-class migrants. [Trans.]

conceived of as an identitarian coincidence, whereas the links with the United States are seen predominantly as a commercial attraction. Is it that Latin identity is less important to us now, or has the "civilizing" influence of the Europeans—their laws and cultural development—become less valuable in favor of economic interests? It is difficult to sustain this interpretation of the past when we read accounts of the economic motivations of the Europeans who arrived to "make it in America," the costs and hardships that were the origin of the well-being that migrants sought.

One might think that the exchanges of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had modified the polarity developed between Europe and America during conquest and colonization. But one observes the perpetuation of stereotypes: Europeans discriminate against Latin Americans, and the latter admire and distrust Europeans. The transformation of the connections reproduced a lasting asymmetric structure. This is confirmed by the limitations or ease that others have in being admitted. An image comes quickly to mind of how the obstacles persist and even worsen. I evoke what the 1853 Argentine Constitution said about one of the most debated topics today in free trade agreements and regional integration: what foreigners are allowed to do and what is proscribed. In the constitution of that country, which received 5.5 million migrants between 1850 and 1930, among which there were some 2 million Spaniards, article 20 states, "Foreigners enjoy within the territory of the Nation all the civil rights of citizens; they may exercise their industry, trade, and profession; own real property, buy and sell it; navigate the rivers and coasts; practice freely their religion; make wills and marry under the laws. They are not obliged to accept citizenship nor to pay extraordinary compulsory taxes. They may obtain naturalization papers [after] residing two uninterrupted years in the Nation; but the authorities may shorten this term in favor of those so requesting it, alleging and proving services rendered to the Republic" (Constitution of the Argentine Nation 1994: 3).

Why did the liberal reception of migrants in Argentina and other Latin American countries recede? Why did the laws become so restrictive toward Latin Americans in Europe and the United States? When the human rights movements question these limitations, the response is that today migrants cannot be accepted as in the days when the countries of America had an immense territory to populate and saw the recently arrived as an opportunity to develop industries, education, and modern services. On the other hand, it is explained that in the United States and Europe, where millions of foreigners already live, unemployment rose in recent years. Large sectors blame migrants for the rise in crime and social conflicts (Dewitte 1999).

Although many conditions have varied in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, an important change in the interactions is that today it is easier for capital, merchandise, and media messages to pass from one country to another than it is for people. It is easier to invest in a foreign country than to become a citizen. Globalization is more easily imagined for the markets than it is for human beings. Another way to say this is that we have crossed over from enlightened modernity to neoliberal modernity.

The conception of modernity developed after the Enlightenment and the French Revolution—which nurtured the European, U.S., and Latin American constitutions and regulated the postcolonial ties between the two continents—aspired to incorporate everyone. Universal education and the extension of modern benefits—among them the rights of citizenship—were key resources for achieving that incorporation, and there was no differentiation between central and peripheral countries, the elite and the popular classes, at least in principle. We know how much distance there was and continues to be between humanistic discourses and political practices. Today, more than in the past, various European countries give unequal treatment to migrants and tourists from several Latin American nations. On the Latin American side there also were not, nor are there now, equal relations with all Europeans: to modernize our countries Germans were often preferred over the Portuguese, or the English or French over the Spanish.

But the current modernizing project is characterized by not proposing, not even in declarations and programs, to embrace everyone. Its principle of selection is based on the capacity to provide work at the lowest wage and to win over consumers more than to develop citizenship. Competition and discrimination in the market prevail over the universality of political and cultural rights. That is why, despite current talk about integration between Latin American and European countries, and despite the greater number of concrete agreements than ever before, the opening to others and the construction of democratic interculturality are subordinated to the market more than in any previous period.

Conflicts in Narratives on Identities

In recent years the impact of Asian postcolonial thought in the United States has led a branch of Latin Americanists working in U.S. universities to transfer the postcolonial analysis to Latin American studies in order to explain the current state of things. As a result they redefine conflicts at the end of the twentieth century as if they were structured and had political options similar to those in India or African countries. This theoretical transference has

produced attractive reinterpretations of those periods in which America was a Spanish or Portuguese colony and of the periods after colonization in the first half of the nineteenth century (Mignolo 1995). Such reinterpretations tend to pose the postcolonial question with greater sophistication than the classic works on the period by Latin Americanist historians; similarly they have advantages over the ideological debates that in the 1960s and 1970s attempted to portray the struggle against Latin American dependency as anticolonialism or anti-imperialism. It is unfortunate, however, that the dialogue between today's postcolonialists with Latin American thinkers of the past three decades is almost nonexistent.

The major problems, however, are different. They emerge when postcolonial theories are applied to the present period of interactions between Latin America, Europe, and the United States. If *colonialism* is understood as the political-military occupation of the territory of a subjugated people, Latin American societies, with the exception of Puerto Rico, ceased being colonies two centuries ago. From then on, socioeconomic and cultural conditions should be explained as part of *modernity* and of our subaltern position within the inequalities of the modern world. What is happening to us in the most recent stage of modernity, called *globalization*, requires an accurate analysis of the facts. Overlooking empirical facts that show our continent to be in a different situation from that of Africa and Asia has permitted the majority of postcolonialist interpreters to assert that Latin America has become "a discursive community that oscillates principally between the colony and postmodernity" (De la Campa 1996: 712).

Nevertheless postcolonial critics are right when they point to the "colonial legacies," the persistence of narratives formed during the colonial age that endure in the discourses with which rulers, journalists, and writers describe the present situation. Therefore it is necessary to examine the inertia of intercultural narratives and their capacity or incapacity to explain the globalized recomposition of the interaction between Latin American, European, and U.S. societies.

It is true that today's narratives often conceive of the relationship between North and South in ways similar to how travel literature framed the relationship between Europe and America: from the gaze of the "innocent" imperial white subject who wanders the new continent as if it were an extension of natural history, to collect unusual specimens, create collections, and name unknown species. Carl Linnaeus's expeditions, according to Daniel Boorstin, were those of a "superintendent [who walked around] sticking on labels" (cited in Pratt 1992: 31–32). Of course, this classifying and rationalizing activity

accompanied the military appropriation of the territory and the religious and political domination of the people, enslavement, and the extraction of riches.

That sometimes aestheticizing, objectifying gaze (Alexander von Homboldt) explicitly assumed its capitalist political-economic objectives when the British arrived. Nature ceased to be seen as a space of enlightenment and contemplation; it became, primarily, a source of raw materials, and its undeveloped state was seen as a consequence of the natives' lack of enterprising spirit, "which legitimized European interventionism." Latin American societies were accused of indifference, indolent habits, and incapacity to emerge from backwardness. "The maximizing, extractive paradigm of capitalism is presupposed, making a mystery of subsistence and non-accumulative lifeways" (Pratt 1992: 151).

It's amazing to see how this binary way of regarding Latin Americans is reproduced in the gaze of Europeans and North Americans throughout the twentieth century. The polarity congeals into a confrontation between irreconcilable identities. This is why these stereotyped views cannot be deconstructed if there isn't first a separation between the notions of culture and identity. The work of the social sciences should be different from so many political debates in which identity is considered the essence of culture or in which the two terms are used synonymously. On this view, culture is assimilated to local identities and therefore is imagined as the opposite of globalization. As a result, the only options left, as we saw before, are to globalize ourselves or defend our identity.

Some authors demonstrate that, from an economic or political point of view, this option is wrongly posed (Beck 2000; Giddens 1998). Here I wish to extend this argument by taking current cultural and anthropological studies as a point of departure. To this end it is necessary to distinguish between current discourses on culture and current discourses on identity.

In this new context, I again take up what I said about the definition and scope of culture. In the second half of the twentieth century culture has become a more consistent object of study in the social sciences. It is defined precisely (it is the set of the processes of production, circulation, and consumption of meanings in social life), and specific fields of research, protocols of observation, and rules to systematize data have been established. All of this allows for the development of lines of empirical research in various disciplines. There is not one sole paradigm for studying cultural processes and their social insertion, and there are disagreements, for example, on the diverse styles and research priorities in each social science. One of the principal discrepancies has to do with what can be measured and verified in cultural processes and how much is left to interpretation on account of the polysemic character and the multilayered

levels of meaning of a single event or object. Nevertheless one can't say just anything about a piece of art or a communication process: the indeterminacy of the aesthetic event and the variety of its receptions tend to move within a certain socially and culturally apprehensible logic. Although it is characteristic of many cultural processes to involve excesses of meaning, innovative games, and a certain purposelessness, to use the Kantian expression, which do not allow culture to be reduced to statistics and graphs like those that can be constructed for demographic movements or economic activity, there is a part of what we call culture that can be explained in terms of behaviors—of producers, intermediaries, and consumers—that unfold with a certain regularity.

None of this can be done with identity. There are conflicting narratives about identities, but there is little chance of defining them rigorously as objects of study. Recent studies by anthropologists and historians recognize the importance of the processes of sociocultural identification in the construction of ethnicities, nations, and other types of imagined communities (Anderson 1983; Lomnitz 1992). These modes of grouping can give cohesion to social groups and attain political strength. We have to take seriously the accounts of identities because many people use them to guide their conduct and are even capable of dying for them. But what we know about identities indicates that they don't have consistency outside of the historical constructions in which they were invented and of their processes of dissolution or exhaustion. Some elements used to delimit each identity, for example the use of a language, are susceptible of being studied rigorously, but other features that are usually used to define identities (skin color, tastes, customs) oscillate between biologistic determinations and ungraspable subjective convictions.

Research about identities does not deliver an ensemble of features that can be affirmed as the essence of an ethnicity or a nation but rather a series of operations of selection of elements from distinct eras articulated by hegemonic groups into a narrative that gives them coherence, drama, and eloquence. The facts about founding events, for example the battles that gave origin to a nation and permitted the founders to fix the limits of their territory, have been selected and combined via accounts enunciated from specific positions. Thus these narratives can have greater or lesser verisimilitude but can no longer be seen as "expressions" or "reflections" of what is real (Appadurai 1996; Rosaldo 1997). Sociological studies that have tried to measure identity, for example whether there is greater Mexicanness in northern or central Mexico, imagine a pattern of identity applicable to different inhabitants, almost without ever questioning the constitutive arbitrariness of the repertoire of selected features.

I want to propose an exercise that makes evident that what is usually called

Latin American identity is imagined through diverse narratives, contradictory among themselves and difficult to sustain when compared with empirical facts. It is possible to perceive the incompatibility between identitary accounts generated within Latin America, but because identity is defined and redefined, again and again, through interaction with other societies, it is advisable to consider how others see us and how we assimilate to the ways we are seen.

I have selected three European–Latin American narratives that have been and continue to be influential in the self-definition and hetero-definition of what is designated as Latin American identity: Manichaean binarism; intercultural encounter; and distant fascination. I review three narratives that have organized the interaction between the United States and Latin America: the incommensurability between Anglo and Latin identities; the Americanization of Latin Americans and the Latinization of the United States; and friendly neighborliness under U.S. tutelage.

MANICHAEAN BINARISM

The violence of the Conquest installed a simplifying opposition: civilization or barbarism. As one listens to the two accounts, one observes a mirror-like structure. From the European perspective, the conquerors represent the discovery, redemptive evangelization, or, if one prefers, civilizing modernization. From the Native American perspective, they themselves are the bearers of a sense of community, an ensemble of knowledges and harmonious relations with nature that the Europeans came to destroy. The Hispanist thesis ascribes goodness to the colonizers and brutality to the indigenous, while for the indigenous or ethnicist thesis the Spanish and Portuguese cannot be anything other than destroyers.

Of course, the asymmetry of forces in the Conquest, and throughout colonization, does not permit reading this opposition according to a single logic that can be simply inverted. It is necessary to remember, even to explain current injustices, as do indigenous movements, by making reference to their remote origin in colonial inequality. But the usefulness of this or any other explanation is inseparable from an awareness of its limits. The domination of some groups over others did not begin in America with the arrival of the Europeans. Similarly, as François Laplantine (1994) observes, the Spanish were not composed only of *hidalgos* (low-level noblemen), nor were there only Aztec nobles among the indigenous people. The persistence of Manichaean oppositions is surprising because from the fifteenth century on it has been possible to make long lists of facts that contradict them. Where do we place the Spanish who fought so that the indigenous would be respected (Las Casas, Sahagún),

the children of Spaniards that led the rebellions against Spain (Bolívar, San Martín)? What do we say about the contribution of the exiled Spanish republicans to publishing and the arts, to Latin American industry and commerce? And what about European NGOs dedicated to righting injustices and defending human rights against Latin American governments?

It is very reductive to emphasize the European-American polarity when the civilization/barbarism opposition is reproduced within every country as a confrontation between the capital and the countryside (Argentina), the modern cities and the *sertão* (outback; Brazil), the coast and the mountains (Peru). Manichaeism did not end with national independence. It reappears periodically, and in its latest incarnation—the discrediting of political parties, unions, and other modern institutions—it assumes the most extreme form of opposition between one's own and the foreign: indigenous people against globalization.

If this last polarity continues to attract adherents, it is in part because in some countries or regions (among others, southern Mexico, the Amazon, the Peruvian highlands) the greatest offenses are still against the indigenous, and transnational capital carries out the cruelest operations on their lands, forests, and riches. But for all the force and verisimilitude that this narrative has in certain zones, its aim of becoming the explanation of the entire continent must be placed in relation to two other facts as verifiable as the oppression of the indigenous people: the multicultural hybridization that has taken place over five centuries and the structural complexity of Latin American modernity. Let us put these challenges in the form of questions: How useful is it for us to posit Latin America's problems as a binary opposition between identities when an important part of the forms of identity (ethnic, national, and class) is reordered in interethnic, transnational, and transclass groups? What is the role of indigenous identities in a continent where the majority of the original cultures have mixed and indigenous groups numbering some 40 million people who constitute fewer than 10 percent of the inhabitants of Latin America, 30 million of which are concentrated in four countries: Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru?

The binary philosophies of history that pit deep nations against imaginary countries do not help us answer these questions. Neither do identitarian metaphysics, which contrasts essential and ahistorical identities with omnipresent modernizers and globalizers, and pure peoples with absolute dominations. Not even hegemonic groups dedicate themselves exclusively to dominate and destroy, nor do the oppressed only resist and confront. The most fecund narratives, those that render more intelligible globalization's multidetermined

complexity, are those that include the imaginary as part of culture and transactions as a resource for power and survival. Although certain confrontations seem to be simple oppositions and globalization exacerbates inequalities (and creates others), no group always acts as if social life were reduced to an incessant war.

THE INTERCULTURAL ENCOUNTER

After a long disavowal of the significance of the European invasion of America, where violence was disguised with euphemisms—"discovery," "evangelism," "civilizing task"—there appeared partial recognitions and conciliatory narratives.

When the Quincentennial was held in 1992, those formulas were sufficiently demystified, and a more cordial one, "the encounter of two worlds," was invented. The criticisms made by historians are well known, as are the reasons why, even in the European academy, it continues to be preferable to speak of conquest. There was no encounter, as if two societies had gathered in the middle of the Atlantic for a friendly festival of exchanges, but rather a history of struggles and impositions.

Deconstructive criticism is still needed because images mask the continuing violence and domination in international fairs, in schoolbooks, and in speeches at Ibero-American government meetings where the enthusiasm for "common" business erases conflict from the imaginaries of memory. Like other "universal exhibitions," the one held in Seville in 1992 juxtaposed exotic goods and industrial products under rules of display and spectacle that appeared to promote mutual awareness and exchanges beneficial to all. The organizers used this conciliatory ideology to legitimize Spanish economic expansion in Latin America, which had accelerated in those years (with the purchase of telephone companies, airlines, and banks), and to resignify a key colonial city of the past, Seville, packaging it as a leading contributor to modernization in Europe. The general theme chosen, "the Age of Discovery," linked the reference to the Conquest with technological advances and with the approaching new century. Several Latin American countries cooperated with that intention in their determination to avoid old stereotypes. For example, Peru included very few Incan materials in its effort to show a modern and internationally competitive country (Harvey 1996).

A notable case was that of Chile, which represented itself with a sixty-eight-ton iceberg plucked from the Antarctic whose journey to Seville lasted nearly a month. The designers of the pavilion, which also included artworks and a

variety of products and services for export that connoted the modern productivity of the country, explain that they tried to respond to those Europeans who saw Chileans as "purveyors of bad news and dirty images for television news programs or newspapers": they wanted to differentiate themselves from recent historical images. They sought to distance themselves, moreover, from tropicalism and to display themselves as a "cold country" that generated economic success, quite distant from the irrational warmth that the North usually imagines to be characteristic of Latin America. However, Nelly Richard saw in that gesture of "hypercontemporaneity of self-promotion" premodern reminiscences" of the scene where José Arcadio Buendía discovers ice in *One Hundred Years of Solitude*, that most emblematic novel of Latin American magical realism. The aim was to place the representation of the country "outside of time and social space," to annul any reference to the historical Chile of the socialist revolution (Richard 2004: 116–17). That "virgin object, white, natural, without precedents" (117), according to the catalogue, represented a country "cleaned, sanitized, purified by the long passage through the sea. It was as if Chile had just been born. The iceberg was a successful sign, architect of transparency and of cleanliness, where the damage had transfigured itself" (Moulian, qtd. in Richard 2004: 109). (One has to acknowledge that although the Chilean exhibition in Seville was meant to improve the international image of the country, the book published on the Expo, *The Chilean Pavilion*, documented the previous and subsequent debates on its meaning among journalists, artists, and intellectuals.)

These commercial and advertising schemes are usually incomplete and limited in effect. The Chilean government's discourse on Spain recuperated the stereotype of colonial domination when, years later, in 1998, the Spanish judge Baltazar Garzón managed to have Pinochet detained in London and the government of President Eduardo Frei responded by arguing that the heart of the conflict was the invasion of Chilean jurisdiction by Spain, a country that had been "incapable of bringing the crimes of the Franco regime to trial." National and international human rights organizations and many governments aside from Chile's interpreted this incident as a necessary bringing to justice of the dictator for his untried atrocities, in accordance with a globalized era in which justice should have supranational scope.

Manichaean narratives reinstall their binary oppositions between North and South, between Europe and America, or they coexist with fairs and trade agreements, with governmental diplomacy and advertising. In addition to the criticism that each of these narratives deserves, it is possible to question them for what they all overlook. The relations between Latin America and Europe

are much more than a pendular game between the Manichaean opposition and the identitarian-commercial encounter. We have to take into account how both sides seduce each other and arouse suspicions.

DISTANT FASCINATION

Europeans have seen in Latin America what Western rationalism has repressed, pleasures without guilt, fluid relations with nature that rapid urbanization in Europe has suppressed: the exuberance of nature that surrounds history and nourishes the flow of life, which Gauguin envisioned when he fled to Tahiti, Segal to Brazil, Artaud to Mexico. Palm trees, papayas, and pyramids, tapioca, toucans, and throngs; the condor flies overhead and on the spur of the moment we go to the Lacandon jungle to personally answer emails from the Zapatistas. "Edenic narratives": in their Disneyesque (the Amazon jungle), ecological (biodiversity must be preserved), or anthropological (the nakedness of the Indians who seduced Lévi-Strauss and many others) versions, these romanticizations simplify "excessively the complex regional pastiche of forests, thickets, swamps and savannas" and transform the varied and contradictory groups that live there into "endangered species or disloyal guardians" (Slater 1997: 23).

As in all Edenic narratives, there comes a time when direct knowledge leads to downfall: the green inferno or the *triste tropique*. Are Latin American societies freer and more transgressive than European ones, or more ceremonial and hierarchical, ritualistic to rigidity? It is not easy to choose a single line of interpretation when we examine the contradictory attempts to achieve in Latin America the utopias that in Europe became unlikely or doubtful: romanticism and Marxism, socialism and autonomous regional cultures. How do we distinguish between the insistent haste to make revolutions and the habitual Johnny-come-lateness of Latin America? What can be done to avert investment in companies without a future, like that of Fitzcarraldo? How can we articulate simultaneously Europe's interest in Mexican and Venezuelan petroleum, the large consumer market of Mercosur, the war in Colombia, carnival in Rio de Janeiro, the coups d'état, and criticism of U.S. interventions?

Meanwhile we Latin Americans have narrated our relation to Europe as a necessary bond that will improve our races and populate our territories, whose greatest challenge, Sarmiento said, is their vastness. We continue to see "European civilization" as a source of rationality and the open-minded contest of ideas, a source that shapes our thinking on universities and democracy, economic development and education in the service of general well-being, innovation for betterment and growth, in sum, modernity. But we find out that Europeans are interested in our writers and artists only for what they create,

almost never taking into consideration what is studied and thought in Latin America. Borges, Bioy Casares, García Márquez, Fuentes, Cortázar, Carpentier, Neruda, and dozens more are translated into French and Italian, but how many of our social scientists are translated into European languages?

This reciprocal interest is played out at a distance. Latin America was so distant that many Europeans situated their utopias there: Thomas More, Campanella, positivism. Comte inspired constitutions in Latin American countries that he never achieved in France. In Latin America we have had Cartesian cities like La Plata and Belo Horizonte, religious communities and sudden enrichment, many different ways of making fortunes or revolutions, in sum, ways of "making it in America" that are unworkable in Europe. The migrations of Spaniards, Italians, Russians, Germans, and Dutch drew European attention to the new continent, but they sent back reports of a distant disorder, together with narratives of a place where what Europe prohibited was possible. Even when Europeans were received with great hospitality, as Spanish refugees were in Mexico, they felt, Lida (1997: 117) writes, like "detached spectators."

According to Laplantine (1994: 81), an anthropologist who sensibly interprets this transatlantic tension, situating himself so as to encompass the viewpoints of both continents and their intersections, "America is the grandiose dream of the Renaissance. There is a will to accomplish there what has failed but has been conceived here." At the same time, Europeans find it strange that nature overwhelms society, that Latin America's excesses are not rationalizable, that cities erupt in the desert or the jungle—like Brasilia, like pre-Colombian cities that persist in Mexico, Guatemala, and Peru—and they become disconcerted when confronted by these confusions between nature and culture. I remember a remark by a Brazilian president from the period in which Brasilia was built, which I read as the epigraph to a book on Latin America by an English traveler, whose name I cannot recall: "Brazil is the country of tomorrow, but tomorrow is a holiday."

Laplantine evokes Antonin Artaud's disappointment with the "materialist" frescos by Diego Rivera and Stefan Zweig's suicide in Brazil. He considers still valid the oeuvre of Franz Kafka, the "European writer par excellence," who in *Amerika* describes this society as a "gigantic hallucination, labyrinths that lead nowhere, individuals who know not why they are accused" (Laplantine 1994: 86). The most recent disjunction appeared when Europe's postwar economic development, including that of the Mediterranean countries most tied to Latin America (Italy, Spain, France), was contrasted to Latin America's stagnation, dictatorial regressions, and socioeconomic instability, which diminished the attractiveness of Latin America as a place to obtain good employment or make

profitable investments. Since the 1980s, when European integration was consolidated, even Spain was more inclined to integrate into the "economic miracle" of the old continent rather than deepen its five centuries of ties to Latin America.

Catherine David, the curator of Documenta X in Kassel and very familiar with the most advanced Latin American art, told me in March 1999 something that she does not agree with but that she hears time and again: "In Europe, Latin America is Africa, a continent that has to be left to fend for itself." I would say that this opinion, or disapproval, which we often encounter in the North, is mitigated by the surge in Spanish, Italian, German, and French investments in strategic areas of Latin American economies. While political, social, and cultural information on Latin America can be absent for weeks at a time in European newspapers, the economic sections, especially in Spanish newspapers, usually carry worried news stories and articles whenever Latin American stock markets drop or when there is uncertainty in the countries in which Europeans have bought banks, airlines, and telecommunications companies.

Also the seduction of Latin Americans by Europe oscillates between come-ons and rejections. A few were attracted by modern European rationality, others by authoritarianism and racism. When democratic models based on individual responsibility didn't know what to do with Latin American communitarian and hierarchical traditions, several Latin American governments oscillated between reproducing what is most advanced in Europe and its barbaric experiences; some adhered to enlightened liberalism, others admired Nazism and fascism. The ambivalence toward Europe has been facilitated by Latin America's complacency with the "irrationality" of our magical realism and the attraction that derives from it for Europeans and North Americans. This fascination, based on misunderstandings, preserves until today the equivocal role of the imaginary in economic and social exchanges, which Laplantine glosses ironically: the Indians believed they appeased Cortés by offering him human flesh; similarly the Spanish of that era failed to understand that those sacrificed to Aztec gods were not considered victims because they had not read Jacques Soustelle, nor had Christian Duverger published his books in Éditions du Seuil.

The Latin American, European, and U.S. free trade negotiators, who invoke our pyramids, our classical poets and artists to embellish their purposes, have not bothered to read our social science studies on communication and culture, for instance those of Jesús Martín-Barbero, Renato Ortiz, Beatriz Sarlo, and Roger Bartra. Their cultural policies are frozen, as I shall discuss later, in an

aristocratic or populist stage of which only a few fragments remain. Politicians and businessmen take little interest in higher education, scientific research, and technology because they ignore the connections between culture and modern, globalized knowledge among Latin Americans.

In sum, the attraction and the suspicions are based on misunderstandings, from Columbus confusing the island that would become Haiti for Japan and Cuba for China, and the Aztecs believing that Hernán Cortés was the reincarnation of the plumed serpent, to the European investors of recent decades of the twentieth century who bought telecoms and publishing houses, airlines and banks, and continue to be amazed that Latin American labor relations and policies are so unpredictable and exotic in their fusion of modern and informal characteristics that they can disrupt their businesses. One of the most recommendable books on globalization, by Ulrich Beck, uses a Latin American metaphor to warn, in the final chapter, what the consequences will be for Europeans if they destroy the alliance between the market, the welfare state, and the democracy established under modernity. He adds that the violent loss of borders wrought by globalization should urge us to figure out how social justice is possible in "transnational spaces" as well as require us to pay attention to what goes on in very different societies. But it is very curious how this author sees Latin America's most dynamic country. If neoliberals keep winning, the social state will collapse, cities will become dangerous, spied on by video cameras, and divided between those who travel in limousines and those who ride bicycles: this he calls the "Brazilianization of Europe" (Beck 2000: 13, 51, 161).

Social and cultural history, conceived as the traffic in identities, is a labyrinth of confusions. Each side selects whatever features it wants in order to dramatize its identity; it combines them according to its categories and acts in whatever way it can. We must continue to deal with these narratives and metaphors of identity because they are internal resources of cohesion for each group, for each nation, and are used to communicate with others. But the globalized world is not just this theater of uncontrolled performances, which from time to time manage to achieve synergy; it is also a space organized by transnational structures of power and communication, by culture industries and economic and legal agreements, which, although precarious, are also knowable and susceptible to political interventions in several senses. Before we examine this industrial and transnational recomposition of culture, we should dwell a bit on another narrative triptych: that which tells how the United States and Latin America observe and interpret each other.

Just as the incompatibility between Europeans and Latin Americans has been repeated since the Conquest, the clash between Latin Americans and North Americans is the core of a story at least as old as the invasion of U.S. troops into Mexico and other Latin American countries. We are told that those who colonized the southern territory of the United States were whites of English descent who conquered that region with their Puritan ethic and the Protestant religion, and that work, frugality, service, and honesty were their core values. They clashed with Mexicans and people of Spanish and indigenous descent and assumed that the mixture produced a passion for relaxation and a lazy and violent sensuality. As Arnaldo de León (1983: 13) explains, the risk of "being dominated by untamed, barbarous, and disorderly creatures made almost inevitable a struggle for national hegemony." The resulting certainty of the superiority of white North Americans over Latin American mestizos has served, as we know, to justify invasions and imagine submissions as civilizing enterprises. It also served to "legitimate" discrimination against almost 30 million Latin Americans living in the United States.

But the confrontation between these modes of life also was and still is useful for energizing literary, filmic, and televisual narratives that glorify the "American" order against the backdrop of violent gangs, passionate Latino lovers, and provocative women (as in the 1940 film *Mexican Spitfire*). In *The Old Patagonian Express*, Paul Theroux (1979: 41) wrote, "Laredo required the viciousness of its sister city to keep its own churches full. Laredo had the airport and the churches; Nuevo Laredo, the brothels and basket factories. Each nationality had seemed to gravitate to its own special level of competence." Even dissident writers, violators of U.S. order, conceived of the passage across the border according to this dualistic opposition. William Burroughs and others see Mexico as a haven for hallucinogenic trips, without the prison sentence they would receive in the United States. For Jack Kerouac (1960: 21–22), the trip to Mexico made him feel "like you just sneaked out of school when you told the teacher you were sick," and then "you walk thirsty through the swinging doors and get a bar beer, and turn around and there's fellas shooting pool, cooking tacos, wearing sombreros, some wearing guns on their rancher hips, and gangs of singing businessmen," all of which enables him to find "this fellaheen feeling about life, that timeless gayety of people not involved in great cultural and civilization issues."

As noted by Norma Klahn (1994), who compiled these references, the dis-

tant admiration of these authors for Mexico, as well as the stereotypes distributed by Hollywood and U.S. television series, find their "confirmation" in novels, soap operas, and Latin American films where pre-Columbian gods "are unearthed" and contemporary conflicts are portrayed in sacrificial terms. Life is interpreted according to magic clues, engaged in intense ritual games, from bullfights to cop chases in the markets. D. H. Lawrence's *The Plumed Serpent* finds echoes in *Change of Skin* by Carlos Fuentes. Chicano literature and visual arts dialogue with Laura Esquivel and Frida Kahlo. The translation into English of these writers and the mega-exhibitions of Latin American art in U.S. museums, duly canonized in literature, art history, and cultural studies courses, complete the cycle of the interaction I have been discussing, organized in terms of contrast and performed as adventures marked by the challenge of otherness. These adventures end when the traveler crosses the border again, leaves the museum, puts aside the novel of magical realism, and returns home. "Tomorrow," says the wife in the story "An Old Dance" by Eugene Garber (1980: 142), "it's back to the good ol' USA."

On the Latin American side, the contrast of identities was imagined between Latin American spirituality of European origin and U.S. pragmatic materialism. José Enrique Rodó's and Rubén Darío's admiration for the United States was tempered by the criticism of "the harshness of the utilitarian hubbub" (Rodó [1900] 1988: 64) that they saw in that country. That stock of views has not changed much in recent literature, as Fernando Reati and Gilberto Gómez Ocampo document in a study on narrative, despite the increase in academic, artistic, and touristic visits to North America. Many Latin American writers and thinkers continue to talk about the spiritual poverty and pragmatism of the "gringo." This *neoarielismo* is less concerned with the economic exploitation of Latin American resources than with the "theft of intellectual and spiritual reserves" that are in short supply in the United States (Reati and Gómez Ocampo 1998: 589).[7]

The protagonist of *El pasajero* (The Passenger), a novel by Rodolfo Rabanal, describes an international writers residency program in New Caen in which he took part: it was like "a hypocritical hell where the creative intelligence

7. José Enrique Rodó's *Ariel* ([1900] 1988) is a call to Latin American intellectuals to eschew the allure of U.S. utilitarian culture and instead model their politics on a quasi-Kantian, disinterested aesthetics. Were Rodó to have taken an activist role in educational policy, it would be possible to see in him an analogue of Matthew Arnold, in whose *Culture and Anarchy* ([1869] 2006) culture is characterized as the atmosphere in which an aesthetic technocracy would rule more effectively than the aristocratic or capitalist classes. [Trans.]

of the entire world is locked up in order to nourish the meager talent of the Americans, incapable of finding original ideas in their own milieu . . . a laboratory in which the superpower would research the rhythm, conduct and modality of intelligence in areas of the world that each of us represented" (qtd. in Reati and Gómez Ocampo 1998: 597, 598). In *Where Elephants Go to Die* by José Donoso, we find a country "where everyone was rich to such a degree unknown by the human race and which was the anteroom where everything was transformed into waste." The protagonist, Gustavo Zuleta, a Chilean professor who worked at Saint Jo University, imagined the revenge: "Why not write, then, a novel about an invasion by *us* of *their* territory, sprinkling our text with anglicisms, cruelly caricaturing the American world such that the characters also become clichés?" (qtd. in Reati and Gómez Ocampo 1998: 599, 600).

Reati and Gómez Ocampo see similar oppositions in three other novels: *Ciudades desiertas* (Deserted Cities) by José Agustín, *Mujeres amadas* (Women Who Are Loved), by Marco Tulio Aguilera, and *El dios momentáneo* (The Momentary God), by Emilio Sosa López. The artificiality of American college life compared to Latin American vitality, the cold versus the heat, "the dull gloom of the incomplete" (Sosa López) ends up returning the five protagonists to their Latin American countries. As in Garber's story, but in reverse: "The door briefly opened to the other's culture closes again." No integration is possible, unless we perceive the irony in some of these novels, especially in that of Rabanal, whose narrator distances himself from persistent stereotypes: "We would always be victims: victims of our suspicion, or victims of reality" (qtd. in Reati and Gómez Ocampo 1998: 607).

AMERICANIZATION OF LATINOS, LATINIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES

This incompatibility between the modes of U.S. and Latin American life seems to be modified in the narrative that deals with the interactions and fusions between the two cultures. Without denying the ideological incommensurability between residents of both regions, there is a growing "Americanization" of culture in Latin America and, conversely, the Latin Americanization of some U.S. areas, especially in the South of the country. Carlos Monsiváis (1993: 24) has written that the concern to defend the specificity of each culture is belated because Latin America has been Americanized for many decades and this Americanization has been "most often flawed and superficial." At a conference in Tijuana in September 1997, Monsiváis suggested that perhaps more than

Americanization, what is happening with Latin Americans is a Chicanization: the ostentatious adoption of signs of the American way of life, exaggerating them with a corny zeal.

Several analysts observe that while this process is accentuated by technological and economic dependence, this does not eliminate the conservation of Spanish and Portuguese as the prevailing languages in Latin America—no matter how many English words they incorporate—nor the fidelity to religious and gastronomic traditions, and various forms of family organization different from those of the United States. At the same time it should be noted that the increasing migration of Latin Americans to the United States influences its political and legal culture, consumer habits, and the educational, artistic, and communication strategies of states like California, Arizona, and Texas. Nevertheless discrimination, deportation, and the increasingly severe exclusion of Latino immigrants from welfare benefits discourage "Hispanic" participation. Of the 7 million Mexicans living in the United States,[8] about 2.4 million are undocumented, and nothing indicates that they will be able to legalize their situation in the coming years. Although other Latin Americans' overall population and number of undocumented are not as high, 1 million Haitians, nearly 1.5 million Colombians, and other Latin Americans and Caribbeans who try to stay in the United States also suffer hostility and periodic deportations. While democratization and the reduction of political violence in Central America and the Southern Cone allow the return of exiles to their home countries, economic decline and rising unemployment in many Latin American countries continue to increase migration to the United States.

Simultaneously with the implementation of NAFTA in the past five years there was an increase in barriers of all types to the entry of Latin Americans. Proposition 187, adopted in 1996 in California, took away the rights of undocumented migrants to use basic services such as schooling and health, forcing doctors and teachers to report to immigration authorities when migrants applied for services without documents, and established the notion of "reasonable suspicion" that makes all of them vulnerable on the basis of two signs: the color of their skin and language (Valenzuela Arce 1999). The main argument to justify Proposition 187 was that undocumented migrants are an economic drain on the U.S. economy, although several studies by the National Commission for Immigration Reform of the United States show that their contributions (about $10 billion annually) are greater than the benefits they receive.

8. According to the Pew Hispanic Center's (2011: 4) analysis of the 2010 U.S. Census, there were 31.8 million Mexican Americans in the United States in 2010. [Trans.]

The proposition was found unconstitutional, but the xenophobic discourse in everyday life and the press shows that the narratives that convey the prejudice and discrimination continue to prevail over objective facts.[9]

Another significant change is that the "line" of wire that separated the territory of the United States from the countries of the South has been replaced by a resounding symbol: the steel plates that were used as landing strips in the desert during the Persian Gulf War, now converted to miles and miles of wall just one meter lower than the one in Berlin. Fortified in its weakest sections by a second barrier of concrete columns, and by border patrol cars and helicopters, that border dispels any illusion that Latin Americans and U.S. citizens will integrate, as have, for example, the citizens of the European Union.

On the Mexican side, the hardening of U.S. chauvinism and discrimination also promotes nationalist reactions. Sometimes there are attempts to defend national production and human rights in the midst of the real conditions of interaction; in other cases it is hard to imagine what actions can be effective in the complex intersections of the border.

A symptomatic case of this difficulty in developing positions of "self-defense" in a context of globalization is that of Tijuana. This city dedicated itself to tourism and entertainment in the 1920s, during the Prohibition era in the United States, and permitted the development of gambling houses, cabarets, and other activities outlawed in U.S. society, acquiring a "black legend" that made it synonymous with vice, prostitution, and drug trafficking.[10] The negative image also applied to the influx of migrants from throughout Mexico, who, if they could not cross over into the United States, formed slums in this border city. In the past three decades the location there of businesses, particularly *maquiladoras* or assembly plants, has generated an extraordinary industrial

9. A little more than a decade later, anti-immigrant sentiment has escalated, and Republican-controlled legislatures have passed xenophobic bills such as Arizona's SB 1070, Alabama's HB 56, Indiana's SB 590, and Georgia's HB 87. [Trans.]

10. Since García Canclini wrote this book, the violence resulting from drug trafficking in Mexico has escalated to unprecedented proportions; from December 2006, when President Felipe Calderón took office and launched an all-out war on narcotraffic, until June 2011 more than forty thousand people died in the crossfire between narcotraffickers and government forces ("Mexican Drug Trafficking," *New York Times*, October 15, 2011, accessed December 26, 2011, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/mexico/drug_trafficking/index.html). Consequently the violence is not simply an effect of news-manufactured stories that make Mexico "look bad." A January 2011 U.S. congressional report on Mexico's drug trafficking organizations points out that the Mexican state's attack on traffickers who seek to corrupt the police and government at all levels has been met with an unprecedented increase in extreme violence that goes beyond the conventional behavior of organized crime (Beittel 2011). [Trans.]

development: one of the main production categories is electric and audiovisual appliances, among which the most noteworthy is the manufacture of 70 percent of all television sets produced in the world. The commerce and urban development of Tijuana were modernized, and it is linking with San Diego into a "transborder metropolis" (Herzog 1990). Nevertheless the 1,600 U.S. border patrol agents who control the 65 million crossings per year between the two cities do not accept that these "modern" activities can be distinguished from narcotraffic and other practices that project the city's prevailing negative view in the U.S. imaginary.

Given the number of movies and news accounts and the possible filming of a soap opera based on the scandalous aspects of Tijuana, in August 1997 the conservative City Council was able to get the Mexican Institute of Industrial Property to register the "city's good name" to protect it from those who wish to use it in "advertising and business, direct mail advertising, brochures, leaflets, printed matter, exhibitions, films, novels, videotapes, and documentaries." It is not difficult to imagine the disruptions that such policies would have inflicted on writers like Shakespeare for situating his crimes in Denmark, or Bertolt Brecht and many others who also located disagreeable stories in countries not their own. The attempt to control the use of the symbolic heritage of a border town just two hours from Hollywood has become even more bizarre in this globalized age, when much of the heritage is formed and disseminated beyond the local area, in invisible media networks. It is a parodic consequence of placing interculturality in identitarian opposition rather than analyzing it in accordance with the structure of cultural interactions.

How can free trade agreements contribute to resolving these clashes between the United States and Latin America? Some economists and politicians in Mexico and the United States are confident that the compatibility of cultural styles, necessary for multinational integration, will develop successfully thanks to "the similarity in the orientation towards democracy" and the coincidence or convergence of economic development patterns, according to Inglehart, Basanez, and Nevitte. Their book emphasizes the incompatibility between the Protestant tradition of the United States and Canada and Mexico's and Latin America's Catholic tradition (the work ethic against the morality of "recreation, grandiosity, generosity, inequality, and manhood"). But they also argue that such historical differences may not be as important if we think that the same process of transnational integration promotes open societies and leads to accepting new conceptual frameworks that will open them. In the North American countries convergence is achieved by the shared interest in developing free market economies and democratic political forms and in

reducing the importance of national institutions so as to favor globalization. We know, however, that these supposedly common three points generate disputes involving the three NAFTA nations. The authors cited, despite their optimistic view of trade liberalization, recognize that this "political opposition occurs because it clearly draws attention to old or emerging dilemmas" (Inglehart et al. 1994). The intensification of conflicts involving the border and migration in recent years highlights unresolved cultural dilemmas, such as, on the one hand, multiethnic integration in the United States, and on the other hand, in Latin American countries, the coexistence of new migrants with longtime residents and the full recognition of the rights of minorities and regions within each country. The narrative on ideological incommensurability continues to prevail and reinvents borders that should be examined as part of globalization.

Not only on account of free trade agreements is there an increase of "Americanization" in Latin America and of Latinization in the United States. As discussed in chapter 6 on the culture industries, Latin American music is becoming part of American multiculturality as well as a strong sector in the economy of symbolic goods. At the same time, the production in Miami of CDs, videos, and television programs in Spanish recomposes signs of Latin Americanness and relocates its role within the United States. Through the companies that distribute these cultural products in other regions, there is a growing interaction among artists, distributors, and audiences in several continents. Somewhat independently of what is agreed on in free trade agreements, the volume of migration from south to north and the transfer of goods and cultural messages are modifying, in people's daily habits and in commercial circuits, the connections and distances between these regions (Yúdice 1999).

FRIENDLY NEIGHBORLINESS UNDER U.S. TUTELAGE

Conflicts between cultures are often camouflaged in the official discourse of friendly neighborliness. It is not only a matter of diplomatic courtesies, for these often involve curious interpretations about what others are like and how they should be dealt with. Dealing with the United States is somewhat different from the "encounter of two worlds" with Europe. One of the stories that struck me most in recent times appears in an interview with Secretary of State Madeleine Albright by John F. Kennedy Jr. The head of U.S. foreign policy characterized the relationship with Canada and Mexico in the following way:

> Americans are very lucky to be between two oceans and to have two friendly neighbors. If you reflect on the rest of the world, this situation

> is unique. Often when I travel—and this is something that the president has commented on many times—I imagine what it must have meant to be invaded by Napoleon or Hitler. That has created a completely different mentality in many of the peoples of the world. The United States has never been invaded or occupied. I say this because I am not a native American: this makes the American people feel invulnerable in a way that is not common in other countries.[11]

There are several problematic assumptions in this reasoning. One is to explain the claim that U.S. citizens feel invulnerable because they never have been invaded.[12] This assumes the correlative hypothesis, as we read in the same paragraph, that Canada or Mexico could have invaded but have not done so because they are "friendly neighbors." This way of telling the story is bizarre to Canadians and Mexicans, who are aware that invading the United States would have little success and for that reason would not usually imagine it. But one might ask why Americans tell the story in this way. The interpretation that comes to mind is that to attribute their sense of invulnerability to the fact of never having been invaded is a way of ignoring that the United States is an invader. This interpretation is supported, in my view, in another part of the interview in which Albright summarizes the philosophy of history of the twentieth century and the role that the United States has had in it: "One of the most important issues which we must all face is: What is the proper use of U.S. power as we approach the twenty-first century? Whether or not the U.S. made use of its power has been the measure of what was good and bad in the twentieth century. In the First World War, the U.S. joined the war in Europe after the Europeans made a mess of things. Then, between the First and Second World Wars, we disregarded their politics. And during World War II, the same thing happened again, we had to intervene again."

Today we can discern the structure of the argument better: if U.S. interventions in other regions have made possible what is good in the history of the twentieth century, they should be considered not invasions but sacrifices for the benefit of other peoples. This is not the view that the recipients of such interventions usually have, and that's why things sometimes haven't gone so well

11. John F. Kennedy Jr., "Interview with Madeleine Albright," *George*, January 21, 1998. Qtd. in "Entrevista a Madeleine Albright: 'Lo mejor con Cuba es aislarla,'" *El País*, February 8, 1998.

12. It goes without saying that the September 11, 2001, attacks produced a feeling of vulnerability, so much so that the response was often overreaction, such as when people attacked individuals with turbans (Sikhs) whom they assumed to be Arab, or when the government extended the huge fence at the U.S.-Mexico border, through which no terrorists ever entered the United States. [Trans.]

for Americans so that they can maintain the certainty of their invulnerability. One thinks, for example, of Vietnam. Albright briefly recalls that experience, but changes its meaning when comparing it to that of Bosnia:

> People who experienced Vietnam said, "No, it's not important, we'll get into a quagmire. We'll end up trapped there. It's a civil war. We do not want to have anything to do with it." Given my background, I saw Bosnia much more in terms of what had happened in Europe when the U.S. was not there, and that if the U.S. had acted sooner against Hitler, we could have been spared World War II. So my reasoning was that if we had done something earlier against the perpetration of rape and looting in Bosnia, we would have been in a much better position to decide whether it had nothing to do with us.

The bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 showed the persistence and futility of this way of imposing protection for intercultural respect.

In sum, in this perspective the world is something that exists and makes good or bad sense to the extent that one sees and values things from the vantage point of the United States. Even when it is a matter of deciding whether something has any relevance to that country, Americans say, "If it has to do with us, then the United States must intervene." Unilateral assertions of identity seem to lead to a tendency to deny the multicentered agency that is sometimes associated with globalization. We could conclude that it is difficult to understand through narratives of identity affirmation the complexity of transcultural interactions and the multiplicity of viewpoints that today constitute the world. Conversely, stories that idealize the homogenizing power of globalization tend to overlook the differences and the inequality of exchanges. I suggest therefore that the object of study of the social sciences and the goal of policies should not be identity but the heterogeneity, conflicts, and possibilities-impossibilities of intercultural cooperation.

In his *inSITE97* project, the artist Allen Sekula offered other images to talk about this confrontation between the United States and the South: a series of photos of Mexican laborers working in Korean textile maquiladoras in northern Mexico, of U.S. Marines and senators investigating the area, and of fishermen in shacks alongside the new Universal Studios built in Popotla, a beach south of Tijuana, where they filmed the sinking of the *Titanic* and other films to take advantage—like the maquiladoras—of Mexican wages that are ten times lower than in the United States. Sekula (1998: 103) sees these "interventions" as the continuation of what has been done by the "white adventurers," who from 1840 on came to Baja California, "a lower space, as a utopia of

childhood freedoms, a space in which lobsters can be devoured ravenously, vehicles driven with reckless abandon." "And now Hollywood itself is fugitive, crossing the triple fence to stage its own expensive retelling of the story of modernity's encounter with the primordial abyss. Extras float and shiver among the dummy corpses, flailing about and gagging on command, a veritable reserve army of the drowned. . . . The industrialized northern border of Mexico is the prototype of a grim Taylorist future."

Chile, from the south, sent an iceberg to the north to relaunch itself and justifies this metaphor with examples of its modern productivity. The United States sends to the south of its territory the *Titanic* so that it will sink and, "refloated," become "the belated harbinger of the runaway assembly line. A reservoir of cheap labor is contained and channeled by the hydraulic action of an apartheid machine. The machine is increasingly indifferent to democracy on either side of the line, but not indifferent to culture, to the pouring of oil upon troubled waters" (Sekula 1998: 103).

Latin American Cultural Space and Transnational Circuits

These six narratives and their brief confrontation with empirical data show the power of imaginary constructions of the identity of others and of oneself in the reframing and manipulation of social processes. Likewise there are limits to taking these identitarian conceptions as the foundation for formulating more or less realistic policies of interaction. Globalization and regional integration require better knowledge of others and the most rigorous research into how our differences can coexist and what the future of our own cultural production is in competition and exchange with that of other regions.

What modifications did the migratory, trade, and media convergences wrought by globalization introduce into the imaginaries that circulate between Europe, the United States, and Latin America? Very few. One change is that of the relationship between discourses and practices. The fearful and hallucinatory fantasies regarding those who are different have, as is known, a long history. The panic produced, from the Bible to Vico, from the *War of the Worlds* by H. G. Wells to Orson Welles's radio pranks, is more narrative than real. It often erupted in wars and cruel conquests, but most of the time the bewilderment regarding others was mitigated by the incommensurable distance separating the fabricators of stories and bestiaries from the cannibals and heretics referred to.

In contrast, the multiplication of First World economic investments in the Third World and the permanent or intense presence of First World actors in

the peripheries and of peripherals in First World cities provide endless opportunities for the imaginaries to take action. Free trade agreements provoke continual practical consequences on the basis of stereotypes that divide the world between those who think that "time is money" and those who continue to be imagined as though they would prefer to extend their siestas to the entire day. The rustic Manichaeism practiced by Renaissance landscape painters and Baroque illustrators is renewed formally, without altering its asymmetry, in tourism and commercial advertising, in disaster films, in political speeches, and in video games.

A review of the historical analyses of these imaginaries, such as those of Roger Bartra and Miguel Rojas Mix, shows that another aspect that has changed in the stories and iconography of the second half of the twentieth century is the much more detailed reconstruction of Third World spaces in which First World heroes must operate. Gerard de Villiers's brochures describe extensively the terror wrought by Pinochet; video games and cop series identify with the accuracy of news stories the habits of the Colombian guerrillas and Mexican drug traffickers. Today's exoticism has a verisimilitude acceptable to the viewers of CNN and readers of the *New York Times* and *Le Monde*. The everydayness of foreigners thus becomes part of the daily life of citizens in Europe and the United States and of Latin American elites who live in gated communities and consume in the segregated shopping centers of their cities, not in an imaginary way but with all the persuasiveness of "the real." At the same time, the middle and popular classes in Latin America are very familiar with the music and personal gossip of the singers, actors, and politicians of the First World; urban youth find in Afro and rasta fashions the emblems with which to distinguish themselves in their local cultures. The proximity of the images of the other do not eliminate but only adapt and refine the polarity between "the Maghreb of migrant workers and that of the posters of Club Mediterranee" (Rojas Mix 1992: 257).

The very fluid movement that is produced in different regions and circulates in almost all prompts us to ask *what we mean when we talk about our own cultural production*. The difficulties are not resolved in ramblings about an alleged American identity. Rather we need to characterize the conditions under which different types of cultural production emerge in Latin America in order to know what we can do together. I will not rehearse the theoretical critiques that discredit metaphysical definitions of a supposed Latin Americanness (Brunner 1998; Martín-Barbero 1993). I also see no need to show the failure of the argumentational contortions with which some have tried to assemble an identity profile that brings together entities as diverse as the (also elusive) identities of

Mesoamerica, the Caribbean, the Andes, the River Plate, and Brazil, not to mention different regions within each country.

I argued elsewhere (García Canclini and Moneta 1999) that there is a more or less common story in Latin America, which enables us to speak of a *Latin American cultural space*, in which many identities coexist. We need not reduce them nor force common features on them. The indigenous, African American, European, Latin, and tropical sometimes converge and in other cases diverge. It is better to admit that each of these aspects refers to partialities. The indigenous, I already said, includes the original cultures but is now reduced to 10 percent of the Latin American population and is in an intense process of hybridization. The "African American" and "tropical," apart from the imprecision of these formulas, can be viewed as sources of magnificent literary and musical productions. The transnational success of salsa and its power to unify Latinos within and outside the United States has led to imagining it as the emblematic musical resource "of a united race, which Bolivar dreamed of," according to Rubén Blades's song (Colón and Blades 1978). In a study of Blades's concerts in the United States and of the media appropriations of this type of music, Daniel Mato (1998b) has pointed to the usefulness of valuing it as a unifying narrative and at the same time reminding us of the intellectual and political need not to obscure the constructed nature of that representation nor the differences between the types of Latinness that it encompasses. Just as Europe and the United States are each multicultural complexes, Latin America is too heterogeneous to consider its joint projects according to essentialist and forced unifications, which ignore the internal discrepancies and inequalities.

It is possible to conceive of a *Latin American common space*, but not predetermined ethnically nor isolated from the shared history with Europeans over five centuries, which established long-lasting ties to this day, or from the history of convergences or confrontations with the United States. In order to understand the present and future trade and integration agreements among Latin American countries, and between them and the United States and Europe, it is necessary to think of the common space of Latin Americans also as a *Euro-American space* and as an *inter-American space*.

Of course, we must face the question of whether or not this triangular scheme (Latin America–United States–Europe) will end up making the Latin American continent nebulous. Samuel Huntington believes that the dispute between Europeans and Americans will end up dividing Latin America. Through NAFTA, he predicts, the United States will annex Mexico, while Mercosur will be incorporated into Europe. This viewpoint ignores the heterogeneity of Latin American politics, its historical continuities, recent business

alliances developed between Mexico and Colombia, Venezuela, and Chile, and within Mercosur the different relations of its countries with the United States. The Rio Summit of 1999 between European and Latin American leaders indicated that European countries would promote free trade agreements not according to geopolitical divisions but rather according to economic reliability. That's why they give priority to Mexico and Mercosur, with other nations to be added later.

The question of how Latin American space is being reshaped into Euro-American or inter-American space arises in different ways when considering economy, media, elite culture, or political culture. The United States is now the dominant reference point in economic development and audiovisual communication. As I discuss in a later chapter, the Latin American publishing industry depends more on Europe, and that corresponds—along with its linguistic coincidence with the Latin world—to the importance that Europe continues to have among intellectual and political elites in Latin America. The way Beatriz Sarlo (1998: 1) put it recently could be endorsed by other Latin Americans, especially in the Southern Cone:

> For me, Europe today is Spanish translations, the Italian center-left political coalition L'Ulivo, English New Labour, Berlin end-of-century reconstruction, the conflict of nationalities, the emergence of new identities, Third World enclaves in Paris or London, the thirty-five hour French labor law. Europe is both Pina Bausch and Godard, and Godard as well as Kiarostami, whom we found out about in European magazines and festivals, and Kiarostami as much as Losseliani, a Gregorian exiled from the outer reaches of Europe, and also Saramago, who comes from the extreme end, *finis terrae*, of decadent Europe. Although in the form of paradox, Europe is our contact with Asia, and we only become autonomous from Europe, relatively, when we think of Latin America.

The connections of Latin Americans with the United States are also changing with respect to the stereotypes described earlier. Technological, economic, and migratory exchanges are redefining the socioeconomic relations and some narratives that circulate between the two regions. CBS and CNN broadcast international news in Spanish and contribute to articulating Latin American cultural and political space with the spread of news from those of our countries with meager press and television circulation. I already referred, and will do so again, to the role of U.S. universities in the study and interpretation of what is happening in Latin America. Several economic journals in recent years highlight how the intensification of industrial, trade, and financial relations

between the United States and Latin American countries creates new forms of mutual understanding and makes some Latin American economies "vital to the U.S. market": "[Mexico] trades more manufactured goods with the United States than Japan and more textiles with the United States than China," so it is possible that "any closure of the production chain in one country is likely to disrupt production in the other country" (Case 1999: 48). Regarding the increasing presence of Latin Americans in U.S. society, the August 1999 issue of *Latin Trade* magazine headlined its cover "Mexico Invades the U.S." Others argue that greater intereconomic, technological, and cultural development, under asymmetric and subordinate conditions, only heightens imperialist domination. Both extreme positions simplify the current structure of unequal exchanges.

In the midst of these interregional circuits there reappears, transformed, the question of what can be understood as Latin America's own proper cultural production—and also that of the United States. This has always been a difficult issue to resolve, as revealed by the multicultural presence of masses of migrants from diverse backgrounds and the intense process of intercultural borrowing in the past between Europe and Latin America, and more recently between the United States and Latin America. It is also clear that the changes generated by the current technological and economic flows cannot be tackled by recourse to the old discourses of identity, nor with multicultural policies deployed within nations when these were still autonomous units. To find out which others interest us or accept us, with whom it is worthwhile to intensify connections and exchanges, are issues that—in addition to engaging the history of whence we come—need to be revised in connection with the new geopolitical and geocultural confrontations within and outside free trade agreements and economic integration processes.

It is necessary to justify this transition from the confrontation of identities to the formation of a sociocultural space by examining how national policies, and policies among nations, have been managing Latin American multiculturality and how they do so today in connection with Europe and the United States. In the next chapter I compare some multicultural and regional or global citizenship policies developed in these areas. Then I examine the current structure of academic, artistic, and cultural industry exchanges to see how the United States and the countries of Europe and Latin America are being reshaped with regard to the redistribution of cultural and communicational power.

FOUR
WE DON'T KNOW WHAT TO CALL OTHERS

Societies narrate their changes and conflicts, imagining myths and stereotypes among the groups, both native and migrant, that constitute them. They also convey this through cultural policies of citizenship. In order to say who belongs to a nation or who is entitled to citizenship, common features have to be imagined for people with different languages and ways of life, ways of thinking that do not match up but may be convergent. Every cultural policy is a policy that works with imaginaries that make us believe we are alike. At the same time it is a policy that works with what we cannot imagine about others, in order to reconcile the differences: how to coexist with those who do not speak my language properly, who allow for unveiled (or veiled) women, who do not accept the values of the hegemonic religion or scientific rationality, who reject or seek to subsume hierarchies into a level democratic playing field.

It has been said and written that ethnocentrism and contempt for those who are different were born with humanity and that there is no innocent

group. The Greeks called foreigners *barbarians*, or "stutterers, stammerers." The Nahua referred to their neighbors as *Popolocas* (stutterers) and *Mazahuas* (those who bell like deer). As for the Hottentots, the Ainu, and the Ramchadal, their tribal names mean "human beings." Is it the same procedure that led Mexicans to pejoratively call the Spanish *gachupines*, and the Argentines to call Italians *gringos*, and other Latin Americans to use the same expression in reference to Americans? And when the Spanish call Latin Americans *sudacas*, are they returning the "favor," or are we in another stage of discrimination and misunderstanding?

There's no need to bring a lot of data to this page to understand that even the most persistent words over the centuries, such as *barbarian*, do not have the same effect in the battles of 2,500 years ago, in the conquests of five hundred years ago, in colonial and imperial wars, and in the age of electronic money and images that travel via satellite. Postmodern generalizations regarding nomads do not apply very well to the heterogeneous promises that induced to migrate those who sought the promised land, the new American world of which the Spanish and Portuguese spoke, or the American way of life.

In the West, nations found different arrangements for living multiculturally. France and other European countries subordinated the differences to the secular idea of the republic. The United States divided ethnicities into different neighborhoods and even into different cities. Latin American countries adhered in the nineteenth century to the European model but gave it different modulations, as we shall see, in three forms of "national integration": Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico. These unifying arrangements in heterogeneous countries operated with injustices, inequalities, and protests for decades, but they achieved a certain stability. To these deficiencies are now added more intense and frequent interactions among many ethnic groups and clashes between different ways of dealing with multiculturality. Latin Americans migrate en masse to Europe and the United States, where large contingents of Asians and Africans also go. Americans promote their concepts of multiculturalism in Latin America, and to some degree in Europe, through ways of doing business, political and academic influence, and ideological models of mass communication. Even Japanese and Koreans propose their multicultural models in the United States, Europe, and Latin America in the ways they arrange labor relations in maquiladoras and through the dissemination of their video games.

This global multiculturality did not suppress the classic ways in which each nation "arranged" its differences. But those differences interacted, and confrontation became unavoidable. There have been varying results. When global

movements are accompanied by secularization and intellectual relativism, they expand our ability to understand and accept what is different. But when globalization brings into close coexistence many different ways of life without the conceptual and political instruments that encourage their coexistence, it leads to fundamentalism and exclusion, it accentuates racism and increases the risk of ethnic or national "cleansing." This also depends on the stages and modes of economic development. Global reconfiguration conditions in different ways the treatment of others in countries with sustainable development and full employment in contrast to those countries mired for decades in economic instability, high inflation, and unemployment. We need to analyze how these cultural, political, and economic differences operate in relation to the main models of multi- and interculturality as they come into play in the interactions between Europe, Latin America, and the United States.

Untranslatable Multiculturality

Just as in another time, when modernity of European origin tended to equate all men with the abstract designation of citizens, today it is tempting to imagine that globalization will unify and make us similar. But this would only erase the current challenges raised by cultural differences and the policies for managing them. To address these challenges, I propose the opposite course: let me review the key formulas used in some societies to resolve the differences, then I will explore what it means that these formulas have no linguistic equivalent in other cultures, or that these cultures give them a different formulation.

First question: Why is there no English word for *mestizo*? Second: Why do the French translate *affirmative action* as *positive discrimination*? Third: Why are hyphenated identities (Italian-American, African-American) unusual in Latin American countries? After answering these questions, I will explore whether societies with such untranslatable differences might come to an agreement in order to share social relationships and establish consensual forms of citizenship.

(A) WHILE IN French, Spanish, and Portuguese, the words *métis*, *mestizo*, and *mestiço* have widespread use, there is no English equivalent. Anthropological and historical texts that deal with other societies incorporate the word in French or Spanish, necessarily making a linguistic exception to refer to those who do not belong to their cultural community. The *Oxford English Dictionary*

includes *mestizo* and *mestiço* as Spanish and Portuguese synonyms of *half-caste*. *Miscegenation*, *half-breed*, and *mixed-blood* also appear, but these usually have a derogatory sense. Some anthropologists and linguists (Laplantine and Nouss 1997) use *creolization* to designate intercultural mixtures; this term refers to languages and cultures created by variations on the basic language and other languages in the context of the slave trade. It applies to the mixtures referred to in the French language in America and the Caribbean (Haiti, Guadeloupe, Martinique) and the Indian Ocean (the islands Reunion and Mauritius), or in the Portuguese language in Africa (Guinea, Cape Verde), the Caribbean (Curaçao), and Asia (India, Sri Lanka). Because *creolization* presents paradigmatic tensions between orality and literacy, educated and popular sectors, center and periphery, in a continuum of diversity, Ulf Hannerz (1997: 14) recommends extending its use to the transnational realm to designate "processes of cultural convergence" characterized "by the inequality of power, prestige, and material resources."

I find the absence of the word *mestizo*, with its potential to designate mixtures in a positive sense, now common in Romance languages, to be a symptom of how these matters are dealt with in English. It is worth differentiating the metaphor of the melting pot used in the United States to refer to purification and distillation in the creation of a new identity only among races of European origin, from the idea of the "multicultural nation" preferred in Canada, where "culture is often a euphemism for race" and different groups are integrated into society (Chanady 1997).

In the United States there is a tendency to essentialize identities, and multicultural heterogeneity is conceived as separatism and dispersion among ethnic groups for which communitarian membership has become the main guarantee of individual rights. People think and act as members of minorities (African Americans, or Chicanos, or Puerto Ricans) and insofar as this is the case, one has the right to claim linguistic difference, demand employment quotas, and receive services, or to have a place guaranteed in universities and government agencies. This "affirmative action" has served to correct and compensate for institutionalized forms of discrimination that led to chronic inequalities, but in a manner that prioritizes groups to which one belongs by filiation, by the weight of biology and history, over and above groups based on affiliation and on mixtures, that is, *mestizaje*.

According to Peter McLaren, it is advisable to distinguish among three types of multiculturalism: conservative, liberal, and left-liberal. In the first, interethnic separatism is subordinated to the hegemony of WASPs and their canon, which stipulates what should be read and learned to be culturally correct.

Liberal multiculturalism posits the natural equality and cognitive equivalence of different races, while the left-liberal variety explains that the failures of liberal equality are due to unequal access to goods and social opportunities. But only a few authors, McLaren (1994: 48) among them, argue for the need to "legitimize multiple traditions of knowledge" at the same time and to enable solidary constructions to prevail over group claims. That is why thinkers like Michael Walzer (1997: 102, 96) express concern that "the critical conflict in American life today is not between multiculturalism and some kind of cultural hegemony or singularity," "a vigorous and independent American identity," but "between the manyness of groups and individuals. . . . The voices are loud, the accents various, and the result is not harmony—as in the old image of pluralism as a symphony, with each group playing its own instrument (but who wrote the music?); the result is a jangling discord."

In recent years several Chicano, Latino, and feminist authors have proposed what Peter McLaren calls "critical multiculturalism," which considers differences relationally and not as separate identities. "Border cultures," such as those that form in border towns between two countries and in schools where the children of immigrants of various nationalities converge, demonstrate the usefulness of thinking relationally about ethnic experience. In this way, a new consciousness of *mestizaje* might form, which would not be "simply a doctrine of identity based on cultural bricolage or a form of bric-a-brac subjectivity but a critical practice of cultural negotiation and translation that attempts to transcend the contradictions of Western dualistic thinking." The critique of dominant culture, instead of being made separately by each group, would be a "multicultural resistance" (McLaren 1994: 67).

The strongest objection to multiculturalism comes from authors such as Nancy Fraser (1997), who question its reduction of the political conflict to the struggle for the rearrangement of the differences in ethnicity, nation, and gender, forgetting about economic injustice, exploitation, and the consequent need to redistribute income. For Fraser, U.S. cultural politics puts the emphasis on culturalist studies of differences and on the dedication of politics to a revaluation of disrespected identities and despised cultural products. The construction of a new emancipatory project should bring together the cultural politics of recognition and redistributive social policies, culture and the economy. I might add that the export of American multiculturalism has found an echo in Europe and Latin America at the very moment when the decline of the socialist critique of capitalism has contributed to the devaluation of redistributive demands.

(B) WHILE AMERICANS speak of affirmative action to refer to policies that seek to counteract inequalities and establish structural discrimination in favor of minority groups, the French translate the term as *positive discrimination*. Why introduce the concept of discrimination in actions meant to prevent it? What has prompted the heirs of Cartesian rationalism to institute the paradox that discrimination (a word that has negative connotations) be characterized as positive? Using "the term positive discrimination is, in itself, an implicit criticism, because the pairing of two contradictory terms produces an effect of pure and simple overload of meaning or the semantic effect of antinomy, if not absurdity" (De Rudder and Poiret 1999: 397).

In France the laws refer to individuals as universal citizens, linked to the secular nation-state, independently of any privilege that might derive from their religion, ethnicity, or gender. The behaviors arising from these differences are allowed by right in private life, but no additional benefits are granted. French law does not provide resources to correct discrimination or inequalities based on group membership, nor does it provide compensation for past injustices.

In any case, this was the situation when the welfare state prevailed; it established a historical compromise among the different, between the bourgeoisie and workers, men and women, those born in different regions, and it provided everyone with basic access to goods and (social) security so long as they were French citizens. But the opening of borders for the political and economic unification of Europe *and* the massive influx of European, African, and Latin American immigrants have rendered uncertain how to imagine the national, regional, and universal. Will the European community of citizens be an addition of already existing national communities? If this is the case, will this extension be based on a historical community of culture or on a new contract among Europeans that excludes those who are not European? What happens, then, to their claims of universality? The new conditions of citizenship cannot be solved, says Etienne Balibar (1998: 43), through a purely normative legal treatment nor by a deductive treatment that takes as its point of departure a preexisting concept of citizenship and of the citizen.

In addition to these historic changes, the diffusion of U.S. and Canadian debates in France and other European countries is provoking reflection on the inadequacy of the principle of equal rights and the inability of institutions to provide effective equal access to goods and services, as well as to prevent racism. The increase in African and Latin American migrants has accentuated the ethnicization of social relations in Europe. Although the laws prohibit discrimination, residential and educational segregation are intensified, and covert and not so covert actions in everyday life call into question claims of

equality and inclusivity. The growth of xenophobic movements and parties in France and Germany are the most disturbing expression of this process.

Several authors and European social movement spokespersons suggest that the inconveniences of differentialist policies and identity politics are greater than their advantages. They militate against the possibility of democratic equality when the society "becomes the terrain of confrontation of particular interests, rather than finding the general interest" (Todorov 1995: 96). I agree, to an extent, with the philosophical depth of Paul Ricoeur's (1998: 60) critique of North American multiculturalism when he suggests changing the emphasis on identity to a politics of recognition: "In the notion of identity there is only the idea of sameness, whereas recognition is a concept that directly integrates otherness and allows a dialectic of the same and the other. The demand of identity always involves something violent with respect to others. The search for recognition, on the contrary, implies reciprocity."

However, the new climate of social conflict leads other authors to admit that "the lesson of American multiculturalism is integration within the conditions of a political space conducive to accommodating the diversity of cultures" (Mongin 1995: 86). Similarly other members of the journal *Esprit* and some of the migration experts mentioned therein say that the specific recognition of each ethnic group can be the starting point for an intellectual and political reformulation of the state and of a transnational citizenship that values difference and dissent rather than a form of discrimination. The issues of migration and foreigners, irresolvable within the classic organization of the republican system, are seen, then, as an occasion for democratic progress and opposition to neofascist movements that resist globalization (Balibar 1998; Wieviorka 1998). Although it isn't possible to do justice here to the richness of the theoretical debate and variety of multicultural policies implemented in different European countries (Beck 2000; Habermas 2000; Rex 1996), I do want to emphasize that the recent complexity of the issue and its opening to the thought of other regions are bringing about a rethinking of the liberal tradition, the rights of minorities, and the conditions for a pluralistic governance.[1]

1. The backlash against tolerance of non-European, in particular Islamic migrants in Europe has led to the belief at the end of the first decade of the new millennium that multiculturalism is dead. Perhaps the most noteworthy news regarding the repudiation of a multicultural EU policy was German chancellor Angela Merkel's declaration that her country's "attempts to build a multicultural society had 'utterly failed.'" Germany's Muslim population, particularly the Turks, are blamed for the dissipation of German culture on the basis of their resistance to linguistic and cultural integration. In the Netherlands the right-wing People's Party for Freedom and Democracy sought stricter immigration laws, increasing the risk that Dutch and other right-wing politicians

(C) IN LATIN AMERICA the relations between culture and heterogeneity developed in other ways. On the one hand, like the United States and Canada, Latin American countries have a colonial past, and like them they have been shaped by mass migrations that led to the coexistence of different ethnic groups. There are also analogies between the U.S. notion of the melting pot, the metaphor of the *crisol de razas* (crucible of races) used in Argentina and other Latin American nations, and the *cadinho de raças* (crucible of races) used in Brazil. But the discursive imaginaries and forms of institutionalization of these metaphors differ.

José Martí's "our *mestizo* America" and José Vasconcelos's "cosmic race" were already attempts to integrate indigenous heritage that they themselves differentiated from what took place in the "bleached blond America" of the United States. Although Domingo Faustino Sarmiento and other Argentine and Uruguayan liberals gave preference to people of European origin, there was more willingness and a greater variety of cultural-political strategies to resolve the heterogeneity through mestizaje. While in the United States blacks were first kept as slaves and then segregated in neighborhoods, schools, and other public spaces, and indigenous people were marginalized on reservations, in Latin American countries the extermination and displacement of blacks and Indians coexisted with mestizaje policies from the nineteenth century and with an (unequal) recognition of citizenship, which reached the heights of symbolic celebration of national heritage in Mexican *indigenismo*. There was racism everywhere, but the alternatives to racism should be differentiated, as Amaryll Chanady (1994) observes in her comparative analysis of the Americas. While in the United States mestizaje and hybridization have been seen predominantly as a scandal, in Latin American and Caribbean countries there exists, together with policies and attitudes of everyday discrimination, a positive valuation of race mixture as an impetus to modernization and cultural creativity.

What might be called the canon of Latin American cultures is historically

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will lead their countries to opt out of EU regulations, thus weakening the union. France's president Sarkozy enraged the European commissioner for justice, fundamental rights and citizenship by ordering the expulsion of Roma immigrants after a clash between the police and the Roma that led to the shooting death of a youth. In Sweden, that erstwhile bastion of social democracy, a far-right anti-immigrant party won twenty seats in the legislature, enabling it to hold the balance of power between the center-right and the opposition left-wing bloc. In February 2011 Prime Minister David Cameron shocked many Brits by attacking what had seemed to be an ingrained diversity policy. He said that multiculturalism "encouraged 'segregated communities' where Islamic extremism can thrive." [Trans.]

closer to Europe and to our native cultures than to the United States, but throughout the twentieth century that canon has combined influences from different European countries and linked them in a heterodox manner, giving shape to national traditions. Writers such as Octavio Paz and Julio Cortázar, artists like Anita Malfatti, Antonio Berni, and many others refer in their works to European and U.S. artists who are unknown to each other but whom we, creators from peripheral countries, as Borges said, "can handle" and combine "without superstition," even "irreverence." Other important aesthetic tendencies, including that of José María Arguedas, the Brazilian modernists, and the Mexican muralists, constructed narratives of our societies that resignified European modernity, establishing the place and legitimacy of native cultures.

While cosmopolitanism is more prevalent in elite culture, we also find hybrid appropriations of metropolitan repertoires and critical uses in popular music and art in accordance with local needs. We have already studied the remarkable malleability of migrants and other popular sectors: craftsmen who adapt their objects and images to entice urban consumers, peasants who reconvert their skills and knowledge so they can get work in factories, indigenous movements that adapt their traditional demands in order to have them included in transnational discourses on human rights and ecology (De Grandis 1995; García Canclini 1995; Gruzinski 2002).

Moreover modern societies in Latin America were not formed according to the model of ethnocommunitarian belonging because in many countries the mass migrations of foreigners merged rapidly into the new societies. The paradigm of these integrations was the secular idea of the republic, yet they were simultaneously open to the modulations that the French model acquired in other European cultures and the historical processes of Latin America.

This account, different from that of the United States, explains why in Latin America the tendency to resolve conflicts through multicultural policies of affirmative action is not prevalent. Inequalities in the processes of national integration also spawned nationalistic and ethnic fundamentalism that support exclusionary self-assertions in order to resist mestizaje. To this end these fundamentalisms make absolute a single heritage that is illusorily thought to be pure. There are analogies between the separatist emphasis, based on self-esteem as the key to vindicating the rights of minorities in the United States, and the Manichaean interpretation of history by Latin American indigenous and national movements, who place all virtues on their side and attribute developmental disabilities to others. However, it was not the prevailing trend in our political history. And even less so in this time of globalization that renders more evident the hybrid constitution of ethnic and national identities, the

asymmetrical and unequal but unavoidable interdependence in which each group must defend its rights. In any case, recent historical research and cultural and anthropological studies demand that we not speak of Latin America as a bloc, as a homogeneous whole. Let's consider the three different ways in which Argentina, Mexico, and Brazil constructed their nations.

We can extend to other Latin American countries what Beatriz Sarlo (1999: 19) said regarding the Argentines: "We ignore what hyphenated identities mean (that is, the form of identities in the United States: Italian-American, Polish-American, African-American)." But I will try to show that this is so for different reasons in each country.

If in Argentina it is not customary to think of composite identities, with hyphens, that is because a tight economic, political, and military system created a nation in which the Indians were almost exterminated, and millions of Spanish, Italians, Russians, Jews, Syrians, and Lebanese were ethnically "reconstituted" through mass education. The native population was replaced by European immigrants, and a homogeneous "white nation" was produced by the vigorous erasure of differences (Quijada 1998b). Sarlo (1999: 19) attributes this task to the public school:

> It maintained a standardizing ideal and imposed it, often in an authoritarian manner and replete with prejudices. Here the idea of a synthetic nationality does not exist: if an Argentine is of Italian origin, he or she is not Italo-Argentine. The spectrum of cultural diversity has been lost. It is also true that for hundreds of thousands of children of immigrants, that origin was never an obstacle for their advancement in civil society and politics, although their parents were identified as foreigners the children were recognized as typically Argentine. The state school, and violent and authoritarian unification were part of the context in which the children of foreigners were converted full speed into typical Argentines.

From an anthropological perspective, Rita Segato Latera agrees with Sarlo regarding the use of violence, but her assessment is less positive. She speaks of "ethnic terror," "panic in the face of diversity, which was, indeed, the Argentine inclination, and cultural surveillance, which was implemented through institutional, official mechanisms, from going to school dressed in all white uniforms, to the prohibition of Quechua and Guarani wherever it was still spoken, and other informal surveillance strategies: making fun of accents, for example, terrorizing entire generations of Italians and Galicians, who had to

restrain and monitor themselves so as not to speak badly" (qtd. in Mateu and Spiguel 1997: 41).

The Argentine nation, says Segato (1998: 17), "was built by constituting itself as the great nemesis of minorities." She admits that having formed a homogeneous nation served to control the hegemonic groups (I would add: in some periods) and to establish "a respectable dose of citizenship when compared with other Latin American countries." But she also attributes to that homogeneity of accents, gestures, ways of dressing, and thinking the structuring of a cultural and political authoritarianism: "Society was trained to be monitored, in the school, in military service, in hospitals . . . in order to control the other, so that it would not be different" (qtd. in Mateu and Spiguel 1997: 41, 44).

In Mexico, in contrast, the indigenous population was subordinated to the national project of Creole and Western modernization,[2] but allowed for mestizaje, in which indigenous social relations and goods survived with limited possibilities of reproduction. As explained earlier, fewer European migrations than in other Latin American countries provided a binary integration between the Spanish and the indigenous, more durable and more efficient from the point of view of the hegemonic groups, although without removing contradictions that persist to this day. Indigenous movements, which in recent years have escalated their challenges to national order, are clear evidence of what has remained socially, politically, and culturally unresolved in mestizaje.

The pluricultural policy of postrevolutionary Mexico differentiates this country from other Latin American countries, including those with large indigenous populations (Bolivia, Peru, Guatemala), and also from the place of Indians and blacks in the United States. As Claudio Lomnitz explains, "Although both the 'black American' and 'the Mexican Indian' were the other of normative citizens in their respective countries, the Indian in Mexico was positioned as the very subject of nationality, who would be transformed by education and racial mixing." The comparison made by this author is symptomatic of the role of anthropology in both countries, which can be distinguished on the basis of the concepts handled by the founders, Franz Boas in the United States and Manuel Gamio, his disciple, in Mexico. Boas criticized U.S. racism and advocated relativism to defend racial pluralism and good treatment of migrants; Gamio used a similar argument to "crown the *mestizo* as the protagonist of Mexican nationality" and to "legitimate a new racial definition of nationality" (Lomnitz-Adler 1999: 88). All of this has been rethought or has

2. Creoles, *criollos* in Spanish, were the American-born descendants of Spaniards. [Trans.]

received radical critiques in recent years, ranging from the insufficient multiculturality in schools through legislative reforms to regional conflicts yet to be resolved (Arizpe 1996; Bartolomé 1997; Bartra 1992; Bonfil Batalla 1996). In addition to internal debate and reformulation, there is now the need to reconsider the nation culturally in relation to free trade processes and greater economic integration with the United States (Lomnitz-Adler 1999; Valenzuela 1999; Zermeño 1996), which I deal with later.

In contrast to these cases, Brazil has a national society better predisposed to hybridization. Without denying its enormous inequalities and class-based and regional fractures, anthropologists emphasize the multiple interpenetrations between migratory contingents that formed this country. Sometimes political and cultural leaders talk about their African and indigenous ancestry and see in ethnic affiliations a kind of voluntarism, amenable to mixing. African culture permeates the entire society in a diffuse and enveloping way (Segato 1998), as evidenced by the transethnic and transclass invitation to Carnival (Da Matta 1991) and the ubiquity, in all segments of society, of the idea of spirit possession, originating in Afro-Caribbean traditions and reinforced by syncretization with European spiritism. Many ethnic features are introduced through leisure practices and rituals, and also through cultural policies, into the heritage of other groups and become part of their worldview. Without losing their idiosyncrasy, identities become less monolithic. The centrality of spirit possession as the "foundational and common experience of Brazilian society, could be considered a metaphor" of "letting oneself be inhabited by the other," at the same time recognizing it as other (Segato 1998: 15–16).

While U.S. identities are often independent units, which make difficult an individual's negotiation with multiple affiliations, in Brazil the subject preserves for itself the possibility of different affiliations and can move between identities and mix them. Thus each of the cultures in contact is maintained as a context for the group and at the same time manages to "impregnate" others, "to have the capacity to convoke or simply be present in a greater share of the population." "Thus is preserved the referential dimension of the culture, but the emblematic, essential territorial conception of the ethnic group as part of the nation is largely lost. A deep sense of interrelatedness is undoubtedly gained, an identification, a possible conviviality among the diverse segments of the population" (Segato 1998: 14).

Intercultural Circuits

When globalization compels Europeans, Americans, and Latin Americans to interact, one notices the low level of compatibility among their ways of dealing with difference. The lack of international agreement on recognized rights places migrants who grew up in one region and now work in another in "schizophrenic" situations. What does one call others? How does one enter into exchange agreements in which everyone understands the same thing or something equivalent, translatable, when speaking of rights and obligations? The answers have to do with creating a transnational public sphere in which cultural conceptions are not politically incommensurable.

This poses a sociocultural and political problem, and, we might add, one of managing subjectivity. An example of how to manage identities within oneself and shuttle between them is that of Tzvetan Todorov. Born in Bulgaria, where he received his basic education and lived in ideological and political terror, he emigrated to and then became a citizen of France, where his academic career evolved and where, he explains, he discovered democracy; finally, in the past three decades he goes as a visiting professor a few months each year to U.S. universities, those isolated campuses, "secular monasteries," where, he says, more is known and said of "scholastic or personal disputes in other monasteries" than of city life (Todorov 1996: 202). Whoever first undergoes deculturation, then acculturation, and finally transculturation never stops being an "uprooted man" (the title of his book), someone who can no longer be entirely Bulgarian nor French nor American, if such completeness is ever achievable. For that reason he does not believe in "the virtues of systematic nomadism" (25). To be ahead of the game, he assures us, is to learn to better distinguish the real from the ideal, culture from nature, the relative from the absolute. Such learning, according to Todorov, distances one from the relativism of "anything goes" as well as from the Manichaeanism of black or white. Confronted with the need to distinguish the different ways of naming others without confusing them, nor opposing them by looking everywhere for the same, he ends up finding compatriots in Bulgaria, fellow citizens in France, and colleagues in the United States.

When I read this classification I was surprised that anyone could be so well organized as to know where to find his compatriots, his fellow citizens, and his colleagues. Other intellectuals, even in France, think the divisions wrought by migration cannot be so easily solved but rather are accentuated in the midst of economic globalization, the deregulation of whole areas of social life, and

the rollback of foreigners' rights. Citizenship, in the broadest sense as "the right to speak in public space," Etienne Balibar observes (1998: 140), seems to disappear or retreat in Europe under policies of "(European) Community lobbying" that separates out a legitimate space which excludes the voices of non-Europeans. Some thinkers relocate their personal experience through the political analysis of the status of migrants and transnational social struggles (Maalouf 2000), making innovative proposals regarding border conflicts. In turn, anthropologists who study intercultural migration differentiate scientists' or intellectuals' experiences of uprooting from those of other social groups with different job opportunities, recognition, and, consequently, integration.

We thus come across a first difficulty in generalizing about the condition of migrants. There are comparable problems: estrangement, the costly acquisition of rights in the new society, the separation between forms of cultural, legal-political, and labor membership. But the ways of solving each of these difficulties and articulating them varies. Perhaps the key difference in this age is that it is easy for some to deterritorialize themselves for short periods (as employees of a transnational corporation or as tourists), and then hold up the happy and chosen nomadic life to justify globalization ideologically. In contrast, the worker's condition reveals most radically what it means to be a foreigner; and also that condition in which work is considered more seriously as a value.

Nor is it easy to group together the variations among migrants of the same nationality or within the adoptive country, or in a given city of the country. "Brazilian immigrants in San Francisco are an abstraction," says Gustavo Lins Ribeiro. In accordance with a classification applicable to other Latin American groups displaced to Europe and the United States, and applicable to migrants from other regions, this author distinguishes three categories: (1) those who, due to their short-term economic objectives, define their stay in the United States as temporary; (2) those who make their life in the new country; (3) transmigrants, who reproduce their lives, interests, and social networks in two nations. The narratives that connect one country with another are coherent only insofar as one chooses one of these forms of migration. For those interested only in working in the United States, that society "is only good for making money" and its people are "unhappy," while Brazil "is the best country in the world." But those who see American society as "the land of opportunity" judge Brazil, as others do Mexico, Argentina, and Colombia, as a broken country, with no way out, that squanders its resources (Ribeiro 1998b: 3–4).

The differences in the assessment of the United States change according to nationality of origin, the precariousness or stability of employment, and legal status. Among the fifteen thousand Brazilians living in the San Francisco area,

as among the 4 million Mexicans living in California, similar views regarding employment status are discernible. It is common for both groups to define their occupation as "underemployed," either in relation to the service activities performed (maids, waiters, drivers), to lack of documentation that legalizes employment, or to its instability. Also contributing to people's lack of sense of citizenship, or to experiencing it otherwise, is the absence in the United States of an identity card, which is common in Latin American countries, and of course the discrimination suffered even when they have a green card, a Social Security number, and a driver's license, the three documents that are used in the United States for the purposes of identification.

It is logical that this vulnerable or uncertain condition encourages the maintenance of frequent ties with compatriots in the new country and in the home country. The difficulties of integrating into the host society encourage solidarity networks, emblematic places of encounter and entertainment (parks, restaurants, bars, and clubs). Migrants intensify religious participation, the passion for sports, and other rituals through which they can reimagine the distant, lost community and speak their own language and feel protected. Mexican, Brazilian, Cuban, and Argentine restaurants, and the dance schools associated with those countries, in addition to reproducing customs and sociability also generate jobs and allow some families to attain prosperity.

At the same time, people look to their country of origin. Being aware of what goes on in the place from where one migrated was a necessity for the exiles of the past, but the rapid communication between distant countries now makes interconnection more fluid and intense. Of course, geographical proximity facilitates even more the flow of information and mutual assistance that connects migrant members of the same family or same town with those who remained, through the travel of the "revolving members" and through their telephone conversations. It is obvious that the $7 billion sent each year from the United States by Mexican workers to their families in Oaxaca, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Jalisco, Guerrero, and Zacatecas not only contributes to sustaining the economies of those regions,[3] but is also associated with the transmission of information and tastes; those dollars influence language and cuisine, entertainment and fashion.

Just as Dallas is a hub for all U.S. carriers, it is also a distributor of people and information, remittances and goods: to and from Chicago, California,

3. As reported earlier, Mexican migrants in the United States sent $21.27 billion in remittances to Mexico, according to the Central Bank of Mexico, which estimates another 5 percent increase for 2011. [Trans.]

Houston, and Florida on the north side of the border, and to Ocampo, a town bordering on the states of Jalisco and Zacatecas, from where everything is forwarded to other regions of Mexico. The connections are almost daily, with ten- or twenty-seat buses that carry mail, merchandise, and the most varied requests. Laurent Faret (1996) explains that those who live in Dallas use the services of people from Ocampo for transactions that could be carried out in Dallas (tailoring, obtaining car parts), even though the cost differences do not offer great advantages. We might discuss whether these circuits should be called a "migratory field" (Simon 1999), a "revolving territory" (Tarrius 1993), or "transnational communities" (Rouse 1991), but there is no doubt that the hundreds of towns and cities with large numbers of migrants are open communities, whose limits do not end within the country, sometimes not even within the same ethnic group. The networks not only connect Mixtecos from Oaxaca with California or Purépechas of Michoacán with Redwood City. Often the need to join forces in communications and in work and to appear before others (Americans) transforms two or three different ethnic groups into "Mexicans." Even Brazilian-Mexican, Cuban–Puerto Rican, Argentine-Uruguayan communities are invented. In this case, the hyphens do matter: they designate a new and precarious integration beyond the traditional inertia of identity.

Although the owners of "ethnic businesses" in the United States tend to identify themselves with national names—Café do Brasil or Restaurante Michoacán—there is no shortage of examples like Goiaz Taqueria in San Francisco, a fusion of Goiaian-Brazilian and Mexican cuisine. In the appetizer section there coexist *feijoada* and *churrasquinho* with nachos, guacamole, and enchiladas; *caipirinhas* are found together with tequila (Ribeiro 1998a: 4). Unlike the difficulties encountered by Brazilian and Mexican governments in having these products traded more freely between the two societies or in agreeing on joint ventures in global markets and on debt negotiations with the United States, the migrants in this country engage in multiple hybridizations in their daily life.

I am not forgetting the intense competition that impedes greater cooperation among Latin American minorities, among themselves and with Chicanos, and the almost nonexistent relationship with African Americans. The oppressed and subaltern also generate their own forms of exclusion. Both hegemonic forms of segregation and affirmative action policies contribute to the hardening of exclusions over alliances. But sometimes the shared enjoyment of a meal or participation in a carnival, of symbolic and economic benefits provided by policies aimed at a broader population induce the formation of ethnic

and transnational communities. Peter McLaren (1994: 67) refers to this when he suggests that multiculturalism offers not only critical witnessing of the suffering of minorities, but also "intermittent, epiphanic breaks, and moments of joy that occur when solidarity in the struggle for liberation is established."

It must be said, however, that the possibilities for intercultural encounter are better exploited by the market than by initiatives to deal with political strife. Broadcasters and producers of shows and CDs are especially good at expanding their customer base with Latino cultural goods. Just as ethnic differences tend to be subsumed in the labor market structured according to national identities—when abroad, Zapotecs and Tzotzils cease to be such and become Mexicans—in consumer capitalism what distinguishes Brazilians from Mexicans and both from Colombians or Cubans is elided in the media glitz of Latinness. As in the subordination of labor alliances to the regime of exploitation of all migrants, Latino communities of consumers are subsumed under the commercial strategies of Sony, Polygram, and MTV. Just as Mexicans can be exchanged for Haitians or Salvadorans when their labor is reduced to a commodity, Raphael, José Luis Rodríguez (El Puma), and Cristina Saralegui—despite their brand differences, which are not permitted to common migrants—could be exchanged for their equivalents in the future insofar as they are icons of a *single* tradable "identity." The question that arises in interviews with migrant leaders is how to leverage alliances and mergers among Latinos without diluting the differences among Cubans, Dominicans, Mexicans, Venezuelans, and other groups that have an inalienable political and cultural value.

Multiform Citizenship

I asked a few pages back if the European, American, and Latin American models of multi- and interculturality can be made compatible. It is not a minor issue, regarding the relations among these regions in the medium and long term, to know how to resolve the discrepancies between the republican system of universal rights, U.S. multicultural separatism, and the much criticized forms of multiethnic integration under the nation-state instituted by Latin American countries. To these three models we should add a fourth type of "integration": when multiculturalism is subordinated to media discourse, the monopolistic organization of culture industries, which makes the appearance and disappearance of diversity dependent on "majorities" measured by ratings. This consumer integration policy cuts across and challenges the three classic models of citizenship.

These four ways of organizing the labyrinth of multiculturalism become inefficient when they resist reformulation to meet the challenges of globalization. In Latin American countries the homogeneity decreed by nation-states is of little use to quell the new ethnic and regional claims. Nor does the abstract citizenship of the European republics serve the multitudes of foreigners eager to share their prosperity. American separatism, in turn, even if improved by the critiques of the academic left, has not convinced the Europeans or the Latin Americans that affirmative action will lead to a productive coexistence. As for the slow advance of media communitarianism, it seems to be more successful on Saturdays and Sundays than during the week.

I see two lines of thinking for working out these differences in dealing with multiculturalism. The first is to overcome what might be called the optional conceptions of difference. Here I want to evoke the incisive clarity of Stuart Hall, whom I heard lecture on hybridization at the University of Stirling in October 1996. He said that one of the merits of hybridity is that it "undermines binary ways of thinking about difference." Nevertheless he explained that we must rediscover how to speak about difference not "as a radical alterity, but as *différence*":

> Whereas one difference, a radical otherness, opposes one system of difference to another, we are dealing here with the negotiation of differences that permanently slide into each other. It is not possible to say where the British end and their colonies begin, where the Spanish end and Latin Americans begin, where Latin Americans end and where indigenous people begin. None of these groups remain within their original boundaries any longer. What is taking place is a kind of Derridean erasure of all these terms, and when we say borders what we refer to are things that cross over. In other words, borders, instead of stopping people, are places through which people constantly cross illegally.

The other line of thinking is to remember *what cannot be reduced to mestizaje or hybridizations*. In other words, all migrants, and even anyone snatched from Edenic "harmony" by globalization, is a subject who is offered the possibility of speaking from more than one place and simultaneously condemned to that possibility as well. Like Arguedas's characters, who, according to Antonio Cornejo Polar (1996: 842–43), do not synthesize their experiences into a single discourse but fragment the possibility of affirming themselves as radical subjects in two languages (Quechua and Spanish), two media of communication (oral and written), as residents of the provinces of Lima, by not forgetting, in part, any stopping place on their journey, by refusing to be deprived of the

freedom to speak from several places.[4] But is it possible to name others and make policies for overcoming inequality only from the purview of injuries caused by difference?

If we juxtapose globalizing and hybridizing strategies, on the one hand, and the varied experiences of multiculturality, on the other, it becomes clear that neither the creation of a global market for finance, some goods, and media circuits nor the progress of English as a "universal language" eliminates the differences and the difficulties in translating among cultures, although it is not impossible. Beyond the facile narratives of absolute homogenization or of local resistance, globalization confronts us with the possibility of discovering fragments of other cultures, although not all of them, and reworking what we were imagining as our own in interactions and agreements with others, although never with everyone. Thus the opposition is no longer between global and local, understanding the global as the general subordination to a single cultural stereotype and understanding the local as a simple difference. Difference does not appear as the compartmentalization of separate cultures but as a dialogue with those with whom we are in conflict or with whom we seek alliances.

The ethnographic material consulted for this study reveals rapprochements and convergences in the spheres of labor and consumption. Although widespread competition in the era of globalization encourages rivalries, we find possibilities of coexistence in the solidarity of migrants with other (different) migrants and with those who remained in their native country, the discovery of the appeal of other cultures that can lead an Argentine to dance salsa or a Mexican to become a devotee of Peruvian or Brazilian food. These rapprochements also reveal the possibility of inventing and sharing material and symbolic resources, not of dissolving differences but of combining them again.

However, these thousands of everyday experiences, repeated in different latitudes, and which are reshaping the geography of ethnic groups and nations, find little expression in the place where rights are negotiated: citizenship. To complicate matters, the points of departure and the modes of managing these issues differ in the two intercultural spaces under consideration: the European Union and inter-American free trade agreements. Supranational communities

4. José María Arguedas (1911–69) was a Peruvian writer and anthropologist who studied the indigenous (Quechua) culture (in particular music and dance) of the Andes and in whose novels he re-creates the Andean world in a highly poetic form of Spanish. The difficulty that highland migrants had in forging an unpolluted hybrid culture as laborers in the capitalist enterprises of the lowlands is the tragic theme of his last novel, *The Fox from Up Above and the Fox from Down Below*, which ends with his suicide note. [Trans.]

formed among migratory movements and in art and media partnerships have contributed in Europe to the creation of a common citizenship and a European cultural space, with funding and cooperation and exchange programs that are also supranational. In that European citizenship, and in its more or less integrated cultural space, one finds only some non-Europeans, and millions of "others" are discriminated against or expelled. The hundreds of Africans who drown trying to reach Italy or cross the Strait of Gibraltar, the twenty thousand who cross the southern border of Spain legally or illegally each year (half of whom are sent back), show that the interdependence between Europe and the southern Mediterranean or the other side of the Atlantic is far from being resolved. If Europe were to request admission to the European Union, it would not meet the standards of its own foreign policies and would be rejected because it is not democratic enough.

Worse still are the blunders of Europe's audiovisual integration policies due to increased control of film production and exhibition and U.S. capital's strategies in the recording industry. But at least these issues are discussed and there are attempts to design policies to address them in that continent's forums. There are also many studies of economic feasibility and cultural consumption habits that help in the design of such policies; most public officials do not have access to such studies in Latin America.

Leaders at Latin American meetings seem unaware that for millions of people today, identity is an international coproduction. Our transnational economic agreements have not created an institutionalized public space at that scale which includes actors from civil society. The proposed inter-American integration, conceived as agreements among business and intergovernmental lobbies, without the participation of citizens, leaves migrants without rights or reduces those rights to whatever the most powerful states may want to grant a few select minorities. As for the media, they are mere businesses in quest of consumers, while interpersonal and social communication are left to "artisanal" networks of spontaneous connections that are marginalized or neglected because of their lack of power or lawlessness. Since so much concerning intercultural relations is left out of integration negotiations, one cannot help but think that action should not be limited to broadening the agenda. It is necessary to reinvent politics.

When the legitimizing support that is citizenship is not reformed so as to encompass the supranational level of existing social relations, we don't know what to call others. In two senses: first, you cannot be called what you are, say, Mazateco, Mexican, or Mexican American, especially if you have three identities and are not allowed to deploy them simultaneously, or whenever it

is fitting. A democratic political culture and a democratic cultural policy go beyond recognizing differences; they must also create the conditions to live those differences in ambiguity.

Second, knowing what to call others means being capable of understanding and accepting them in their difference, in the multiplicity of their differences. Here something crucial comes into play: How do we include identities that are different in scale and nonexclusive in a notion of inter-American or supranational citizenship? If we could achieve this basic condition, then the separation that relegates compatriots to one place, fellow citizens to another, and colleagues or coworkers to yet another might be less traumatic. One of the key issues at work in the (oppressive or liberating) character of globalization is whether it allows us to imagine ourselves with multiple, flexible, modular, and overlapping identities and creates the conditions for us to imagine the identities, or better yet the cultures of others as legitimate and combinable and not only as competitive or threatening.

But above all there is something radically democratic in admitting that often we do not know what to call others. That is the starting point for listening to what they call themselves.

PART II

INTERLUDE

FIVE

DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN A LATIN AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST, A EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGIST, AND A U.S. CULTURAL STUDIES SCHOLAR

There was a time when anthropologists analyzed rural communities or an urban neighborhood, sociologists the structure and changes of each society, literary and art critics the culture of a nation, and all of them discussed globalization at international conferences. Today, in addition, we study borders, intercontinental migration, globalized corporations, the production and reception of entertainment with global reach, scholarly conferences and their exchanges among distant countries. You can no longer understand the relation between a theory and its social conditions of production simply by referring it to the nation or class or university in which it was developed. Taking into account the daily life from which researchers look at transnational objects of study and reflect on them requires understanding how we are situated in delocalized information flows, in networks and travel that go beyond one's own country, the homogenization of trends of thought on a worldwide scale, the reprocessing of differences in each nation, and how knowledge of those processes is exchanged in conferences and journals in several languages.

1

When the Latin American anthropologist received the invitation to participate in a conference in Berlin in December 2000 on the relations among European and North and South American cultures, he wondered if it made sense to start the new century with this topic. Hadn't everything already been written on the European conquest and colonization, on U.S. imperialism, and Latin Americans' resistance? What new assessments can be made of what the Spanish, French, and Italians brought to America, about their natural scientists, architects, and railways, perfumes, prostitutes, and romanticisms, writers, travelers, merchants, and politicians, who also ended up becoming writers through the enchantment of these lands? The conference program took up these issues anew and also threatened to deal with travelers who went from one continent to another. Was it possible to say anything new in reexamining Rubén Darío's and Julio Cortázar's quests in Paris, those of Roger Caillois in Argentina and Claude Lévi-Strauss in Brazil?

And why Berlin? The choice of that city, and not of Paris or Madrid, suggested a novelty: the desire of the German capital to become the capital not only of Europe but of Europe's ties with the United States and some Latin American countries. The anthropologist was not surprised after so much evidence of Deutsche Bank's role in the economic policies of the European Union, having seen on his previous trip that the cultural power previously wielded by Montparnasse, then the Latin Quarter or London, was dwarfed by the business and entertainment center being built at Potsdamer Platz, surrounded by museums, theaters, and jazz and rock concert halls that brought to Berlin and concentrated there entrepreneurs and artists, writers and rock musicians from all over the Western world and and some Asian countries as well.

However, even though for many years—from the 1960s to the 1980s—Berlin had the second largest library dedicated to Latin America (the first is in Austin, Texas), Germany did not have a tradition of Latin American studies comparable to that of the United States. Nor did France, England, or Spain, and even less Italy, despite the contingents of immigrants who moved to Latin America and despite the many Latin American exiles and travelers received in Europe. It's true that Berliners had the sense to include in the conference specialists from the United States. But would they travel to Germany?

The novelty, thought the anthropologist, was that now the identity of Latin Americans would be discussed in English, German, and even Russian or Polish, as he had already seen when he received the invitation to the Third Congress of European Latin Americanists, which would take place in Warsaw, also

in 2000. The current composition of the globalized world prevented a return to the stereotype of those who denounced, in previous times of postcolonialism or dependency theory, that Latin America was being thought by outsiders. Perhaps these same de-centered conferences, the joint research conducted by Argentines and Brazilians in the United States, by U.S. universities in Mexico, Guatemala, and Peru, that sometimes result in multinational research groups, and of course the papers and letters coming and going on the Internet, oblige us to speak of transatlantic and inter-American circuits rather than spaces. In these circuits our understanding of America, Latinness, hegemony, and resistance and the ways of asking questions are being reformulated.

It's no longer a matter, he tells his wife, who dedicates herself to comparative literature, of Asturias discovering Guatemala while in Paris, and Cortázar Argentina, or Cabrera Infante Cuba from London. Something different is happening compared to what was discussed so often regarding *Rayuela* and *Three Trapped Tigers*. Sociologists and anthropologists also feel nostalgia or longing for their country while on a campus in California, New York, or Berlin, and that feeling distorts the selection and interpretation of the information when writing their theses on the national business community in Argentina or ecological disaster in the Amazon. It's not just a question of whether that distance allows one to see one's country of origin better, to be less or more Argentine, Brazilian, or Guatemalan. The anthropologist thought that his wife was half listening because she continued answering emails, but then she responded, "Don't you think that what distance used to mean has changed?"

2

When the Spanish sociologist who received his doctorate in Paris was invited to the Berlin conference, he noted that the date coincided with that of the course he had agreed to teach in São Paulo. Would he go to South America just as hundreds of Latin Americans were coming to Europe, including some Brazilian friends he met during his years in France? He wanted to get to know Brazil and was interested in becoming a European specialist on that country, perhaps also on Argentina, thus positioning himself for a job in Spain. Each year there were fewer positions available for scholars working on European issues. There were openings, however, for those who studied the culture, economy, and society of those Latin American countries with which the European Union had increased its trade. Some years earlier, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, it seemed possible to remain on the continent specializing in Eastern European countries. Given the attractiveness of doing business there, Europe's

gaze made a U-turn and its fascination with Latin America decreased; he himself had managed to participate in two missions, one organized by UNESCO and the other by the French government, aimed at educating Romanians on how to design social democratic cultural policies under capitalism. But that opportunity was foiled by the Yugoslavian wars, the economic disasters, and the social disintegration of postcommunism. Although Latin America was not much more reliable, it regained a certain attractiveness.

As for São Paulo, friends who had been there talked to him about its university's academic ranking, its cultural sophistication; moreover his agreed-upon visit would also coincide with the famous Biennale in that city. In truth, more than that overcrowded megalopolis, with almost no parks or plazas, what seduced him were the tales of the surreal Brazil, its beaches, music, carnival, and Afro-Brazilian cults. Bahia, Rio, Ouro Preto. Rather than the chaotic hypermodernity of São Paulo, which didn't even have the historical density of Mexico City, what attracted him was the eloquence of mestizaje, the contrasts and abraded reconciliations that had been neutralized in Europe. For someone raised in a Catholic and Francoist society, with barely the opportunity of mitigating that formation through his course of study under French rationalism, it was intriguing to reflect on the meaning of Caetano Veloso's song about there being no sin south of the Equator.

On the other hand, the Berlin conference seemed to be dominated by cultural studies. Was it due to the rise of that trend in some European centers, or as a means of interesting the North Americans? Spain had no market for cultural studies, which seemed to stop, like certain winds, at the Pyrenees. Are they a fad, as some colleagues in Madrid think of globalization? Or perhaps Spain, despite its pretensions to mediate between Europe and Latin America, is impervious to many of the intellectual innovations from the North?

3

The U.S. cultural studies scholar had devoted years to deconstructing the narratives that her country devised since the nineteenth century to justify the distrust of Latin Americans. She discovered that one of the procedures of that justification was the insistent rhetoric of the incommensurability between the lifestyles of Americans and Latin Americans. However, she now thinks that cultural studies' and postmodern anthropology's questioning of the production and communication of knowledge has weakened the arrogance of those paternalistic, colonizing, and condescending narratives of encounter with magical

strangers. We now live in a postcolonial situation because subalterns do not let themselves be represented by others, she explained to her students who were learning Spanish.

Two circumstances made her doubt these developments. First, while cultural studies seeks to read literary works critically as simple social discourses, freeing them from aesthetic mysticism, the publishing market enshrines as representatives of Latin America the most complacent narratives, and some universities grant high cultural recognition to those novels about witchcraft, or to neo-Mexicanist and neo-Incan paintings, impressed by what they believe to be their testimonial value. Isn't it time to listen to those who, having undertaken the sociologizing or deconstructive zeal of cultural studies, precisely to not give in to the market, to become interested anew in the uniqueness and density of aesthetic explorations, in which many believe it is possible to find—beyond their testimonial force—the ability to disrupt the certainties of the same and to open up to the other and others? She had heard what the Latin American anthropologist had said at a conference regarding the transition from European to North American cultural dominance: that when we began the twentieth century we learned from the avant-gardes how to connect art with life, and now we ended up asking ourselves how to differentiate that connection from the market. The opposition seemed a bit Manichaean to her, but it provided food for thought.

Her second doubt arose when she observed that the globalizing trends in the economy reinforced some borders and led to the invention of others. It is true that the discontinuities between the United States and Latin America are reduced under free trade agreements, technologically advanced communications, and the transnational exchanges of migrants. But just as the U.S. government and society raise new barriers (which greatly mobilized people to participate in demonstrations against Proposition 187, which had been passed in California), so also the differences and distance persist between researchers from the North and South. As she read in a letter to the journal of the Latin American Studies Association, scholars from the North seldom publish "the results of their research in Latin American journals or books in Spanish or Portuguese, or in French, when it comes to research on Haiti and other Francophone populations." Often the Americans "return home with information or data of which they leave no copy in the countries where they obtained them." Meanwhile Latin American researchers rarely publish their work in the North "because of the cost of translation, or because of lack of knowledge of, or access to specialized publications" (Dietz and Mato 1997: 31).

4

The anthropologist and the cultural studies scholar went to the ARCO art fair in Madrid in February 1998, but they didn't see each other because it was more crowded and tumultuous than a meeting of the Latin American Studies Association or the American Anthropological Association. The two wanted to see how the Spanish—who in 1997 dedicated the fair to Latin America and this year to Portugal—attempted to establish their intermediary role between backward Latin Americans and prosperous Europeans through the traffic in artworks. They also wanted to displace the United States as the broker between Latin America and the world. What they found was a fair in which a few of the major galleries from New York, Paris, Buenos Aires, Germany, Italy, and Mexico were placed alongside those from all regions of Spain and Portugal. They saw paintings by Andy Warhol and Keith Haring in a French gallery, canvases by the Argentine Guillermo Kuitca in a Mexican gallery from Monterrey, works by the Mexican Gabriel Orozco in a French gallery, and one of the best sold works, by Juan Dávila—friezes that simultaneously evoked comic-strip images and the Southern Cone peasant folklore of the nineteenth century, framed by pre-Columbian borders—was presented as an installation by a Chilean artist who worked in Australia.

They were not surprised to read in a magazine article by a Spanish sociologist that the fair—like those of other European countries and the biennials that abounded in Latin America during the 1990s—expressed the globalization and polycentrism of a market according to which those artists living outside their native societies could be represented by galleries from several countries. That's why they showed in their work much more than or something other than their local color. This fair, like the biennials of São Paulo and Venice and Kassel's Documenta, said the article, shows that there are sources of diffusion other than New York, although that city concentrates the largest number of operations in the global art economy and in the administration of tastes.

However, decentralization and the development of regional blocs rarely lead to a balanced articulation between the local and the global. On the occasion of the Madrid fair, *El País* asked ten Spanish artists which artwork they considered the most important or significant in the century that was ending; except for one, who chose Duchamp's *The Large Glass*, the others mentioned works by Picasso, Miró, Tàpies, all of them Spanish. What do Spanish museums acquire when they host these intercultural mixtures at home? The Galician Center of Contemporary Art bought exclusively Galician paintings at the Madrid fair, and Catalonian organizations bought installations made in Barcelona. These

institutions invite artists from almost all over the world; they stimulate the production of electronic works that travel deterritorialized. But when it comes to acquisitions, complicity with the neighbor prevails.

It occurred to the anthropologist that these paradoxical combinations of economic globalization and cultural nationalism were grist for formulating questions that economists do not ask. But he was concerned that cultural studies, the field that seemed better suited to challenge the hegemonic relations between culture, nation, and globalization, took almost no interest in understanding what art, literature, and the media mean as facts of the market. In that encyclopedia that is *Cultural Studies*, by Lawrence Grossberg, Cary Nelson, and Pamela Treichler, not even one of its forty articles is dedicated to the economy of culture; there is much about communication, consumption, and commodification, but in its eight hundred pages there are almost no hard data or graphs, only discursive treatment of facts that need to be analyzed empirically. As the anthropologist read in a polemic between Lawrence Grossberg and Nicholas Garnham, the neglect of the economic dimension has to do with the fact that cultural studies has dealt mostly with consumption, reception, and the moment of interpretation, and almost not at all with the production and circulation of symbolic goods (Garnham 1995; Grossberg 1995).

5

The cultural studies scholar, who teaches Latin American culture in one of the best equipped universities in the United States, used the vast library of her institution to include copious Latin American references in her most recent paper. Her interethnic fervor allowed her to comment on Subcomandante Marcos's communiqués from the previous week, and to frame all of that in relation to what Fanon contributed to decolonization, as interpreted by Homi Bhabha in his most recent texts. When the Peruvian student who is getting a postgraduate degree at that university summarized his professor's paper for his Argentine father, who went into exile in Lima, he received an email reply asking him who Homi Bhabha was and expressing surprise that the specialist on Latin America would cite that novice sociologist to discuss Fanon, that she would turn to Fanon for a new perspective in order to understand Latin America when debates on that author took place in Buenos Aires, São Paulo, and Mexico in the 1960s, when he was translated into Spanish and generated much discussion, perhaps too much, his father emphasized, on whether or not what Fanon wrote about Africa was of any use for Latin Americans. He remembered, moreover, that there was interest in him in the Southern Cone

because Sartre had quoted him, but also because he was useful in arguing against the culture that Sartre represented. The father was going to add that he would like his son to send him one of Bhabha's texts so he could figure out what this was all about when the electricity went out due to the unusual floods in Lima, some say because of El Niño, and when the power came back on he had barely enough time to send the email, the *emilia*, as he was told Puerto Ricans say, as he had to run off to his class at the University of San Marcos. He went off wondering what Fanon would say, now that everything that cannot be explained by El Niño is attributed to globalization.

6

The Spanish sociologist was still undecided whether to dedicate his research to Brazil or to other Latin American countries with which he shared the language and a great part of the same cultural background. In addition, a colleague in Madrid had told him that the Brazilians have little to do with Latin America: "They are an introduction only to themselves. They imagine themselves as an autonomous continent." He pondered that Brazil was more the other of the Spanish than Spanish America, and that dealing with a radical otherness appealed to him, especially with regard to anthropology and mestizaje, which offered solutions for some of the impasses of sociological thought. Isn't there an anticipation of future democratic solutions in this capacity, shown by some sectors of Latin American societies to form multicultural identities beyond the issue of skin color?

Although, strictly speaking, if it were a matter of seeking the most extreme otherness and the most baffling classifications for a Spaniard, where he had to go was the United States. The use that Americans make of "Hispanic" never ceased to surprise him, even after several years. It was, precisely, a Brazilian professor who was a visiting scholar at the University of California at Berkeley who told him that university officials refused to register him as white because that category is reserved for "persons having origin in any of the original peoples of Europe." The secretary in the Department of Anthropology recommended that he define himself as Hispanic, since that category included "black individuals whose origin is Hispanic," "Mexican/Mexican American/Chicano Persons of Mexican culture or origin, regardless of race, Latin American/ Latino Persons of Latin American culture or origin (e.g., Central Americans, South Americans, Cubans, Puerto Ricans), regardless of race." When the Brazilian told him that he had "certain reservations about identifying with the category Hispanic since Brazil wasn't colonized by Spaniards," the secretary

told him that it was advantageous to be thus classified since he would be part of a minority (Oliven 1997: 235).

All this seemed confusing to him, and even more bizarre when practiced in an anthropology department, yet it was also consistent with other accounts he had heard. He remembered the story of a Brazilian sociologist, appointed consul in San Francisco, who sent his children to a school in that city. At the first meeting of the parents with the director, she explained that in that institution "you could change ethnicity only three times." It was a way of controlling the resources used for getting included within the quota system of affirmative action. A student who entered as Hispanic could perhaps be sent to another school the next year if there were too many students in the Hispanic category. So he would then re-register as a Jew and change categories as necessary in ensuing years so long as the ethnic backgrounds of his parents or grandparents permitted it.

The sociologist mused that not only in Latin America are there expressions of magic realism.

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Finally, the U.S. cultural studies scholar and the Latin American anthropologist met twice: once on a U.S. campus and once in a Latin American capital. Both conversations were recorded, but because of an oversight the places where the sessions were taped were not indicated on the cassettes, so it is difficult to know what was said on campus and what in the Latin American city. At times it seems possible to differentiate them because in the dialogue that took place on campus the anthropologist seemed to be happy. He had just spent the morning in the periodicals library of the university and photocopied dozens of recent articles from journals in English and Spanish that were impossible to get in his country. In contrast, in the other cassette it seems that the cultural studies scholar is ill at ease, that she would have preferred for the conference to take place in a small and ancient city, as she had been promised in the invitation (they had mentioned Cartagena, Pátzcuaro, and Tucumán), and not in that tumultuous capital that she had already been to six times and that awkwardly imitated the malls and urban developments of the North American middle class.

The dialogue was difficult because the Latin American anthropologist saw the cultural studies scholar as a global representative of U.S. academic culture, and she had to explain the differences between working in California or the East, and that it is not the same to be "Hispanic" in Los Angeles, Miami, New

York, or Chicago. The cultural studies scholar was also surprised in turn, despite everything she had read of Latin American cultural studies, to discover to what extent transdisciplinary research, the study of multiculturality and its connections were formatted differently than in the United States, and at the same time differently in Mexico and Peru, where interculturality is defined by the indigenous presence, or in the Caribbean, where the Afro-American is dominant, or the River Plate region, where the predominance of European culture created the simulacrum of a white homogeneity. But then why do Latin American cultural studies, so careful regarding regional, indigenous differences and policies, give such insufficient attention to issues of gender?

They ended up admitting that there is no such thing as *the* U.S. cultural studies scholar nor *the* Latin American anthropologist. There are men and women who work on these issues—Cubans living in the United States or Spain, Argentines in Mexico and Brazil, Uruguayans in Argentina and Australia, Chileans in Germany, North Americans who move from city to city or change countries every five years. We all carry inside a Trojan horse with two heads; we all leave things in Havana, in Buenos Aires, and in Santiago, including friends who stayed to live there and know about two-headed horses. Sometimes we feel the temptation to dress as Trojans and have our pictures taken next to pyramids, deterritorialized campuses, subaltern or hybrid cultures, and transnational fairs, but more often we are like modest ants who trek from a conference in the neighborhood to an international convention, to send a letter of solidarity by email.

When the anthropologist expressed his concern that the United States had more researchers and PhD students writing dissertations on Latin American countries than in all of Latin America, the cultural studies scholar wondered why college students from Argentina, Chile, and Peru weren't interested in studying Americans. If for half a century there has been a project on Chiapas at Harvard, why only in this decade are Mexicans, and more recently Brazilians, beginning to explore what is happening in the society to the north, where millions of migrants who are fellow citizens live? There is talk of Americanization, but for many Latin American intellectuals, as she heard Beatriz Sarlo say, "the United States looks like a secret model." Maybe that's why the United States doesn't appear in their empirical and conceptual work but emerges in metaphors and narratives. It is disturbing, she added, to imagine what knowledge will be produced in this expanding trend in U.S. universities, museums, and galleries, while the Spanish and Latin Americans study only their own societies and are interested only in their local art.

It is not just a matter of academic publications. She recalled that in early

March 1998 she heard at the National Meeting of Hispanic Media Directors in Austin, Texas, that the U.S. Spanish-language press had grossed $492 million in advertising in 1997, which is greater than the value of the entire print industry in Mexico. They agreed that Latin Americans know little of the 1,214 Spanish-language periodicals, including twenty-four dailies and 246 weeklies published in the United States, or of the ninety-three television stations, the 591 radio stations, and the 340 Internet sites that operate in Spanish within the United States.

They wondered whether so much production of books and conference papers had the goal of understanding societies and their relationships with others. Or whether cultural studies, anthropology texts, and art exhibitions are oriented to the operation of institutions rather than to the interpretation of social life.

When they left, walking across campus to get into their cars, or along the main avenue to catch the metro, in different directions, they both thought they should write a novel in which not the protagonist but a secondary character, half hidden in the narrative, caught unexpectedly in a corner, gathers phrases from Latinos and Anglos and speaks them as if they were his own, as if he lived elsewhere and this was his way of being here. Or he expressed himself like those nearby as if this were his way of taking leave. She thought it wouldn't be a difficult task for a Chicana writer. He imagined, rather, a Spanish writer, perhaps because that very week he was reading Javier Marías.

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The anthropologist or the cultural studies scholar—it is difficult to say which, but at this point it is not so important to know because the anthropologist had read a lot of cultural studies and the U.S. scholar knew enough anthropology—in short, one of them asked what remained of the subject after structuralism had deconstructed it, and who was the other after poststructuralism and postmodernism showed that it is imagined by an I that may not exist. Wasn't it necessary to reconstruct some kind of subject who would take responsibility, and also to reconsider, beyond the dispersion of imagined others, the existence of empirically identifiable forms of otherness, and not only discursively imagined ones?

It occurred to one of the two that to make the transition from a constructed otherness to something more specific it would be necessary to speak about the other that suffers and enjoys, the other I care about, about our others. She or he imagined that the proper way to study the era of globalization was

to interrogate via melodrama and interculturality the stories of the mass convergence of consumers in many nations, juxtaposed to the encounters and divergences with those who are our closest others. Could Fukuyama's totalizing narrative and that of the World Bank be corrected by those of José Ignacio Cabrujas and Paul Auster?[1]

The Spanish sociologist, who also asked these questions, remembered a phrase from a French philosopher whom he liked to read during his stay in Paris. In that sentence he glimpsed the way anthropologists, sociologists, and cultural studies specialists speak as subjects, of their ability to think of themselves from a more or less consistent place as themselves and as others. He thought he remembered the sentence with which Gaston Bachelard (1970: 97) ended his text: "I am the limit of my lost illusions."

He thought it did not say much about the I, but for the moment it seemed comforting to him.

1. Cabrujas (1937–95) was a Venezuelan playwright, theater director, and screenwriter.

PART III

POLICIES FOR INTERCULTURALITY

SIX

FROM PARIS TO MIAMI VIA NUEVA YORK

In the first part of the book we saw how societies and the connections among them have been narrated and how they were imagined by travelers and writers, published in books and newspapers, and managed by nation-states. To the extent that we placed these intercultural relations in the context of globalization, we had to begin explaining how those connections are now imagined by the culture industries, narrated in television and electronic messages, and negotiated by business lobbies.

It is often argued that the industrialization of culture is what contributes most to its homogenization. Undoubtedly the creation of industrial formats even for some traditional arts and literature, mass distribution through reproduction and communication technologies, the reordering of the symbolic fields in accordance with a market controlled by a few management networks, nearly all of them transnational, tend to generate world audiences with similar tastes. However, in this chapter I show that even those sectors most willing to participate in globalization do not imagine art, literature and other types

of publications, or film, television, and music in the same way. Within each of these fields we see differences in how artists, museums and galleries, writers and publishers, musicians and record producers conceive of globalization and imagine themselves within it.

Overall, from industry's perspective there is a tendency to globalize culture and, at the most extreme, to manufacture a global culture. On the other hand, many artists continue to experiment with the differences between cultures and the ones they create in their language games. You cannot draw a sharp line between the two types of actors because there are writers who are also publishers, filmmakers and musicians who have production companies, and because artists act according to different personal and group strategies. I will present a select repertoire of these rearrangements in the fields of art and communication, not with encyclopedic pretensions but to show the variety of ways in which cultural production is situated in processes of globalization. This description raises three dilemmas in which aesthetic conflicts correlate to three competing options within cultural politics: creativity versus mass communication; linguistic experimentation versus the creation of international styles; and the restructuring of the public sphere and citizenship.

In accordance with the dual purpose of this book—to describe the changes in culture in the age of globalization and to explore alternative ways of managing it—I take as one of the main organizing points a key conflict. I refer, on the one hand, to the discrepancy between state and community actors, dedicated mainly to managing and disputing preglobal and preindustrial forms of making culture, and on the other hand, corporations that control the symbolic industries. The question advanced in the previous chapters—How is Latin American sociocultural space and its relations with Europe and the United States being transformed?—cannot be fully answered without analyzing the discrepancy between the national management of the public sphere oriented to classical culture and the transnational-corporate industrialization of communication processes. I will summarize this discrepancy in relation to the following features:

1. The narratives that guide recent discussions of cultural policies and that structure the practices and scope of most of them are national. They focus on traditional heritage and preglobalized modes of production, circulation, and consumption. Nation-states are the key actors in these efforts regarding material heritage, education, folklore, and the "classic" arts (theater, visual arts, literature, music).

2. On the other hand, the majority of publishing, audiovisual, and computer products and messages are not part of the heritage of nations, or only portions of them are recognized as such. Texts, songs, and shows are produced with industrialized formats, they are manufactured by multinational corporations, and they circulate through channels controlled by those who manage on a supranational scale the market for books, music, software programs, and the multimedia fusion of these products in networks of movie theaters, television, CDs and DVDs, computer programs, and the Internet. This private enterprise, as we know, is accomplished mostly by companies concentrated in the United States, Europe, and Japan and that operate independently of nation-states, even of those countries in which they have their headquarters. Although Hollywood is in the United States, Televisa in Mexico, and Bertelsmann in Germany, audiovisual and publishing production based in these locations is highly transnationalized, and their enormous global influence has little to do with the cultural strategies of public institutions in those countries.
3. The transnational and oligopolistic action of the large culture and informatics industries is reshaping the public sphere, social communication, information, and everyday entertainment in almost the entire world. This global interaction promotes mutual understanding between previously disconnected cultures and enables large demographic sectors to gain diversified access to modern goods and messages. But this interculturality and modernity continue to be unevenly distributed. Large masses of people are limited in their incorporation into globalized culture because they can relate only to information and entertainment that circulates on free broadcast radio and television. Only the upper and middle classes and small sectors of the popular classes gain access to cable television and computer networks. The use of computers, faxes, dish satellites, in short, the circuits of innovation and interactivity in electronic networks remain restricted to business, academic, and political elites.[1]

1. Two current processes have changed this scenario. First, access to the Internet, especially via mobile telephones, has given large numbers of Latin Americans access to media that appear simultaneously on the web or that have been made available on social networks or P2P platforms. According to Internet World Stats (2011b), South America has a 40.7 percent penetration rate of Internet usage and a 92.4 percent penetration of mobile cellular subscribers. Second, piracy, which is rampant in Latin America, has given the majority of people access to content previously available only to middle and upper-middle classes. [Trans.]

4. Unlike what happened in previous stages of markets up to the 1970s, when they organized culture according to the rules of internationalization or transnationalization (see chapter 2), the center of debate is no longer between state planning and privatization of cultural activities within nations but between policies of national scope and globalized policies. This difference overlaps with the one that exists between public policies, which are restricted to what nation-states do in their territory, and corporate policies developed by the majors on a transnational scale.

These four processes do not operate in the same way in Europe, the United States, and Latin America, although one of their features is to intensify the confrontation and competition among the three regions. Nor is it structured in the same way in all cultural fields, so I distinguish three areas for discussion: visual arts, publishing, and audiovisual production. Nevertheless the multimedia combinations that interrelate these three areas mix their strategies, and their connection with digitization also relativizes the traditional separation between them. In any case, they should be treated separately since global rearrangement does not proceed in the same way in each case.

Visual Arts: From Avant-Garde to Jet Art

When asking how the role of the visual arts has changed in the context of the new articulation of the national and the global, between Europe, the United States, and Latin America, the first thing to say is that painting is no longer the platform of representation of the national imaginary as it was in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and first half of the twentieth centuries. But one shouldn't simplify the past fifty years by saying that the mass media took its place. What happened is more interesting. I focus on two processes: the reordering of national markets and imaginaries according to a globalizing logic and the transfer of leadership from the cosmopolitan avant-gardes to glocalized institutions and entrepreneurs.

Several modern artistic trends had national names: *French* Baroque, *American* pop, and *Mexican* muralists. It was imagined that there was a national community that "expressed" itself through David and Duplessis, and the works of these artists were conceived of as images of citizenship in postrevolutionary France. The iconography of Diego Rivera, Siqueiros, and Orozco was readable so long as you understood its relationship with the reinterpretation of Mexican history proposed by the Revolution of 1910. The works of Jasper Johns, Claes

Oldenburg, and Robert Rauschenberg privileged American symbols, evident in their reference to the imaginary of transnational consumption (emblematic drinks, actors and actresses). These ways of organizing artistic production were used even to classify avant-garde movements that transgressed ordinary sociocultural codes: people spoke of *Italian* Futurism, *Russian* Constructivism, and the *French* new novel as if national profiles served to define their projects of artistic renewal.

References to foreign art are part of the entire history of Latin American art. Appropriating the aesthetic innovations of the metropolis was a resource many artists used to rethink their own cultural heritage, from Diego Rivera to Antonio Berni. Countless artists cut their teeth on cubism, surrealism, and other Parisian avant-garde movements as a means to develop national discourses. Anita Malfatti sought in New York expressionism and Berlin fauvism the tools with which to reconceptualize Brazilian identity, and like Oswald de Andrade she used the Futurist manifesto to rethink the connections between tradition and modernity in São Paulo.

When in the mid-twentieth century New York stole the idea of modern art from Europe, American hegemony was expressed as an export of national styles—abstract expressionism and then pop art—because it was still the era of the internationalization of culture. European and Latin American artists, who practiced their cosmopolitanism by adopting these trends, most frequently ended up affirming their own culture. National cultures contextualized the imaginaries of the avant-gardes, and even when they incorporated television sets and parodies or celebrations of advertising, their works maintained the difference between the visual codes of art and those of the media. Starting with Andy Warhol in the 1970s, artists became television characters.

One faction of European and Latin American art continues to cultivate national iconographic traditions and circulates only within the given country, but the place of its leading figures has changed. The visual arts remain a source of what is left of the nationalist imaginary; they are still platforms for the consecration and communication of the signs of regional identity. However, a large part of the creation, dissemination, and reception of art today operates within a scale larger than that of the society where the works are produced.

Not all of the art market has been reshaped according to the logic of globalization. The artists who sell their works for $50,000 or more are the ones who constitute a transnational system of competitors managed by galleries with headquarters in cities of various continents: New York, London, Paris, Milan, and Tokyo. A small number of galleries, allied to major museums and international journals, manage the global art market in a very concentrated way.

Ten years ago Sotheby's and Christie's covered nearly three-quarters of international public art sales. While the dominance of American capital in Sotheby's may be associated with the hegemonic role of the United States, the firm has auction houses in fourteen countries and has established offices in more than one hundred countries on all continents (Moulin 1992, 1994). Smaller galleries also have a multinational structure, which gives their operations a financial and aesthetic versatility that allows them to interact with movements, artists, and audiences from very different backgrounds. The more or less simultaneous circulation, or at least information about them, in networks of museums in different countries, of trade fairs and international biennials, as well as media coverage of art events, reduces the national character of the aesthetic creations.

We know that the global rearrangement and concentration of artistic development do not derive only from economic processes. The reorganization of the art market could not take place without the operation, also articulated globally, of museological institutions, publishers, and academics who manage aesthetic criteria, the prestige of artists, and the experts who canonize them. There emerge new profiles of jet-set critics and artists who weren't formed primarily within a national society or by an extended residence in *one* metropolis, *one* university, or *one* museum of some leading center but by the ability to move flexibly among many centers on several continents. New York is still the place through which most art travels to all continents, but for at least two decades it has not spawned a dominant national trend that it can impose on the world. In the words of Robert Hughes, a *Time* magazine critic, "New York . . . remains *a* center, but not, as its art world used to imagine, *the* center" (Hughes 1990: 19). Cross-border relations become more crucial than national representation, and multicultural alliances more important than identification with a particular culture. It is the artists, critics, galleries, and museum curators who combine the local and the global; they are the glocalizers who integrate features from different cultures. They are the ones who play the leading roles.

As the twentieth century gives way to the twenty-first, there coexist modes of organization of artistic practices developed in the periods of internationalization, transnationalization, and the current globalization of the economy and culture. Neither nationalism, albeit moderate, nor the increasing cosmopolitan style of every nation's art and literature has disappeared in art discourse, in newspaper declarations by many artists, or in a faction of art criticism. In Latin America one can still read and hear affirmations of one's own culture, of art used to represent and promote a "national consciousness." Others defend regional specificity that can integrate the travel and itinerant gazes in the creation of repertoires of images that differentiate and connect each society.

Travel and migration are recurring themes in the works of artists living in New York, Paris, Buenos Aires, Bogotá, and São Paulo, who often travel between these cities. Also recurrent are the references to the coexistence of diverse and dispersed cultures. Alfredo Jaar's installations of refugee workers in various continents and his experiences with passports whose unfolding pages reveal heterogeneous images of different countries suggest that the place of the artist "is not within any particular culture, but in the interstices, in transit" (Valdés 1989: 47). Sebastião Salgado's photographs are "a good example of artistic wandering (both individually undertaken or sponsored)" (as Luis Camnitzer and MariCarmen Ramírez wrote to me in a letter); they represent a tendency among many artists who place that theme in the center of their oeuvre and work in line with that vision of the transnational, some more critically, others more experimentally or using the nomadism of migrants as a metaphor for their artistic explorations. The references in chapter 2 to the artistic metaphors of globalization and the analysis of aesthetic experiences on the U.S.-Mexico border involve similar explorations.

Of course, this description could include more nuances and subclassifications. I refer to what I think are strong trends. In addition, it bears explaining that the artists evoked here have become known in circuits that transcend their societies of origin. Because they live in metropolises or travel regularly to them or have achieved an international reception for their work, they can incorporate fluidly into their work "legitimate" innovations, the versatility to dialogue with codes from different cultures and rework their local traditions and insert them significantly into a transnational exchange that is nevertheless asymmetrical and unfair. But the difficulties involved in relating to the global are greater when it comes to visual products (arts, crafts, design) that cannot transcend regional cultures. For each Francisco Toledo who manages to show the Zapotec imaginary and what its peculiar worldview can say within contemporary discourse, there are thousands of excellent contemporary Latin American visual artists whose symbolic richness never makes it into metropolitan or Latin American exhibitions nor into national museums even in their own countries.

International exhibitions and museums, art magazines, and the art market are organized according to aesthetics of metropolitan origin, and whenever they deal with artists from the periphery, they almost always expect a folklorish marginality. The "strange" Latin American experiences tend to be normalized by recourse to the stereotypes of the Mexican, Andean, or Caribbean or to magic realism. Twenty or thirty years of multicultural relativism and postmodern deconstructions of Western metanarratives have done little to

extend recognition to the various conceptualizations of body and color, images of nature and society from societies excluded from metropolitan canons. Free trade and supranational integration agreements (NAFTA, Mercosur, etc.) have done very little to open up the bottlenecks of museum policies, of diplomatic exchanges, or the training of professionals to include different and challenging viewpoints.

Finally, it should be said that the visual arts—and literature and music as well—are changing as they participate in the industrialization of culture. Museums, foundations, and biennials, those institutions in which aesthetic and symbolic value prevailed in the past, are increasingly adopting self-financing, profitability, and business expansion procedures typical of commercial industries. The economic impact that their programs aim for is usually associated with a change of scale, transcending the city and nation in which they are located. The exhibitions and advertising, the shops and para-aesthetic activities undertaken by many museums, galleries, and biennials resemble the logic of production and marketing of images and sounds in the communication industries. This is most noticeable when the exhibitions or art magazines deal with photography, shows, and design or when they explicitly seek to connect with mass tourism. It should be noted that the globalization of tourism is another factor that inserts many museums, archaeological sites, and historic cities, even those of the Third World, into the dynamics of globalization.

Despite these changes in the last three decades of the twentieth century, the move is not only toward a comprehensive standardization and commercialization of cultural products and cultural messages. Rather there is a persistent tension between the homogenizing and commercializing tendencies of globalization, on the one hand, and the embrace of the artistic field, on the other, as a foundation for the maintenance or renewal of symbolic differences.

The visual arts remain significant as differentiating agents, partly because their own history of institutional discourse and organization facilitates it, and also because the most minimal requirements of investment and revenue generate better opportunities for experimentation and innovation. Nevertheless, while the opportunities for artists and curators, critics and administrators of cultural institutions have expanded worldwide, to the point that the Johannesburg and São Paulo biennials are considered (second-string) mainstream events, I don't think that in this area we can speak of a global field of competition and regional specialization according to comparative advantages, as exists in auto, food, and clothing markets. I mention these three examples because they are, in the domain of economic production, some of the most charged

with symbolic and aesthetic values. It is necessary to reconsider, under the present conditions of globalization, what is happening with the old problem of the specificity of aesthetic messages and their role as shapers of social distinction. The proposals of aesthetic idealism in this regard are not very helpful, of course, and I suspect we will have to reformulate much of what the most solid sociologists (Pierre Bourdieu comes to mind) have contributed in recent decades because their studies are limited to national societies.

The Publishing Industry: Mundialización Torn to Pieces

I said in the initial chapters that the concept of globalization, understood as the unification and homogenization of all societies, serves to describe what happens in financial markets, somewhat less in industrial production, and much more dubiously what occurs in cultural and migratory exchanges. The publishing industry is one area where what is billed as globalization involves opening each national market to many others but ends up in several regionally integrated markets or sets of similar markets.

Because literature is rooted in a particular language, books and magazines tend to circulate within limited linguistic contexts and stylistic repertoires. Writing was the first cultural area changed by industrialization, yet its inclusion in local traditions offers resistance and restrictions to worldwide homogenization and integration.

For these very reasons, the transnationalization of Latin American publishers took place in connection with Spanish companies and others of Latin Europe, in contrast to what happens in other communication systems, from the visual arts to the audiovisual and information technology industries, in which globalization can be confused with "Americanization" and the predominance of English. It was on account of this linguistic community and a related cultural history that Spanish and not U.S. companies took over Latin American publishing when in the mid-1970s (twenty years before the signing of free trade agreements) foreign investment in Latin America was encouraged and publishing sales declined. Then Latin American dependency came under the charge of other European countries when Mondadori bought Grijalbo, Planeta acquired Ariel and Seix Barral, and Bertelsmann annexed Sudamericana.

The external reorientation that took place in Latin American publishing was impressive; it played a key role between 1940 and 1970 in national development and the internationalization of the cultures of the region. Due in part to their own economic and cultural leadership, and partly under the impetus

of Spanish exiles, Argentina and Mexico published in those decades the works of the most important authors in Latin America and many from Spain. They also translated a large number of books from Europe and North America and a number of Asian authors. It was in this area that our continent achieved, in economic, literary, and journalistic terms, its greater participation in the international circulation of cultural goods. This development in publishing was important in the formation of an enlightened citizenry.

The decline of the economies of this region in the past two decades and the Spanish advance in the same period changed this situation. Argentina and Mexico produce about ten thousand titles per year, while Spain publishes more than sixty thousand. The export of Spanish books and magazines generated 55 billion pesetas (US$450 million), approximately four times more than audiovisual exports from Latin America in the same year (Bonet and De Gregorio 1999). Many Latin American publishers and bookstores have closed, and many newspapers and magazines went bankrupt or reduced the number of pages. The international increase in the price of paper, compounded by sudden devaluations of the national currency in almost all Latin American countries, are some of the causes of this decline. Other reasons are the overall decrease in consumption due to the impoverishment of the middle and lower classes and the transformation of books into mere commodities, without the tariff benefits or tax exemptions from which they once benefited.

Subsequently the free trade agreement between Mexico, Canada, and the United States, which didn't include any specific stipulations regarding publishing, created the conditions for McGraw-Hill and Prentice Hall to enter the Mexican market with dictionaries, high school and university textbooks, and self-help books. Some publishers believe that the future involvement of U.S. business will not be in the creation of new publishing houses but in the production process: supplying paper and machinery and, as is already the case, high-quality (color, hardcover) editions, for which they are better equipped in terms of personnel and infrastructure.

There are data indicating that the current rapprochement between Mexico and the United States may give rise to as many changes in the U.S. publishing market as in the Mexican market. Novels by Laura Esquivel, Gabriel García Márquez, and Carlos Fuentes have sold several million copies in bookstores and convenience stores in New York, California, and Texas, of which 20 percent were purchased in Spanish. For the first time there is in the United States a copyright market in this language, which complements the access to publishing in English of Latin American and Chicano authors. The "Americanization" of Latin America is offset to some extent by the Latinization of the United

States.[2] A few transnational corporations have entered this market, but neither Latin American publishers nor the governments of the region have created programs to exploit these opportunities. Megapublishing companies are the ones that decide about the globalization of literary production, what will be selected for global or local distribution. The number of translations and sales of bestsellers show that the works promoted by large publishers are not simply "Americanization" since many non-U.S. companies have attained global distribution. An example: Planeta celebrated in July 1999 4.6 million sales of *Like Water for Chocolate* over ten years in thirty-five languages.

How did the circulation of Mexican and Argentine books fare in Latin America, a "natural" market based on language, shared historical interests, and readers' consumption styles? Sales declined because of the economic and political difficulties throughout the region. The only government that actively promotes the publishing industry is Colombia: the Book Act enacted in 1993 exempted domestic publishers from paying taxes for twenty years, guaranteed the purchase of 20 percent of all editions for libraries, and encouraged the development of a publishing industry with transnational capital and increasing export capacity. However, the economic and political crisis of this country is slowing investment and the purchase of books. Other nations' laws in this regard are outdated, and the obstacles to the circulation of books and magazines are more numerous than the programs that promote production, dissemination, and reading.

This scenario, as discussed elsewhere (Alatriste 1999; Bonet and De Gregorio, 1999; García Canclini 1996), is becoming more unified, in a sense, as transnationalization expands beyond the Latin area to a more global scope. An important development in this regard is the proposed acquisition of Spanish and Latin American publishers by Italian, French, and German companies, thus integrating them into multilingual circuits. Other contributing factors arise from the use of new digital and telecommunications technologies in production and distribution, such as the recently launched virtual library of a

2. The Latinization of the United States will not necessarily be an exclusively Spanish-language affair. The fact that Penguin and Random House, now merged into the largest publishing conglomerate in the world, launched two new Spanish-language and bilingual imprints in 2008 and 2009—Celebra (Penguin) and Vintage Español (Random House), respectively—means that there is a substantial Hispanic market in the United States. However, as the director of Celebra acknowledged, 75 percent of Hispanics read in English. This is consistent with the demographics referred to earlier. Two-thirds of U.S. Hispanics/Latinos are fully fluent in English and prefer their media in English. A symptom of this is that the hitherto most salient exclusively Spanish-language imprints, Rayo of HarperCollins and *Críticas* of *Library Journal*, closed in 2009 after only seven years of operation (Yúdice 2011). [Trans.]

million and a half Spanish-language titles by the Bertelsmann group through its Spanish subsidiary Plaza y Janés.

The technological and industrial reorganization of production on a transnational scale with globalizing tendencies has several consequences. First, it differentiates books from other graphic products (magazines, brochures, mass trade books sold outside of bookstores), although it subjects them all to production costs contingent on global competition. Furthermore it subordinates production in each country to bestseller policies, including those with stronger markets (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico). When Bertelsmann bought the Argentine publishing company Editorial Sudamericana, whose cultural prestige ensued from being the first to publish outstanding Latin American writers and social scientists, the new manager drew criticism by declaring that henceforth he would not print books that sold fewer than five thousand copies per year.

To be precise, one can observe a pendulum-like policy, which sometimes includes the need to adapt to national cultural habits and give some autonomy to subsidiaries. "Local production is what drives the ensemble of a group's activities, and therefore of exports. That's what Planeta Internacional tried to do after suffering some failures (large losses in Mexico in 1995 because of the devaluation of the peso, difficulties entering the U.S. market). For this reason, its managing director, Antoni Rossich, advises maintaining lightweight structures that can adapt to the particularities of unstable local markets that require costly intermediation expenses external to the publishing business" (Bonet and De Gregorio 1999: 98).

In this game of ups and downs, publishers must grapple with several structural problems: (1) the low readership in Latin American countries as a result of poor education and the lack of public libraries (except Mexico) and state programs that encourage reading and protect and promote local production; (2) the historical instability of regional and national distribution systems worsened by the closing of bookshops and the shift of sales to department stores and supermarkets; and (3) the decline in purchasing power of middle and popular classes and the deterioration of high school and university education, where study loses its material relationship to books and, in the words of Carlos Monsiváis (2004: 8), slouches toward a "Xerox degree of reading."

This uncertain context favors paradoxes (not to call them absurdities) and abrupt realignments of the writer's profession. Two examples, among many, illustrate the vagaries of globalization. According to the policy of appropriating local markets, transnational publishers seek to capture the most prestigious national authors, but, with the exception of jet-set writers, they distribute

them only within their own country. This self-denial of the ability to link diverse societies using their transnationalized structures reaches the extreme of strange investment goals like those of the publishing company Alianza, which translated and printed in Argentina Renato Ortiz's book *Mundialización y cultura*, perhaps the first major work published in Latin America on the subject (in 1994 in Brazil and in 1997 in Buenos Aires). Despite the appeal of the topic, its well-informed treatment with broad international references, and good sales in Portuguese and Spanish, the Argentine edition was not exported. It boggles the mind, although it may be explainable by historical inertia, that Brazilian books cannot be found in Mexico; but even more difficult to explain is the fact that the Spanish-language edition, produced in Buenos Aires by a transnational publisher like Alianza, did not leave Argentina.

We could put forth cultural and political arguments so that trade liberalization in NAFTA, in Mercosur, and among other countries in the region includes plays and concerts, visual arts exhibitions, even radio and television cultural programs, and films and videos that are usually left gathering dust in the country where they were produced. It can be shown that promoting the free circulation of books, plays, songs, and films from each Latin American country in the others causes less damage to the economies and cultures of the receiving countries than when customs duties on the export of textiles, electronics, and luxury cars are suddenly lifted.

It is the opposite of continental integration that publishers are loath to "risk" publishing books that make original interventions in social research, are internationally recognized to the point of being translated in the United States, and sell tens of thousands of copies in the countries where they are published: Argentina, Brazil, and Colombia. I'm thinking of books by Beatriz Sarlo, Renato Ortiz, and Jesús Martín-Barbero and also those of two of our greatest narrators, José Emilio Pacheco and Juan José Saer, which circulate successfully in several countries where the same language is spoken, but in photocopies.

Audiovisual Industries: Latino Voices Edited in English

The visual arts fluctuate between national contexts, where most of their production is exhibited, and more or less globalized networks, predominantly American, which reach a minority of artists and audiences of the hegemonic countries and even fewer elites from peripheral regions. The publishing industry is organized by transnational publishers, which bring together production and distribution in regional and linguistic circuits. It is in the audiovisual industries—film, television, music, and computer networks as a fourth system,

which functions partly in tandem with the others in the integration of multimedia programs—that globalization can be more clearly seen to reorganize production, circulation, and consumption.

The rapid expansion of culture industries has brought to a close the era in which culture was considered a sumptuary and unproductive activity. Nor can it be analyzed as a mere ideological tool, as was done with the mass media until two decades ago, although it certainly maintains that role within each nation, and now as well in divulging globalizing discourses and rendering them persuasive. But the world economy has in the culture industries much more than a resource for shaping imaginaries. It is one of its most profitable economic activities.

How many industries produce, like the audiovisual industry, earnings of $300 billion a year? Between 1981 and 1996 the music market alone grew from $12 billion to $40 billion, 90 percent of which is concentrated in five majors: BMG, EMI, Sony, Warner, and Polygram Universal.[3] The dispute between the United States, Europe, and Japan is not just about ideological influence, since export earnings are the top grossers in the U.S. economy, and in several European countries the culture industries generate about 3 percent of GDP and about half a million jobs in each of the most developed societies (UNESCO 1998; Warnier 1999: 56).

Three processes increased the economic size and geocommunications scope of video culture. One is the formation of global markets of symbolic goods by technological innovations from the 1960s to the 1990s: the development and miniaturization of computers, satellite and cable transmission, the connection of telephone and computer communication (via Internet, and the expansion into global networks of financial services, sales, information, and entertainment).

Add to this the restructuring of the political and economic fragmentation of the world since the fall of the Soviet system: free trade agreements and regional integration in Europe, North America, Mercosur, and Asia, and the pressure brought to bear by multinational corporations, the International

3. As is now well known, the music industry has undergone a profound transformation, driven in great part by Internet downloading and the rise of live music and other new business models, including music streaming (Last.fm, Pandora, Spotify) and music sites on social networks (e.g., Facebook, Google). According to "Recording Industry in Numbers 2011," a report of the International Federation of the Phonographic Industry, global recorded music trade sales for 2010 were $15.933 billion, an 8.3 percent drop from 2009. The restructuring of the music industry has opened new opportunities for independent music; Latin American music initiatives are among the most vibrant (Yúdice 2012). Of course, the global industry is not about to lie down and die. It is fighting hard to regain its profitability. [Trans.]

Monetary Fund, and other agencies that promote the reduction of trade barriers in all countries. Although trade liberalization treaties rarely take into consideration cultural goods and messages, the greater interdependence between national markets, of West and East, and North and South, has contributed to the global dissemination of messages and has put into competition all companies that produce film, music, television, computer programs, and videos and those that manufacture equipment for these activities.

The third factor is multimedia integration, which brings together in audiovisual commercial packages films, videos, music CDs, television viewing rights, and the production and sale of related paraphernalia (T-shirts, drinks, toys). Until a few years ago these transnational offerings were relatively filtered by national systems of exhibition and sale, and also by the diverse tastes and habits of consumers. This capacity for national selection, and the inclusion of national products among globalized ones, is shrinking dramatically as transnational corporations buy up movie houses or construct new cineplexes with advanced technology that suffocates traditional venues. Likewise metropolitan publishers acquire bookstore chains or set up book sections in supermarkets, and other large corporations take over shopping malls and stores that include videos, publications, and CDs among their offerings.

In those same years in which this restructuring and global expansion of culture industries took place, with protectionist support for their own production in the United States and European countries, Latin American governments privatized television channels, reduced credit to filmmakers, and in general investment in the audiovisual and publishing fields. As radio and television became the principal means of disseminating information and entertainment, the transmission of high culture, the platform of public life, and stimulus for consumption, governments decided they had nothing to do or say through the media. Our dependence grows because we do not develop endogenously this productive sector, which on a global level is the one that grows more dynamically and generates more modern jobs, with high value added, high wages, and occupational opportunities for advancement. States retain very few commercial channels and rarely sponsor media where the cultural and artistic prevail over the commercial; examples of the latter are the TV Cultura channel in Brazil, channels 11 and 22 in Mexico, and isolated programs in other countries. They generally get a 2 to 3 percent market share in these societies and do not offer an alternative strategy for commercial video culture.

The situation is even more dramatic in the area of advanced technologies. I am referring to the transition from analog to digital recording and the integration of telecommunications and computer resources. This is an area of dispute

among Americans, Europeans, and Japanese for control of the entire world, with long-term consequences regarding the accumulation of strategic information and services, encompassing all fields of culture, from the documentation of historical heritage and artistic experimentation to the marketing of the most heterogeneous products for home delivery and the creation of scientific and entertainment networks. Except for a few Latin American satellites and a few secondary and subordinate research projects in some nations, this region is primarily a consumer of these developments.

Not even Brazil and Mexico, the only two countries with strong audiovisual export industries and extensive production capacity, have undertaken competitive software development programs. And even in the use of advanced technologies comparison reveals very unequal starting points for access to information and innovation. While in the United States 539 of every 10,000 people have a fax machine, and 480 in Japan, only thirty-four in Uruguay and eleven in Chile do. Television sets: in the United States there are 805 per 1,000, in France 589, and in Germany 554, while in peripheral countries with high television production, such as Mexico and Brazil, there are 219 and 220, respectively (UNESCO 1998: 46, 107). The Internet is supposed to bring about the democratization of access to national and international public spheres, but fewer than 2 percent of Latin Americans have access to the network of networks, compared to 23.3 percent in the United States and 6.9 percent in other OECD countries (Trejo Delarbre 1999: 262; UNDP 1998).[4] The richest 20 percent of the population accounts for 93.3 percent of Internet access, and if they read English, provides 70 percent of the hosts, sites from which information is disseminated; Spanish-language hosts are fewer than 2 percent.

We must remember that the period of the 1980s and 1990s, when Latin American states eliminated their productive infrastructure in the audiovisual field and refrained from participating in technological innovations, was the same in which the military dictatorships ended and democratization processes and social participation advanced more than ever before. Aside from losing the media in which mass communication was growing, the governments

4. This disparity has rapidly changed since this book was written. As reported earlier, South America has a 40.7 percent penetration rate of Internet usage and a 92.4 percent penetration of mobile cellular subscribers. Six countries have more than a 40 percent penetration: Argentina (66 percent), Uruguay (56.1 percent), Chile (54.8 percent), Costa Rica (43.7 percent), Dominican Republic (41.3 percent; Internet World Stats 2011a). Moreover access to the Internet grew more rapidly in 2009–10 compared to any other region, according to Comscore's (2010) statistics: 23 percent versus 15 percent in the Middle East and Africa, 12 percent in Europe, 10 percent in Asia and Pacific, and 9 percent in North America. [Trans.]

surrendered to private, often transnational hands the key instruments for informing the public and providing public channels for expression.[5]

From the point of view of the sophistication of the supply and expansion of cultural consumption, the past two decades have shown rapid progress: radio and television reached more than 90 percent of households, and there was increasing access to cable and the Internet and a proliferation of transnational shops and services providing an unprecedented wealth of information and entertainment. But this way of connecting us to globalization is offset by the loss of cultural resources and the discouragement of endogenous production capacity. In the distribution of earnings in the audiovisual sector, U.S. companies get 55 percent of the total, Europe 25 percent, Asia 15 percent, and Ibero-American countries 5 percent (Hopenhayn n.d.).

It's no wonder that the balance between our imports and our exports is catastrophic. In 1997 Latin American countries paid $2.351 billion in rights for audiovisual products, while exports earned a mere $218 million. Even Mexico, with its copious production, earned only $13 from its audiovisual exports to the United States for every $100 that it spent on the purchase of audiovisual material from that country (Bautista 1997). Under these conditions it is difficult to choose: 85.8 percent of Latin American audiovisual imports come from the United States. Latin America is ill equipped to protect the exhibition of films produced domestically when U.S. capital, and to a lesser extent Canadian and Australian capital, have acquired distribution in movie houses, video sales and rentals, and television programming. Legislative bills designed to use a small portion of ticket sales to fund domestic production have failed, as happened in Mexico, and in Argentina, where the law was passed, the government of Carlos Menem placed these funds at the head of the queue for budget cuts in 1999. Europeans also have disadvantageous import-export balances with regard to U.S. audiovisual material (the deficit was $5.6 billion in 1997, according to Warnier 1999), but the various countries of the region enter into coproduction deals and are thus able to triple the film production of Argentina and Mexico.

5. Left-center governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Brazil have either reformed their outdated media laws or are in the process of doing so. The Argentine law, fiercely contested by media conglomerates like Grupo Clarín, was passed in October 2009 and replaced a law legislated during the dictatorship (1976–83). It redefined audiovisual communication as a public service, de-monopolized ownership by establishing limits in the number of stations and cross-media enterprises owned, established quotas of nationally produced content, and distributed frequencies equitably across civil society (associations, foundations, cooperatives, universities, unions, guilds, etc.), government, and private enterprise, each with 33 percent of the spectrum. [Trans.]

Only the television industries of two countries, Brazil and Mexico, manage to balance their trade with Europe (Bonet and De Gregorio 1999: 99–102).

European legislation encourages coproductions, provides sponsorship funds like Media and Euroimages, and promotes exhibition in its countries. Spain and several Latin American nations have signed bilateral agreements that announce similar projects, but from 1982 to 1996 only forty-two Spanish films were shot in Latin America, which is not indicative of integration if one considers that in the same period Spain made 1,053 films.

In music recording the Spanish surrendered 70 percent control of their market to the same five majors that dominate in Latin America. But the latter, with sales of $2.5 billion a year, exceeds Spain, which grosses around $600 million per year. However, to speak of a Latin American market is not very relevant, given that 56 percent of operations correspond to Brazil. Integration of the music industry in Latin America is weak when we consider that in the larger countries—Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico—about 60 percent of the music purchased corresponds to the national repertoire of each country (Bonet and De Gregorio 1999: 105).

This last fact could be interpreted as a sign of the dominance of national over foreign music. This is no doubt true in consumption. Moreover English-language rock sales fell from 65 to 32 percent in the past ten years, while Latin music gained a large audience in Latin America and the United States. But we have to put these figures in perspective by looking at production and distribution, 80 percent of which is managed by the majors. These transnational corporations absorb those domestic producers that survive, or at least their most successful catalogues.

As has been the case for decades in the arts, much of Latin American musical production is made to be sold and profited from outside the region. This trend leads to many of the most recognized musicians moving to the United States, as was already the case with many artists. "The indies or national companies," says Carlos Sánchez, president of Polygram Venezuela, "are increasingly worried about developing artists, the product. They generate product and repertoire and the majors quite often draw them away if they have global and money-making potential" (Yúdice 1999: 124). Since most Latin American companies cannot invest the $100,000 it costs to produce a disc and pay for additional resources such as television programs, video clips, and online selections, they will most likely end up partnering with a major, and if the product sells, the artist will end up living in Miami.

On account of the media complementarity between music, film, and tele-

vision, many of the transnational actors in these transnational circuits aspire to reside in that city. "If what you want is a real Latin American program that will reach an international public, you have to be where all the celebrities are, and that means Miami," says Jaime Bayly (qtd. in Yúdice 2003: 204). They think the same as Julio and Enrique Iglesias, José Luis Rodríguez, Lucía Méndez, Carlos Vives, Israel "Cachao" López, and many others, and that includes the Federation of Producers of Phonograms and Videograms, which moved to Miami from its previous location in Mexico City. In total there are in that city about ten thousand people dedicated to the Latin entertainment industry. As an industry it is "anomalous in terms of ethnicity as understood in the United States, for half the capital and more than 80 percent of the talent and workforce are Latin Americans and Latinos," says George Yúdice, but in order to ensure the volume of business and the guarantee "not to succumb to political or economic uncertainties," to "the seizure of bank accounts or devaluations," one has to be in Miami, as Larry Rohter argues in the *New York Times*: it is logical for Miami to become the cultural capital of Latin America.[6]

Neither the historical relationship of Latin American visual arts to France and subsequently the United States nor the Latin American publishing trade with Spain have had as extensive and intensive transactions as those that currently link Latin America to the music-radio-television complex administered in Miami. In economic terms, the inequality between the majors and the few Latin American national companies is overwhelming. However, the asymmetry and oligopolistic concentration of production and distribution is not equivalent to homogenization or replacement of the local by the global. Unlike classic Hollywood that internationalized American culture, allowing few or no interactions with what's different, Miami is glocal because it represents a new mode of (economic and cultural) accumulation that grows insofar as it puts Anglo and Latino repertoires into interaction.

Let me be clear: the relationship is unequal. Although a few Latin American singers may enter the U.S. market through the circuits of that country, are listened to by Anglo-Americans, and from there expand their reach to Europe and Asia, neither their shows nor their records, television programs, or advertising are formatted in cultures that generated those songs and stories. Local cultures break into the global marketplace selected and resignified according to

6. Larry Rohter, "Miami, the Hollywood of Latin America," *New York Times*, August 16, 1996, accessed July 22, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/18/arts/miami-the-hollywood-of-latin-america.html.

decontextualized management criteria. Some may object that these stories are already intercultural, like "Pedro Navaja,"[7] or the Caribbeanism of Gloria Estefan, or even Ricky Martin's bilingualism. They are not mere media fabrications, but correspond indeed to the multicultural experience of sizable social groups. I explore a little further on the aesthetic and political significance of the equalization of so many Latin voices in recording studios that they do not control.

Gains and Losses

With regard to the description of the structural changes on which this chapter focuses, I have underlined in my comparative analysis of the visual arts, publishing, and audiovisual industries the different ways in which globalization operates on these diverse orders of the imaginary. However, it is also necessary to point out coincidences or convergences. The first point is *greater attention by metropolitan producers to plastic arts, literary works, melodramas, and music created outside the United States and Europe*. This generates a pendular movement between globalization and regionalization with remarkable similarities in the three fields considered. There is talk of a "world cinema," a "world-music," and an "international style in literature." In all three cases, megacorporations produce a globalized reconstruction of local symbolic repertoires, decontextualizing them to make them more understandable in the cultural areas of different continents. At the same time, they create regional branches or make agreements with local producers to "indigenize" production. The *Wall Street Journal* and *Time* magazine publish weekly summaries inserted into Argentina's *La Nación*, Colombia´s *El Tiempo*, Mexico's *Reforma*, and newspapers from other Latin American countries. CBS and CNN broadcast part of their television programming in accordance with Latin American cable systems. Few companies show as much flexibility in their globalizing projects as MTV. If this company, which began only in 1981, manages to be heard by young people from almost everywhere, it's because of its ability to combine several innovations: it mixes genres and styles, from rock rebelliousness to hedonist tunes and "standardized liberal thought," and it associates with "important causes" (the struggles against poverty, illiteracy, AIDS, and pollution), proposing internationalized exercises in citizenship compatible with a modern, sensual sense of everyday life. In addition MTV created five regional branches in less than ten years, two in Spanish America, one in Brazil and one in Miami, with personnel from

7. "Pedro Navaja" is a salsa song written by Rubén Blades and based on "Mackie Messer" by Bertolt Brecht and Kurt Weill. [Trans.]

several countries in the region and spaces for autochthonous groups that balance, to some extent, the dominance of American music.[8]

Second, the tension between globalization and regionalization, managed from the metropolitan countries according to commercial rules, *accentuates the asymmetry between production and consumption, between metropolitan centers and peripheries, and although it encourages innovation and cultural diversity, it limits them through the requirement to expand markets*. From an economic perspective, the production companies that grow are those with headquarters in the metropolis or associated with them, while in the peripheral countries it is consumption that grows, and increasingly the appropriation of what others produce. From a geographical point of view, the increase in cable TV multiplies and diversifies the supply of information and entertainment; for example, in Argentina, which has the highest proportion of wired households in the continent (70 percent in some cities), one can see channels from Europe and several Latin American countries. This expansion increases the repertoire of entertainment and information but has done little to boost domestic production and innovation in the use of the media.

One wonders whether we have reached the semiotic and aesthetic limits of the expansion of communication subordinated to commercial criteria. The development of industry and information technology in the past twenty years gives little hope that greater decentralization of production and broadcast of messages (Internet included) and the recognition of ethnic, age, and gender differences will contribute to revitalize semantic density and linguistic experimentation in communications. The colorful MTV video clips, with few exceptions, are banal recyclings of the avant-garde art and film of the 1960s and 1970s. The Latin American filmmakers who go to Hollywood perpetuate the most spectacular and most opaque versions of magical realism. Some European filmmakers who go mainstream end up making the most expensive and patriotic American films. (The German Wolfgang Petersen outdid with *Air Force One* what his compatriot, Roland Emmerich, did with *Independence Day*.) The disruptive and multicultural effect in the United States of work by filmmakers exiled from Nazi Germany in the first half of the twentieth century, or more recently Milos Forman and Roman Polanski, becomes diluted in an age in which Australians, Chinese, and Mexicans who go to Hollywood assume that to get financing they must be like Spielberg.

The transnational merger of communications and publishing companies that have intercontinental influence is connected to the market-oriented

8. Yves Eudes, "MTV: Chaine du rock et de la jeunesse," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, March 1997.

media redefinition of what should be published. The cosmopolitanism of the boom writers of the 1960s, which created tensions between local culture and that of the metropolis, has mutated into an "international style." That's what *El País*, the newspaper associated with one of the most powerful Spanish publishing groups and various electronic media enterprises, called it in an article on the anthology *McOndo*, whose slight modification of the name of the emblematic town of magical realism reverberates with the aura of that gastronomic transnational corporation. In each story various countries are jumbled, and youthful lifestyles and globalized "narrative gestures" abound, as if they were part of a festival of the Iberoamerican Television Organization, says the Spanish newspaper.[9]

Such productive speed and efficiency are not exclusive to Americans, Germans, and Japanese. Alcalá de Henares celebrates every year a fast-literature contest in which participants must write a story in less than three minutes, which will be awarded a prize in the McDonald's franchise closest to the birthplace of Miguel de Cervantes. Enrique Serna, the Mexican writer who told this story in Mexico's *La Jornada Semanal*, quipped that "love and literature are best done slowly," and applied to literary creation a saying by José Alfredo Jiménez that what matters is not getting there first but knowing how to get there. Perhaps one of the few defenses against such rapid prose recommended by publishers and media megagroups is irony, like that which Tito Monterroso leveled against Bryce Echenique: in a recent televised dialogue, the latter said he wrote six pages a day and never corrected even a comma. Monterroso replied, "I only correct."

Today technological developments and large economic investments facilitate traveling mega-exhibitions in the visual arts and megaprojects in publishing, music, and television, all with similar quality and distributed instantaneously around the world. But they leave little room and little time for risk, correction, and experimentation, which do not guarantee huge profits. Given the partial regionalization of production, attentive to a degree to the world's diversity, what is most worrisome about globalization managed by the culture industries is not the homogenization of what's different but rather the institutionalization of innovation, criticism, and uncertainty.

9. Ignacio Echeverria, "El estilo internacional," *El País*, January 18, 1997.

SEVEN

CAPITALS OF CULTURE AND GLOBAL CITIES

Where do I belong? Globalization has led us to imagine differently our geographic and geocultural location. Cities, and especially megacities, are places where this gets intriguing. So where does what we thought was a place become blurred and uncertain? I'm not referring to bounded and homogeneous areas but spaces of interaction in which identities and feelings of belonging are formed with material and symbolic resources of local, national, and transnational origin.

It also isn't easy to answer when we are asked where we live. "Habitats of meaning," as Zygmunt Bauman (1992: 190) calls them, are spaces that stretch and contract. We live in "the postmodern habitat of diffuse offers and free choices" (Hannerz 1996: 42–43). Sometimes they are not so free but are conditioned by a variety of information and styles from many places that are not this place, and that return here multiplied and flexible. We imagine our places of belonging while living and traveling, within the city and between cities.

Comparing European, U.S., and Latin American cities is a good method for discerning that the articulation between the internal differences of each city, and of the local, national, and global within them, varies significantly. In the United States many cities have been transforming, writes Amalia Signorelli, "into constellations of ghettos, either poor or rich, reciprocally segregated, yet connected (when they are) independently of each other to national circuits of political, economic, and cultural integration," and often directed "by command centers that do not need to be part of a city." Meanwhile the processes and mechanisms of internal integration of ghettos "are localized, increasingly miniaturized, and assume contents within the ghetto, thus reinforcing their isolation and segregational characteristics" (Signorelli 1996b: 54–55). Richard Sennett (1996: 101–9) has shown that ethnic and class segregation in American cities, the need to always be "among ourselves," is a source of suspicion and intolerance, hostility toward outsiders reinforced by a paranoid obsession with order. Bauman (1998: 47) says that in such homogeneous cities or districts it is difficult "to acquire the qualities of character and the skills necessary to cope with human difference and situations of uncertainty," so that the predominant inclination is to "fear the other, simply for reason of being an-other."

In Europe and in Latin American cities founded on European (especially Spanish and Portuguese) models, modernization included the integration of both foreign and national migrants from different regions of the country. Although there was separation of rich and poor and of central and peripheral neighborhoods, these cities nevertheless promoted interethnic coexistence. It was an unequal but generally less segregating coexistence of the locals and those who came from other parts of the nation and from other nations.

In the past two decades, increasing numbers of migrants (in Paris and Berlin, Buenos Aires and São Paulo, among other cities) and increased insecurity have driven people to entrench themselves in gated communities under systems of delocalized surveillance, which approximate patterns of land use and fragmented interaction typical of the American model. Yet the integrative concept of city living still prevails such that large cities are environments amenable to interculturality among middle and popular classes; they are perhaps "the only spaces where it is possible to circulate information and compare experiences in the presence of a concentration of people large enough to form a set of relationships that are not irrelevant to the global social system" (Signorelli 1996b: 55). Protest marches of students and workers, of women and villagers, and community radio and television stations are all transnational urban instances, statements that arise from the cities and speak mainly of what lives in them and among them. Even in the United States these urban

actions and urban grassroots networks constitute the movements and circuits in which segregation is overcome, even if only circumstantially.

Urban Renaissance

I want to elaborate more specifically on how big cities are places to imagine globalization and articulate it to the national and local. This issue was researched in the 1990s in connection with the global megacities of the First World. Saskia Sassen, who started this line of research on New York, London, and Tokyo, and Manuel Castells, Jordi Borja, and Peter Hall, who examined European cities, overturned the panicked view of urban decline that prevailed in the 1980s. In contrast to images of traffic jams, pollution, crime, and other disasters, globalized urbanism speaks of strong economic advances, the partial halt of depopulation, and large renewal projects. Also mentioned with regard to this trend is the return to downtown centers in some cities. Paolo Perulli refers to Paris and Berlin as examples of revitalization—Paris because it harvested the fruit of large construction policies in previous decades; Berlin because it rode the coattails of German and European unification processes.

Moreover some regional metropolises assume a new role in this direction, especially in the southern European Arc: Barcelona, Munich, Lyon, Zurich, Milan, and Frankfurt. These cities have undergone cultural and economic recovery and increased employment, not only in the tertiary sector but also in industry, which had been in decline; there emerge new immaterial networks of infrastructure, and monumental public works are promoted. Something similar is said of New York; the city whose violence and degradation led a developer to define it as "the terminal stage of Western civilization" (Koolhaas 1994: back cover) saw a decrease in recent years in murders and robberies (due to surveillance cameras?) and undertook the construction of new art centers and businesses; it is also the headquarters for powerful publishing companies, of one hundred newspapers, 240 magazines, and 160,000 Internet domains.

What makes a global city? The authors just mentioned note the following requirements: (1) the strong presence of transnational corporations, especially management, research, and consultancy firms; (2) a multicultural mix of national residents and foreigners; (3) prestige deriving from the concentration of artistic and scientific elites; and (4) a high number of international tourists (Borja and Castells 1997; Hannerz 1996; Sassen 1998).

One may ask, How real is this urban revitalization, and who benefits from building ultramodern plazas that the majority see as mere spectacles? This criticism has been made regarding the cities mentioned earlier. In October

1998 I visited the renewal site in the heart of Berlin, where 250,000 people worked around the clock erecting buildings designed by Norman Foster, Renzo Piano, I. M. Pei, and other famous architects. What was most impressive was the speed with which they were covering over the huge scar left by the razed wall that divided the two Germanies in the Potsdamer Platz area. There were still a few buildings, but most visible was the huge hole under construction, which sightseers could not enter. But it was possible to go up in the InfoBox, a magnificent red tower-terrace where videos were shown of what the construction would look like when finished. There was also a shop that sold computer-simulated "photos" of the planned buildings, brochures, ornaments, shirts, videos, posters, and mugs with pictures of what was yet unbuilt, and even a puzzle so one could erect virtual buildings, and an interactive CD. Visitors could "participate" in the largest business center in Europe and symbolically feel like a participant in and a spectator of what Daimler-Benz, Sony, and other transnational corporations were building. Globalizing modernization is offered as a spectacle for those who truly are excluded, and it is legitimized by creating a new imaginary of integration and memory with souvenirs of what does not yet exist.

The distance between globalized urbanization and the unintegrated traditional city is even greater in Third World megacities. In fact several experts on the subject (Castells, Hannerz, Sassen) distinguish between global cities proper and "emerging cities." The first set includes New York, Los Angeles, London, Paris, Berlin, Frankfurt, Tokyo, and Hong Kong as advanced headquarters of financial transactions, insurance, consulting, advertising, design, public relations, and audiovisual and computer industry management. The emerging cities include "regional centers" like Barcelona, São Paulo, Mexico City, Chicago, Taipei, and Moscow, where the formation of globalized service management nodes coexists with traditional sectors, informal and marginal economic activities, deficient urban services, poverty, unemployment, and insecurity.

The second group of cities exists in the tension between extreme forms of tradition and global modernization. This schism generates opportunities for international integration and also inequality and economic and cultural exclusion. These problems are particularly evident in relation to youth who are not easily incorporated into the job market due to economic inequality or lack of educational attainment.

Disintegration and inequality, that is, the dualization of the global, on the one hand, and the marginal, insecure local city, on the other, are the main obstacles for many cities to achieving this new stage of development. Borja and Castells (1997: 120) point out that a major risk of globalization is that it is only

for elites: "Part of the city is sold, while the rest is hidden away and abandoned." Several U.S. cities racked by problems of insecurity and violence that tarnished their image in the past dealt with those problems through specific (and not always democratic) policies of intense rearrangement and through the development of artistic and cultural offerings that make urban spaces highly attractive. In the megalopolises of Asia and Latin America, economic and financial crisis and the downsizing of the state have reduced the possibility of improving services and security or of mobilizing new economic and cultural resources in order to renew and expand urban life and promote themselves to the outside world. Unemployment increases, especially among new generations.

The Globalization of Peripheral Cities

Just as the study of cities (Berlin, Paris, Vienna) contributed to rethinking modernity, we can ask whether research on urban transformations today helps to explain some problems in the theory of globalization. If we agree that megacities, or at least some of them, are places where globalizing movements appear in industry, finance, services, and communications, the transformations in public space can give us clues to understand their trends and their interaction with local culture. I will focus my analysis on changes in urban symbols and visual cityscapes in some Latin American cities, Mexico City in particular. We need to understand what role the imaginaries of globalization play with regard to the "hard" processes of economic and political interdependence. At the same time that this leads us to rethink the global, it also induces us to explore how to reformulate the meaning of urban space and citizenship in so-called global cities.

Buenos Aires, Lima, and Mexico, like other colonial cities, served as regional capitals and articulated the connections to Spain. That supranational interaction persisted after independence and during the formation of modern nations. The great port cities were from the early twentieth century very open entities, where local traditions were hybridized with cultural repertoires from the metropolises with which they traded: Spain, France, and England in the Atlantic cities (Buenos Aires, Caracas, Havana, and Rio de Janeiro, the latter two in a rich interaction with Africa), and the United States and Asia in the cities of the Pacific Rim (Lima and Panama). We find in these cities antecedents of globalization but within limits derived from the colonial or imperial logic that privileged connections to only *one* metropolis. Until the mid-twentieth century, urban structure and the meaning of life in these Latin American cities were conditioned primarily by their role as the political, economic, and

cultural centers of each nation. However, what now makes Mexico City and São Paulo global cities is not that they are capitals of regions or the connecting nodes to metropolitan countries but that they became crucial centers of economic and communication networks on a global scale.

Although from the mid-nineteenth century to 1940 the population of Mexico City increased from 185,000 to 3,410,000, the urban structure maintained the grid format established in the sixteenth century by the Spanish conquistadors. Until fifty years ago the life of the city was organized in a clearly defined territory, whose geographical, political, and cultural core was located in the historical downtown center consisting of colonial and nineteenth-century buildings and some sites that evoke the pre-Hispanic past.

During this period the state was the main actor in national society and urban life. It constructed a nation, to some extent overcoming the divisions between indigenous groups and the separation between regions of the country by integrating them through a system of railways, a national economic market, an educational system based on Castilianization, and political unification in a single party and a centralized trade union. Symbolic goods also contributed to this unification: crafts, visual arts, and film created a cultural heritage that synthesized the iconography of the nation. That repertoire of imaginaries circulated in national museums and international exhibitions, in huge public murals and the films that connected peasant memory with the new urban sentimental education. As the population poured into cities (10 percent of Mexicans lived in cities at the beginning of the century, while 70 percent lived in them seven decades later), they crowded into the capital city and filled the schools, museums, visually monumental archaeological sites, and colonial buildings preserved by the Mexican state, in keeping with the most consistent cultural policies of any Latin American country.

How have public space and the ways in which the population gathers and interacts in Mexico City changed from midcentury to now? When in 1950 the capital consisted of what today are the most central districts—Benito Juárez, Cuauhtémoc, and Coyoacan—life was largely limited to neighborhoods. There were trolley cars, 22,000 horse-drawn carts, 60,000 cars, and 1,700 buses transporting 1 million passengers per day. Any inhabitant could reach the historic downtown center on foot or by a bus ride of no more than five kilometers. A small part of the population stayed informed by reading newspapers, and a greater number listened to the radio, which was just becoming a mass medium; many went to the movies, dance halls, and parks. There was no television, no video. The university, bookstores, and theaters were in the center of the city.

From Urban Spaces to Media Circuits

As the city grew from 3 million to the more than the 18 million inhabitants of today's megalopolis,[1] other demographic, socioeconomic, and entertainment changes took place which received little attention from cultural policymakers. Industrial development did not favor the creation of museums, libraries, or theaters in popular settlements in the north and east of the capital; there are only a few parks and some recreational sites. Only radio and television, the bullfights, and, since 1985, video rental stores and a few public libraries offer something to do with leisure time. The mass media are where public space is made available to the population.

What was redistributed in the urban space of the past twenty years? Above all, press, radio, TV, video, and data networks. Also libraries, shopping centers—some include cultural offerings—and more recently multiplex cinemas. As in Bogotá, Caracas, and São Paulo, media *circuits* have greater influence than traditional *places* in the transmission of information and imagery of urban life, and in some cases they offer new forms of encounter and recognition, from "participatory" radio and television programs or phone-in venues to rendezvous in shopping centers that replace in part the previous spaces for meeting and promenading. Moreover many of these cultural offerings have the ability to connect large segments of the population to macro-urban experiences and to other countries. These changes transformed the meaning of the city as a public space. These media favored a more fluid interaction of the capital with national life as well as transnational goods and messages. The megalopolis became places for the concentration of information, international shows, branches of foreign department stores, capital management centers, innovations, and globalized imaginaries.

There still are in Mexico City local cultural and recreational events that attract many sectors of the population. The 3 million pilgrims who arrive on December 12 at the Villa to celebrate the Virgin of Guadalupe, the 2 million who visit Iztapalapa on Holy Week, the crowds that gather in the Zocalo for political meetings and in the stadiums for sporting events are a few obvious examples. There also endure patron saint festivals, dance hall and popular neighborhood street dances, and other local practices that also include the industrialization of culture. The large city still encompasses towns that preserve the customs of the inhabitants and festivals of rural origin, whose names

1. Sources vary, but *Demographia World Urban Areas* estimates Mexico City's population at 19,565,000 in 2011 (Demographia 2011: 14). [Trans.]

synthesize the Hispanic Catholic and indigenous Nahuatl elements. The inhabitants relate to the modern metropolis through their workplaces, but their neighborhoods, founded in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, continue to operate with relative autonomy, reproducing practices and festivals from that era, which, of course, are not incompatible with rapid-transit highways that traverse them nor with the presence of modern buildings and advanced technology that project a postmodern imaginary. Some recent anthropological studies that compare residential styles and the imaginaries produced by different areas of the city found that while those living in villages and neighborhoods feel that they "belong," those who live in modern areas (condominiums, subdivisions) speak of "living there" (Portal 1997).

The distinction is important. But we must recognize, as discussed elsewhere, that the circuits of consumption generate new modes of belonging that encourage less personalized ways of living, even on a transnational scale (García Canclini [1995] 2001). Nevertheless the continuous and systematic activities of the majority, the areas where the largest investments are concentrated, where most employment is generated, and the spaces and circuits in which the public sphere operates with more dynamism and influence, are those of the press, radio, television, and mass entertainment venues (cinemas and shopping malls) linked to transurban and supranational networks.

Like many cities in Latin America and other regions, Mexico is undergoing a process of deindustrialization due to the closure of factories under transnational competition or the relocation of those factories to the periphery and other areas of the country for environmental reasons. This is also due to economic reconversion that gives greater importance to tertiary activities (Nivón 1998). A mere twenty years ago theories of urban development characterized cities by their difference from the country and the transfer of labor from agricultural activities to secondary and tertiary activities. Now the most powerful impetus for development proceeds not so much from industrialization but from information and financial processes. And since these services require a physical infrastructure, even the most mobile and deterritorialized products are rooted in cities that have the requisite technology and highly skilled human resources. The geographic spread of global interactions is combined in many parts of the globe with strategic locations that specialize in communications.

In a globalized economy, large cities become the settings that connect the economies of many countries; they are service centers rather than industrial production sites. In New York and London, manufacturing industries employ no more than 15 percent of the workforce, and it is expected that in the early twenty-first century that number will drop to between 5 and 10 percent (Hall

1996). If just a few decades ago the emblematic images of megacities were chimneys and working-class neighborhoods, today they are the huge transnational advertising billboards that visually saturate and pollute all expressways and postmodern architectural monuments, those tall corporate office buildings encased in reflective glass, which in Mexico City are transforming the cityscape in Paseo de la Reforma, Polanco, Santa Fe, and the southern end of town.

The important cultural role of large shopping malls in large and medium-size cities should be pointed out. Besides expanding real estate and commercial capital, restructuring investments in a concentrated manner, creating jobs and eliminating others from retail business, they offer spaces for displaying consumption in which architectural monumentality is combined with promenading and recreation. They create new signs of distinction and symbolic differentiation for upper and middle classes and increase the role of transnational products and brands for satisfying needs. Many malls include culturally specific offerings, such as multiplex cinemas, bookstores, record stores, video-game outlets, music performances, art exhibitions, and entertainment centers. Attractively designed, safe, and hygienic, these spaces transcend their commercial ends and function as places to go on dates and socialize, especially for young people. The combination of these elements makes them more seductive than cultural centers proper and more reliable than other places designed only for buying or promenading. One of the key cultural elements of their success is that they bring together symbolic differentiation and the freedom to behave as one wishes. Interviews with users reveal that they are places where the consumption of clothing and other items generates greater distinction and where access to more "modern" or "global" entertainment and cultural goods, of higher exhibition values, can be had without ceremony while walking and talking dressed in jeans (Ramírez Kuri 1998).

This massive transformation in the use—including the cultural use—of urban space and consumption has not been part of the debate on cities, and even less on cultural policies. In Mexico City only the Cuicuilco Mall was controversial because it was felt that its construction and that of an affiliated corporate building would affect the adjacent ceremonial center of the same name, the oldest in the Valley of Mexico (from the second century BC) and aggravate water problems and road congestion. Is it only conflict with the historical and monumental city that should make us think of the public interest when leisure and the cityscape are commercialized?

Given the massive turnout at these centers and the private appropriation of public resources, their construction could be a reason to commission feasibility reports and analyses from a public perspective, and not only when

they affect an archaeological site. But one should also think about the *positive public uses associated with shopping centers* in addition to the regulatory and restrictive functions of the state. Just as they have fostered a return to movie theaters, the consumption of records, and art exhibitions, one may ask in this regard whether they might also provide other informational and participatory cultural activities promoted by public cultural policies. It is something that already happens in malls in Barcelona, Berlin, London, and other European cities (Borja and Castells 1997), where shopping center investors include non-profit spaces like day care centers and social and cultural services.

In Mexico the law that regulates commercial television states that stations must cede 12 percent of airtime for public interest broadcasts. Moreover in the Federal District legislation has designated Special Zones of Controlled Development, either because of their historical value or to preserve urban harmony in areas of growth; those looking for more intensive land use than that which is authorized (type of land occupation, extent of construction) must offer public services for urban regeneration or improvement.

Shouldn't it be possible to condition the construction or expansion of shopping centers on setting aside space for nonprofit cultural activities: performances, art workshops, movie theaters administered by the Cineteca (National Film Archive), computer centers oriented to social services? Just as the environmental impact of these large buildings is regulated, there should be cultural impact assessments and the requirement that for-profit investments set aside part of their profits to serve community life. Perhaps this reconsideration of the public value of the new spaces of sociability and consumption could be grounds for an extension of the public agenda, as is being done in other cities (Holston and Appadurai 1996).

While the growth of Mexico City in the past half century was due to industrialization and the consequent attraction of domestic migrants, with the onset of the country's economic opening to foreign investment in the early 1980s the most dynamic areas of development in the capital are connected to the advance of cross-border investments and the transnationalization of Mexican companies. The Federal District and its metropolitan area have become one of the twenty or thirty enterprise megazones of the world that integrate management, innovation, and marketing on a transnational scale. This change is especially evident in the 1,600 hectares in the area of Santa Fe occupied by the office buildings of Hewlett Packard, Mercedes Benz, Chubb Insurance, Televisa, and other businesses, shopping centers, and upscale residential areas. We also see this in the architectural revitalization of the Paseo de la Reforma, parts of Polanco, Insurgentes, and Periférico Sur, in the proliferation of mega

shopping malls, new transnational hotels, the modernization of telecommunications and satellite connections, the spread of computer services, cable and digital television, and the aforementioned cinema multiplexes. Several of these activities introduce changes directly into cultural and communication offerings; others rearrange the sense of urban life and the traditional ways of appropriating space. In both cases the state cedes its leading role to private entrepreneurs and transnational corporations.

In order for the globalization of urban life to take root and become more than just real estate, business, and media enterprises, it is necessary to rethink the relationship of cultural policy to the public sphere and to citizenship. If arts and crafts traditions, museums, and historic neighborhoods could become part of an urban (and national) development project together with advanced communication and computer systems, they would provide other opportunities for dealing with the problems of disintegration and inequality. Perhaps the image and international competitiveness of the city (and of each country) would change.

Provincial and Global Imaginaries

At this stage of the analysis, urban duality seems to be connected to the problem of segregation in global processes. To what extent does globalization energize megalopolises, and to what extent does it accentuate their decomposition?

If we follow the media coverage of Latin American cities we see an increase in news about violence and insecurity, the breakdown of the social fabric, and the privatization of public space for the sake of protection. Studies such as those of Miguel Angel Aguilar in Mexico and Teresa P. R. Caldeira in São Paulo show how the imaginaries of these megalopolises are being modified by new forms of segregation and violence. In Latin American cities segregation was structured during the course of modernization by separating social groups into different neighborhoods. Then, to introduce order to urban sprawl caused by migration and industrialization since midcentury, people were divided according to the binary center-periphery: the middle and upper classes occupied the better equipped central areas, and the poor crowded into deprived suburbs. Although this latter model continues to operate, Caldeira's study of São Paulo shows that when the different groups get too close in many areas of the city, the wealthy erect walls, gates, and checkpoints; residential neighborhoods are closed, limiting access to their streets, and large buildings are constructed with encrypted electronic entryways.

Citizens adopt new protective strategies that modify the urban landscape,

the means of travel throughout the city, daily habits, and imaginaries. In poor neighborhoods—the Brazilian favelas, the slums of Buenos Aires, and their equivalents in Bogotá, Lima, and Mexico—neighbors organize to ensure security and even prevent, in some cases, the entry of the police. Powerful economic sectors create residential communities and work sites closed to traffic or with strictly monitored access. In some malls and other public buildings strict control mechanisms are also installed. In recent years the construction of gated communities has become the main stimulus in large cities for the organization of upper and middle classes, who were not accustomed to being part of social movements; their particular way of exercising citizenship is to isolate themselves from urban unrest through the privatization of super-monitored space and the restriction of sociability or chance encounters.

The multicultural cityscape is turning into compartmentalized retreats. Migration research explains that the cities that migrants moved to from the provinces—looking for jobs and better incomes, comfort, and anonymity, and drawn by city lights—are becoming somber hideaways, places where one sees no one and can go unseen.

There is a contrast between the provincial imaginary, for which megacities are still the promise of modernity and progress, and the international imaginary that circulates in the press, television, and some specialized studies, in which cities like Mexico City, São Paulo, Bogotá, and Caracas are associated with overcrowding, congestion, pollution, and violence.

Alongside the deterioration of public spaces, uncontrolled sprawl, and segregating violence, there appear in the 1990s new sources and forms of cultural development. As dual cities and the economy worsen and the disorder of informal trade and crime increases, a few Latin American capitals have elected their mayors for the first time (Buenos Aires, Mexico City), and others find in postdictatorial periods the initiative to exercise more democratic forms of participation and revitalize their cultural development (Santiago de Chile, Montevideo, Bogotá, São Paulo). It is worth mentioning the experiences of Porto Alegre, Brazil, which from the beginning of the 1990s, under Workers Party administration, managed the imbalance of accumulated social demands and budgetary constraints by involving citizens in all districts in setting priorities for the use of resources (Jelin 1998). Another example is the city of Barcelona, where the municipal administration instituted democratic participatory projects for aesthetic improvement as a means to foster the more intensive use of public spaces and thus contribute to their security (Borja and Castells 1997).

Economic and communication globalization encourages a more cosmopolitan development in cities. It does not occur evenly in all areas. With regard

to academic and other fields of intellectual life, the principal Latin American cities receive numerous international visits and are the sites of intense information flows. However, the withdrawal of the state and weak private funding lead to a decrease in the diffusion of foreign cultural works in cities that once were very cosmopolitan, as is evident in the impoverished visual arts exhibitions in Mexico City, or in the theaters of Montevideo and Bogotá. Cinema, whose production declined in the few Latin American countries that have a national industry in this area (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico), with ever fewer movie theaters, now shows signs of recovery, although the distribution of theaters and of multimedia exhibition venues is increasingly controlled by North American companies.

In almost all of these areas, new urban administrations are fostering improvement and diversification of cultural life. A new development is the extension of international showcases beyond the cultural production of First World metropolises to major Latin American cities; it sometimes happens through state initiative (intercity festivals, cinema and theater series that circulate from one country to another), and in other cases they are programmed by associations of private entrepreneurs or independent producers, whether Televisa or Caribbean music festivals that link the cities of Central America and the Caribbean with New York and Miami. An exchange network of musicians, visual artists, and theater groups has been set up between Porto Alegre and Buenos Aires.

It is not useless to ask with what cultural capital Latin American cities undertake these projects. To what extent is this mobilization today based on a city's own (historical, musical, film, video, local) capital, and to what extent does it depend on imports and commercially oriented gigs and hence copious delocalized capital almost always governed by lite aesthetics, fast profit, and ephemeral visits? What are the chances that a city may speak in its own behalf and communicate with other cities when so many categories of local production have withered: publishing houses gone bankrupt or purchased by transnational corporations, limited ability to make films and the subordination of what little is made to the profit motive of international coproduction schemes? Indeed these market trends are counterbalanced, to some extent, by regional adaptations of transnational chains (e.g., MTV branches in Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, or the major record labels). These changes also correlate with new trends in cultural consumption: more cosmopolitan tastes and the predominance of communication industries over local culture.

All this is also connected to the already mentioned change in significance of Latin American capital cities as well as European and U.S. capitals. What Paris, Madrid, or London meant at one time for Latin Americans is now represented

by New York for the elites and by Miami or Los Angeles for the middle classes. The large number of artists and intellectuals as well as middle and popular classes from our region who live in these cities and the fluid communication between Latin American communities of the First World and Latin American cities lead us to think of them as Latin American cultural capitals (and not only prestigious foreign references). We have to ask, when designing urban and cultural policies, how transurban policies can contribute to intercultural knowledge and understanding. Several recent programs, such as the Buenos Aires–Porto Alegre week of art, the U.S.-Mexico Fund for Culture, and the designation of Mexico's Federal District as a "refuge city" for persecuted writers, are initiatives that further this line of work.

These trends, which do not move in the same direction and are sometimes supported by conflicting interests, reconfigure Latin America's cultural landscape. It is not something limited to big cities, although they are where much innovation is concentrated. They are therefore preferred scenarios for reflecting on the meaning of the changes and challenges that urban governments, private companies, and independent associations confront in the whirlwind of globalization.

I want to emphasize, finally, the role of cities in the conceptualization of the global and the imaginaries that it generates. Unlike the literature of the 1980s and early 1990s, largely organized around the binary global/local, the recent literature considers the process of globalization as a "triangulation of nation state, global economy, and strategic localities" (Sassen 1998: 15). Additionally a fourth reference point is the importance of transborder regions where globalizing trends adopt specific formats, such as Tijuana–San Diego (Alegría 1992; Herzog 1990; Valenzuela 1999), and incipiently several places along the Argentina-Brazil border.

Like borders, many cities, including border cities, are scenarios where the global is spatialized, exhibiting tensions between globalization and deglobalization, and taking forms that differ from one border to another, from one megacity to another (Vila 1999). Two consequences ensue from this observation. One is the methodological conclusion that macrosocial studies of globalization, usually economic and communication ones, need to compare their findings with cities and border areas where the global interacts and is remodeled by local history. The second inference is political: the cultural actions that states can develop in the context of globalization are not confined to culture industries and international organizations; they can achieve specific outcomes in strategic cities and border areas where nations interact with the global.

EIGHT

TOWARD A CULTURAL AGENDA OF GLOBALIZATION

We have seen that even though globalization is imagined as the copresence and interaction of all countries, of all corporations, and all consumers, it is a segmented and unequal process. There is an intensification of reciprocal dependencies between First World societies and the elites of the periphery. Both achieve a more diversified access to a greater number of goods and messages. But even in those privileged sectors globalization should be distinguished from internationalization and transnational movements and from simple regional aggregates.

For reasons of geographical and historical affinities or of differential access to economic and technological resources, what we call globalization often takes concrete form as a regional cluster or as historically connected countries: Asians with Asians, Latin Americans with Europeans or North Americans; North Americans with distant countries that speak English and share their lifestyle. The cultural affinities and differences are important in understanding

whether or not globalization encompasses the entire planet and whether it is circular or simply tangential.

We also observe that some areas of industry and consumption are more likely to contribute to globalization's extended reach. The publishing industry wields force and fosters exchanges over linguistic regions, while film and television, music, and computers enable their products to circulate more easily around the world. Megalopolises and medium-size cities (Miami, Berlin, Barcelona), headquarters for highly globalized activities and for the intensive movement of migrants and tourists, connect better to global networks, but even in those cases there is a duality that begets large marginalized sectors.

The more or less "objective" conditions that circulate goods and messages among some nations more than others, arranged in more or less planetary activities, can be outlined in what we might call the dual agenda of globalization.

1. The most repeated story about globalization tells of the expansion of postindustrial capitalism and mass communication as a process of unification and/or articulation of productive enterprises, financial systems, information and entertainment systems. Wall Street, the Bundesbank, Bertelsmann, Microsoft, Hollywood, CNN, MTV, Sotheby's, and Christie's are some of the characters that organize this narrative. By unifying financial markets and simultaneously interrelating financial flows throughout the world, by producing the same news and similar entertainment, there arises everywhere the conviction that no country can exist with different rules from those that organize the world-system. If this story has been so pervasive in many societies it is because there are globalized banks, corporations, and NGOs, and also integrated consumer networks like transnational "communities" of credit card users and computer services, and consumers of movies, information, and video clips. Turned into ideology, into a single way of thinking, *globalization*—a historical process—has become *globalism*, that is, the imposition of unified markets and the reduction of political discrepancies and cultural differences to those markets. By subordinating these two scenarios of difference to a single economic vision, politics is diluted and the state seems almost unnecessary. From this purview, cultural policies are fated to surrender to the commercialization of the symbolic and to renounce any aesthetic pretensions and any recognition of differences other than those that characterize their clients. Exclusion or dissidence cannot even be thought except as what is totally outside of the commercial organization of social life.

2. At the same time, this worldwide unification of material and symbolic markets is, as Lawrence Grossberg states, a "stratifying machine," operating not so much to erase differences as to reorder them to produce new borders,

less connected to territories than to the unequal distribution of goods in markets. Moreover globalization—or rather the global strategies of corporations and many states—configures machines that segregate and scatter. Its policies of "labor flexibility" produce disaffiliation in unions, migration, and informal markets in some cases connected to networks of corruption and lumpenization. Several authors cited in this book, who focus not only on the movement of capital but also on what globalization does to workers, to social rights, and to ecology, stress that the elimination of barriers to foreign investment has been the mechanism for destroying the norms of unions, welfare, and ecology, which have been the means by which modern states tamed the voracity of capital and protected the population. From this perspective, globalization refers not only to the free movement of goods and messages; we should also define it as the power to "export jobs" to wherever labor costs and taxes are lower.

In short, globalization unites and interconnects, but it also "parks itself" in different ways in each culture. Those who reduce globalization to globalism, to its commercial logic, only perceive its integrative and communication agenda. We are just beginning to see in sociological and anthropological research on globalization its segregating and dispersing agenda, the multidirectional complexity that ensues from the clashes and hybridizations of those who retain their difference. Given little recognition by hegemonic logic, the differences turn into inequalities that often become exclusion.

What happens when these two movements are combined? Globalizing tendencies produce what Sergio Zermeño calls the "shredding of the social": the destruction of entrepreneurs and workers who contributed to import-substitution industrialization, of the salaried middle classes, of the spaces of intermediation between social actors and the state (unions, parties, grassroots movements). The result is national and transnational migrations that cannot be accommodated by stunted labor markets, increasing deterioration of working conditions, urban insecurity, the spectacularization of all this in the mass media, failed attempts to control the protests, and the increasing violence of legal and illegal repression.

The gap generated by the paradoxical complementarity of these agendas leads to the following question: What happens if these two movements cannot be combined? There emerges a radical asymmetry between the extraterritorial nature of power and the territoriality of everyday life. "The company is free to move; but the consequences of the move are bound to stay," explains Zygmunt Bauman (1998: 8). This point, the relationship between globalization and cultural alterity, reaches its greatest inequality when capital, faced with the invincible resistance of difference, looks for other, more malleable markets.

Given that "mobility has become the most powerful and most coveted stratifying factor" (9), the minority that manages to move, isolate itself, and act from a distance becomes immune to local interference; it immobilizes those segregated in the corners of urban space and at the endpoints of electronic terminals. From this it follows that there are two requirements for countering the power of globalizers: that subordinate groups acquire the capacity to act in different and distant circumstances, and simultaneously that they act to strengthen local organizations (in cities and nation-states) so as to set limits on the movement of capital and money. It is obvious that if each state does this separately, capital will go elsewhere. It is imperative, then, to forge regional agreements and advance toward a world government and global citizenship.

Cultural Studies When Astonishment Is in Short Supply

In these pages I have explored how the study of culture can help us better understand the contradictions of globalization. Now the question remains whether cultural activities can intervene in the dissociation and conflicts between these two globalizing agendas. Another way of posing the question is to ask whether, in this era of privatization and loss of control over national economies and cultures, it still makes sense to speak of cultural policies.

I have suggested that to answer this question we must problematize what the social sciences and cultural studies do. Where do they speak from, and what do they have to say? A strange way of moving forward on this issue occurs to me, which is to see where anthropology and cultural studies books are now placed in bookstores. What I am about to say became apparent to me in the United States, but then I saw something similar in French, Spanish, Argentine, Brazilian, and Mexican bookshops. Anthropology and cultural studies texts are often located between religion and travel. A literal interpretation of this placement suggests that anthropology and cultural studies are associated with beliefs and travel. In more specialized bookstores, these books are placed together with social theory and postmodernism. If we combine both observations, we can conclude that insofar as they are linked to beliefs and travel, cultural studies and anthropology are about astonishment. And their proximity to social theory suggests a tendency to think conceptually about the surprise that difference produces in us, inducing us to look for models that enable us to understand what happens to us when we encounter others.

I think there is yet another explanation for this placement in bookstores as well as the increase in shelf space and sales of anthropology and cultural studies books. It has been said that anthropologists have a predilection for studying

what is dying out, and since astonishment is one of the scarcest goods at the end of the twentieth century, it is an attractive topic for anthropology. Who is surprised any longer to find African and Indian shops in Western cities, or that the most popular radio station in New York, La Nueva Mega, is in Spanish? Who is surprised that Sony bought the leading producer of Hollywood films and that the German company Bertelsmann acquired Random House, the largest publisher in the United States? In short, we no longer are in awe of intercultural crossings and mixtures. Nor is there room in this transition from one century to another for the unexpected when revolutionary hopes fade and it is assumed that there is only one way to imagine globalization.

Perhaps because our capacity for amazement abates in this unstable and intertwined world it becomes a central theme in anthropology and cultural studies. It has something to do with the fact that both fields are associated in part with postmodernism. One of the features of modernity, taken to the point of exasperation by the avant-gardes, was relentless innovation. Postmodern art, which did not break with the avant-garde as much as it would have liked, also sought to amaze us with unexpected novelties. The difference is that their innovations did not represent an originality that aspired to supersede evolutionarily what came before but produced surprise by mixing de-hierarchized periods and styles.

We know that one of the tragedies of today's artists is that they no longer discover how to surprise. I believe this is happening also to anthropologists and specialists in cultural studies. Ten years ago it was novel to say that we could not speak from self-same identities, and we devoted many pages to the analysis of disconcerting mixtures: indigenous crafts in modern boutiques, folk music that became successful in the mass media, culinary and religious traditions that for centuries were limited to specific locales and suddenly spread to distant cultures. Similarly artists used to amaze by making multicultural collages, and books and magazines increased their readership by showing these unusual encounters.

Today one rarely finds astonishment in bookstores, cultural studies conferences, or art biennials. The novelties now appear each year on fashion runways, film premieres, and innovations in information technologies. But most of these surprises are market requirements, the need to accelerate obsolescence to boost sales. Very rarely does this have to do with innovation in aesthetics or research. Nor does the increase in poverty and insecurity, whose scandals are repeated daily, contribute to renew our view of society.

Would the novelty in cultural studies and anthropology then be to speak of the impossibility of astonishment? I find two ways to look at this issue. On the

one hand, cultural studies are taken to be the swan song of high culture and a critique of the mass media by denouncing the commercial manipulation by which they manage the new. On the other hand, there are those who choose a subordinate position—subalternity, the postcolonial condition, minority discourse—and propose to construct a critical, alternative vision of the world from that vantage point.

Indeed both positions have precedents among those who for many years have sought alternatives to the contradictions of modernity. Bunkering up in high culture to discredit commercialization and amnesiac rapid obsolescence was practiced by thinkers like Theodor W. Adorno and José Ortega y Gasset, who in turn were disparaged for their aristocratic attitudes. On the other hand, the penchant for an oppressed subject who will provide the clues to capitalist and colonialist contradictions has its precedent in Georg Lukács, who attributed to the working class that privileged role in epistemology and politics, or in Frantz Fanon and others who located that contestatory agency in colonized countries, or in countless vanguard leftist leaders. It seems redundant to emphasize the partial failure of these diagnoses or to dwell on the well-known refutation of their theoretical inconsistencies. Hugo Achugar (1997), among others, has pointed to what in these trends still offers grist for thought, particularly regarding the precedents and shortcomings in critical theory from Latin America.

One of the reasons why those critical views do not go away completely is the persistence of the cultural banalization and socioeconomic exploitation challenged by these authors. The latest face of capitalism, globalization, is also challenged for going back on its promise to be inclusive, for its aggravation of asymmetries and inequalities, and for generating other problems. From a social point of view, we now have fewer illusions about globalization and its ability to produce radical innovations.

Cultural studies of globalization lead to three conclusions. The first is that capitalist globalization cannot be justified as a single social order nor as the only way of thinking. The second is that the complexity of interactions in a globalized world does not permit identifying as primary any of the oppositions between hegemony and subalternity, nor the single decisive agent (whether the proletariat, minorities, colonials, or postcolonials) that will alter the historical course of the contradictions. The third is that the complex and ambiguous formation of the contradictions does not allow them to be explained only as antagonisms. I will limit my discussion of these three conclusions to what is relevant to research and cultural action.

I focus on three directions of future work suggested by the analysis of

globalization from the perspectives of interculturality and the critique of the inequalities it generates. First, faced with the monolithic thinking of those who understand globalizing movements as homogenizing, it is necessary to take into consideration the differences that globalization cannot reduce, most of which are cultural. Second, it is important not to attribute a decisive role to any particular difference but rather to recognize their variety and therefore the difficulty in taking those differences as cumulative (in a single type of sociocultural analysis or a single political front). Third, given that, in a world with a high degree of integration, different cultures tend to share aspects of hegemonic cultures, the differences cannot always be attributed *in the same way* to inequality; hence diversity can sometimes appear as antagonism but also as compromise and negotiation.

Working with these starting points may provide a way out of the routine biases of cultural studies, that is, enabling new alternatives (several, not just one), including the recuperation of the capacity to be amazed or to include what hegemonic information systems neglect. If in this book I have privileged the contributions of anthropology and cultural studies, it is because I find in these fields the most developed tools for revising the critique of globalization processes. But in order to take this approach to its most radical consequences it is necessary immediately to raise political issues.

The Cultural Reconstruction of Public Space

To explore what globalization means in places like Latin American countries where a segregating agenda often prevails over integration and communication, it is necessary to ask if there is no hope when there is low participation in global markets of goods and messages, outdated technology in the publishing and audiovisual industries, and when the opportunity to develop our own innovations in information technologies has been lost. In this last field, the dependency seems irreversible, and in the other areas the dependency has increased in the past two decades. However, consumption in all cultural and communication industries expanded dramatically, and in some areas in a few countries (Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Colombia) there has been a resurgence recently in endogenous production in film, music, and above all television.

Other data show real progress, at least in the potential of Latin American countries. An increase in the population entering secondary and higher education, incorporating vast sectors into a market of almost 500 million people, to which should be added 40 million readers and viewers in Spain and 30

million U.S. Hispanics, makes us one of the largest linguistic groups with the greatest capacity for cultural consumption in the world. The expansion of radio, television, and the transnational dissemination of books, magazines, and interactive media (from the Internet to video games) takes place faster in Spanish than in other languages. Latin Americans' preference for their own music, newspapers, and television, including from their own countries, shows that there are greater potential opportunities than endogenous production has taken advantage of. You can add, without exhausting the list, an increasing number of professionals in the arts and culture industries, the extraordinary development of film, journalism, and communication schools (not all of them with high standards and very few with graduate programs), and the advancement of academic research in the past fifteen years that offers for the first time hard data on cultural and communication patterns in the more developed countries of the region.

This potential for a strong position in global markets and for productively taking on the new role of the communication industries in economic development is not taken advantage of by the region's elite cultural policymakers, who show little interest in it. The ministers and other officials responsible for culture in Latin America have been absent, or silent, in two economic negotiations in which cultural issues played a central role: the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1993 and the Multilateral Agreement on Investment at the OECD summit (1997 and 1998). Discussions at these forums were taken up in publications by UNESCO and its World Conference on Cultural Policies (Stockholm, 1998), as well as at other meetings sponsored by European governments, Canada, and international organizations to develop diverse positions regarding the Multilateral Agreement on Investment, the Hollywood oligopoly, and the multinational entertainment majors. In several of these meetings, the French, Swedish, and Canadian ministers argued that cultural goods are not only commodities but resources for the production of art, diversity, national identity, cultural sovereignty, access to knowledge, and plural visions of the world (Alonso 1999; UNESCO 1997).

Although some agencies exclusively dedicated to economic issues co-organized international meetings with cultural institutions to address these issues—for example, the Latin American and Caribbean Economic System (SELA) collaborated with UNESCO and the Andrés Bello Covenant in Buenos Aires (July 1998) and with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in Paris (March 1999)—most governments showed apathy. In this latter meeting, the IDB convened Latin American ministers of culture and finance to dialogue with a group of experts on culture industries and social participation just two

days before the annual meeting of finance ministers in the same city. Not one of the finance ministers attended the discussions. The meeting was a dialogue among specialists, with intense participation by IDB officials and few interventions by the cultural ministers present.

I attended these three meetings and several other intergovernmental ones during the 1990s in Latin America. I kept a field diary at some of the meetings, from which I transcribe an observation:

> "There are no accidents" is one of the major concerns expressed at the sessions and interviews by officials at these meetings where ministers and other cultural leaders from over one hundred countries encountered each other, some with delegations that comprise up to one thousand persons. As in large airports like those of Dallas or Paris, in which every five minutes over one hundred aircraft take off and land, everything is carefully planned so that everything turns out right, so that schedules and the order of participation are complied with, so that there are no conflicts and nothing unexpected happens. . . . One of the ways international conferences avoid accidents is to induce silence among participants. The invisible agenda, which no one mentions, which includes what no one wants to discuss, is complied with as strictly as the explicit agenda of what is to be addressed and negotiated.

What lands and what takes off at these meetings on cultural policies? There is talk of pianists who will arrive and painters and writers who will be sent; there are discussions on historical heritage that should not be moved or touched and that lately are being marketed. What almost no one wants to talk about are the culture industries.

It is as if a century ago presidents had refused to mention the railroads, as if fifty years ago cars, trucks, and tractors were off-limits, or thirty years ago appliances and energy sources. What is the goal of removing from the public sphere discussions on strategic resources for the development and enrichment of nations? Isn't it possible that the huge profits derived from the industrial uses of cultural creativity can be made to benefit the societies that generate them, enabling them to better understand, enjoy, and communicate in a diverse way with the greatest number of cultures?

No doubt there are political and economic reasons for this neglect, characteristic of a time when governing is reduced to managing a business model that understands the global as the subordination of the periphery to a powerful market, a time in which politics and culture—understood as the management of differences—are subsumed in economic homogeneity. I want to dwell on

the misconceptions and the cultural-political perspective that contribute to the absence of political power in strategic areas of social life.

We are accustomed to referring to public *space* and the public *sphere* as areas within the territory of each nation, and we reflect on the use that the country's own political parties, trade unions, and social movements make of them. But as we have just seen, the public has become blurred spatially, and today we need to reconceive it with images of *circuits* and *flows* that transcend territories. John Keane suggested a new definition of the public that, while still using spatial metaphors, allows us to understand it in this open and transterritorial sense. He defines the public sphere as "a particular type of spatial relationship between two or more people, usually connected by a certain means of communication (television, radio, satellite, fax, phone, etc.), in which non-violent controversies erupt, for a brief or more extended period of time, concerning the power relations that operate within their given milieu of interaction and/or within the wider milieux of social and political structures in which the disputants are situated" (Keane 1995: 8).

To characterize how the disputants interact at different geographical and communicational scales, the author distinguishes, first, *micro-public spheres*, local areas in which tens, hundreds, or thousands intervene. Examples: neighborhood meetings, churches, cafés, and, of course, the social movements that function as local laboratories of public communication.

In second place are the *meso-publics spheres* of national or regional scope, where millions of people debate about power, for example, in newspapers like the *New York Times*, *Le Monde*, *A Folha de São Paulo*, *Clarín*, and *El País*, and electronic media with similar effects. In the past few years the predominance of these media over local communication, and their administration by private companies, shows the declining role of "public utilities" or public-private utilities and the hegemony of private actors in disputes about power.[1]

The processes of globalization also lead us to recognize the existence of *macro-public spheres*. This third circuit is represented by the news agencies that cover the entire planet and transnational multimedia corporations (Time-Warner, MTV, Bertelsmann). Their way of concentrating journalistic and creative talent, technological innovations, and broadcast channels renders them the largest managers of information and entertainment in the world. They foster transnational public debates (even if the events occur only in one or two countries), as seen in the wars in the Persian Gulf and among the Baltic

1. More recently there has been a move to rein in the private hold over what should be of public service. See chapter 6, note 5. [Trans.]

countries and in financial crises in Southeast Asia, Mexico, and Brazil. We go from the U.S. House of Representatives and national television stations to the world of satellite communications as the deliberative sphere.

We need to go beyond Keane's valuable proposition, which is too formal and tends to allow for broadening the perspective only by saying that if you want to act in public life you have to do so on all scales. It is necessary to consider how power reorganizes by articulating different scenarios and circuits. As transnationalized culture industries appropriate strategic areas of public life, culture is privatized and loses all sense of responsibility with regard to social interests and correcting inequalities. Globalization is imagined, as I explained, according a single logic of homogenized competitiveness in markets. The abstract citizen of classic modern democracy is replaced by abstract businessmen and investors with no discernible differences in their appearance. Of course, they tend to introduce the brands and styles of their social and symbolic system (American, Japanese, or of some European country), but in truth the main bias they bring to their practices is to reduce to commodities the polysemic sense that cultural goods have.

What can states and supranational organizations do regarding this reorganization of cultural markets? State actors and intergovernmental organizations (UNESCO, IDB, Andrés Bello Covenant, SELA, Mercosur), as representatives of public interests, can relate trade to other social and cultural interactions where the quality of life is managed and that are not reducible to the market, such as human rights, scientific innovation, aesthetics, social participation, and preservation of natural and social heritage. This endeavor is getting under way in keeping with the globalized recomposition of the public sphere, in texts by these organizations listed in the references at the end of this book. But these lines of thought rarely are translated into policies of states and supranational organizations to address social and cultural rights or the political demands of majorities and minorities.

Unlike the opposition that held in another time between the state and corporations, today we conceive of the state as the place of articulation of governments and business initiatives and with other sectors of civil society. One of the tasks of regulation and arbitration that public agencies can perform is to not allow civil society to be reduced to business interests, nor even that business interests be reduced to those of investors.

"The state should not intervene in culture," we often hear. This principle has been useful for opposing censorship, authoritarianism, and paternalism that stifle social creativity. But when applied not only to creation but to all processes involving the circulation of cultural goods, this preference leaves them

subject to the determinations of the most powerful actors. Such a view assumes, for idealists, that cultural creation is made only by individuals and happens only in private. That's difficult to maintain before the evidence provided by anthropological, sociological, and communication research that shows that cultural creation also takes place in circulation and reception. Although private companies profess to protect the creative freedom of individuals, they nevertheless make major interventions in the selection of what will or will not circulate; they condition the "invention" and "creation" of individuals and groups. It's not for the state to tell the artists what to write, paint, or film, but it has a public responsibility to ensure that these products are accessible to all sectors and that cultural diversity can be expressed and valued.

I will now briefly describe four strategic areas in which action can be exercised by states, supranational agencies, and social institutions to revitalize public life. I have selected them by taking into account the possibilities of nonhegemonic countries in cultural production so as to improve their competitive participation in global markets and to give greater democratic recognition to diversity.

1

The cultural policy considered a priority in assessing how society conducts itself within globalization is the one that is made together with the public. This means, above all, giving the leading role in development to people, not to capital or other commercial indicators. The initial question is not which cultural products will make us more money so that we end up promoting films, CDs, or telenovelas and leave symphonies, paintings, and scientific books to fend for themselves. The point of departure is to understand how the cultural offering of a society has been structured (in connection with historical heritage, with what is created currently, and what is received from other cultures) and how it interacts with the population's habits of consumption and appropriation. It's a matter of studying whether that offering and those modes of appropriation are the most suitable so that the various sectors of society can recognize their differences and achieve a fairer distribution of material and symbolic resources, so they may relate to each other and to other nations in solidarity. The agents of cultural policy—especially state and social agents, in collaboration with private ones—need to figure out how to promote the various heritages of a society and make room for unrecognized differences and for unforeseeable innovations.

Working simultaneously with sociocultural cohesion and differences involves developing programs to reduce inequalities for access to culture and its

creative exercise. These programs should be derived from experiences of being male or female, white, black, or Indian in different cities or districts, but they should also ensure public settings and communication circuits so that men and women, members of various ethnicities and age groups can express what has been and is meaningful to their groups, and can also engage in the renewal of their heritages. If these conditions hold, then almost everything is in place for consumers and creators of culture to become citizens.

To place citizenship at the center involves not only working with historically constructed differences within a territory, but also with those of natives and foreigners. The examples discussed in this book regarding the continual circulation of people, money, goods, and information between original and new societies demonstrates the importance acquired by multiterritorial economic and symbolic communities, systems of multiple belonging between those who live inside and outside a country. If millions of members of these diasporic communities behave in accordance with these multinational maps, why can't this have political, legal, and cultural expression that represents their transborder culture?

Free trade agreements in North America and Mercosur are not very concerned about this issue even though the interaction among migrants makes it a daily reality in these societies. It gets bottled up in national policies. For example, the Mexican Congress approved in December 1996 constitutional amendments that guarantee to persons born on Mexican territory and to children of Mexican fathers or mothers born in the same country that they will not be deprived of Mexican nationality in case of adopting another citizenship. This decision was made with special consideration for the millions of Mexicans living in the United States who apply for U.S. citizenship in order to avoid attacks on their precarious migrant condition. José Manuel Valenzuela has highlighted the change that this recognition offers in contrast to the symbolic expulsion from their national community suffered by Mexicans who migrate to the United States, who are identified as "denationalized," "pochos," and "gringified." It also involves redefining the concept of sovereignty, since it allows Mexicans living abroad who adopt another nationality to participate in economic activities in the home country, but it does not allow, although it has been considered, the right to vote in Mexican elections.[2]

In other Latin American countries where nationality cannot be renounced, it is possible to acquire a new one, as has been proven by political exiles and

2. Mexico granted Mexicans living abroad (even if they had naturalized as citizens of other countries) the right to vote in absentia as of the 2006 presidential election. [Trans.]

economic migrants from Argentina and Uruguay who in recent decades also became Mexican, Spanish, or Italian. This combination of loyalties can also have subjective complications, as were described elsewhere in this book, but to my knowledge it has not resulted in political damage. Many have written about the cultural benefits for the countries of origin and destination (e.g., Ribeiro 1998a; Yankelevich 1998). However, this flexibility does not yet have a new legal status of international scope, like the processes of trade liberalization and economic integration among Latin American countries. We are far from the construction of a continental or regional citizenship, as was worked out in the European Union.

Perhaps comparative anthropological and sociopolitical research on the transnational exercise of "cultural citizenship" will make visible the legal necessity, the risks and opportunities of creating a Latin American citizenship. To spur action on one of the worst experiences of vulnerability and irregularity lived by millions of Latin Americans is one of the encouragements that lead us to take on this issue. Its importance becomes evident especially when we observe that the agreements in Mercosur and NAFTA are almost exclusively confined to two areas:

- Coordination of highly concentrated corporate interests (the "greater homeland" exalted in diplomatic rhetoric is now an extension of the "financial homeland").[3]
- Coordination of security arrangements, administered by law enforcement agencies and the military, aggravate the disciplinary and repressive invasion by private power seeking to control the personal lives of citizens.

Perhaps it is not possible to expect much more than this so long as Latin American integration is not understood as a union of citizens, as relations of solidarity among workers, artists, scientists, and communication media that express cultural diversity. There are only a few arrangements in these areas, arising in civil society and with little government support: the Mercosur Cultural Network, the Andrés Bello Covenant, the U.S.-Mexico Fund for Culture,[4] occasional meetings of university presidents, anthropologists, and artists.

3. *Patria grande* is the original Spanish for "greater homeland." The expression refers to the commonality among all Spanish American countries. *Patria chica*, "small homeland," is the Spanish term for each specific country. [Trans.]

4. The Andrés Bello Covenant and the U.S.-Mexico Fund for Culture are now defunct, and the Mercosur Cultural Network has not made significant strides beyond a few conferences and rhetorical pronouncements. [Trans.]

No doubt there are reasons to keep borders and different nationalities separate in Latin America countries, for example, to protect natural, historical, and economic heritage, to regulate migration flows, to control drug trafficking and other forms of criminal globalization, and of course to defend the continuity of local cultures. But prevention measures have not been important in the hurried free trade agreements between the countries of Mercosur, NAFTA, and other arrangements between Latin American nations, as well as the transnational privatization of companies of geopolitical interest, such as telephone utilities and television networks.

It is not wise to leave these matters only in the hands of politicians and businessmen, since they have to do with basic human rights to communication as well as with understanding among nations. They involve education as a shaper of views with respect to those who are different, and cultural policies regarding the selection and exclusion of heritages, which when transmitted contribute to discrimination or to the appreciation of diversity. If at times, as exemplified earlier in this book, those who deal with culture, especially artists, have a particular competency in these matters, it is because of their willingness to imagine possible lives. Poets, playwrights, and actors are adept at embodying other bodies, bringing the distant near, experiencing time and space beyond the routines that their own culture sets. The avant-gardes of the twentieth century extolled the ability of artists to transgress, and they cultivated the marginality to which their proclivities led. Faced with the homogenizing agenda of globalization, that dissidence remains a valuable task of art and of many groups who, without artistic pretensions, practice it. But at the same time, the confrontation with imagined lives that inheres in some globalizing tendencies suggests that the option for difference—other customs, other medicines, other languages—is now more than ever a possibility that can be integrated into our daily lives. It helps us practice nonconventional ways of being citizens.

2

Having established that cultural policy should be centered on its meaningfulness for citizens, we can better *understand the goods and messages that society and each group within it are able to communicate to mass audiences through the market*. The description in previous chapters shows that neither states nor social organizations are the main protagonists of the international expansion of Latin American telenovelas and ethnic and regional music. The profits generated at a transnational scale by these cultural goods show that their producers and private intermediaries are important managers.

Some filmmakers, broadcasters, music producers, and publishers find in Latin American music and melodramas the cultural resources to better compete within and outside the region. Contemporary melodrama—an extension of post-Romantic serials and theater—could be an instrument for articulating "pre-modern and surreal imagery with an industrial-urban imaginary," says Román Gubern.[5] Thanks to this dramatic style, the symbolic capital of traditional sectors could recover the market share it lost through the advance of transnational media culture. Why not expand this shared heritage of Ibero-American countries, asked the Spanish critic, through film and television coproductions, which will make these nations more competitive "in the post-Gutenberg era"?

The undeniable appeal of this line of expansion is refocused by other specialists into a wider and not exclusively commercial perspective on cultural policies. European and Latin American authors have studied the connections between the massive success of melodrama—not only in fiction but also in political and social information programs—and "market neo-populism," which values the media with an uncritical view of ratings (Sarlo 2001: 4). The alliances between "aesthetic conservatism," the special effects of advanced technologies, and political populism serve to neutralize challenges to unjust social structures and to organize consensus on behalf of the charismatic power of authoritarian leaders (Bourdieu 1998). In this confusion of entertainment, celebrity, and politics Evita and Che can become part of the same series of shows that feature Lady Di's and Clinton's erotic adventures. It does not seem that this "equality" of the South and the North helps to even up the score. Nor is the magic realism of writers, soap operas, and films that stereotype Latin America in the niches of Edenic narratives, exuberant nature, and the traditional family the best way for peripheral countries to gain recognition. It hasn't helped us to understand our societies by resorting to interpreting their conflicts as family dramas and dramatizing the social as always bewitched by emotions.

It would be useful moreover to revalue the "successes" of the transnational industrialization and massification of Latin American cultures in accordance with data that we do not have today: How much do Latin American societies retain of the royalties produced by our music, soap operas, and books? How many artists, producers, and technicians benefit from this transnational dissemination? We know something about what happens with movies in Spanish,

5. Román Gubern, "Pluralisma y camunidad de nuestras cinematagrafias," *La Jornada* (Mexico), April 11, 1997.

which do not exceed 10 percent of screen time, even in film-producing countries. But only by conducting an assessment, by cultural and artistic category, of the economic and aesthetic significance of symbolic exports would it be possible to evaluate their possible prominence, their benefits for the region, for producers, and for those who are only investors.

3

Redesigning cultural policy based on public interest requires *reversing the trend toward the simple privatization and denationalization of institutions and cultural action programs*. It is not a matter of returning to state ownership (of radio and television) but of reconstructing the state's role as regulator of private companies, driver of the weakest and nonprofit social initiatives—theater and musical groups, libraries and community centers, independent media—and advocate and coordinator of publicly valuable actions. To rediscover the place of the state at this juncture it is necessary to rethink it as an agent of the public interest and of the multicultural collective and as arbiter of disputes between private interests and between enterprises of the hegemonic nations and those of the underdeveloped countries. "Nations provide a focus for self-determination" (Giddens 1998: 131).

According to the principle that one of the state's functions is to prevent cultural goods and ventures from being reduced to commodities and to defend what in the symbolic life of societies cannot be merchandised, we need the existence of spaces like national museums, schools, public universities and research centers, and artistic experimentation supported by states or by mixed systems in which the collaboration of governments, private companies, and independent groups ensures that the interest and the informational and recreational needs of the majority will not be subordinated to commercial profitability.

The states' social action should be directed, first, to defending and reinforcing what was historically acquired in social struggles, in national cultures, and to keep it in institutional memory and actions. Then it is necessary that the appreciation and preservation of the public find organized supranational forms, so that social and cultural achievements are not overrun by global market players.

4

What states and independent national organizations can do depends increasingly on the construction of *new regional cultural programs and institutions to accompany trade integration among nations*. There are intermediate levels between

the culture industries of transnational scope and the weak cultural policies of each country. The redistribution of cultural and communication power presents opportunities for regional and intercity alliances, state agencies, NGOs, and other associations and independent foundations that drive tangential forms of globalization and intercultural cooperation. As for how to strengthen regional economies in global competition, there are already examples in the European Union: mechanisms for integration that facilitate the free circulation not only of goods but also of people and messages. They do this through joint educational programs, policies that protect a common cultural heritage, what is defined as "the European audiovisual space," and by establishing regulations that require states to promote books and reading, to defend authors' rights, and to expand endogenous culture industries.

Even when Europeans offer increasingly less resistance to the privatization of their telecommunications industries and to U.S. control over their cultural space, their governments have designed common regulatory frameworks that promote the circulation of the continent's own programs, establishing minimum exhibition and airtime standards for all member countries in terms of content and limits on media advertising. They have also created programs to develop the audiovisual industries in the region, promoted high-definition television, and shared standards for satellite transmissions. They argue that it is necessary to defend not only identity but also the the important role of the culture industries in economic development, job creation, and the consolidation of participatory democratic societies (Council of Europe 1997).

The weaker initiative of Latin American governments in these areas is compensated in some respects by the actions of independent cultural organizations and networks. Among several examples, I mention the network of directors, producers, distributors, and lawmakers from Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Cuba, Spain, the United States, Venezuela, and Mexico, who held a meeting in Mexico in 1998 titled "We Are Not Hollywood." To revive the film industry in these societies they developed proposals to obtain government subsidies, tax incentives, payment for transmission of films on television, and a tax (from 5 to 10 percent) on the cost of tickets at the box office. To defend Latin America's film industry from the unfair competition of U.S. producers, it was proposed that each country legislate a change in status—and concomitant application of import duties—from "copies without commercial value" to the recognition that they are films that cost $100 million or more and will generate even greater gains. In 1998 there were two more meetings, in Venezuela and Colombia, where participants agreed to create a standing committee

of Latin American legislators to defend the "film diversity" of the region and "harmonize criteria and mechanisms for the protection of [cinematic] cultural heritage" (Cámara de Diputados 1999).

Other experiences of collaboration among states, private enterprise, and independent organizations are being explored, and their innovative value deserves attention. The last example I wish to mention is that of the U.S.-Mexico Fund for Culture.[6] In 1991 the Rockefeller Foundation, the Mexican National Fund for Culture and Arts (a public institution), and the Bancomer Cultural Foundation (a private Mexican bank), created a binational body to "enrich cultural exchange" between these countries (qtd. in Yúdice 1997: 23). Such a fund was needed because the U.S. National Endowment for the Arts and Mexico's National Council for Culture and the Arts support activities only in their respective country.

The Fund provides financial support each year to binational projects in libraries, publications, music, dance, museums, visual arts, media arts, theater, cultural studies, and interdisciplinary work. The 3,386 applications submitted from 1992 to 1999, of which nearly five hundred were supported, show the extensive impact of this initiative in two countries that, despite the intensity of their interactions, were not accustomed to having joint programs, partly because of the lack of cultural institutions that would sponsor them. In a diagnostic study of the Fund that George Yúdice and I conducted in 1996, we interviewed beneficiary institutions and artists who expressed their appreciation for "interactive collaboration" and the development of a shared artistic imaginary between such diverse societies. We requested that in addition to financial support, the Fund organize workshops, symposia, and other activities to promote greater understanding of one culture in the public spheres of the other and vice versa, to contribute to work through differences interculturally, and to encourage "community and ethnic-based art practices" and multicultural reflection and experimentation neglected by the market (García Canclini and Yúdice 1996). It also was interesting to see that these encounters not only generated shared experiences between different cultures but also led to work through the different conceptions of culture and diversity in the United States and Mexico, to which I referred in previous chapters. Surely it would be productive to extend such initiatives to other regions.

6. As reported earlier, that initiative was discontinued. [Trans.]

Aesthetics for Intercultural Gourmets

In early 1998 Susan Sontag visited Mexico and was reminded that in her book *Against Interpretation* she had stated that if forced to choose between Dostoevsky and the Doors, she would choose Dostoevsky. But she also wrote, "Why do we have to choose?" The interviewer asked what would be today's equivalent of those cultural options. Sontag said that the Dostoevsky-Doors opposition was specific to the high–mass culture debate of the 1960s, when intellectuals defended the legitimacy of different experiences. "The problem now," she added, "is that people are so fascinated with mass entertainment, that they can hardly think at other levels. The idea now has to do with the concepts of 'seriousness' and 'commitment.' The question now is why one would want anything other than mass entertainment?"[7]

This dilemma not only points to a conflict between different narrative aesthetics; it puts us at the center of transnational public space and suggests that today the exchange is between cultures. It has to do with recovering the symbolic dimension of politics and with "what the market cannot do," to use an expression by Jesús Martín-Barbero. This author points to three shortcomings:

> The market cannot *ground traditions* and everything that it produces "melts into air" because of its structural tendency of accelerated and generalized obsolescence, not only of things but also of forms and institutions. The market cannot create *social connections between subjects* because these are constituted in the process of communicating meaning, and the market operates anonymously via value logics that involve purely formal exchanges, evanescent associations and promises that only generate satisfactions or frustrations but never meaning. The market cannot *generate social innovation* because it assumes nonfunctional differences and solidarity, resistance and dissidence, while the market works only to make a profit. (Martín-Barbero 1998: xv, xvi)

I want to add a fourth failure of the market as "organizer" of multiculturalism. Although markets are governed by competition, which globalization intensifies, cultural mixing is presented in commercial circuits as *reconciliation and equalization*, with greater tendencies to cover up the conflicts than to work through them. I think of the races that coexist in Benetton advertising posters; the Flamenco, Italian, British, and non-European melodies that "transcend" their local differences in the concert tours of the Three Tenors; the universal exhibitions, Olympic spectacles, and sports festivals that "bring all peoples

7. Susan Sontag, "En el centro de la polemica: Entrevista colectiva," *La Jornada Semanal*, April 5, 1998.

together in one family" and offer simple versions of all that is diverse and multiple; the channel surfing that enables us to connect in a few minutes with programs from thirty countries. These are some of the experiences that create the illusion that the world's cultural repertoire is at our disposal in a pacified and understandable interface.

When hybridization mixes elements from many societies that marketers manipulate to interest consumers in commodities, the differences between cultures are usually managed according to what in music is called *equalization*. Just as the differences in timbre are reduced by recording and reproduction devices and melodic styles lose their specificity, distant cultural forms can become too easily commensurable.

The search for an aesthetic balance of sound, which began in airports, restaurants, shopping centers, and other places where the environment is "conditioned," is now expanded by industrial recording techniques to eliminate "the discordant." José Jorge de Carvalho (1995) has studied the main processes used: (1) the intensities of different musical genres and instruments are manipulated by the pianissimos and fortissimos that are balanced to sound in orchestral uniformity or are subordinated to the voice channel; (2) the abuse of return or reverberation effects in shows and bars that atrophy the listener's ability to capture subtle sequences is extended to the habits of youth groups and even to individuals who listen to Walkmans, for whom the best way to listen to music is with the greatest amplification and sound volume; (3) the compact disc fixes the uniformity of listening paradigms by providing "purified" versions that are presented as if they were produced in perfectly balanced acoustic chambers and the listener positioned in the ideal spot: the equalized recording with a self-possessed listening subject, always in the center.

Created as a resource for Western tastes, equalization is a reassuring hybridization procedure, reducing the points of resistance of other musical aesthetics and the challenges brought by cultures that are not understood. Under the guise of friendly coexistence among them, getting near others is simulated without the need to understand them. Like rushed tourism and so many transnational blockbuster films, equalization is often an attempt at monological conditioning, forgetting the differences that do not dissolve.

It is not just a matter of toning down difference. Inequalities in access to production, circulation, and consumption of culture are also concealed. An analysis of commercial hybridization strategies should classify them in the terms of Ulf Hannerz's (1997: 115–16) "political economy of culture inherent to the *creole* continuum," that is, the uneven distribution of centers and peripheries, and even the "coexistence of multiple continuums rather than a single

inclusive one." The fact that corporations from the hegemonic countries pay greater attention to the underdeveloped and that Latin American migrants and messages sometimes hybridize within the center (e.g., ethnic music recorded in New York, Miami, Mexico, and Buenos Aires; cities transformed by MTV into capitals of Latin rock) does not mean that the center and the periphery disappear.

Rather than reconcile or match up races and nations, hybridization is a starting point for getting rid of fundamentalist temptations and the fatalist doctrines of civilizing wars. It helps you become capable of recognizing the productivity of exchanges and mixtures; it prepares you to participate in various symbolic repertoires, to become a multicultural gourmet, to travel among heritages and taste their differences (Werbner 1997: 11). Historical heritages, understood in this open and changing way, can become enriched and act as bridges of understanding between different societies. But hybridization is sometimes the place where cultures lose their character or are frustrated, as verified by migrants forced to give up their language or who see it wither in their children, or as one can see in artists pressured to "decontextualize" their style if they want to enter the mainstream. Perhaps rock, where "rebel ideology, its intensity of feeling, and its massive and profitable presence in the market" coexists with greater intercultural freedom and the constant risk of being trapped in generational fetishes, is the place where these paradoxes make themselves most eloquently discernible (Ochoa Gautier 1998: 252).

It is true, as Nikos Papastergiadis (1997: 257–58) says, that hybridization —insofar as it conceives identity "constructed through the negotiation of difference"—"has served as the organizing principle for international cultural initiatives." But hybridization doesn't in itself guarantee democratic multicultural policies. It depends on the power retained by musicians, writers, and film directors in editing and circulation so that their hybrid products become "the third space that makes possible the emergence of other positions" (Bhabha 1994: 211), a simple sublation that denies and preserves, synthesizing the contraries, as in the Hegelian *Aufhebung* (Beverley 1996) or a field of energy and sociocultural innovation. The cultural mix can be depleted, as in equalized World Music or the international style in literature, but it can also form part of unplugged and unexpected improvisations that renew the established language. It can be a pretext for commercial strategies or a support for conversations that generate unexpected visions. It isn't only cultural contents that circulate in the processes of hybridization; one also experiences the relatively arbitrary and contingent character of any culture, which is one of the foundations for the recognition of difference that is needed in the democratic game.

“Why do we give such importance to the aesthetic issue while discussing cultural policy?” an official from an international organization asked me. Indeed the emphasis on aesthetics seems interesting only for elites and therefore opposed to public life, which is usually linked to what can be shared by all. However, art is important here in a paradoxical way. The writers and artists not devoured by the cultural establishment, and even those who are accepted by it, reject the monolithic agenda by which the market structures the public sphere and fulfill the role of a counterpublic because they introduce local issues or ways of expressing them that seem unproductive to the hegemonic market. Those who need time for private activities that may not earn a profit (four years to write a novel that will be read by two thousand people?) and admit that it takes them weeks or months to say in one amazing page how some people live or what many prefer to forget, are counterpublic-individuals, at least in the eyes of those who assume that public life is that of capitalist rationality, as in the case of soap operas whose one-hour episodes require investments of $100,000 to $120,000, are filmed in three days, and then are sold to over one hundred countries (Mato 1999b). By upsetting the usual relations between public and private, between cultural experimentation and economic performance, the slow economy of artistic production fulfills the public function of encouraging us to rethink what the impetuous economy of the symbolic industries imposes as public, fleeting, and forgetful.

The writer is the one who “interrupts the debate in the public arena, who stops, changes, and shifts it,” says Ricardo Piglia. He notes that there is an (inverted) analogy to what the TV does when it doesn’t allow the popular classes to speak:

> [Reporters arrive,] probably due to some catastrophe, in a neighborhood, a working-class area, the TV shows up and suddenly, like a Martian, a worker talks, and tries to explain; he has a temporality and a way of using language that is antagonistic to social logic. They interrupt him immediately because he takes longer to speak than professionals. Also, he speaks normally, as if he were at home or in a bar, and he isn’t “adapted” to public speaking, to TV, radio, to the scene. A worker appears and they question him in his environment regarding some tragic matter (a strike, a crash, a crime), and they’re often women, those who survived or suffered violence, and she or he starts talking as always, looks at the camera and tries to speak, to narrate, stops to think trying to be accurate and say what happened and then stutters a bit and immediately they remove the microphone and the newscaster tells his

> version, and leaves him there, mute, because he speaks another language, and doesn't have the accuracy that they who play this game in public space have learned. (Piglia 1998: 17)

The writer and artist not subjected to the media interrupt this interruption, reinstate the social drama, the tension between languages, between ways of living and thinking, that the media wanted to reduce to a spectacle, a quick show so they can go on to the next one.

This brings us to a second characteristic of aesthetic action: in a world narrated like circular globalization, which simulates that it contains everything, art holds open the tangential and even deviant globalizations. In other words, art holds open the possibility of choice, something much more strategic than handling the TV's remote control. Interrupting and choosing another logic sustains the unstable tension between the social and modes of reimagining it, between what exists and how we may criticize it. It refuses the narrative of globalization and its massifying potential as the end of history announced by Francis Fukuyama or like the end of geography celebrated by Paul Virilio and Internet ideologues of a world without center or edges.

The (hi)story of globalization is just beginning. Its generalization of interactivity is held back not only by the "backwardness" of slightly integrated cultures but also by new boundaries and the segmentation of circuits and audiences invented by those who claim to put the world in a state of telepresence. Despite the unifying rhetoric, the historical and local differences persist primarily because the globalizing powers are insufficient for including everyone and also because their way of reproducing and expanding requires that the center not be everywhere, that there be differences between the global circulation of commodities and the unequal distribution of the political capacity to use them. Also the logic of inequality drives the excluded from work, trade, and uniform consumption to revitalize artisanal or preglobalized modes of production. Artistic creations, slow and divergent, sometimes represent in their narratives and procedures the contradictions of global policies, the vicissitudes of inequality, and the need of the marginalized to interrupt the totalizing and totalitarian flows with affirmations of their own, with de-globalizing inventions.

From the Gesture of Interruption to the Politics of Intermediation

I am suggesting that artistic interruption is correlated with broader cultural and social movements; with indigenous and environmental movements that reaffirm their territoriality and the local uses of natural and social resources

that cannot be reduced to global logic; with feminist movements that challenge in specific spheres masculine pretensions to define the public sphere according to the view of one gender; with the unemployed or those excluded from production or globalized consumption who, unrepresented by politicians and not heard by governments, cut off roads, make *escraches* (performative public denunciations in front of amnestied torturers' homes in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay). Or they organize in movements of consumers or television viewers. Just as the compulsive commodification of advertising interrupts films every few minutes, so also the story of globalization is interrupted by the eruption of unsatisfied local interests.

Cultural and anthropological studies have emphasized in recent years that many interruptive acts with political dimensions do not aspire to gain power or take control of the state. Why did the Chinese students demonstrate their "enormous courage" defying the tanks in Tiananmen Square, Craig Calhoun asks, if it was foreseeable that such confrontations were bound to fail? Instrumental thinking concerning interest, attentive only to the rationality of economic and macropolitical success, fails to understand behaviors that seek instead to legitimate or express identities. They are, says Calhoun (1991), struggles for meaning. In assessing the affective dimension of cultural and social practices and group solidarity and cohesion, we discern the peculiar *political* meaning of actions analogous to those of art, insofar as they do not pursue the literal satisfaction of demands or commercial profit but uphold the structures of meaning of certain lifestyles. However, these acts, even when they sometimes achieve effectiveness because they appropriate the silences and contradictions of the hegemonic order, do not do away with the question of how to transform politics.

I do not know how much sense it makes at this stage of speedy globalizations and incipient de-globalizations to propose a totalization of these scattered interruptions. Perhaps the most fruitful option is to acknowledge that the (partial) dismantling of states and the (inefficient) subordination of national societies to the global logic of the market is modifying intermediary spaces and circuits. I conclude by noting the two tendencies that are advancing in this regard. One of them is represented by the *"integration" of the excluded into global drug trafficking and crime networks that find refuge in national bureaucracies and "premodern" power structures*. For those expelled from the formal market and labor rights, for those nations whose endogenous industrial development has been limited, these networks offer illegal "compensations." The fact that the globalization of the trade in arms and drugs is equal in revenue to that of electronic commerce worldwide (approximately $1 trillion per year)

suggests in what ways the managers of the networked world and the perpetual present, 24/7, 365 days a year, coexist with the different temporality of the armed fundamentalisms of Algerians and Croatian Serbs, with the bureaucracies of former communist nation-states, and with Latin American neoliberal populisms.

Like the electronic money that comes and goes from corrupt money laundering to the formal economy, global communication traffics in local and archaic cultures. According to Manuel Castells, just as "the global criminal economy is a form of advanced capitalism" (because of its market logic, its investment conditions, and the preservation of its financial assets),[8] so also do the murders that top off the breakdown of national policies, alliances, and clashes with the economic powers destabilize the order of global trade. At the same time, opportunely filmed, these crimes renew our televisual imaginary each week. The aesthetic strategies of transnational communication corporations that condemn these events in their discourse but celebrate them by transmitting them continuously, have never been closer to the marginalized and lumpenized popular cultures that accompany these processes: more than five hundred *corridos* (ballads) that narrate the adventures of drug traffickers, broadcast and listened to on pirated and legal cassettes, have become the music most heard when you board a bus or taxi. The mass media and advanced technologies share with sectors excluded from the formal economy, with the lords of informality, a hegemonic culture that is the grotesque caricature of modernity. Their key resources are the will to triumph in their ruthless competition and spectacularization of cruelty, to accumulate money within the family, applying the codes of mafia honor and loyalty, and religious and rural traditions side by side with electronic ostentation and frivolous cosmopolitanism.

However, so many interconnections and complicities between the local and the global, the traditional and hypermodern, and the popular and superinformed cannot be interpreted as a Machiavellian harmonious world plan. It's just a matter of remembering everything that globalization cannot include in its policies or its conceptual frameworks. The acceleration of exchanges and the approximation of distance increases information about others but seldom leads to understanding their differences, which often make them unbearable: racism and xenophobia also increase with globalization. Although some networks can be used in a "civilized" way, such as the Internet, which began as a military system, the majority of circuits are designed for fierce competition and surveillance of what cannot be incorporated. But competition and

8. Manuel Castells, "Crimen Global," *El País*, February 21, 1997.

surveillance also operate in a fragmented way. They do not lead to a world government because commercial globalization can advance more quickly without states or transnational public powers, in short, without political globalization.

The other kind of intermediation is that of cultural movements and nongovernmental social groups that try to bring together those excluded and marginalized by nation-states and globalized markets. I'm thinking of human rights organizations (Amnesty International, research networks on dictatorships and disappearances), of community-based movements and media that operate in the micro-public space and are connected via the Internet or in association with movements, radios, and music producers from other countries in order to establish information and cooperation circuits in which cultural and political representation takes precedence over commercial accounts. In recent years several intergovernmental meetings—the Environmental Summit in Rio de Janeiro and the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna, among others—have included side meetings of these independent networks. Sometimes, as in the World Conference on Cultural Policies organized by UNESCO in Stockholm in 1998, these networks are incorporated into the program through forums parallel to those of the intergovernmental participants.

Not all initiatives deserve the same valuation. Some take the community as the absolute good and are indifferent to states; others seek, through negotiation with them, to convert these exercises of citizenship into new forms of governance. One way or another, they show that between Goliath and David, between globalized market forces that imagine themselves omnipotent and social unrest without political expression, there is something other than the patronage networks of criminal globalization. However, it isn't possible to draw such absolute conclusions as those of Anthony Giddens (1998: 140), who emphasizes the growth of international governmental organizations (about twenty early in the twentieth century and over three hundred now) and transnational NGOs (from 180 to five thousand in the same period) and concludes, "There already is global governance and there already is global civil society."

There is undoubtedly an emerging transition from interruptive gestures to the construction of new forms of social, cultural, and political intermediation. What does it mean to make intermediation the center of sociopolitical action? First of all, it means overcoming the binary opposition between states and citizens, businesses and clientele, macro-institutions and communities in order to rethink more complex public communication processes where intermediaries legitimate institutions and redefine social consensus. Then, to the extent that many intermediary movements develop their action transnationally, they succeed in inserting themselves into various scales of sociopolitical processes

with greater flexibility than nation-states, intergovernmental organizations, and exclusively local groups. They approximate the versatility of the megacorporations that reorder markets, communicate with societies, and constitute a "global civil society" focused on consumption and the neglect of the citizenry.

These intermediations do not resolve the problem of envisioning a world government, but they make headway toward an understanding of what globalization means in the lives of the people, and they work, in some cases, toward an ecumenical citizenship that makes possible a global governance with democratic foundations. Perhaps more important today than attaining a coherent paradigm of globalization, which would be expressed in a new world order, is discerning the destructive or promissory effects of global narratives and actions with the rigorous knowledge that the social sciences can provide, inventing new ways of accumulating local and national knowledge in connection with regional and globalized networks, and connecting intellectual and artistic agents with social movements and culture industries to imagine integrated programs.

The celebrations of the end or beginning of the century do not exalt the end of history or geography; they are aimed instead at figuring out how to draw the geopolitics of a communication capable of recognizing what exists between globalizing narratives and those that only affirm identities. In those culture industries that do not renounce the risks of artistic imagination, in the economic exchanges that accept plural social policies, in the cultural movements that open up innovative forms of mediation, we can glimpse not a final scene destined to be repeated like a spectacle but a different future that distances itself from the totalitarianism of the market or the media. On that horizon it is possible to imagine globalization as something more than a monotonous abundance.

NINE

TOWARD AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF MISUNDERSTANDINGS

A Methodological Discussion on Interculturality

Artistic and Scientific Strategies

Can a foreigner study and understand another country? Is it possible for migrants or exiles who spend many years abroad to continue understanding their society of origin so as to study it, and even to be eligible to vote from abroad? These questions are posed with greater force in some countries, especially those with a dense and powerful history that have become particularly wary of strangers after invasions, as is the case of Mexico. Faced with artists from different countries who have painted their indigenous peoples and photographed Mexican cities, faced with European and North American historians and anthropologists who have spent decades investigating the Revolution or the everyday politics of this country, I have heard several Mexicans say, Foreigners have no idea of what Mexico is like.

At first glance, it seems necessary to separate these questions. It's not the same to write the history or anthropology *of* Mexico as to make Mexican art. Part of the international consensus on social science is constructed and

justified in a field of relative objectivity. Belonging to a nation or immersing oneself in its everyday history and culture may be useful at the moment of *discovery*, when one formulates hypotheses, but soon the researcher should question the certainties of common sense, construct his or her object of study, and test its hypotheses without asking for any methodological privileges for the certainties accumulated by having been born and raised familiarizing oneself with what a nation, an ethnic group, or a region consider to be its identity. Given that this immersion in identity can provide as many advantages as eyeglasses, it is possible—as in fact is the case—that the histories of the Mexican Revolution and modernization written by Alan Knight and François Xavier Guerra are as relevant and as dubious as those written by the historians of the Colegio de México.

If today we have serious objections to the anthropological studies of Robert Redfield and Oscar Lewis, it is not because their foreignness prevented them from understanding the unique aspects of Mexican life, but for reasons similar to those that lead us to question the work of Manuel Gamio and Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán: the theoretical assumptions that guided their field observations were partially inconsistent, or they no longer help to explain new social and cultural processes that they could not foresee.

What happens to art and literature is different. Their images and texts aspire to tell not how a society functions but how men and women enjoy and suffer that way of functioning, how they manage to act in it and at the same time imagine other performances consistent with the desires, fantasies, and frustrations generated by having been raised in a certain kind of family, social class, and nation.

That's why it makes sense to speak of a Mexican literature to which belong, for example, Octavio Paz, Carlos Fuentes, and José Emilio Pacheco, or a Mexican cinema composed by, among others, Fernando de Fuentes, el Indio Fernández, and Arturo Ripstein. But we don't include as Mexican *Under the Volcano* by Malcolm Lowry or the films Eisenstein made in Mexico. On the other hand, it does not seem to me appropriate to speak of a Mexican anthropology, as if there were a national way of doing science; instead we can speak of an anthropology of or about Mexico. Nevertheless I hasten to add that this classification leaves many problems unresolved. One is what to do with large portions of the works of Paz, Fuentes, and Pacheco that can be fully understood without ever having lived in Mexico because they dialogue not only with this country but with art, literature, and what we might generally call the contemporary condition. Another difficulty is that while I have arguments for not including Eisenstein as a Mexican director, I would be hard put to exclude

from Mexican cinema the films that the Spanish director Luis Buñuel made during his stay in this country.

The blurry area of these works, which does not let them get caught in the domestic-foreign dichotomy, also holds true for the social sciences that I cannot include in this classification. Many anthropologists today would say that our discipline works both on the social order and also on the imaginaries that men and women make in order to act and think according to desires not satisfied by the functioning of that social order.

Here we reach the point where anthropology, as well as history, sociology, and other so-called scientific disciplines, approach art and literature, whether for the importance they give to creativity in the research process or for the use they make of metaphors and essayistic writing to say what they cannot expound with the rigor of scientific discourse. This gray area between science and art, we already know, is about the tensions and slippages between the objective and subjective. It is also related to what I began asking in this chapter: whether or not a foreigner can capture what Mexico is.

A first conclusion that I drew from the foregoing became clear after observing what happens with the foreign artists who try to talk about Mexico. I found that when some Mexican art viewers remarked "This is not Mexico," they were referring to artists who had represented pyramids, masks, and dances or narrated scenes in bars or markets, seeking to describe them objectively or to suggest interpretations of what, "deep down," really happened in those places. In contrast, the viewers were more attracted when the artist seemed not to be saying "This is Mexico" but rather "This is what happened to me when I lived in Mexico," which was suggested by subjective reflections or by inserting images from their personal non-Mexican history in their representations of pyramids and canteens.

What does this artistic comparison entail for anthropological work? To the extent that we anthropologists seek to produce knowledge, or, we may prefer to say, a knowledge more concerned about objectivity than that of the artists, we must make descriptions and interpretations based on data constructed with scientific methods, explained in such a way that they can be empirically tested and perhaps refuted. But at the same time the anthropologist is positioned at the intersection between "objective reality" and the imaginaries of subjects, nationals and foreigners, who contribute to shaping the meaning of a pyramid, a dance, or a market. Mexico was always an imagined construction derived from the selection of certain aspects and the exclusion of others, we are told by historians and anthropologists (Bartra, Gruzinski, Lomnitz), and this selection was made, at least since the Conquest, in a complex process of negotiation

between how it was imagined by those born in the country and those observing it from other perspectives, say, from Counterreformation Hispanicity or enlightened modernity, in Europe, Latin America, or the United States. This intersection between the "real" society and the nation imagined by natives and foreigners is even more intense in a time of economic globalization and regional integration that pressures Mexicans to define themselves as Americans or Latin Americans, Westerners or inheritors of indigenous cultures. This is a time when Mexicans develop new tactics to resist what may harm them in choosing either alternative and to situate themselves more conveniently in what they imagine to be the future of those contradictions.

I think that what characterizes anthropologists as specialists in heterogeneity and otherness is that they work in these intersections. Conceived this way, the anthropologist can diminish the distance between two characters: on the one hand, the Mexican anthropologist who tries to understand his society without mimicking himself through it, decentering himself from the ethnocentric self-portraits; on the other, the foreign-born anthropologist who from within tries to look at this country beyond what is said by the media, tourism agencies, and hegemonic discourses preached by the nation itself. We know that even observing Mexico from this intercultural perspective there will remain differences between a native anthropology and the one practiced on this society by North Americans, Europeans, and Latin Americans. I will try to reflect in this chapter on the possibilities and limits of this intercultural approach, taking as my point of departure the experience of someone who came to Mexico as a philosopher, who learned to be an anthropologist here, and who tries to describe what some parts of this country are like while trying to understand what it means for an Argentine to do social science and live in a nation that he feels increasingly to be his own without losing the capacity to be bewildered by it.

I remember the words of Adorno: in exile the only house is writing. "What house can be a foundation for writing?" asks Julio Ramos in his discussion of Adorno's formula. It is even more difficult for the social scientist who pretends that his home is the university or research center. But doesn't the native scientist also have a similar difficulty when he decides not to mimic himself through his society, not to be the ventriloquist of his countrymen?

Disconnected Histories

Exile is an experience of passages. Not only the passage from one country to another, but also the displacements, both personal and work-related, of the habits and understandings of the world "familiar" to those rooted in the

society that receives us. I will present more or less objective descriptions of the structure and significance of these differences between Argentina and Mexico, based on the experience of someone who chose to stay to live in the latter country and has developed, through the contrast, a different view of his national origin.

I refer to three passages: (1) that of someone who traveled from one society with a short and underdeveloped history to another with a dense history that lurks everywhere; (2) that of someone who traveled from a society with pretensions of being entirely Western, white, and homogeneous to a multiethnic nation; and finally, (3) I turn to a difficult comparison to deal with, about which we foreigners in Mexico speak a lot but on which almost nothing has been written: what we think and feel about the various modes of taking a stand with respect to Mexican conflicts.

Argentina and Mexico have had fewer ties with each other than either of these countries has had with other Latin American nations.[1] Despite being societies with greater economic and cultural development in Spanish-speaking America, and in spite of the intense relationship between some of their intellectuals, before the period of exile began in the 1970s mutual exchange and understanding were scarce. What little we knew of each other was riddled with misunderstandings, which those of us who moved to Mexico gradually came to discern. The Mexican poet Antonio Mediz Bolio, while serving as ambassador in Buenos Aires, wrote to Alfonso Reyes in 1921 that Argentines were ignorant about almost everything regarding Mexico. They only "know, and with enthusiasm, some of our biggest names": Amado Nervo, "almost appropriating him," José Vasconcelos, and Reyes himself. Bolio Mediz devoted much of his time as a diplomat denying in two Argentine newspapers, *La Nación* and *La Prensa*, the distorted news that the Associated Press and United Press news agencies presented regarding the postrevolutionary changes in Mexico. He also refuted U.S. film representations of Mexicans as traitors, drunkards, and bandits. This task was also carried out by other writer-ambassadors, among them Enrique González Martínez and Alfonso Reyes, who developed friendships with Argentine writers and expanded the dissemination of their country's culture by donating hundreds of books to public libraries in Argentina.

Such exchanges were echoed by the leaders of the Argentine university reform movement, which began in 1918. The Mexican Revolution, and especially the artistic and intellectual effervescence in Mexico promoted by Secretary

1. This point and the following one revisit in part my essay "Argentines in Mexico: An Anthropological View," published in Yankelevich 1998.

of Public Education Vasconcelos, appeared in several Latin American countries "as a model of political and cultural reconstruction" (Yankelevich 2002: 198). The leaders of the university reform, which transcended the classroom and sought to turn the university into a social program of democratization, not only in Argentina but also in Chile, Peru, Colombia, Cuba, and Guatemala, saw in postrevolutionary Mexico the promise that their utopias could be transformed into state policies. Vasconcelos's reflection on Latin American mestizaje as the foundation for a new "cosmic race" seemed to give consistency to the continental project that animated the Argentine university reformers. News traveled quickly to Buenos Aires, La Plata, and Córdoba of Secretary Vasconcelos's leadership in international campaigns against Latin American tyrants, especially against Juan Vicente Gómez in Venezuela, and that he had identified as the causes of dictatorships the same issues that the Argentine reformers stressed: military warlordism, large landholdings, the exploitation of workers, and clerical rule.

From September 20 to October 8, 1921, the Federation of Students in Mexico held an international conference with participants from sixteen countries. The Argentine and Mexican delegations took the lead in the sessions and in the final declaration, which called for a continental struggle against "the exploitation of man by man," opposition to nationalist patriotism, and "the integration of all peoples in a universal community."

A few weeks after the conference, one of the Argentine delegates, Arnaldo Orfila Reynal from La Plata, received two boxes and a trunk with books and archaeological objects to organize an exhibition of Mexican culture in Buenos Aires. In 1923 the magazine *Valoraciones* was launched in La Plata under the direction of Alejandro Korn; in it were juxtaposed articles by students and writers from the two countries that were developing these friendships: Aníbal Ponce and Alfonso Reyes; Hector Ripa Alberdi and Daniel Cosío Villegas; Jorge Luis Borges and Diego Rivera. This collaboration was multiplied by travel to Argentina by Antonio Caso and Vasconcelos, who lectured at universities there.

Although Vasconcelos declared in his lectures that "the romantic era of Ibero-American relations has passed and it is now time to connect our people through close ties and constant exchange of ideas and products" (qtd. in Yankelevich 1998: 459–60), the exchanges didn't amount to more than sharing intellectual and romantic utopias: the organization of Mexican conferences in Argentina and Argentine conferences in Mexico, periodic donations of books, and encouragement by way of the revolutionary experience so that in Argentina a political-intellectual space oriented to anti-imperialism and Latin

American integration might take shape. One remarkable result is the inclusion of one country's intellectuals in the institutions of the other: when Pedro Henríquez Ureña left Mexico in the mid-1920s because of political conflicts, he was appointed as a professor at the National College of the University of La Plata; in the 1930s Alfonso Reyes, the Mexican ambassador to Argentina, taught courses at the Universidad Popular Alejandro Korn in La Plata; in the 1940s Arnaldo Orfila became director of the Argentine annex of Mexico's Fondo de Cultura Economica in Buenos Aires and was subsequently invited to direct the headquarters of that publishing house in Mexico City. He held that position until a conflict over the publication of Oscar Lewis's *The Children of Sanchez* in the late 1960s led him to leave the Fondo and go on to create Editorial Siglo XXI with the financial support of Mexican and Latin American intellectuals. At the core of the conflict over Lewis's book was whether a foreigner was entitled to speak of "the culture of poverty" in Mexico.

Among the few attempts to establish economic agreements between the two countries, the most salient one was General Enrique Mosconi's visit to Mexico in 1928 as a consultant to the oil industry, based on his experience in the Argentine state oil company; that consultancy helped in the creation of Petromex in 1934, which sought to expand oil production in order to ensure self-sufficiency and the industrial progress of Mexico. But such Latin American cooperation initiatives to develop the autonomy of national economies were limited by U.S. ambition to appropriate Latin American oil and by political instability in Mexico and Argentina.

This story was almost unknown to those of us who were educated in Argentina during the second half of this century. When I was a student and professor at La Plata in the 1960s and 1970s, very few of the names I quoted ever came up in conversations except when a professor from the university's National College mentioned that, say, Henríquez Ureña had been his teacher. I wonder why no one ever prompted me to read his remarkable *Literary Currents in Hispanic America* or brilliant essays by Reyes and Vasconcelos. Sometimes we would go to the University of La Plata's library to browse through the *Revista de la Universidad de México*, but we were really only interested in Octavio Paz, Carlos Fuentes, and a young writer named Carlos Monsiváis, who published his irreverent writings there. One day we saw *Mexico: The Frozen Revolution* by Raymundo Gleyzer in a *cine club*, and we learned of the student movement and the repression of October 1968, but for us '68 was Paris, and we didn't understand very well why the revolution made by Indians and peasants had come to a halt; we wondered whether there were still many Indians and peasants in a country that we thought was modern and cosmopolitan, where avant-garde

novels like Fuentes's *A Change of Skin* and Paz's *Liberty under Parole* were written. It was difficult to find answers because newspapers almost never brought news from Mexico.

From the Argentine side I see two reasons for this low level of knowledge about Mexico. First, the exchange among elites was largely disrupted during the Peronist government (1945–55), whose nationalist and Latin Americanist tendencies sought out interlocutors different from those of Mexico, such as the dictators Stroessner and Trujillo. But from a more structural point of view, I think one of the main differences that drew Argentina and Mexico apart is their different relationship to history.

In recent years, following the policies of censorship and erasure of memory practiced by the last Argentine military dictatorship (1976–83), there has been much work, within and outside of Argentina, on the forgetting of history in that country. But in truth, we Argentines always had a weak and careless relationship to our past. Unlike nations where pre-Columbian cultures and colonial society had a powerful development (Mexico, Guatemala, Bolivia, and Peru), in Argentina political persecution and the lack of laws to recognize and protect its heritage aggravated its already weak historical development. The oligarchy preserved for a long time some historic sites, furniture, and customs as evidence of their greatness, and made private use of that heritage without ever concerning themselves to socialize it in museums or communications programs that would bring them into modernity, beyond self-celebratory complacency. Populist nationalism, which expanded the concept of heritage by incorporating popular traditions and extended its dissemination to subaltern sectors, remained in the hands of nostalgic and ideological folklorists who embalmed those traditions in a metaphysical, ahistorical vision of "national being." To be a liberal or leftist in Argentina meant almost never having time to worry about anything other than the future. The recent revitalization of a few buildings and neighborhoods in some cities in Argentina is usually limited to commercial revaluation of arbitrary signs for an ephemeral present.

That's why those of us who came to live in Mexico are surprised and fascinated by the concentration of preserved monuments and living traditions, museums that require considerable investment, and ancient peasant feasts that are also performed in cities. In short, an eloquent history. Some people do not know how to situate themselves before so much past; one of the greatest Argentine writers, a historian by profession, once explained why he hadn't visited the Museum of Anthropology: "Because I lack the Code." Others of us have felt the difficulty of assuming so dense a past and dialoguing with it, but to some extent we have learned, on the basis of what we have seen in

Mexico, to appreciate our own national history—and Latin American history as well—not as a scholarly reference but as the explanatory source of current traits.

Discovering Multiculturality

Aside from revealing the depths of history, Mexico has been for many Argentines the place where we find the indigenous face of Latin America. For those of us who had thought and written from the purview of the white societies of the River Plate region, without traveling to northern Argentina or to the Mapuche enclaves in the mountains, Mexico City made us confront the central place that ethnicity has in many cities of this continent. More so if, as was my case, one becomes an anthropologist and goes into Purépecha territories to do fieldwork and accompanies students into the mountains of Oaxaca and Chiapas and to the hybridized territories of the border with the United States. I want to dwell a bit on this difference both to understand the sociocultural contrasts between the two societies and to grasp what it means to be an anthropologist in one and the other society.

To that end I will introduce into this narrative what happened in 1973, when Argentina was inaugurating yet another democratization and Mexico's president at the time, Luis Echeverría, explored the possibilities of becoming an international leader. As had happened with Garcia Morín, Alfonso Reyes, and many others, the Mexican diplomatic corps reserved a prominent role for artists and scholars, and so Echeverría filled his plane with intellectuals and traveled to Argentina. The anthropologist Guillermo Bonfil, who was part of the expedition, told me that in the national palace, the Casa Rosada, the Argentine president, Héctor Cámpora, gave them a dinner at which nearly one hundred representatives of Mexican culture were to meet with their Argentine counterparts. The protocol was organized in a way that seemed peculiar to the Mexicans: a painter would arrive, an aide asked him his name and occupation, and then shouted into the dining room, "A painter!" Then an Argentine who had to do with the visual arts appeared. And then came Carlos Fuentes, and the aide shouted out, "A writer!" When it was Guillermo Bonfil's turn, he told the aide he was an anthropologist, and after hesitating a moment with a look of puzzlement on his face, the aide announced, "A film director!"

It seems that in the early 1970s in Argentina it was as difficult to find an anthropologist as it was to find the objects they supposedly study. The affirmations of the national and popular at that time, more ideological than effective, did not correct the centralism of Buenos Aires nor the discrimination

against those from the provinces. Many continued believing that genocide, still called euphemistically by official history the "campaign of the desert," had eliminated most of the Indians in the early twentieth century, and there was little news that in other countries anthropologists had begun to study their own societies. I was a professor of philosophical anthropology in the Faculty of Humanities in La Plata, but what I taught by Lévi-Strauss and Herskovits were their theoretical contributions. I knew almost nothing about Mexican anthropology.

On arriving in Mexico, the first stable job I got was as a professor at the National School of Anthropology and History. I wanted to study popular art, so I went to Michoacán to do fieldwork with students. I studied anthropologists whom I was reading for the first time along with my students. And I also discovered that anthropology had something to say about modern societies that wouldn't even occur to researchers in other disciplines. That's how I converted to social anthropology without abandoning philosophy, and I became a specialist in the cultures of Mexico without ceasing to be Argentine.

Interdisciplinarity and interculturality: there are analogies between the act of moving from one country to another, learning other cultural codes, and moving from one discipline to another, becoming a kind of epistemological migrant. The Mexican context encouraged me to experience what might happen by comparing the knowledge that art history and philosophical aesthetics had accumulated regarding high culture, what anthropology produced regarding the popular, and communication studies regarding mass culture. Mexico's proximity to the United States and its multicultural debates and massive discrimination toward Latin Americans made me see what these issues mean in our dealings with the metropolis. Mexico's multiethnicity, still unresolved, as evidenced by recent conflicts in Chiapas and other regions, but less repressed than in Argentina, led me to perceive the theoretical and empirical complexity of these issues and their centrality in our time.

We know that Argentina is constitutively a multiethnic nation composed of indigenous peoples, who subsist in the Northeast, in el Chaco and Patagonia, and of diverse European migrations. There are also notable differences between its regions. But I also know that it is an Argentine habit to try to forget all of this. As if the tango and farcical theater, Borges and Les Luthiers, Fontanarrosa and rock that is called national were not full of quotations from other cultures. I'm not saying that it's indispensable to leave Argentina to realize that the world is much more than our local pride; nor does one have to leave to construct a non-ethnocentric view of our traditions. Fontanarrosa renewed our folklore parodically by having Inodoro Pereyra interact with Don Quixote,

Darwin, Zorro, Superman, ET, and Antonio das Mortes.[2] But some of us have needed to become migrants or were forced to migrate in order to acquire a less biased view of the place of Argentines in the world. Being an "Argenmexican" helped me to understand both the myopia of Sarmiento-like liberals that took everything European to the absolute and that of populists who still pursue, against the liberals, the dream of an equally improbable national being.

Rituals on One Side and the Other of the Window

To go into exile is to become a minority. This may not be as difficult as it was for those of us who had to leave the country because the positions we represented were minoritarian and also persecuted. The first reaction of many of us who came to Mexico in the mid-1970s was not the shock of historical and cultural differences, nor the difficulty of finding work or learning to live in a multiethnic megacity, but that of having freed ourselves from terror. Then we began to sense that something significant was happening to us regarding the peculiar way in which we Argentines experienced being a minority in Mexico. Without doubt, the common language and other customs we shared with Mexicans facilitated our integration, compared to those who migrated from the United States, France, or Sweden. Other important factors that favored these solidary relations were the cultural characteristics we shared with other Latin Americans residing in Mexico and that the political causes that propelled us to migrate were viewed with sympathy, or at least without rejection by a large number of Mexicans. Why, then, are there so many critical jokes about Argentines compared to other nationalities?

It is possible that the different ethnic and national histories to which I referred have contributed to this negative view of Argentines in Mexico. But that does not seem enough to explain the difference: on the one hand, because there were no similar jokes regarding Uruguayans and Chileans, with whom there could be the same perception of intercultural distance; on the other hand, because this characterization of Argentines is not exclusive to Mexicans. In other societies that also received migrants from my country of origin, Argentines are also defined as Italians who speak Spanish but think they're English, or it is said that the ego is the little Argentine we all have inside us.

Already at the beginning of the twentieth century visitors remarked on Argentines' arrogance and pretentiousness. In his *Letter to an Argentine Young*

2. The name of the Fontanarrosa comic-strip character, Inodoro Pereyra, is a pun. He represents the gaucho, who historically is of mixed race. While "Inodoro" sounds like "Isidoro," a likely name, it literally means toilet. [Trans.]

Man Who Studies Philosophy, José Ortega y Gasset was astonished that the recipient of his letter asked "a few things" and admitted "the possibility that he didn't know them"; Ortega found Argentine magazines and books to have "too much emphasis and so little precision. How can one trust such emphatic people?" (qtd. in D'Adamo and García Beaudoux 1995: 20–21).

I didn't know these old references in the mid-1980s when I attended the soccer match between Argentina and China in the World Youth Championship in Azteca Stadium, and the three or four thousand Argentines were surprised by the fervor with which ninety thousand Mexicans rooted in favor of China. Then we learned that in the 1990 World Cup in Italy the Argentine team was permanently booed, while the Italians supported Cameroon. Rather than imagine an unintended complicity between Mexicans and Italians and Chinese and Africans, we must accept that these preferences were ways of expressing a repudiation of Argentines.

How do we Argentines overcome the feeling of bewilderment that this rejection causes us? A resource used by those of us who are not from Buenos Aires is to blame exclusively the *porteños* (residents of Buenos Aires) for that image, arguing that we non-porteños too have suffered their centralist arrogance. But something doesn't sound quite right when Mexicans perceive this difference and think they praise us by saying "You don't look Argentine."

Two social psychologists, Orlando D'Adamo and Virginia García Beaudoux, who conducted a survey in several countries that have received Argentine migrants, give some explanations for this image. Above all, they emphasize the importance of foreign training in Argentine society. In 1914 the census indicated the presence of 5,527,285 native inhabitants (70.2 percent) compared to 2,357,925 (29.8 percent) foreigners (D'Adamo and García Beaudoux 1995: 64). Argentina drew crowds of Spanish, Italian, Jewish, French, and German immigrants, who on arrival verified the benefits of working and eating in this new nation. To buy shoes, shirts, and especially meat, Argentine workers needed to work fewer hours than French, Italian, or German workers. Life expectancy at midcentury was higher in Argentina than in many European countries; the possibility of sending their children to secondary and higher education was also higher, and the illiteracy rate was one of the lowest in the world. These economic and sociocultural features favored economic and sociocultural awareness of "power" and "superiority," especially among poor immigrants who arrived from Europe fleeing war and famine.

But how does one sustain this self-image in the second half of the twentieth century, when Argentina slid into economic decline and hyperinflation? The authors point to the discrepancy between this decline and political and

everyday discourse, as well as the possible compensatory or consoling function of delusions of "Argentine grandeur," for the majority of economic, social, and educational indicators verify the loss of comparative advantages gained at the beginning of the century. "We needed to lose a war and learn the significance of our foreign debt to begin to become aware" (D'Adamo and García Beaudoux 1995: 71). The authors refer to the Falklands war, lost in 1982, but the exiles, and millions of Argentines who did not leave, could add the defeat—of political projects, economic aspirations, and intellectual and moral hopes—that the dictatorship of the 1970s brought us. Under the pretext of exterminating the guerrillas, the dictatorship imposed economic restructuring which was continued by the civilian governments that aggravate, until today, the data that show the decline of the majority: economic recession with monopolistic concentration of profits, rising unemployment, school dropouts, the resurgence of diseases such as cholera that we thought belonged to the nineteenth century but reemerged like a symptomatic community of misfortunes with other Latin American countries. Other causes and expressions of the decline of the dream of a "European" and powerful Argentina mentioned by the authors are the depreciation of the currency and its subordination to the dollar and long lines at the Spanish and Italian embassies waiting to get dual citizenship.

In their study of Argentina's image abroad, D'Adamo and García Beaudoux argue that for many citizens of Venezuela, Mexico, and Spain, "their views on Argentines improve" when they get to know them in their own country. They think certain traits like pride and defensiveness may become exacerbated among migrants upon finding themselves in an unknown context and confronted by the dire needs of survival. (People tend to invent or exaggerate merits and downplay limitations.) Meanwhile those who conduct themselves "honestly and skillfully . . . go unnoticed, surprising those who found out their nationality, and considered them 'weird' Argentines" because they didn't confirm whatever stereotype one might have of "Argentineness" (D'Adamo and García Beaudoux 1995: 75–76).

All this helps to explain the historical formation of Argentines' image for export. But it would be simplistic to reduce to this the difficulties of coexistence and the negative evaluation that Mexicans have of them. The question is whether there are other differences between the prevailing cultural forms in both countries that emphasize the disagreements or make the agreements more complex. There are some features of the Argentines, visible especially in the way they talk and express feelings, that can be used to develop this point.

Along the lines of Ortega's observation on the excessive emphasis of Argentines, in Mexico they see us as too loud, with a tendency for all to talk at once,

and with our high-pitched prosody we sound like we're giving orders when we ask for something. Without doubt, this trait is the opposite of the reserved, silent, and melancholic character that many scholars, from Octavio Paz to Carlos Fuentes and Roger Bartra, have found in Mexican culture. But I think the comparison could be taken further: it's not just a matter of different modes of expression, which could correspond to sociocultural features; there are differences in political culture and ways of doing politics in the broadest sense, that is, of managing power relations with others. One way to inquire into this is to ask, in return, what we Argentines have found puzzling or difficult to bear in Mexican society.

To find out, the social sciences use several techniques, of which the most common are surveys and focus groups. In the absence of such information I propose a different technique, which is to identify what sentence is most distinctive of a society.

As far as I know, the first scholar who used this procedure was the Brazilian anthropologist Roberto da Matta, who found that the key phrase in his country is "Do you know who you are speaking to?" It is not just a phrase, da Matta tells us, but part of a ritual that is marked by asymmetry, the radical and authoritarian separation between two social positions. When this formula is stated, the "cordial" character that Brazilian society attributes to itself and exhibits before others is negated. Foreigners are shown soccer, samba, beaches, and Brazilian women, but they are not subjected to this question, which is the correlate, according to this author, of "To each his proper place." The phrase is used inside Brazil's hierarchical society to reestablish a superiority that is challenged. Indeed this ritual makes evident the coexistence of two conceptions of national reality: one is the vision of the world as a place of integration and cordiality; the other is the vision of social order centered on exclusive categories, arranged on a scale of respect and differences.

What would be the key phrase in the culture of Argentina? Guillermo O'Donnell argues that it is "What's that to me?," which can sometimes become, according to the emphasis perceived by Ortega y Gasset, "Why should I give a shit?" In general, says O'Donnell, this formula is used, as in Brazil, when someone feels placed in a violent situation by an "intolerable equality" and tries to rehierarchize the connection. "But in contrast to da Matta's cariocas, the *porteño* interlocutor is, precisely that, an interlocutor: he finds in front of him another speaker. The latter usually tells the other absolutely, explicitly, and without ceremony to go fuck himself, and together with him, the hierarchy in which he sought to place himself." In fact, says O'Donnell, "the interpellated one does not deny or do away with the hierarchy: he ratifies it, so

as to irritate his ‘superior’ as much as possible.” O’Donnell analyzes a set of interactions in which this reciprocal violence “organizes” relations in Argentina: for example, when trying to enter the main avenue from a side street during the most congested rush hour, in the United States one proceeds in the order in which one got to the corner; in Rio de Janeiro it is more problematic, but it gets resolved as a “favor,” evident in the beneficiary’s appreciative gesture of thumbs up;

> in Buenos Aires we are apparently equal: the rule is that if there are no police in sight (or, presumably, hidden) everyone should go first. Therefore, part of the procedure is to prevent the other from passing. . . . The way to do it, theoretically illegal but universally practiced, is to “stick the snout” (or “stick the front end”) in the other’s way. The result: the cars advance until they nearly scrape each other. . . . The consequence of this is, of course, a monumental inefficiency, fights, insults and, quite often the self-complacent gesture of thumb enclosed in the evocative circle of the index finger of the one who managed to stick his end in front of the other and leaves him flooring the brakes with anger (sounds like the title of a tango), a couple of millimeters from the car that slides away victoriously.

The relationship that O’Donnell establishes between these behaviors and the violence of military repression—which I don’t have time to summarize now—enables him to show that Argentina is perhaps more egalitarian than Brazilian society but equally authoritarian and violent. These behaviors correspond to an “individualistic society, full of confrontations that do not solve anything but activate the fury of the most powerful.” The mini-dramas of the individual confrontations “display an *appearance* of equality that ratifies the existing differences, so that it also sows resentment and occludes cooperative opportunities” (O’Donnell 1984: 20–21).

The difficulties we Argentines encounter in adapting to a society like Mexico are understandable in light of the foregoing. To explain it further, I suggest juxtaposing the phrase chosen by O’Donnell to what may be one of the key phrases in Mexico: “He who gets angry loses.” It’s a formula that Mexicans use internally, as in Brazil, in situations where someone challenges the order and the hierarchy. It is applied or it is explained to us foreigners when we get impatient and exhibit an improper recognition of these hierarchies, or when we are pressed to resolve some matter or a conflict performing the usual rituals in Mexican society. It is possible to interpret this phrase literally, as a symptom of the type of relationships that prohibit getting angry and encourage

resignation, at least for those in subordinate positions. There is no shortage of analyses by Mexican authors, including those already mentioned by Paz and Bartra, that support this line of interpretation of the society in general, although they do not specifically refer to this phrase. It seems to me appropriate, in keeping with the above-mentioned studies on Brazil and Argentina, to understand this formula as part of a ritual organization of power and social hierarchies, which, as Claudio Lomnitz (1992: 99) states, are associated with "tactical uses of ambiguity."

It should be noted that this description of Mexican culture does not extend to the entire country. Some Mexicans born in Tabasco, Veracruz, and northern Mexico have pointed out to me that their most expressive nature, their most direct way of relating and expressing affect is not well represented by that characterization, deemed more applicable to the inhabitants of the central plateau. Perhaps the centralization of the nation has overdetermined the global image of "Mexicanness," just as the features of the porteños are attributed to people from all over Argentina. As in other societies, the ease in the creation of national stereotypes does not sufficiently allow for distinguishing the differences of each region.

Whether or not the crucial character of this phrase needs to be demonstrated by further research, I want to point to the contrast with the kind of culture characteristic of Argentine society and that we natives would like to rediscover abroad. The opposition between the formulas identified as representative of Argentina and Mexico corresponds to the difference between a society where interpersonal expressiveness is more direct, often mocks institutions and institutionalized forms of interaction, and is not ceremonial, as O'Donnell notes, and another society, the Mexican one, where conflicts and differences are heavily ritualized, institutions last longer, it is customary to make long-term plans, and there is a tradition, at least in the postrevolutionary period, of seeking the peaceful reproduction of the whole society. Everyone knows that Mexicans also get angry, but they tend to delay the outburst, allow time for negotiations to emerge, and confide, in the last instance, that the rituals will preserve the collective order, apparently more important than individual satisfaction. Learning to live in Mexico has required that we understand another way of relating personal passions and feelings with a communitarian or social sense, of relating individual and group realizations and frustrations with political processes.

I go to the bank and ask to see my account's transactions over the past two weeks. I notice that the employee struggles with the computer and cannot obtain the information. She consults a fellow worker at the next window and

says something that the glass partition doesn't allow me to hear. She then tells me that she can't verify my current account status. I explain to her firmly that this is the third time this week that I have asked for the same information and it is not given to me.

"Do not shout at me. I am informing you."

I don't think I have shouted, but I find out once again that to raise your voice, as we Argentines do to make a claim, is regarded in Mexico as anger. I leave the teller window angrily, like an Argentine, because the information I needed was not provided, and from my Mexican side I demand to know why, after twenty years of being in Mexico, I still react like an Argentine. I decide to be neither, and I ask myself—from the perspective of my two professional identities—what is the meaning of what occurred.

As a philosopher, I reflect on the meaning of the teller's telling me that she informed me when she couldn't provide what I had requested. I recognize that the teller gave me the information she had, or rather she informed me that she couldn't verify the status of my account on her monitor. In connection with my request, it could be said that semantically the information was zero, but regarding what happened in the interaction of the teller with the machine, in context and from a pragmatic point of view, the information was clear and concise.

My anthropological side has me find out how to interpret the ritual of the interaction. I reflect that aside from the inefficiency of the bank or the employee, the disappearance of my account from the screen is a metaphor for intercultural relations. How can we configure or be capable of configuring the behavior of others? The inertia of my programming as an Argentine prevented me from behaving appropriately in the context of a Mexican bank. I know that getting angry is useless in this country in pragmatic terms, and it even increases the obstacles to what you want, but is it always possible to hide anger, or the emphatic request that is interpreted as anger, if one was trained in another cultural mode, which in turn implies another form of organization of emotion and interpersonal relationships?

When I ask myself why I am insufficiently Mexican after so many years of living here, I remember that this country made me realize that there are many ways of being Mexican and that it is difficult for its presidents and as well as its writers, clerics, businessmen, and artisans to share a common heritage and style. Carlos Monsiváis, considered by many journalists and intellectuals the greatest chronicler of Mexico, comforted me with something he said in an interview. At the end, the interviewers proposed that he ask himself the question that he always wanted to be asked. Monsiváis answered,

> The question is: why do you concern yourself so vividly with a society most of whose traditions you do not recognize or find interesting? And the answer is: I care about Mexico's historical tradition, not completely, but what is most fundamental: I am a Juarista, a Maderista, a Zapatista. I acknowledge the formidable impulse in collective creation, I acknowledge what's very significant in cultural tradition, and I stop there. I'm not a Guadalupan, I don't like football, I detest bullfighting, I never drank tequila, I have no buddies, and so on. But it is my belief that my relationship with the part of the country that matters to me is very much alive, and I leave aside everything else in levels ranging from indifference to rejection at any cost. (qtd. in Bautista 1997: 33)

I agree with that response, except that I enjoy football and tequila. The main coincidence lies in affirming, like Monsiváis, that belonging to a group does not entail accepting all of its traditions and customs. Instead I am attracted to groups and nations capable of recognizing multiple ways of imagining what it means to be part of them, and that's why they coexist better with others.

This is perhaps the basic problem of interculturality. How to articulate the intellectual understanding of differences, and the flexible practices they require, with the rigidity or unidimensionality of formation and affective loyalties? The clue to learning intercultural coexistence is to establish models of democratic interaction, and as objectively and horizontally as possible, while recognizing the legitimate diversity of affective positions and institutional cultures on both sides of the window. Put another way, it is a matter of making commensurable and convivial what jibes with what doesn't in the cultural constitution of everyone.

I am helped in advancing this line of reasoning by the "window anthropology" developed by Amalia Signorelli. Let me transcribe her description in full, for it can't be summarized:

> In mid June 1992, at 11 a.m. I was in a branch office of the postal service of the Italian Republic, located in the center of the city of Naples. It was a big office full of people. I was on a long line in front of window x, hoping to make the payment that allows everyone to enjoy the status of users of electric power, telephone, water, gas; we have to pay the bills, which show the amount we have consumed. The deadline is near, the line is very long, and we are all tired and sweaty. The wait is longer because window x also deals with other "transactions" related to the Postal Service itself and other services, which in Italy, one has to get at the post office. The line is orderly and silent.

> The phrases that are heard ("Excuse me, do you have a pen?," "Thank you very much") have an instrumental content and an honorably impersonal and formal style. The wait extends, the heat rises, my blood pressure decreases, my aggressiveness increases. I comment softly that on days like these "they could open another window," but none of my companions in misfortune reacts.
>
> A few yards further on there is window Y, over which there is a rudimentary but peremptory sign: CERTIFIED MAIL. There was no one on line in front of the window; behind it, a young employee. Two urban guards dressed in uniform arrive and head straight for Y. They take out their invoices and give them to the employee. She takes them and starts the corresponding transactions.
>
> My Puritan tendency of a law-abiding citizen, scrupulously concerned with distinguishing public from private, regardless of any privilege, does not tolerate such a provocation: I leave "my" queue, and literally "march" over to the window. I show my city councilor ID and protest against the guards: first, because a personal matter was being settled while on duty, second because they used their uniform to enjoy the preference of a public official. The two guards look at me dumbfounded. I observe in their eyes looks of amazement, astonishment, disbelief, but nothing like embarrassment or concern, let alone shame. The employee who witnessed the scene is no less amazed, but she is the first to recover the ability to "go beyond certain values." She lunges forward and accuses me in a confidential but respectful tone: "Councilor, you should have spoken up sooner and I would have attended You too!" (She capitalized the You in her pronunciation, I swear.) Confused, literally without words, I return to my queue, and its constituents activate their body language as best they can to send a collectively silent but eloquent message: "She is not one of us, we don't know her." Dejected as well as confused, I arrive, at last, at the long-awaited window and proceed to pay my bills. Obviously, as I exit the post office I get angry with myself. Of course, how stupid of me, what kind of anthropologist am I, I deserved what I got, as if I didn't know that I violated the first rule that defines the field of social relations in Naples, "*Don't stick your nose where you aren't invited*." (Signorelli 1996a: 27–28)

"Don't stick your nose" is another formula which, as stated many times, can be considered representative of interpersonal and intercultural relations in an individualistic society like Argentina. To be sure, it is applicable to other

countries, including Mexico, where foreigners who stick their noses in others' affairs are treated with caution. And some interviewees on this issue reminded me of the "I don't give a shit," which Mexicans use to say that they have no interest in domestic or foreign affairs. At the same time, in the context of globalization, applying the ban on getting involved with foreigners has limited effectiveness in a time when borders dissolve due to the penetration of the culture industries, and mass migration and economic and communication exchanges blur the geographical boundaries between nations.

Amalia Signorelli observes that in a time when the instances of power are increasingly abstract, unattainable, and unimaginable to citizens, informal contacts and exchanges between them and the state, through windows and "acquaintances," open up alternative possibilities of solving problems and integrating socially. The window, like other thresholds between different subjects and asymmetrical powers, such as geographic boundaries, are places where one negotiates various ways of articulating public and private, collective and individual. In this sense they are places where we get involved with others, the others get involved with us, and we agree upon limits and exchanges. This may be done in an informal way. But in the modern world the conflict emerging in such liminal spaces is managed by formalized procedures or in a public sphere that guarantees rights with relative independence of the actors and their subjectivities: the same public space, with common rules for those who are cordial and hierarchical, for those who get angry, and for those who ritualize their confrontations.

The novelty of the recent globalized years is that this public space has to be built on a transnational scale. It is difficult for the world to operate as a series of windows that vary arbitrarily according to the knowledge, friendships, and subjective preferences of those who encounter each other or are set loose onto the cultural styles of each society. No doubt cultural particularities will continue to intrude. But both the construction of a public sphere beyond ethnic groups and nations and research methodology need to get beyond the concern of whether foreigners are entitled to study the culture of a nation other than the one they were born in. Rather it is a matter of exploring supranational relations in migrations, culture industries, and all of the circuits that intersect in our ways of life. And as for cultural policies, it is a matter of moving up from spasmodic interactions among Latin American countries, and of these with Europe and the United States, to the construction of permanent exchanges.

Increasing the exchange of quality art, literature, film, and television, which show the trajectories of each society, can help us get rid of stereotypes, on both sides, and to think together about what it is possible do in our societies

and between them, so that they are less unequal, less hierarchical, and more democratic. Moving forward on fluid exchanges between intellectuals and artists from Latin America, Europe, and the United States requires organic plans of transnational scientific and cultural research, actions that represent the multicultural explorations in the mass media, where majorities get their information, so that the images in which we recognize or reject ourselves are not only those designed and communicated with commercial interests.

EPILOGUE: SOCIAL AND IMAGINARY CHANGES IN GLOBALIZATION TODAY

Conversation between Néstor García Canclini and Toby Miller, Autumn 2011

TOBY MILLER: To begin, I would like to remind you that you finished writing *Imagined Globalization* in 1999 and that it is a commonplace to say that some parts of the world, or perhaps the entire world, changed in 2001. Were there also changes in Mexico and Latin America at this time, and in what way?

NÉSTOR GARCÍA CANCLINI: One change, for everyone, was the way in which risk is spoken of. I was in the United States on September 11. I had gone there a few days before to attend the Latin American Studies Association Convention, in Washington, D.C., and afterward I went to Atlanta to deliver lectures invited by professors at Emory University. I remember that on the Sunday before, September 9, I was taken to a hotel on campus by a professor who met me at the airport. He said to me, in jest, "In front of your hotel is one of the most important infectious disease research centers in the United States, so if any bacteria break out, they'll get to you lickety-split."

TM: Right, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

From 2001 to 2008

NGC: On Tuesday the 11th I wasn't at the hotel but in another building nearby, beginning a class with my students, when we received a call to inform us that we should turn on the TV. That's when we saw the second tower topple, and then we saw both towers come down over and over again. At one o'clock there was a meeting of professors and some graduate students to discuss the effects that this could have in the future. We were all disconcerted. I could not return to the hotel because the whole area was cordoned off for protection. I was taken to a professor's house and stayed there with her for five days because there were no flights for me to return to Mexico. In conversations with this professor and her economist husband who researched the stock exchange, I was able to comprehend the magnitude of the event for the United States. He said never before had banking and financial operations been suspended, as they had now until the following Monday, not even during the 1929 crisis. I read about the worldwide repercussion in Latin American and French newspapers and on the Internet, and I observed a large discrepancy. Although there was international solidarity, some Latin American newspapers—left-wing newspapers, some a bit dogmatic—made comments to the effect that the United States was partly responsible for those attacks because of its international actions.

TM: Not like *Le Monde*, which said, "Nous sommes tous Américains."

NGC: Newspapers such as Mexico's *La Jornada* or Argentina's *Página 12* also shared expressions of pain and solidarity, but they also held the United States responsible for contributing to the violence. We soon found out that not only were international and national flights canceled for several days but also tourism and much international trade diminished. Then the war against Iraq and other rearrangements in international relations demonstrated that almost all U.S. relations with the world had been modified.

Currently we have a different sense of what happened in 2001, not only because we learned more about Al Qaeda and other little-known international processes at the time, but also because other catastrophes occurred, like the demise in 2008 of Lehman Brothers and other U.S. companies and banks, unleashing a tremendous negative impact on economic development in many countries. Structurally there was a reshuffling of the different levels of globalization, of the different ways of imagining it. It could be said that the changes that occurred in 2001 and 2008 were not only disruptions of financial and economic markets but also changes in the different ways of imagining the

world. If we understand globalization in the classic sense, such as formulated by Ulrich Beck, as a radical increase in the interdependence of all countries and societies, that interdependence is conceived in very different ways by the managers of corporations, culture industries, documented or undocumented migrants, and people in other professions and of other nationalities. That diversity, quite visible already at the end of the twentieth century, led me to think of globalization as something partly imagined.

TM: I'm thinking about the changes in the past decade, particularly in China, India, and Brazil, in three countries with huge populations and physical dimensions, and it strikes me that the global discourse on globalization has shifted to an Asian future, far from its usual domination by the United States. People speak of Brazil, for example, as a country whose place as imagined by theorists of globalization and journalists has changed. I know you spent some time in China a couple of years ago. Do you agree that the future is Asian? And what do you think specifically about Latin America, of Brazil's impact on global recomposition?

NGC: The first thing that occurs to me is that the countries you mentioned—China, India, and Brazil, three of the so-called BRIC countries—did not vote in the UN for the invasion of Iraq; in fact they opposed it and have disagreed on other points of the U.S. and European global agenda. At the same time, it should be noted that these are no longer underdeveloped or emerging countries; instead their rise as global players shows the obsolete character of certain binary oppositions, such as North/South and center/periphery. These countries are positioned differently on the international scene, compared to the place they had a decade ago. This can be summarized by saying that there has been an important de-Eurocentering. We can contrast this to a previous transformative event, the fall of the Berlin Wall, which was interpreted as a change in world history but in reality was a Eurocentric affair. Twenty years after the demolishment of that wall we can better appreciate the role of other walls in the relations between the United States and Latin America or in other regions of the world, such as Israel and Palestine. Many other barriers have been erected that do not permit us to speak of a fluid circulation between countries, such as postmodern thought posited, with its idealized vision of nomadism, as one of the ways to imagine the scope of globalization.

At the same time, this emergence of countries that were not imagined as protagonists on the global agenda twenty years ago, like China, Brazil, and India, comes with the expansion of advanced technologies and the increase in value of raw materials. What is not clear is the role of industrial development:

we don't know what is the place of industrialization in the economy today as a decisive factor of historical progress or social development, at least as it was understood throughout most of the second half of the twentieth century. It used to be said that if a country wanted to develop or if it wanted to intervene internationally and globalize, then it had to industrialize. What we see today is that industrialization is still important, but its contribution to most countries' GDP has decreased. On the other hand, there has been an increase in value of raw materials and other commodities like water, territory (in the geographic sense), and more dematerialized forms of development like technology. These very important changes are to a good degree represented by the role of these three countries: Brazil, China, and India.

Migration as Symptom

NGC: We see other important transformations in North-South relations in migration processes. Migrants' behavior constitutes a telling assessment of how large social groups perceive globalization. In the last decades of the twentieth century until the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century there was a rise in the statistics for migration from the Southern Hemisphere to the United States and Europe. More recently, and especially since the 2008 economic crisis, there has been a decrease in the flows from south to north, as hundreds of thousands of Mexicans and Colombians return from California, Chicago, and Miami to their native countries; Argentines, Ecuadorans, and Peruvians leave Spain to reincorporate themselves into the nations where they were born. In 2010, 580,000 people left Spain, 90 percent of them foreigners who had chosen to live there and 10 percent of them Spaniards. Until 2005 tens of thousands of Brazilians migrated to Portugal, many with the hope of taking advantage of easy entry to that country, which served as a springboard for relocation to Europe. In the past five years the flow has been in the opposite direction—the Portuguese seek employment in Brazil—and includes scientists and technicians from other European countries. This change in migration routes is due to the difficulties in finding jobs and surviving in hegemonic countries and is driven by the imaginary of a better personal future in Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and other South American countries. There is no shortage of problems in these countries, some of them chronic—inequality, corruption, narcotraffic, indulged by too many politicians, businessmen, and judges—but they have managed to break free from the common sense established by the IMF and have imagined other paths to independent development that include redistribution of wealth and attention to social needs.

TM: Let's turn to culture for a moment. There is an incredible statistic that I read about last week: Nielsen, the company that measures media ratings in the United States and other countries, announced in September of this year that there are more people in Africa with cell phones than who have access to drinkable water. Nielsen presented this datum as a triumph.

NGC: Whose?

TM: That's the question. Because of the deregulation of telecommunications it was possible for most people without electricity or access to conventional fixed-line phones to use this form of communication . . . but they don't have access to drinkable water. This is an incredible change in context for people of our age, for whom development meant drinkable water, electricity. Now modern development means access to cell phones.

NGC: Without having to go to Africa, I can see this behavior among youth in Latin America today, like those I studied in the past fifteen years in research on what it means to become independent. Thirty or forty years ago independence was conceived mainly as finding a job, getting married, and leaving one's parents' home; today becoming independent is something connected to individual access to technological resources: a cell phone for the son, for the daughter. Each member of the family has a TV set. Cell phones or iPhones are delocalized; they have no relation to a territorial rootedness or belonging to a family home but rather to the possibility of circulating, communicating from any place to any other; that is what drives youth to imagine their independence. Even surveys of youth, especially in Europe, have modified the age at which people are still considered young. Until a few years ago it was thought that you were young up to thirty years of age; in Mexico national youth surveys still use the fifteen- to twenty-nine-year-old age range. In Spain and other European countries youth surveys use thirty-five years of age as the cutoff. The main reason for this is that they still live with their parents. Although they may live with their parents because they don't have a job or because their underemployed status does not earn them enough to become independent and get their own apartment, they nevertheless enjoy a greater independence thanks to digital networks.

TM: Is this sense of independence related to *Imagined Globalization*?

NGC: Yes, because the horizon of emancipation has broadened. Let me give you a few examples. Historically there were countries like Argentina and Uruguay that from the beginning of the twentieth century had a very broad international horizon, at least with respect to all of the West. From the middle

of the twentieth century many young people went to study abroad and often remained in other countries; in Mexico and several European countries, on the other hand, students did their graduate work abroad but returned to their countries of origin. This has been changing. Thousands of Europeans began to stay in the United States after completing graduate school. Mexicans, who twenty years ago did not have the habit or imaginary of staying and living in another country, now, due to the drop in job opportunities on account of a stagnant Mexican economy and the lack of growth of universities and business enterprises, have begun to internalize the "normal" expectation of leaving with the intention of living outside of Mexico. The horizon has broadened to the degree that it has become "normal" for them to go live in Asian countries like China, India, Singapore, or Australia. In some Latin American countries this geocultural opening began during the dictatorships of the 1970s. Many Uruguayans and Chileans went to Australia, and there is still an important community there of people from these countries. For the economic migrants after the dictatorships, the existence of these communities broadened the imaginary of where they could go, where they might find work, where they might thrive.

TM: On the other hand, I'm thinking of what we might call rejected globalization. Two examples: the first is from your country of origin, Argentina, and has to do with Kirchner's new relation with the IMF and the World Bank after taking office in 2003; the second, in the current conjuncture, is the reaction of many youth around the world against globalization and the financialization of everyday life. This is what the student protests in Chile are about.

NGC: And now with the indignants in the United States.

TM: Against Wall Street and against student debt. They believe they are creating this worldwide movement. Of course, in San Diego, Los Angeles, and New York these are not exclusively youth movements but global movements against globalization.

NGC: I also see in those two examples you mention—rejection of globalization, or what I would call *deglobalization*, and the new movements of frustrated young indignants—indications of two transformations that we cannot see clearly where they are headed, although they are important. Another important change is the change in direction of migrations. Let's discuss them one after the other.

Regarding what you say about countries that reject some global actors, such as the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, as happened in Argentina and Iceland, let me add other countries, like Brazil and Uruguay, that

renegotiated their debt in an unorthodox manner, without following the prescriptions and impositions of the IMF. Just yesterday I was reading an article by Joseph Stiglitz, "To Cure the Economy," whose claim that there isn't a social or economic paradigm to understand globalization caught my eye. Not even narratives. Narratives, in the postmodern sense, substituted for epistemological paradigms, but now we don't even have a worldwide narrative. It isn't that there aren't stories; what is needed is an encompassing story that enables us to think the necessary coexistence of all cultures and societies. I was also interested in Stiglitz's observation that the economic crisis that erupted in 2007 and replays again in 2011 has no model for understanding it and hence for taking action to do something about it. He explains that one of the reasons for the crisis is the accumulation of funds in countries that sought to defend themselves from the risks of globalization and that refrain from investing them to generate more consumption or new business or public initiatives. He mentions a few Latin American countries, among them Argentina. I think that this is one of the possible explanations for the current global economic stagnation, but there is also another process that is taking place. For example, in Argentina there is a great debate on inflation between the government and the opposition; it is a debate, in the first place, about statistics, because the government is not telling the truth about inflation. The official Institute for Statistics and Censuses reduces by a half what private analysts claim regarding inflation.

TM: They don't have structural independence.

A Decentered Globalization

NGC: No, in fact one of the difficulties of the survival of globalization and the democratic system is that in many countries there are ministers who manage to impose themselves over statistics, rating agencies that prevail over governments, investors who violate the rules of production and consumption, even while operating according to the logic of capitalism. An argument for modifying inflation statistics is that Argentine officials do not consider it dangerous; likewise for consumption. The second argument is that if they acknowledged the real figures for inflation, which is about 25 percent per year, they would have to pay higher interest on the debt. While these statistical modifications are questionable, they nevertheless indicate independence (we could wrap the word in scare quotes or not) with respect to the international rules of the economic game. I would say that from 2003 until now, in 2011, the economy, which grew at a rate of 7 to 9 percent in the past few years, has not been put at risk. Moreover Argentina has achieved a measure of economic and social

redistribution, with improved services and wages and with policies that take the public interest into account. Other countries, like Brazil, Uruguay, and China, in a different way have also rejected the globalized homogenization of financial liberalization and have sought alternative means to economic and social development. It is interesting that there is no uniformity with regard to a normalized monolithic thinking, but rather trials that have risks. No one can guarantee that Argentina's economy will not be affected in a few years by the European and U.S. crises, but if we take into consideration Argentina's neighbor Chile, which until a year ago was the poster child of neoliberal economic achievements applied in peripheral countries, we now see it suffering drops in some of its exports, the decrease of copper prices and other products necessary for internal growth. It is from within this unfavorable situation that the crisis of the educational system—its management and financing—exploded.

Let's examine the second factor, the proliferation of indignants' movements. Some of these movements are related to globalization, but there are internal dynamics that explain the specificity of each one. The movements of the Arab Spring, in which youth had a protagonist role, follow a logic different from that of other movements that oppose dictatorships, promote social democracy and the socialization of commodities, and question gender hierarchies, which are various aspects that motivated this insurgency. This is very different from what takes place with Spanish indignants, who reject the entire system of political parties. It is also different from the Occupy Wall Street movement in the United States, which has the support of some unions and receives it enthusiastically. And it is different from the movement of Chilean youth, who challenge the profit motive in the educational economy, including that of the public system; the crisis erupts because of the impossibility for many families to pay $40,000 for each child to finish his or her studies. When politicians ask how free education is supposed to be paid for, the students propose three alternatives: the nationalization of the vast foreign mining interests; tax reform so that the richest pay more taxes; and a reduction in defense spending. These are measures that in other eras would have been considered revolutionary, but they are proposed by youth who do not identify as revolutionary, but on the contrary grew up under neoliberalism and a social democratic system that never dared to make changes to correct the system imposed by Pinochet.

TM: I agree, but I would like to discuss some changes in the conception of freedom. We can go back to what happened when Prague confronted state socialism in 1968. It is a different sense of freedom than we find in 2011 in the Arab

Spring and also in other Third World countries. How do you see the different reactions to most economic problems? Some of these movements are quite spectacular, and sometimes the media present them as spectacles of freedom and as if there were a connection across the different countries and cultures, as also happened in 1968.

NGC: Yes, but the geopolitical situation is different. In 1968 we still lived in a Euro-American world.

When the Berlin Wall came down several years after 1968, it was thought to be a world event. The meaning of the student struggles in France, Germany, Berkeley, and Mexico were very different from the struggles of the Arab students or the Chilean students, which were different from each other as well. They nevertheless have points of convergence in the current geopolitical conjuncture: in this second decade of the twenty-first century neoliberal thought, normalized on a worldwide scale, has deteriorated, and in several regions it has been seen that not only another world is possible but that many worlds and forms of social organization are possible, as are different relations between men and women, between technology, territory, and investments. This decentered multifocality is what is interesting to me because it changes the terms of explanation and interpretation and discredits geopolitical predominance. It also leaves behind the attempt to restore Marxism and simple postcolonialism without the more complex interpretations of colonization, or the return to socialist and communist regimes of the past.

TM: I remember well that LASA Convention in 2001 when a discursive shift was taking place from postmodernism to globalization. In this past decade we have witnessed a change in papers given at conferences: from postmodernism to another worldview and to the cultural differences in globalization. When you speak of this sense of a fractured future, in which different social movements emerge, is this a return to postmodernism or a combination of imagined globalization and postmodernism?

NGC: Neither of the two. I don't think postmodernism will ever return. We can discern in postmodern thought, with its impact on philosophy, architecture, art, and painting, a way of taking to extremes the contradictions of modernity and the de-authorization of the claims of certain modern movements to developing a unilinear history. It was productive so long as it questioned a unilinear philosophy of history that was to culminate in a single point. We benefited from thinking in terms of fragmentation and the de-concentration of the world, and in this regard postmodernism was a foretaste of globalization or a

first interpretation of what was happening in globalization. However, since history is not linear, after postmodernism we had a monotone global thought that sought to tow all societies in a single direction. Now we see that it failed, that there are possibilities for multiple decentralized and multifocal experiments. But I don't see any nostalgia for postmodernism. Moreover postmodernism was too weak a form of thought, to use Vattimo's expression, which for him was a compliment; too celebratory of fragmentation. The contradiction that I tried to analyze in *Imagined Globalization* is the tension between postmodern thought that celebrates globalization and entrepreneurial thinking that tends to monopolistic concentration, so that there are only four companies that manage the global music market, or that there emerge a few digital companies like Google. We need to develop ways of thinking de-totalization. Not totality, because it is impossible to encompass, and for me the idea, the notion of totality suggests something closed, which one already knows where it ends. However, if we think dynamically about totalization processes, we necessarily transcend the fragments. Perhaps it is worth saying, which was the event that generated in me this way of thinking, how I came to discern this tension between the impossibility of celebrating fragmentation in a postmodern way and, on the other hand, the need to think processes of transnational totalization.

When I undertook the study of urban processes in the late 1980s and early 1990s, postmodern urbanism was the prevailing paradigm in Mexico. To try to plan societies or cities was frowned upon. It seemed to me that it was Eurocentric thinking, which had emerged with respect to cities that had been planned for centuries and that had grown at a slower pace in comparison with large Latin American cities. In cities like Mexico City, the first regulatory plan was made in 1979, when the greater metropolitan area already had 15 million inhabitants, when growth had had decades of chaotic, disorganized, unregulated development, with more than 50 percent of homes self-built. So to try to correct the disorder and give it sense entailed posing the problems from the perspective of urban totality. We cannot create hubs that radiate outward to the totality in order to regenerate the urban fabric; first we need to encompass the structural problems of the entire city, the ecological and transport problems of Mexico City and the greater metropolitan area. These are structural problems. They cannot be addressed piecemeal by looking at the fragments. I think the discrepancy between solutions regarding large cities generated from First World cities and those generated from the periphery is symptomatic of the greater need in countries that used to be called peripheral to think of totalities and at the same time act on that scale, as we said a moment ago is being done in Argentina, Brazil, and China.

TM: Yes, it is interesting to consider the triumph of planning in China, of creating new cities without the invisible hand of Adam Smith but rather with the very visible hand of the state.

NGC: Of the state and the party.

TM: Yes, of the party and also of the experts; it is the triumph of formal knowledge.

NGC: There is another point that I already mentioned and that I want to expand, in addition to the two movements you refer to, deglobalization or the processes of rejection of globalization, and the already mentioned change in direction of migration. In the past two or three years we hear in Mexico that the migration of Mexicans to the United States is diminishing and that this does not occur because Mexico is better off or as the automatic consequence of the hardening of the border patrol. Undoubtedly the U.S. crackdown on the border is important, but there are other factors that appear when we look at what is occurring in other migrations and not just that of Mexicans to the United States. Spain's population is declining not only because it has closed itself to migration from Latin America and Africa, as we said before, but also because people born in Spain are leaving, especially skilled workers and professionals who leave for Germany or the United States. The direction of migration processes, which until recently went from south to north, has changed; there is a new legality being established with relation to that reconfiguration of migration flows.

Another change in deglobalization processes, or rather the critique of deglobalization today is visible in the language and metaphors used. In the 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century there was an attempt to localize many crises as if they were simply the result of bad national management. It was recognized that the Argentine or Brazilian crisis had effects on all stock exchanges and world markets, but the terms used to name the crises put the blame on the country of origin; pundits spoke of the "tequila effect," the "tango effect," the "samba effect" in reference to Mexico, Argentina, and Brazil. Today these metaphors cannot be used because there is widespread awareness that crises are global, that there is a shared responsibility in the system that no one knows how to control or alter. Where are the rating agencies located? Although we know they have headquarters in the United States, we know that their action has a global effect.

There is something else that concerns me, but in a different way than in *Imagined Globalization*; I am referring to the continuities and discontinuities. On the one hand, we have the abstract, dematerialized, and delocalized

character of international organizations, of world summits, one of whose most striking effects is the collapse of the European Union. I was very optimistic in *Imagined Globalization* in valuing that unification process, which I continue to believe is one of the most advanced with regard to regional integration, because it was not simply a process of free trade but a deep economic integration, that also created European citizenship, symbols (from a hymn to a flag) and other elements, and cultural, media, and educational programs like Erasmus and Media that prompted an integration that was not only economic and commercial. Why is European integration failing? In my view, the causes were already anticipated in critical studies of the European Union, like those of Marc Abélès, whom I cite in *Imagined Globalization*. When I wrote that book I was struck by Abélès's focus on the disconnection between the summits in Brussels and societies and citizens and his warning of the risk that European unification was primarily the work of summits, despite all the educational, cultural, and media programs. The lack of interest of the various societies, and now of the citizens who vote with their feet, is deepening because they are losing their jobs and businesses and because whole countries like Greece are collapsing. So why bet on unification or relinquish certain benefits of national sovereignty? At the same time, the opacity of international organizations and the difficulty of intervening to correct wrong decisions from the perspective of citizens seems to be another of the aspects that is beginning to change. Innovative movements in the United States and Europe protest that "they no longer believe the story that they have to give up everything for the benefit of abstractions."

TM: Two very short anecdotes, one about Jean Monnet, the founding father of European integration, who said that to answer a question "there are things that you will have to do differently," and they have to do with the way each society recognizes its culture. The second anecdote concerns a famous German theorist with whom I shared a taxi ride in India eight years ago. The taxi driver asked us where we were from, and my theorist friend responded, "From Europe." Then the taxi driver retorted, "Yes, but where are you really from?" This fellow encountered many everyday problems in the Third World, but the worst for him was to say "I am from" not only Germany but from any specific country.

NGC: I agree that it is necessary for us, and for others, to consider rootedness and belonging. However, it is necessary to recognize that the European Union is failing not only because of the resistance of some countries to subordinate or subsume themselves but because European countries globalized under neoliberal prescriptions that undermined the original project. When we consider that the European Union was born quite a while ago, in the middle of the

twentieth century, in order to design continental policies for coal, we understand that there was a need to organize to produce energy and because energy was needed for industrialization. These were concrete processes of production and cooperation that diminished in importance in the transition from a physical, human relation connected to energy and industrialization to a service economy in which everything was subsumed in the dematerialization of abstractions of the financial market that rules over the majority of resources and subjects them to monetary flows, to the detriment of productive investment for the community and the public.

Perhaps the question now is not how to return to preglobalization but rather how to live after the globalization that was established and is irreversible, to find new ways of articulating the local, the regional, and the national with the protagonism of social actors. There already are places where independent banks are being established outside the finance system, that give loans and credit. New collective forms are appearing, many ways of realizing themselves outside the regime of financial speculation. They are still weak, but they show that it is not impossible, and they achieve a measure of sustainability.

TM: You said that you were overly optimistic about Europe when you wrote the book ten years ago. Are there other parts of the book that you are reconsidering these days?

NGC: Yes, I can recognize the difference in the analysis of contemporary art. It is what has interested me most in recent years. Today I understand that the resonance that the avant-gardes still had in the 1990s has changed, as well as the attempts to develop the arts in connection with social activism. On the other hand, the multifocality that we spoke of is also observable in biennials. The Venice Biennale is no longer the decisive place for defining what should be world art. There are significant biennials in Singapore, Istanbul, South Africa, and many other places.

As for publishing and audiovisual industries that operated until the end of the past century within the incipient process of globalization, we now find a reconfiguration due to the emergence of technological networks, cell phones, new screens, mini screens that have changed how film and video are made, that have brought down the cost of production and circulation.

I should clarify that this is not a linear process, because we see unstable equilibrium points between the industrialization of culture made for the new screens and the social network uploads and downloads that democratize access. Today we also find a proliferation of live music festivals that prioritize physical face-to-face relations. In publishing paper books have not been

displaced by digital books or direct online access; instead there is a coexistence that we still don't know how it will turn out. I don't believe, as some publishers predict, that in five years there will no longer be bookstores or paper books. Recent processes suggest that there is a reconfiguration in the market, which is not occurring in the same way in different languages. For example, the impact of tablets in the Anglo-American world is much greater; in contrast, among Spanish speakers and in other languages one doesn't see the same diffusion. There isn't a substitution process. One of the laws that is confirmed in the cultural sphere is that new media do not eliminate the previous media: the movies did not replace theater; television did not do away with film; nor did video replace television. There develops a coexistence that reshapes the role of each medium. In a globalized and simultaneously deglobalized world it is possible for local forms of different formats to survive next to other supports or media easier to globalize, such as the most recent technologies.

TM: Sure, but there is competition among formats that bears a relation to what we may call the warehouse of culture. One of television's capacities was and continues to be to offer this warehouse, this archive of contents, which can be combined with others.

NGC: Well, since you mention television and digital warehouses, it is worth noting that in the past five or seven years they are being displaced by social networks. One example: the role of the large monopolies, which concerns us so much when we refer to the TV networks Televisa of Mexico or Globo of Brazil, or the three U.S. networks, has been modified partly in some countries in which new laws redistribute the radio frequency spectrum to democratize access. The multiplication of signals with the digital switchover has created the possibility of more channels that can be distributed in more plural forms of supply and access. However, it is also true that digitalization favors new forms of monopoly, like Google, and there appear antidemocratic tendencies through the concentration of contents and their sale at very high prices. We see this, for example, in specialized scholarly journals, and it is also prevalent in other musical and audiovisual contents. We are thus faced with a new kind of challenge that is no longer that of the television monopolies but also that of these next-generation communication technologies that require other regulation and democratization processes. In this regard, I was very interested in what Robert Darnton writes as a researcher on Google and as the director of the university library at Harvard. He has proposed a system of digitalization of the contents of large U.S. and European libraries that will offer alternative access to what digital warehouses contain.

TM: I have friends who work at university presses, and when they go to Harvard to offer Darnton a new journal he accepts it on one condition: "Tell me which existing subscription to one of your journals you suggest I cancel in order to buy this new one." There are trends that increase the power of globalization over circulation and at the same time other trends that return to or re-create the national or regional via deterritorialized networks throughout the world according to age or language.

NGC: I wouldn't say deterritorialized, but following our good friend Daniel Mato, transterritorialized, because all networks have some territorial moorings, even if they are only the places where users happen to be living at a given moment.

TM: It's like the Indian taxi driver: "Yes, but where are you really from?" Now to conclude, since you have spoken of deglobalization, please explain to me what you understand by this term.

NGC: It allows you to capture multiple movements counter to globalization or that attempt to redirect its effects on national economies and societies. We could say that this tension between globalizing and deglobalizing processes began when some regions felt that indiscriminate liberalization made them fragile, and they grouped together to protect themselves: European integration, Mercosur, free trade agreements or treaties among countries, such as NAFTA.

The envisaged fragility turned into a catastrophe. Although in the past two decades this globalization had produced unemployment, migrations from the South, xenophobia and rejection of migrants in the North, the impoverishment of middle classes and terrible poverty everywhere, the model burst in September 2008. There had been national disasters in the past (Mexico in 1994, Russia and other Eastern European countries at the end of the 1990s, Argentina in 2001), but in the past three years the collapse has been globalizing; the European Union is incapable of maintaining its integration, and the United States is constantly on the brink of collapse.

Should we abandon the euro? European ministers ask. How do we protect ourselves from universal contagion? And what about the Chinese advance? Other, similar doubts point to a deglobalizing trend.

Deglobalization can be understood in two ways: as failing promises of global integration or leaving out vast populations, or as the creation by global movements of local infrastructures (physical and human) that transcend the local.

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